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Article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) obliges all World Trade Organisation (WTO) members to protect 
plant varieties. This thesis unpacks plant variety protection in the Global South, 
using Nigeria as a case study. To do this, the thesis adopts Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL) as a macro-methodological lens and regime 
complex theory as a supplement. TWAIL is a historically aware methodology that 
engages with international law from the perspectives and aspirations of the Third 
World. While regime complex theory illuminates how the overlapping non-
hierarchical institutions, agreements, systems, and principles governing plant 
variety protection shape the implementation of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. 
Combining TWAIL with regime complex theory uncovers the complexities in 
plant variety protection law-making in the Global South with a view to provide 
lessons for Nigeria. 
 
As Nigeria currently does not have a plant variety protection system, the thesis 
employs an original empirical study, involving semi-structured interviews in 
Nigeria, to understand realities and stakeholders’ perspectives on the subject. 
Based on the empirical insights, the thesis proposes a sui generis system which 
protects the interests of both small-scale farmers and commercial breeders as best 
suited to Nigeria. To understand the intricacies and contingencies of designing such 
a system, the thesis examines plant variety protection laws and law-making of 
Global South WTO members such as the African Group, India, and Thailand. 
Drawing lessons from this examination, the thesis develops original frames for 
analysing plant variety protection in the Global South, namely: trade agreements, 
regional associations, pressures from seed companies, international institutions 
lobbies, and civil society activism. In combining the original multi-layered 
methodological lens, empirical study, and analytical framework, the thesis presents 
the first comprehensive analysis on plant variety protection in Nigeria. It is hoped 
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This thesis analyses plant variety protection in the Global South, using Nigeria as 
a case study.1 Plant variety protection in the Global South came to the fore 
following the entry into force of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on 1 January 
1995.2 TRIPS is a comprehensive legally binding multilateral agreement that sets 
out minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
However, the obligation to protect plant varieties as set out in Article 27.3(b) of 
TRIPS is one of the most controversial issues between the Global North and Global 
South at the TRIPS Council.3 This is because of the differences in their farming 
practices, seed systems, and socioeconomic realities. The latitude in Article 27.3(b) 
of TRIPS as well as the existence of other legal systems and principles relevant to 
plant variety protection further exacerbates the controversies as seen below. 
 
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS obliges all WTO members to inter alia protect plant 
varieties using patents, an effective sui generis system, or a combination of 
systems.4 For WTO members that choose the patent option, TRIPS sets out 
                                                 
1 The Global North-Global South divide is broadly considered a socio-economic and political 
divide. Although there are differences in sizes and state of economies, in this thesis, Global South 
(otherwise called ‘Third World’ or ‘developing’ countries) generally refers to less industrialised 
countries with interconnected histories of colonialism or marginalisation in the international 
economy, such as countries in Africa, parts of Asia, and Latin America. Global North (otherwise 
called ‘the West’ or ‘developing’ countries) refers to industrialised countries such as the United 
States (US), Western European countries, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.  
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) Annex 1C, 33 ILM 
81 <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf> accessed 04 July 2017 (TRIPS).  
3 See generally, World Trade Organisation (WTO), ‘Current Issues in Intellectual Property’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_issues_e.htm> accessed 04 July 2017. 
4 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS states inter alia: ‘Members shall provide for the protection of plant 
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.  The 
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement.’ Although the biological and legal conceptualisation of plant varieties differ, 
they both generally refer to a group of plants with certain common traits. ‘Plant varieties’ include 
both seeds and other propagating material. This thesis therefore uses the term ‘plant varieties’ and 
‘seeds’ interchangeably.  
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minimum standards for designing a patent system.5 TRIPS also states that WTO 
members are required to comply with the pre-existing Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).6 Reference to the Paris 
Convention demonstrates that where TRIPS intends for WTO members to apply 
provisions of another international treaty, such international treaty is expressly 
mentioned. This is important because for the sui generis option, TRIPS neither 
refers to the pre-existing international treaty for plant varieties, the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention), nor 
sets out minimum standards for designing a sui generis system.7 In other words, 
although the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system is a type of sui generis system 
for protecting plant varieties, TRIPS does not refer to it. Nevertheless, Global 
South WTO members increasingly tend to mimic the UPOV plant breeder’s rights 
system or accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention.8   
 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) such as the Genetic Resources Action 
International Network (GRAIN) and La Via Campesina, alongside academics such 
as Carlos Correa and Dwijen Rangnekar, explain that the UPOV Convention is 
unsuited to small-scale farming prevalent in the Global South for the reasons 
                                                 
5 TRIPS, arts 27-34. 
6 Article 2 of TRIPS states: ‘In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement [Patents are under 
Part II] Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention 
(1967). Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that 
Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome 
Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.’ 
7 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1991) 815 UNTS 89 
<http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm> accessed 04 July 2017 
(UPOV Convention). UPOV is the French acronym for Union Internationale pour la Protection des 
Obtentions Vegetales. The UPOV Convention was first adopted in December 1961 and has been 
amended three times – in 1972, 1978, and 1991. The UPOV Convention establishes the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), which is an 
intergovernmental organisation with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. For clarity, UPOV or 
UPOV Convention is used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the international treaty or 
organisation. 
8 Chapter 4 discusses the reasons why African countries are increasingly joining UPOV, thus 
providing insights to UPOV’s expansion in the Global South. Examples of African UPOV members 
are Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, and Tunisia. These African WTO members are party to the UPOV 
1991 Convention: Kenya as of 11 May 2016, Morocco as of 8 October 2006, Tanzania as of 22 
November 2015, and Tunisia as of 31 August 2003. UPOV, Members of the International Union 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants: International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants UPOV Convention (1961), as revised at Geneva (1972, 1978 and 1991) Status 
on 15 April 2016. 
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outlined below.9 First, the ‘distinct, uniform, and stable’ conditions for protection 
under the UPOV Convention marginalises small-scale farmers as their traditional 
farmers’ varieties do not fulfil these requirements.10 Second, the UPOV 1991 
Convention gives member states the option to restrict farmers from saving, reusing, 
exchanging, and selling seeds of protected varieties.11 Restricting access to seeds 
is detrimental to small-scale farming practices as over 70 per cent of farmers in the 
Global South are resource-poor farmers who may not have the finances to purchase 
new seeds every planting season.12 Third, the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system 
expressly prohibits the incorporation of alternative legal principles.13 This means 
that the alternative legal principles in other international treaties relevant to plant 
variety protection, such as access and benefit sharing set out in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), along with farmers’ rights set out in the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), cannot 
be incorporated in a UPOV plant breeder’s rights system.14  
                                                 
9 These actors explain that the UPOV 1991 Convention is suited to industrialised farming prevalent 
in the Global North. See generally, GAIA/GRAIN, ‘Ten  reasons not to join UPOV: Global Trade 
and Biodiversity in Conflict’ (15 May 1998) 2 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1-ten-
reasons-not-to-join-upov> accessed 04 July 2014; Dwijen Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, 
Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (Study paper 3a, United Kingdom Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights 2002);  La Via Campesina/GRAIN, ‘Seed Laws that Criminalise 
Farmers: Resistance and Fightback’ (8 April  2015) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5142-
seed-laws-that-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback> accessed 04 July 2017; Carlos M 
Correa, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries: A Tool for Designing a Sui Generis 
Plant Variety Protection System: An Alternative to UPOV 1991’ (APBREBES 2015). In this thesis, 
the term CSOs broadly refers to non-government organisations or institutions where people 
organise themselves to pursue shared interests. These include environmental groups, social 
movements, community-based organisations, and farmers’ organisations at the national, regional, 
or international levels. 
10  UPOV 1991 Convention, arts 5-9. 
11 Article 15(2) of the UPOV 1991 Convention states: ‘… each Contracting Party may, within 
reasonable limits  and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict 
the breeder's right in relation to any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating 
purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, 
on their own holdings, the protected variety or a variety covered by Article 14(5)(a)(i) or Article 
14(5)(a)(ii).’ 
12 Karla D Maass Wolfenson, ‘Coping with the Food and Agriculture Challenge: Smallholders’  
Agenda: Preparations and Outcomes of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable  
Development RIO+20’ (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2013) 22  
<http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Coping_with_food_and
_agriculture_challenge__Smallholder_s_agenda_Final.pdf> accessed 04 July 2017. 
13 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 5(2). 
14 Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 143, 31 ILM 818  
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf> accessed 04 July 2017 (CBD); International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (3 November 2001) Res 3/2003 FAO 
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In essence, although the obligation to protect plant varieties in the Global South 
arises from Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS which offers choice, Global South WTO 
members are increasingly abandoning this choice by acceding to the UPOV 1991 
Convention. However, in addition to the options under TRIPS and UPOV, there 
are other international treaties relevant to plant variety protection, namely the CBD 
and the ITPGRFA. By adopting the Nigerian case study, this thesis seeks to 
understand and explain the problems and challenges, as well as effective ways to 




Nigeria is a pragmatic and opportune case study for this thesis. This is because it 
currently does not have a plant variety protection system despite being a signatory 
to TRIPS. As a ‘developing country’ WTO member, Nigeria had until 1 January 
2000 to implement its TRIPS obligations – including the obligation to protect plant 
varieties.15 However, it has failed to meet this deadline. Similarly, Nigeria is a 
signatory to the CBD and the ITPGRFA, which set out legal principles that 
facilitate the design of sui generis systems in the Global South, yet it has not 
implemented these international obligations.16 The absence of a plant variety 
protection system in Nigeria is particularly interesting because Nigeria was one of 
the key interlocutors for the Global South during the TRIPS negotiations.17 Nigeria 
is also a member of the African Group that advocates for sui generis plant variety 
protection systems at the TRIPS Council.18 Yet, it appears that there is a sharp 
disconnect between its ‘Geneva rhetoric’ and its actions at the national level.19  
                                                 
Conference, 31st Session <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf> accessed 04 July 
2017 (ITPGRFA).  
15 TRIPS, art 65. As a ‘developing country’ member of the WTO, Nigeria was entitled to a period 
of five years from the date TRIPS entered into force (1 January 1995) to fulfil its obligations.  
16 However, Nigeria is yet to ratify the ITPGRFA as highlighted in Chapter 2. 
17 See generally, Jayashree Watal and Antony Taubman (eds), The Making of the TRIPS 
Agreements: Personal Insights from the Uruguay Round Negotiations (WTO 2015). 
18 See generally, WTO, ‘TRIPS: Issues, Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm> accessed 04 July 2017.  
19 ‘Geneva rhetoric’ here refers to the countries’ communications or rhetoric at the TRIPS Council 
in Geneva. It borrows from Dwijen Rangnekar’s use of the phrase and uses it in the same way. See 
generally, Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Geneva Rhetoric, National Reality: The Political Economy of 
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Apart from Nigeria’s pending international obligations, its current agricultural 
policy and industrial property Bill also underscore the importance of introducing a 
plant variety protection system.20 The current agricultural policy – Agriculture 
Promotion Policy: 2016-2020 (APP) – promotes a private sector-led agricultural 
market.21  Experiences of Global South countries such as Kenya reveal that private 
seed companies have pressured countries to introduce the UPOV plant breeder’s 
rights system.22 Furthermore, the Industrial Property Commission (IPC) Bill 2016, 
which seeks to reform patent and trademark laws in Nigeria, also introduces plant 
variety protection provisions that are skewed in favour of plant breeder’s rights.  
 
Accordingly, the Nigerian case study provides rich insights into the 
implementation of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS in the Global South. Drawing from 
lessons of other Global South WTO members, such as the African Group as well 
as India and Thailand, the thesis finds that introducing national plant variety 
protection systems is not simply a straightforward process. While determining the 
type of plant variety protection system suited to a country is challenging, actually 
translating that choice into law is even more so. As such, the thesis makes a case 
for analysing plant variety protection laws, as well as plant variety protection law-
making in the Global South. 
 
This chapter presents the background to the thesis. It is divided into six parts. Part 
I begins with the context of study, which covers the origins of the extension of 
IPRs to plant varieties. Part II sets out the research questions. Parts III and IV 
                                                 
Introducing Plant Breeders’ Rights in Kenya’ (2013) New Political Economy 1 (‘Geneva Rhetoric, 
National Reality’). 
20 Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), The Agriculture Promotion  
Policy (2016-2020): Building on the Successes of the ATA, Closing Key Gaps (Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development 2016) 
 <http://fmard.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-Nigeria-Agric-Sector-Policy-
Roadmap_June-15-2016_Final.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017 (The Agriculture Promotion Policy); 
‘A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Intellectual Property Commission of 
Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap. T13, LFN 2004 And Patents And Designs Act, Cap. P2, 
LFN 2004 and Make Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of Trademarks, 
Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and Farmers Rights and For Other Related 
Matters’ (IPC Bill). 
21 FMARD, The Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016-2020) (n 20). 
22 This is discussed in Chapter 4. The term seed companies in this thesis refers to national and 
multinational seed companies as well as agribusinesses. 
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discuss methodology and methods employed in the thesis. Part V reveals the 
original contributions to literature the thesis makes, while Part VI delineates the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Context of Study 
 
IPRs are legally enforceable rights granted by national authorities to protect a wide 
range of intangible assets.23 The range of legal rights is broadly divided into three 
categories: industrial property, copyrights, and sui generis rights. Industrial 
property includes patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical 
indications. Copyrights protect literary works, artistic works, and related creative 
works such as performances, broadcasts, and sound recordings. Sui generis rights 
comprise any type of special IPRs. Each of these forms of IPRs originated 
independently at different times and in different places.24 This part traces the 
extension of IPRs to plant varieties at the national, international, and global phases. 
The goal here is not to provide a complete definitive history of the extension of 
IPRs to plant varieties. It is to unfold the trajectory of plant variety protection to 
show the role of actors, as well as its contested unsettled nature. The historical 
mapping of the contested unsettled nature of plant variety protection provides 
insights into the discussions and debates on the subject covered in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
                                                 
23 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook (WIPO 
Publication No 489 (E), 2nd edn, WIPO 2004) (WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook). Use of 
‘intellectual property’ to refer to both industrial property and copyright started in the 1950s. See 
Arpad Bogsch, Brief History of the First 25 Years of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO 1992) 8. 
24 See generally, Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth 1996) (A 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property); Brad Sherman and Lionel Bentley, The Making of Modern 
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press 1999); Ruth L Okediji, ‘The International 
Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global 
Intellectual Property System’ (2003) 7 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 
315; Christopher May and Susan K Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2006); Mario Biagoli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha Woodmansee (eds), Making and 
Unmaking Intellectual Property: Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspectives (The 
University of Chicago Press 2011).  
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1.1.1. National Origins 
 
From the inception of IPRs systems in the United States (US) and Europe, patents 
were granted for inventions; however, the patentability of new plant varieties was 
questioned.25 This is because plants are different from other mechanical inventions 
such as the phonograph or telephone; plants are living things. Extending patents – 
or any other IPRs system – to plant inventions raised a variety of questions. The 
questions raised included: (i) whether plant inventions were inventions or merely 
products of nature which evolved naturally; (ii) whether new plant varieties could 
fulfil requirements for patentability; and, ultimately, (iii) what type of IPRs system 
was appropriate to protect new plant varieties?26  
 
The product of nature question was one of the key legal objections to patenting 
new plant varieties in the US and Europe.27 This objection was premised on the 
argument that plant varieties were non-inventions because they were products of 
nature and not the result of a creative process. Although the US Patent Act did not 
explicitly prohibit the patenting of plants, the US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) generally denied patents for plant inventions based on the ‘product of 
                                                 
25 The first Italian patent was a three-year monopoly awarded in 1421 to Filippo Brunelleschi, an 
architect in Florence who created a crane system for shipping and transporting marble along the 
Arno River. The first official patent law – the Venetian Act – was enacted in 1474. One of the early 
English patents was a 20-year monopoly awarded in 1449 to John of Utynam, a Flemish glassmaker 
who invented a technique for producing stained glass. The first official English patent law was 
enacted in 1624, under the Statute of Monopolies, while the first US Patent Act was passed in 1790. 
The first US patent was awarded to Samuel Hopkins for a method of producing potassium carbonate 
(potash). See generally, Edward C Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (1994) 76 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 697; Edward 
C Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (1994) 
76 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 849.  
26 Andre Heitz, ‘The History of the UPOV Convention and the Rationale for Plant Breeders’ 
Rights’, Seminar on the Nature of and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties under the 
UPOV Convention (UPOV Publication No 697 (E) 1991) 25 (‘The History of the UPOV 
Convention and the Rationale for Plant Breeders’ Rights’); Glenn E Bugos and Daniel J Kevles, 
‘Plants as Intellectual Property: American Practice, Law and Policy in World Context’ (1992) 7 
Osiris (2nd series) 74, 80 (‘Plants as Intellectual Property’); Geertrui Van Overwalle, ‘Patent 
Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and European Approaches’ (1999) 39 IDEA 
Journal of  Law and Technology 143, 143-48 (‘Patent Protection for Plants’); Alain Pottage and 
Brad Sherman, ‘Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant Inventions’ (2007) 31(2)  
Melbourne University Law Review 539, 539 (‘Organisms and Manufactures’).  
27 Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Protection for Plants’ (n 26) 148-49. 
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nature’ doctrine.28 The principle is traceable to the Ex Parte Latimer case decided 
in 1889, where William Latimer’s patent application for a method of extracting 
fibre from the needle of an Australian pine (pine australis) was denied.29 On 
appeal, the US Commissioner for Patents affirmed the patent examiner’s decision. 
The Commissioner held that the fibre was not patentable because it was neither the 
product of a new process of extraction nor a new product itself.30 In other words, 
the fibre was not derived using a new process and it had been produced by the 
process of nature. While the Ex Parte Latimer case was not specifically about 
patenting new plant varieties, it established the landmark ‘product of nature’ 
doctrine which influenced the patent office decisions, judicial decisions, and 
debates on patenting plant varieties.31 Similarly, the ‘product of nature’ objection 
to patenting plant varieties gained traction within Europe.32 For example, while the 
German patent law did not explicitly prohibit the patenting of plant varieties, the 
German patent office generally denied patent applications for plant inventions by 
relying on the ‘product of nature’ doctrine.33  
 
On the patentability requirement question, one of the key issues raised was whether 
the full disclosure requirement for patent applications could be met. The full 
disclosure requirement is central to patents as it reflects the social contract concept 
underlying patent law. ‘Social contract’ stems from the premise that a patent is a 
contract between the society and inventors.34 Inventors are granted a temporary 
monopoly on the invention through exclusive rights, in exchange for full disclosure 
                                                 
28 Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Protection for Plants’ (n 26) 149; Pottage and Sherman, ‘Organisms and 
Manufactures’ (n 26) 551.  
29 Ex Parte Latimer (1889) 46 OG 1638, Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents 123-27 (Ex 
Parte Latimer). 
30 ibid. 
31 K P McElrow, ‘Elements in Patent Law’ (1929) 21(6) Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 608, 
608.  
32 Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Protection for Plants’ (n 26) 149. 
33 Freda Wuesthoff, ‘Patenting of Plants’ (1956-1958) 1 Industrial Property Quarterly 12, 19 
(‘Patenting of Plants’); Stephen A Bent, Richard L Schwaab, David G Colin, and Donald D Jeffery, 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Worldwide (Stockton Press 1987) 43 (Intellectual 
Property Rights in Biotechnology Worldwide).  
34 Adam Mossof, ‘Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550-1800’ 
(2000-2001) 52 Hastings Law Journal 1255, 1257-58; Vicenzo Denicolo and Luigi Alberto 
Franzoni, ‘The Contract Theory of Patents’ (2004) 23(4) International Review of Law and 
Economics 365-80.  
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of the invention. The full disclosure enables any member of the society to 
reproduce and develop the invention upon the expiration of the patent. However, 
in the absence of full and enabling disclosure, the invention effectively remains 
outside the grasp of society. The traditional method of fulfilling the full disclosure 
requirements in the US and Europe was to provide written descriptions and 
drawings in the patent application.35 Yet, it was difficult to accurately provide a 
full written description or drawing of the main distinguishing characteristics of new 
varieties such as the smell of a flower or the taste of a fruit. Furthermore, while 
providing a full written description of the invention was one issue, the ability to 
reproduce that invention following the written description was another issue. As 
plant inventions are subject to natural or non-human factors, the reproducibility of 
an invention based on a full written description could not be guaranteed.  
 
Despite similar questions in the US and Europe about extending patents to plant 
varieties, these jurisdictions adopted different approaches to plant variety 
protection. The perception that patent laws were inappropriate for protecting plant 
varieties resulted in the initial establishment of sui generis systems in the US and 
Europe. However, as will be seen below, the divergence in both jurisdictions 
occurred when the US went on to extend patents to plant inventions through case 
law, while Europe explicitly prohibited patents for plant varieties under the 




The Plant Patent Act 1930 (PPA) was the first plant variety protection legislation 
in the world.36 It grants protection for asexually reproduced plant varieties (i.e. 
plant varieties reproduced by grafts or cuttings, not seeds). However, the PPA 
excludes tuber propagated plants such as Irish potatoes and Jerusalem artichokes. 
                                                 
35 Andrew Christie, ‘Patents for Plant Innovation’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 
394, 402 (‘Patents for Plant Innovation’). 
36 The US Congress passed this legislation as the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930, and 
President Hoover signed it into law on 23 May 1930. It has been consolidated into Title 35 of the 
US Code as Sections 161 to 164 (consolidated on 19 July 1952, amended on 3 September 1954). 
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Tuber propagated crops were excluded because they were easily accessible; the 
part of the crop used for reproduction was the same part also sold as food.37 
Therefore, enforcement of the IPRs would have been difficult to achieve.38 To 
address the ‘product of nature’ and ‘full disclosure’ oppositions to the extension of 
patents to plant varieties, the PPA established a special patent system by deviating 
from the standard requirements for patents. For example, rather than the ‘full 
disclosure’ requirement, the PPA provides for a written description of the plant that 
is as ‘complete as is reasonably possible.’39 
 
The success of the PPA is directly linked to actors in the nursery industry led by 
Paul Stark of Stark Brothers Nurseries.40 Paul Stark was primarily concerned with 
protecting the Stark Brothers Nurseries’ business interests. Stark Brothers 
Nurseries was the largest US nursery in the early 20th century, but it did not carry 
out plant breeding.41 Instead, it purchased new desirable varieties from people who 
had discovered or bred new varieties and marketed the purchased varieties.42 In 
particular, Stark Brothers had marketed some of Luther Burbank’s – the renowned 
plant breeder – varieties. Luther Burbank discovered or improved over 800 
varieties of trees, vegetables, fruits, and flowers.43 When Burbank died in 1926, he 
passed on his ample collection of new varieties to Stark Brothers.44 Thus, Stark 
Brothers had a wide collection of new un-marketed varieties which they sought to 
commodify through IPRs. In other words, the Stark Brothers’ motivation to lobby 
for the extension of IPRs to plant varieties was simply to commercialise the large 
collection of plant varieties they had inherited.  
 
                                                 
37 Bugos and Kevles, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property’ (n 26) 83. 
38 Cary Fowler, ‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation’ (2000) 82 
Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 621, 634 (‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930’). 
39 Plant Patent Act 1930.  
40 Fowler, ‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930’ (n 38) 634. 
41 ibid 628; Cary Fowler, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics and Plant Evolution (Gordon 
and Breach 1994) 79. 
42 Fowler, ‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930’ (n 38) 629-30. 
43 Fowler, Unnatural Selection (n 41) 85. 
44 ibid 79. 
11 
 
During debates and lobbying for the PPA, the nursery industry led by Stark argued 
that plant breeders deserved IPRs just like other industrial inventors and authors.45 
Ironically, there was minimal scientific breeding for asexually reproduced crops.46 
In fact, the PPA excluded sexually reproduced plants which were at the centre of 
developments in scientific plant breeding.47 The PPA only protected asexually 
reproduced plants, which were still products of traditional breeding practices.48 
Paul Stark and the nursery industry had persuaded the seed companies, who were 
also initially involved in pushing for the extension of IPRs, to stop lobbying for the 
protection of sexually reproduced plants.49 The plan was to gently introduce IPRs 
for plant varieties starting with asexually reproduced plants, then to push for the 
extension of IPRs to sexually reproduced plants afterwards.50 The rationale for 
focusing on asexually reproduced plants was to prevent criticism about IPRs 
leading to monopolies on staple food crops in the US Congress.51  
 
Indeed, the Plant Variety Protection Act 1970 (PVPA) – which provides sui generis 
rights for sexually reproduced and tuber propagated plant varieties – is evidence 
that the Stark Brothers and the nursery industry’s plan worked.52 Apart from the 
PPA which pioneered plant variety protection in the US, a series of events both in 
the US and Europe triggered the passing of the PVPA. First, UPOV was established 
in Europe in 1961 to protect plant varieties. This plant breeder’s rights system 
covering both asexually and sexually reproduced plants revived discussions about 
plant variety protection for sexually propagated plant varieties in the US.53 Second, 
significant developments in plant breeding research in the US inspired calls to 
                                                 




49 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Sciences Industries: A Twentieth 
Century History (Ashgate 2003) 181. 
50 ibid. 
51 Asexually reproduced plant varieties include flowering plants, fruit trees, and vines, while 
sexually reproduced plant varieties include staples such as corn and wheat. 
52 Plant Variety Protection Act 1970, 7 USC, ss 2321-582 (PVPA).  
53 The US did not become a party to UPOV until 8 November 1981. Fowler, Unnatural Selection 
(n 41) 108-09; Mark Janis and Jay Kesan, ‘US Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury?’ (1994) 
Articles by Maurer Faculty Paper 430, 727 and 734-44. 
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protect sexually propagated plants.54 In particular, the American Seed Trade 
Association (ASTA) was actively involved in promoting the PVPA.55 John 
Sutherland, a high ranking official of ASTA, and Louis Robertson, a Chicago 
attorney employed by ASTA, both drafted the PVPA.56 Inspiration for the PVPA 
Bill was drawn from the PPA and the UPOV 1961 Convention. Cary Fowler 
graphically notes that John Sutherland sat with a copy of the PPA, pulling out 
sections to create a draft legislation.57 
 
However, the IPRs architecture for plant varieties in the US changed remarkably 
in 1980, with the US Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Diamond v 
Chakrabarty.58 The Supreme Court held that living organisms could be protected 
under the US patent law.59 Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist with General 
Electric, invented a bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of 
crude oil.60 Rejecting the ‘product of nature’ objection to patenting raised by the 
patent examiner, the Supreme Court held that the live human-made 
microorganisms constitute patentable subject matter.61 Further case law, such as 
Ex Parte Hibberd and J E M Ag Supply v Pioneer Hi-Bred, confirmed the 




                                                 
54 Bugos and Kevles, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property’ (n 26) 92-93; Nicholas Seay, ‘Intellectual 
Property Rights in Plants’ in Stephen Baenziger, Roger A Kleese, and Robert F Barnes (eds), 
Intellectual Property Rights: Protection of Plant Materials (Special Publication No 21, Crop 
Science Society of America 1993) 64. 
55 Jack Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 1492-2000 (2nd 
edn, University of Wisconsin Press 2004) 139. 
56 Fowler, Unnatural Selection (n 41) 108-09. 
57 ibid.  
58 Sidney A Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Ananda M Chakrabarty et al 
(1980) 447 US 303 (Diamond v Chakrabarty). 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid.  
62 Ex Parte Hibberd et al (1985) 227 USPQ 443; JEM AG Supply Inc, DBA Farm Advantage Inc et 
al v Pioneer Hi-bred International Inc (2001) 534 US 124. For a discussion on these cases, see 
Anne E Crocker, ‘Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on an International Level? 
A Look at the History of the US and International Patent Law Regarding Patent Protection for 
Plants and the Likely Changes After the US Supreme Court’s Decision in J.E.M. AG Supply v 





Like their American counterparts, the European seed companies were also eager to 
extend IPRs to plant varieties.63 However, there were variations in the plant variety 
protection systems within Europe. Britain and Denmark prohibited patents for 
plant varieties,64 Italy and France allowed patents for plant varieties from 1948 and 
1949,65 while the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany enacted sui generis IPRs 
systems for plant varieties in 1942, 1946, and 1953, respectively.66 The post-World 
War II efforts to enhance integration of European communities inspired the calls 
to harmonise IPRs legislations in Europe. However, as in the US, deciding on the 
appropriate form of IPRs protection for plant varieties to be adopted in Europe 
engendered debates. Two groups of actors were at the forefront of the debates on 
the harmonised IPRs system for plant varieties in Europe. These were the 
International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI) and the 
International Association of Plant Breeders (ASSINSEL); that is, a group of patent 
lawyers and a group of plant breeders. While both groups agreed that plant varieties 
ought to be protected, the concern remained that of determining the appropriate 
type of IPRs system for plant varieties. 
 
The German delegation in AIPPI – Franz and Freda Wuesthoff – advocated for a 
dual system of protection which provided for both patents and sui generis 
systems.67 The Wuesthoffs proposed patent systems for ‘major breakthroughs’ and 
sui generis systems for ‘ordinary new varieties.’68 However, AIPPI rejected the 
German proposal at its 1952 Vienna and 1954 Brussels meetings. In particular, 
                                                 
63 Bugos and Kevles, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property’ (n 26) 90. 
64 ibid; Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Sciences Industries (n 49) 184. 
65 Bugos and Kevles, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property’ (n 26) 90; Dutfield, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Life Sciences Industries (n 49) 184.  
66 Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Protection for Plants’ (n 26) 161. 
67 Franz Wuesthoff and Freda Wuesthoff, ‘Protection of New Varieties of Cultivated Plants’ 
(Report in the name of the German Group, Vienna Congress 1952 of the International Association 
for the Protection of Industrial Property) reproduced in Bent and others, Intellectual Property Rights 
in Biotechnology Worldwide (n 33) 83-97. For more on the Wuesthoffs’ position on patenting plant 
varieties, see Freda Wuesthoff, ‘Patenting of Plants’ (n 33) 12; F Wuesthoff, ‘Cultivated Plant 




AIPPI members argued that protecting living products alongside industrial 
products would confuse established patent legislations.69  
 
Meanwhile, ASSINSEL had initially favoured patent systems as the main option 
for protecting plant varieties.70 In fact, ASSINSEL contributed to the inclusion of 
patent variety protection debates in the 1952 AIPPI Congress highlighted above.71 
However, Andre Heitz notes that following the opposition to patents for plant 
varieties at AIPPI, ASSINSEL members began to rethink their position on 
patenting plant varieties.72 Thus, at its 1956 Congress held in Semmering, Austria, 
ASSINSEL called for the organisation of an international conference to consider 
the appropriate plant variety protection system for Europe and to set out the 
principles to govern such system.73 ASSINSEL requested the French government 
to organise the international conference, later known as the International 
Conference for the Protection of New Varieties.74 This International Conference, 
which was held from 7 to 11 May 1957, became the first session of the International 
(Diplomatic) Conference for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, which 
established the principles of plant breeder’s rights that was incorporated in the 
UPOV Convention.75  
 
Alongside the AIPPI and ASSINSEL debates on plant variety protection, the 
proposed post-World War II move towards European integration resulted in two 
agreements relevant to plant variety protection in Europe. These two agreements, 
                                                 
69 Bugos and Kevles, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property’ (n 26) 90.  
70 ASSINSEL had favoured patent systems from the 1940s to the 1950s. Dwijen Rangnekar, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Agriculture: An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Plant 
Breeders Rights’ (ActionAid UK 2000) 10  
<https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/content_document/ipr.pdf> accessed 21 July 
2017.  
71 Bent and others, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Worldwide (n 33) 51. 
72 Andre Heitz, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’ in The First Twenty-Five Years of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 2 December 1961-2 
December 1986 (UPOV Publication No. 879 (E) 1987) 82 (‘The History of Plant Variety 
Protection’). 
73 ibid. 
74 Heitz notes that ASSINSEL approached France to organise the Conference because it knew in 
advance that the request would be accepted. Heitz, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’ (n 72) 
82. 
75 Heitz, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’ (n 72) 82. UPOV is discussed in the next section.  
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the Strasbourg Convention for the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law 
on Patents for Inventions 1963 (Strasbourg Convention) and the EPC, established 
the European position on patenting plant varieties. The Strasbourg Convention 
gives member states the option of prohibiting patents for plant varieties. Article 2 
of the Strasbourg Convention provides that: 
 
The Contracting States shall not be bound to provide for the grant of 
patents in respect of … plant or animal varieties or essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals…76 
 
The optional prohibition of patents for plant varieties introduced under the 
Strasbourg Convention became a mandatory legal principle under the EPC. The 
EPC, adopted in 1973, provides the legal framework for granting European patents. 
Rather than leaving it to the discretion of member states as was the case under the 
Strasbourg Convention, the EPC expressly prohibits patents for plant varieties. 
Article 53(b) of the EPC provides that: 
 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of plant or animal 
varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals…77  
 
To close this discussion, the seed industry – through its association ASSINSEL – 
was active in pushing for plant variety protection systems in European countries 
just like its counterpart in the US. However, unlike in the US, the European patent 
attorneys and the IPRs association AIPPI were also actively involved in shaping 
the IPRs systems for plant varieties in Europe. While there were initially variations 
in the IPRs systems for plant varieties in Europe, by the late 1950s, AIPPI favoured 
a sui generis system for plant varieties and not patents. Thanks to the move towards 
the integration of European economies, the Strasbourg Convention and the EPC 
which governed patents for inventions in Europe prohibited the patenting of plant 
                                                 
76 Emphasis added. 
77 Emphasis added. 
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varieties. The preference for a sui generis plant variety protection system 
culminated in UPOV. The establishment of UPOV precipitated international 
contestations about plant variety protection, as will be seen below.   
 
1.1.2. International Contestations 
 
International contestations about plant variety protection came to the fore in the 
1970s, following the extension of IPRs to plant varieties through legislative and 
judicial processes in the US and Europe, as seen above. However, with the gradual 
extension of UPOV outside Europe, the international contestations were generally 
couched as North-South debates.78 
 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants  
 
As highlighted in the preceding section, ASSINSEL’s call for an international 
conference to consider the appropriate plant variety protection system for Europe 
culminated in the establishment of UPOV.79 While harmonisation of European 
plant variety protection systems was one reason for the establishment of UPOV, a 
second reason was the European plant breeders and the seed industry’s desire to 
increase seed trade within and outside of Europe.80 Plant breeders and the seed 
industry organised under ASSINSEL concluded that an international agreement 
was required for the effective international protection of new plant varieties.81 A 
third reason was that European seed companies had also started to propagate new 
plant varieties outside Europe – such as in Africa – to take advantage of the sunny 
and dry weather conditions as well as cheap labour.82 Therefore, these companies 
desired international protection for new plant varieties to control access and use of 
the varieties. UPOV provided the desired international system of protection. 
                                                 
78 This is discussed under the International Undertaking and Convention on Biological Diversity 
below. 
79 See 1.1.1 above. 
80 Robin Pistorius and Jeroen van Wijk, The Exploitation of Plant Information: Political Strategies 
in Crop Development (CABI Publishing 1999) 80-81 (The Exploitation of Plant Information). 
81 ibid 80-81. 
82 ibid 81. 
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UPOV was established after two sessions of the International Diplomatic 
Conferences – in 1957 and 1961, respectively. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden actively participated in the 1957 international 
conference, while Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland had observer status.83 
Representatives of the United International Bureaux for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (BIRPI) as well as the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations (FAO) were also observers.84 In addition to the above-
mentioned European countries and international organisations that attended the 
first Conference, the United Kingdom (UK), Finland, ASSINSEL, AIPPI, the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
International Community of Breeders of Asexually Reproduced Ornamental and 
Fruit Varieties (CIOPORA), and International Federation of the Seed Trade (FIS) 
also participated in the second Conference which took place from 21 November to 
2 December 1961.85 The participants in the two conferences reflects the European 
origins and dominance in UPOV. 
 
The UPOV Convention was adopted in Paris in 1961. It entered into force in 1968 
after three countries – the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands – ratified it.86 The 
UPOV 1961 Convention has been revised three times since it entered into force.87 
It had a minor revision on 10 November 1972, and two substantial revisions on 23 
October 1978 and 19 March 1991, respectively.88 Each of the UPOV Convention 
revisions progressively strengthened its plant breeder’s rights system.89  However, 
as will be seen next, the extension of IPRs to plant varieties raised a variety of 
concerns from activists and CSOs from both the Global North and Global South. 
  
 
                                                 
83 Heitz, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’ (n 72) 82-84.  
84 BIRPI is the predecessor of the WIPO. 
85 Heitz, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’ (n 72) 82-84. 
86 The UK ratified the UPOV Convention on 17 September 1965, the Netherlands on 8 August 
1967, and Germany on 11 July 1968. The UPOV Convention entered into force on 10 August 1968. 
87 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, UPOV Lex  
<http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/upov_convention.html> accessed 28 October 2016. 
88 ibid. 
89 The UPOV plant breeder’s rights system is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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International Undertaking and the Convention on Biological Diversity  
 
Concerns about the extension of IPRs to plant varieties were first raised in the mid-
1970s by individuals such as American activist Cary Fowler and Canadian activist 
Pat Mooney.90 Fowler and Mooney, along with Hope Shand, established the CSO 
Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), which was dedicated solely 
to plant genetic resources issues.91 Fowler, Mooney, and Shand along with RAFI 
and other CSOs such as GRAIN and the Community Technology Development 
Trust (CTDT) were instrumental in raising awareness about the implications of the 
extension of IPRs to plant varieties.92 These implications include the following: (i) 
free access to plant genetic resources without adequate benefits returning to the 
countries where the genetic resources were sourced from; (ii) restriction of the 
farming practices of small-scale farmers such as saving, reusing, exchanging, and 
selling seeds; and (iii) protection only of varieties that meet certain ‘distinct’, 
‘uniform’, and ‘stable’ conditions which only seed companies fulfil, thus 
marginalising small-scale farmers’ varieties.93  
 
Raising awareness about these concerns changed the plant variety protection 
debates. As mentioned in the discussions on national origins above, the debates 
about plant variety protection in the US and Europe mainly revolved around 
‘whether to protect plant varieties using patents or sui generis systems.’ The 
concerns Fowler and Mooney raised shifted the discussion on plant variety 
protection from its focus on choice of the patent or sui generis option to more 
nuanced debates about the implications of the plant variety protection on two 
                                                 
90 Mooney recalls that ‘only Cary and I wanted to talk about seeds’ in the mid-1970s. Patrick 
Mooney, ‘International Non-governmental Organizations: The Hundred Year (or so) Seed War – 
Seeds, Sovereignty and Civil Society – A Historical Perspective on the Evolution of “The Law of 
the Seed”’ in Christine Frison, Francisco Lopez, and Jose T Esquinas-Alcazar (eds), Plant Genetic 
Resources and Food Security: Stakeholder Perspectives on the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Earthscan 2011) 136 (‘International Non-
governmental Organizations’). 
91 Mooney, ‘International Non-governmental Organizations’ (n 90) 140. 
92 See generally, ibid; Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, Shattering: Food, Politics and the Loss of 
Genetic Diversity (The University of Arizona Press 1990); Hope Shand, ‘There is a Conflict 
between Intellectual Property Rights and the Rights of Farmers in Developing Countries’ (1991) 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 131-140. 
93 These ‘distinct’, ‘uniform’ and ‘stable’ conditions are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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marginalised groups: small-scale farmers and the Global South. The activists and 
CSOs chose the United Nations (UN) as the appropriate international forum to 
lobby for international agreements that addressed the concerns raised above.94 
UPOV was not deemed appropriate because of its European dominance. In 
addition, the UN was chosen because the Global South countries could their use 
numeric majority to effect desired changes.95  
 
Robin Pistorius and Jeroen van Wijk note that the concerns about the implications 
of plant variety protection in the Global South aligned with the struggle for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) that was adopted as a UN policy in 1974.96 
The NIEO was an attempt by the Global South to redistribute global wealth.97 In 
applying this redistribution aspiration to plant variety protection, the Global South 
– led by countries like Mexico, with support from activists and CSOs such as 
Mooney, Fowler, Shand, RAFI, and GRAIN – pushed for the two international 
agreements in the UN that addressed concerns about the farming practices of small-
scale farmers and control over plant genetic resources in the Global South.98 At the 
1983 FAO Conference of the UN, Global South countries succeeded in establishing 
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (International 
Undertaking).  
 
The International Undertaking is a non-binding agreement that provides for the 
conservation and control of plant genetic resources.99 It states that ‘plant genetic 
resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without 
                                                 
94 Pistorius and Wijk, The Exploitation of Plant Information (n 80) 10. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 Susan K Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (State 
University of New York Press 1998) 27-32; Ruth Okediji, ‘History Lessons for the WIPO 
Development Agenda’ in Neil Weinstock Netanel (ed), The Development Agenda: Global 
Intellectual Property and Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 2008) 148-152. 
98 Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Law making’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 35 (‘Regime 
Shifting’). 
99 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (23 November 1983) FAO Resolution 8/83 
(International Undertaking). A binding treaty on plant genetic resources – the ITPGRFA was 
subsequently negotiated at the FAO from 1994 to 2001. As the ITPGRFA was adopted in 2001, 
which is post-TRIPS, this section focuses on the International Undertaking. The relevant provisions 
of the ITPGRFA are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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restrictions.’100 The Global North rejected the International Undertaking because 
it covered all plant genetic resources – including new plant varieties protected 
under IPRs systems such as the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system.101 In 
particular, Denmark, Finland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK, 
and the US officially indicated unwillingness to support the International 
Undertaking because it was contrary to the economic interests of their seed 
companies.102 As a result, the Global North continued to freely access genetic 
resources from the Global South and protect new plant varieties developed from 
those genetic resources, while the Global South received no compensation.103  
 
Global South attempts to find a balance between the International Undertaking and 
plant variety protection culminated in three interpretations of the International 
Undertaking between 1989 and 1991. These Resolutions – 4/89, 5/89, and 3/91 – 
were adopted as FAO Conference Resolutions and annexed to the International 
Undertaking. In particular, Resolution 4/89 in 1989 expressly stated that UPOV 
plant breeders’ rights were not incompatible with the International Undertaking.104 
Furthermore, the three Resolutions introduced ‘farmers’ rights’, a loosely defined 
concept that seeks to recognise and reward small-scale farmers’ contributions to 
the conservation and improvement of plant genetic resources.105  Regine Andersen 
points out that after Resolution 3/91, FAO members concluded that the conditions 
for access to plant genetic resources under the International Undertaking required 
further clarifications.106 This was because the different FAO Resolutions had 
                                                 
100 International Undertaking, art 1. 
101 Regine Andersen, ‘Historical Context: Evolving International Cooperation on Crop Genetic 
Resources’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges 
in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 101-03 (‘Historical Context’). 
102 Susan Bragdon, Kathryn Garforth, and John E Haapala Jr, ‘Safeguarding Biodiversity: The 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ in Geoff Tansey and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control 
of Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property Biodiversity and 
Food Security (Earthscan 2008) 84 (‘Safeguarding Biodiversity’). 
103 GRAIN, ‘International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources: The Final Stretch’ (GRAIN 
Reports 2001) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/90-international-undertaking-on-plant-
genetic-resources-the-final-stretch> accessed 25 July 2017.  
104 Resolution 4/89 of the International Undertaking states: “plant breeders” rights as provided 
under UPOV (International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants) are not 
incompatible with the International Undertaking.’ 
105 Resolution 4/89 (29 November 1989); Resolution 5/89 (29 November 1989); Resolution 3/91 
(25 November 1991). The concept of farmers’ rights is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
106 Andersen, ‘Historical Context’ (n 101) 108. 
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expanded on the interpretation of the International Undertaking, making its 
provisions unclear. Clarifications on access to genetic resources were achieved 
under the CBD. Notably, the Global South secured the provisions on access to 
genetic resources and compensations from the use of these resources – access and 
benefit sharing – which they were unable to achieve in other fora such as the FAO 
or UPOV.107 
 
During the CBD negotiations – from May 1989 to June 1992 – the Global North 
and Global South were divided on proposed provisions regarding access to genetic 
resources.108 The Global North desired free access to plant genetic resources from 
the Global South to develop new plant varieties.109 However, the Global South, led 
by the ‘Group of 77 developing countries’ with support from CSOs such as the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), argued that countries where genetic resource are 
sourced from ought to be compensated.110 In line with the Global South’s demands, 
the CBD, which was adopted in 1992, provides that countries have sovereign rights 
over all biological materials – including plants, animals, and microorganisms – 
originating in their territory. This established the access and benefit sharing 
principle.111  
 
Without doubt, the international contestations expanded the scope of plant variety 
protection. Moving beyond patents and plant breeder’s rights as the main forms of 
IPRs systems for protecting plant varieties, the negotiations in the UN resulting in 
farmers’ rights as well as access and benefit sharing principles provide alternative 
ways to rethink national plant variety protection systems. What is clear from the 
international contestations is that the appropriate type of IPRs system for plant 
varieties is far from settled. This is reflected in TRIPS as will be seen below. 
 
                                                 
107 Bragdon, Garforth, and Haapala Jr, ‘Safeguarding Biodiversity’ (n 102) 84. 
108 The CBD negotiations were conducted under the aegis of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘History of the Convention’ 
<https://www.cbd.int/history/> accessed 05 July 2017. 
109 Bragdon, Garforth, and Haapala Jr, ‘Safeguarding Biodiversity’ (n 102) 83-84. 
110 Veit Koester, ‘The Biodiversity Convention Negotiation Process and Some Comments on the 
Outcome’ (1997) 27(3) Environmental Policy and Law 175, 183. 
111 Access and benefit sharing is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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1.1.3. Global Minimum Standard: TRIPS  
 
TRIPS introduced global minimum standards for IPRs, including plant varieties.112 
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS expressly obliges WTO members to protect plant 
varieties using patents, sui generis systems, or any combination of systems.113 This 
apparent latitude in TRIPS reflects the lack of consensus on plant variety 
protection, particularly in the Global North. As stated earlier, the US allowed 
patents for plant varieties following the Diamond v Chakrabarty case. Meanwhile, 
Europe had established a harmonised UPOV plant breeder’s rights system in 1961, 
whereas the Global South had secured farmers’ rights as well as access and benefit 
sharing principles under the International Undertaking of the FAO and the CBD, 
respectively.   
 
Thus, during the TRIPS negotiations for plant variety protection, the US proposed 
patents for plant varieties, which the European Community (EC; now European 
Union (EU)) and the Global South countries rejected.114 The EU favoured a UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system as its sui generis system.115 On the other hand, the 
Global South countries, led by ‘Group of Ten’ countries including Brazil, India, 
and Nigeria, favoured a sui generis system that incorporates farmers’ rights as well 
as access and benefit sharing principles.116 Significantly, these divergences reflect 
not only the North-South contestations on plant variety protection, it also reflects 
the divergences within the North, particularly between the US and EU on the 
appropriate plant variety protection system.117 Dwijen Rangnekar refers to the 
                                                 
112 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press 
2000) 63 (Global Business Regulation). 
113 See the introduction to thesis above.  
114 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs 
and Sustainable Development: Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 388-395. 
115 ibid 394. 
116 Watal explains that trade negotiators from ten Global South countries – Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
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Uruguay Round. Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing 
Countries (Oxford University Press 2001) 19-20 (Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and 
Developing Countries). 
117 A number of  commentators who participated in the TRIPS drafting process have provided 
detailed analysis of the negotiating process, such as Thomas Cottier, ‘The Prospects for Intellectual 
Property in GATT’ (1991) 28 Common Market Law Review 383; Jorg Reinbothe and Anthony 
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Global North divergences on the appropriate plant variety protection system as a 
‘rare case of intra-Quad dissonance.’118 In other words, while the US, EU, Canada, 
and Japan (Quad) generally agreed or settled on the substance of other IPRs 
provisions in TRIPS, plant variety protection was one of the rare provisions that 
the Quad was unable to agree on.  
 
The final text of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, which contains the options of a patent 
system favoured by the US, sui generis system favoured by the EU, or a 
combination of systems, reflects the delicate compromise reached between the US 
and the EU. Nonetheless, TRIPS provides for a review of Article 27.3(b) within 
four years from the entry into force of TRIPS – that is, in 1999.119 This proposed 
review is still pending.120 Notably, there is also another on-going treaty negotiation 
on IPRs and genetic resources at the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO).121 The adoption of this WIPO treaty would further expand the plant 
variety protection landscape.  
 
This part introduced the contested nature of plant variety protection. Second, it 
drew attention to the role of actors in plant variety protection law-making. With 
the national origins, the role of seed and nursery industries in the extension of IPRs 
to plant varieties was highlighted. The international contestations demonstrated the 
role of activists and CSOs in generating counter-narratives to dominant 
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conceptions of plant variety protection by introducing farmers’ rights as well as 
access and benefit sharing principles. The global minimum standards also reveal 
the extension of plant variety protection, from its origins in the US and Europe to 
a global treaty. This extension of IPRs for plant varieties to the global level reflects 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ thesis that ‘globalisation is always the successful 
globalisation of a given localism.’122 That is, the US and Europe globalised their 
IPRs system for plant varieties through the TRIPS, imposing minimum plant 
variety protection standards on Global South countries like Nigeria.  
 
The above historical analysis of plant variety protection can be summarised thus: 
the origins of plant variety protection systems at the national, international, and 
global levels were shaped by state and non-state actors with specific interests. The 
divergences in actors’ interests resulted in different sets of legal agreements 
negotiated in different forums. Three themes explored in this thesis from the above 
are: (i) actors’ involvement in plant variety protection law-making; (ii) the 
interconnections between TRIPS and other agreements relevant to plant varieties, 
namely the UPOV Convention, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA; and (iii) the debates 
or concerns surrounding the different legal principles and systems relevant to plant 
variety protection.  
 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
As highlighted in the preceding part, the global minimum IPRs standard for plant 
varieties introduced under TRIPS obliges Nigeria to design a plant variety 
protection system. Prior to TRIPS, plant variety protection was uncommon in the 
Global South, including in Nigeria.123 Therefore, the TRIPS obligation to protect 
                                                 
122 Santos also explains localised globalisation as the restructuring of the local terrain as a result of 
globalisation. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Globalizations’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture and Society 
393, 396. See also Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization and Emancipation (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
123 For example, within Africa, only Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe had introduced plant 
variety protection systems prior to TRIPS. Peter Drahos, ‘Global Property Rights in Information: 
The Story of TRIPS at the GATT (1995) 13(1) Prometheus 6, 6; GRAIN, ‘For a Full Review of 
TRIPS 27.3(b)’ (GRAIN Reports 2000) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/39-for-a-full-
review-of-trips-27-3-b> accessed 26 July 2017; Philippe Cullet, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Africa: 
Towards Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement’ (2001) 45 (1) Journal of African Law 97, 97.  
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plant varieties, coupled with its apparent latitude, has created implementation 
conundrums in the Global South for two reasons. First, plant variety protection is 
a highly specialised type of IPRs, with wide-ranging impacts on small-scale 
farmers, research institutes, seed companies, and the society in general. Second, 
the range of stakeholders who are affected by plant variety protection systems give 
rise to pressures from specific state and non-state actors to push for preferred plant 
variety protection systems at the national level. Thus, plant variety protection is 
not narrowly about determining appropriate legal systems; it involves political, 
economic, and social dynamics. 
 
Considering these deeper implications of plant variety protection, one can argue 
that Nigeria and the other Global South countries should simply opt out of TRIPS. 
However, the strategic integration of TRIPS as part of the WTO set of compulsory 
agreements which was conceived by the US means that countries cannot cherry-
pick preferred agreements.124 This is because the WTO agreements constitute a 
‘Single Undertaking’ so countries cannot simply opt out of agreements that are 
unfavourable to them.125 Countries desirous of participating in the WTO 
multilateral trading system remain WTO members. As such, the conundrum about 
plant variety protection under TRIPS in the Global South subsists. This thesis 
examines this conundrum by asking the questions below.  
 
Central Research Questions:  
 
1. Considering the obligation for all WTO members to protect plant varieties 
set out in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, what type of plant variety protection 
system is best suited to Nigeria?  
                                                 
124 The US, backed by multinationals such as Monsanto, Pfizer, IBM, and Microsoft, first devised 
the idea of linking IPRs to trade by amending Section 301 of its Trade Act to incorporate IPRs 
provision. This strategic link of trade to IPRs was what informed the inclusion of TRIPS in the 
WTO to ensure stronger enforcement. Prior to TRIPS, IPRs were generally governed under WIPO. 
Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation (n 112) 61-63; Peter Drahos and John 
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (Earthscan 2002) 88-
107 (Information Feudalism). 
125 Richard Steinberg, ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO’ (2002) 56(2) International Organization 339, 359-360.  
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2. Cognisant of the Global North-Global South narratives and counter-
narratives, alongside the interconnections between Article 27.3(b) of 
TRIPS, the UPOV Convention, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA, how can 
Nigeria design and introduce such plant variety protection system which is 
best suited to it? 
 
The central research questions seek to understand Nigeria’s plant variety protection 
status quo, the plant variety protection system best suited to it, as well as what it 
needs to have in place to design and introduce such system. 
 
Subsidiary Research Question: 
 
Why are Global South WTO members increasingly adopting the UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system despite their advocacy at the TRIPS Council 
for sui generis systems that incorporate access and benefit sharing as well 
as farmers’ rights principles? 
 
The subsidiary research question seeks to elucidate reasons for the contradictions 
between Global South WTO members’ ‘rhetoric’ at the TRIPS Council and their 
actions at home. At the TRIPS Council, Global South WTO members express 
preference for creatively designed sui generis systems that incorporate principles 
from the CBD and the ITPGRFA. Yet, there is a proliferation of the UPOV 1991 
Convention in the Global South. Accordingly, the question not only seeks to 
address the problems and challenges with plant variety protection law-making in 
the Global South, it also seeks to illuminate the possibilities for Nigeria to 
introduce the plant variety protection system best suited to it. 
 
The answers to these research questions are woven throughout the thesis. Chapter 
2 sets out a background of the existing laws, policies, and practices relevant to 
plant varieties in Nigeria to explain its current state of affairs. This background 
delineates Nigeria’s realities and attempts to answer the first central research 
question. Chapter 3 examines the plant variety protection options under TRIPS; it 
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delves into Global North-Global South debates and contestations on plant variety 
protection, with the aim of discovering the plant variety protection system best 
suited to Nigeria’s realities. As a result, Chapter 3 also contributes to answering 
the first central research question. Chapters 4 and 5 tease out factors that contribute 
to variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South, extracting 
lessons for Nigeria. That is, the factors that can impinge or facilitate the successful 
introduction of the plant variety protection system suited to Nigeria’s realities. 
Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 answer the subsidiary research question. Chapter 6 revisits 
the Nigerian case study introduced in Chapter 2, by applying the findings from 
Chapters 3 to 5. Therefore, Chapter 6 answers the second central research question. 




Although there are a variety of ways to frame this thesis, food sovereignty was 
initially considered. However, the problem with the food sovereignty frame is that 
it is narrow, as it only focuses on certain issues unpacked in the thesis. It does not 
provide the lens to engage in the robust analysis the author attempts to present. 
Food sovereignty is principally about the rights of people directly involved in 
farming and producing food to democratically shape their own food systems.126 It 
seeks to regain control of the food system from large multinational corporations 
and international institutions, by placing it back in the hands of local peoples, 
communities, and national governments.127 Food sovereignty prioritises local 
markets by promoting small-scale driven food production, distribution, and 
consumption based on environmental, social, and economic sustainability.128 But 
local production and food self-sufficiency is not the central focus of this thesis. In 
other words, this thesis engages in a more nuanced and complex discussion than 
                                                 
126 Raj Patel, ‘What does Food Sovereignty Look Like?’ (2009) 36(3) Journal of Peasant Studies 
663, 663. 
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the insights that food sovereignty provides. Thus, the author turns to critical legal 
theory, particularly the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).129  
 
Third World Approaches to International Law 
 
TWAIL is a critical way of thinking about international law through the lens of 
Third World peoples. Like the African proverb ‘[u]ntil the lions have their own 
historians, tales of the hunt will always glorify the hunter’, TWAIL tells the story 
of international law from the perspective of the Third World.130 In this way, 
TWAIL scholars produce otherwise untold alternative narratives about 
international law.131 Put differently, TWAIL scholarship produces counter-
narratives to mainstream international law. In recounting Third World narratives 
and counter-narratives, TWAIL scholars pay attention to the historical foundations 
of international law in order to understand its present form.132 Here, TWAIL 
scholars maintain that it is only by looking to the past that one can understand the 
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present, and in turn, rethink the future of international law to make it more 
responsive to the concerns of the Third World.133 
 
James Thuo Gathii explains that TWAIL’s origins can be traced to the spring of 
1996 at the Harvard Law School, when a group of graduate students initiated a 
series of meetings to discuss Third World perspectives about international law.134 
This group of students consisting of James Thuo Gathii, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
Celestine Nyamu, Elchi Noworeje, Hani Sayed, and Vasuki Nesiah, along with 
visiting scholar Bhupinder Chimni, coined the name ‘Third World Approaches to 
International Law.’135 The group had three interrelated objectives: (i) to present 
new ways of thinking about international law from the perspective of the Third 
World;136 (ii) to change historical narratives of international law by telling Third 
World stories;137 and (iii) to formulate substantive critiques of mainstream 
international law to uncover its role in producing structures that marginalise and 
dominate Third World peoples.138 The TWAIL vision statement, drafted in 1997, 
reflects these objectives.139 
 
For these TWAIL scholars, ‘Third World’ goes beyond the geographical 
boundaries of a nation.140 ‘Third World’ is emblematic of peoples with shared 
historical experiences of colonisation or similar concerns of oppression, 
underdevelopment, or marginalisation.141 Balakrishnan Rajagopal – one of the 
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TWAIL originators – explains that in defining ‘Third World’, ‘the emphasis 
henceforth, would be on the actual terrain that power operates on, rather than some 
predetermined given one such as the ‘nation.’142 Viewing ‘Third World’ in this way 
enables us to address forms of marginalisation and struggles such as gender, 
sexuality, class, and minority groups, amongst others. Applying this definition of 
Third World to this thesis would mean ‘Third World’ also refers to marginalised 
small-scale farmers whose interests are excluded from certain plant variety 
protection systems such as patents and UPOV ‘plant breeders’ rights’ systems. This 
aligns with Karin Mickelson’s construct, which recognises the differences between 
and within Third World countries, yet describes ‘Third World not as a bloc, but as 
a distinctive voice, or, more accurately, as a chorus of voices that blend, though 
not always harmoniously, in attempting to make heard a common set of 
concerns’.143  
 
In imagining ways to ensure that the voices of the marginalised peoples are heard, 
Rajagopal proposes the rethinking of international law by paying close attention to 
interventions of social movements.144 The investigation of these interventions 
reveals how concerted social movement actions have driven international legal 
developments. That is, international legal norms are increasingly produced and 
shaped through the interaction between states, international institutions, and social 
movement networks of farmers, peasants, and environmentalists, amongst 
others.145 An example from this thesis shows that farmers’ rights principles in the 
International Undertaking, and subsequently in the ITPGRFA, were products of 
both social movements along with the influence of Global South countries.146 Some 
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of the active social movements involved in promoting small-scale farmers’ 
interests in recent times include the African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Gene 
Campaign, GRAIN, and La Via Campesina. 
 
While TWAIL scholars engage with international law through the lens of Third 
World peoples, they undertake this in a variety of ways. TWAIL is a fluid approach 
comprising of scholars who blend, recycle, and revisit archives of TWAIL and 
non-TWAIL ideas to present novel ways of viewing international law through the 
lens of the Third World.147  However, this fluidity or diversity within the TWAIL 
movement is one of its criticisms.148 David Fidler argues that TWAIL needs to be 
more coherent, as it ‘can neither be a dogma nor cacophony of contradictory 
claims.’149  A response to this criticism is that the fluidity of TWAIL scholarship 
generates vibrant discourses, allowing imaginative expansion of TWAIL, which 
this thesis seeks to achieve. In essence, TWAIL accommodates all international 
law scholarship which self-identifies as a TWAIL approach, through shared 
commitments to concerns about the Third World. This open-ended decentralised 
approach encourages new TWAIL scholars to introduce novel analytical tools to 
address Third World concerns, thus creating their own version of TWAIL. 
Ultimately, these novel TWAIL analyses contribute to the smorgasbord of TWAIL 
ideas. 
 
Nonetheless, TWAIL scholarships share these three themes. First, TWAIL 
scholarship critique international law by providing historical evidence to challenge 
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partial narratives of international law.150 Second, such historical context of 
international law disinters ways through which particular aspects of international 
law are unjust to Third World peoples or affect the Third World.151 TWAIL 
scholarship may stop at critiquing and highlighting features of international law 
which are unjust or affect the Third World. However, some TWAIL scholarship 
proceed to the third common theme, which is to attempt to reform or even 
transform the unjust international law.152 Notably, the common themes that run 
through TWAIL scholarship contribute to a robust understanding of international 
law vis-à-vis Third World peoples, which is absent in the partial mainstream 
narratives produced by Western international law scholars. These three themes run 
throughout this thesis. The thesis not only provides a historical context of plant 
variety protection, it examines implications of dominant IPRs systems for plant 
varieties in the Global South, that is, patents and the UPOV plant breeder’s rights 
system. The thesis goes on to suggest a plant variety protection system suited to a 
Third World country, Nigeria, and attempts to rethink the global legal architecture 
for plant varieties. 
 
Application of TWAIL to Thesis 
 
TWAIL applies to this thesis in two significant ways. First, it provides the broad 
historical lens that challenges a simplistic legal analysis of substantive plant variety 
protection provisions. As Gathii rightly notes, history is an important part of 
TWAIL scholarship as it contributes to knowledge production from Third World 
perspectives.153 Significantly, the historical context emphasises the 
interconnectedness of plant variety protection laws and other subject areas such as 
politics and economics. In this thesis, the historical analysis illuminates the origins 
of the TRIPS global minimum standards for plant variety protection obligations 
from the US and Europe, international North-South contestations about plant 
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variety protection, as well as the political and economic dynamics in plant variety 
protection law-making at the national level.  
 
Second, TWAIL provides the analytical lens to reform or transform international 
law to make it reflective of the interests and aspirations of the marginalised small-
scale farmers. The TWAIL scholars’ approach to the reform or transformation of 
international law provides insights for analysis in this thesis in two ways. 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal envisions reforms or transformation of international law 
through social movements, while Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja envision reform 
or transformation of international law through its implementation at the national 
level. As previously discussed, Rajagopal emphasises the role of CSOs in 
reforming or transforming international law. Indeed, he argues that social 
movements have a significant role to play in ensuring that the voices of 
marginalised peoples are heard.154 Analysing plant variety protection through the 
lens of social movement actions shows how counter-narratives such as farmers’ 
rights have evolved and reshaped the global legal architecture for plant varieties. 
At the national level, the creative sui generis plant variety protection systems in 
India and Thailand were the outcome of the activism of domestic CSOs, with 
support from international CSOs.  
 
Furthermore, in conceptualising the reform or transformation of international law, 
Eslava and Pahuja propose looking beyond reforms at the international level.155 
They draw attention to how implementation of international law at the national 
level, especially in the Global South, can silently expand its interpretation, thereby 
contributing to reforms of international law.156 This perspective uncovers how the 
creative interpretation of the obligation to protect plant varieties under TRIPS in 
India and Thailand have expanded the definition of the sui generis option. For 
example, provisions such as the protection of farmers’ varieties in Section 14 of 
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India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (PPVFRA), and 
the protection of local domestic varieties in Section 43 of Thailand’s Plant Variety 
Protection Act 1999 broadened the categories of protected plant varieties from the 
narrow focus on ‘new varieties’ under the UPOV Convention. These successful 
interventions at the national level can serve as guides for subsequent reforms to 
plant variety protection provisions under TRIPS or even under the UPOV 
Convention. Indeed, this thesis looks to the Thai and Indian examples in 
discussions about implementing TRIPS in Nigeria as well as on reforms to the 
global legal architecture for plant varieties. 
 
From the above, TWAIL provides the lens to understand the historical context, 
narratives and counter-narratives, role of actors especially CSOs, and 
implementation of international law to suit Third World interests. Although 
TWAIL provides the macro-methodological lens for this thesis, it is supplemented 
with ‘regime complexity’ which illuminates certain nuances in the analysis of plant 
variety protection regimes set out in this thesis as seen below. 
 
Regime Complex  
 
Kal Raustiala and David Victor define regime complex as an array of partially 
overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular subject 
matter.157 The term ‘regime’, borrowed from international relations theory, is 
defined as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.’158 Regime complexes manifest through the existence of 
legal agreements created and maintained in different fora with the participation of 
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different sets of actors.159 The agreements in these regimes functionally overlap, 
however there is no agreed hierarchy for resolving conflicts between them.160 The 
agreements covering plant variety protection are TRIPS, the UPOV Convention, 
the ITPGRFA, and the CBD alongside regional and bilateral agreements. Apart 
from state actors, non-state actors involved in the plant variety protection regime 
include intergovernmental organisations, regional organisations, CSOs, and seed 
companies. 
 
The existence of overlapping institutions covering one subject enables actors to 
relocate rule-making processes to international institutions where they are best able 
to promote preferred rules and achieve desired outcomes – otherwise known as 
forum or regime shifting.161 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos define forum 
shifting as a strategy through which powerful actors (from the Global North) seek 
to shift a specific agenda from one international forum to another, or at times 
attempt to entirely abandon a forum when they consider their interests as being 
threatened.162 While Braithwaite and Drahos explain that only powerful actors 
forum shift, Laurence Helfer points out that both powerful and relatively weak 
parties (from the Global South) can engage in ‘regime shifting.’163 Helfer observes 
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that regime shifting provides an opportunity for Global South countries to create 
‘counter regime norms’, which are binding treaty rules and non-binding soft law 
standards that seek to reshape existing international laws.164 For plant variety 
protection, these counter-regime norms are farmers’ rights along with access and 
benefit-sharing principles.  
 
However, Daniel Drezner perceptively points out that overlapping institutions with 
contradictory mandates could raise the costs of compliance for all actors, which 
create dynamics that favour the Global North.165 This is because Global North 
countries possess greater capabilities or strategies for institutional creation, 
monitoring, and enforcement.166 Indeed, negotiating international treaties in 
regimes with inconsistent elements – or divergent provisions – requires technical 
expertise and resources which are more readily available to Global North countries 
than to Global South ones. This is evidenced by the role of Global North countries 
such as the US, the EU, Japan, and Canada in the TRIPS negotiations.  
 
While the regime complex lens provides useful insights for understanding the 
increasing density of international agreements and interactions among institutions 
relevant to plant variety protection, its sole focus on the regimes under study is one 
of its criticisms.167 For example, the focus on the plant variety protection regimes 
alone does not completely explain the consequences of the overlapping regimes on 
small-scale farmers at the national level. Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier call 
scholars who apply the regime complex theory ‘to give equal weight to analysing 
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Application of Regime Complex to Thesis  
 
The key insight that regime complex provides for analysis in this thesis is that it 
draws attention to how the overlapping non-hierarchical regimes shape and 
constrain the introduction of plant variety protection systems at the national level. 
 
While Global South actors may succeed in introducing preferred provisions in 
alternative international treaties, implementation of these provisions at the national 
level may be undermined through provisions in other regimes. This is reflected in 
the plant variety protection example. Although Global South actors succeeded in 
pushing for farmers’ rights along with access and benefit sharing in the FAO and 
the CBD, Global North countries such as the US and European countries have 
restricted certain Global South countries from designing creative sui generis 
systems through additional bilateral trade or investment agreements – otherwise 
known as ‘TRIPS-plus’ agreements.169 These TRIPS-plus agreements eliminate or 
substantially constrain some Global South countries’ flexibility to implement 
preferred plant varieties protection systems by expressly mandating them to enact 
UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems that favour multinational agribusinesses. 
 
Furthermore, regime complex characterised by overlapping institutions covering 
one subject matter also translates to fragmentation of institutions with mandates to 
implement treaties at the national level. For example, in Nigeria, the Ministry of 
Trade and Ministry of Justice have the mandate for IPRs-related matters under 
TRIPS. The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for food and agriculture issues 
– including farmers’ rights under the FAO – while the Ministry of Environment 
covers biodiversity matters, including access and benefit-sharing under the CBD. 
Yet there is no synergy amongst these institutions. As such, while the Global South 
may push for pockets of preferred principles in favourable international 
institutions, reconciling the different principles in a coherent national legislation 
may be a bigger challenge. Conversely, for the often more experienced Global 
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North actors, regime complexity provides an opportunity to implement their 
preferred interpretation of the international treaty obligations.  
 
In sum, TWAIL supplemented with regime complex theory draws attention not 
only to the broad historical contexts, role of actors, narratives and counter-
narratives, but also to strategies such as bilateral trade agreements which could 
further expand rules in the overlapping plant variety protection regimes. While 
TWAIL seeks to reform or transform international law, it is also important to pay 
attention to other factors that may impede the implementation of the proposed 
alternative legal systems at the national level. It is here that TWAIL scholars such 
as Eslava and Pahuja’s call for careful implementation of international law at the 
national level dovetails with insights from regime complex.  
 
1.4. Note on Methods  
 
The research for this thesis involves empirical and comparative studies alongside 
contextual analysis of primary and secondary literature. The empirical study 
conducted in Nigeria for over a period of three months – from August to October 
2015 – draws on 52 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders relevant to plant 
variety protection. The stakeholders include small-scale farmers, farming 
communities, CSOs, plant breeders, academics, legal practitioners, and 
government officials from the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, Justice, and 
Trade.  
 
As this thesis seeks to provide deeper insights into plant variety protection in 
Nigeria which is otherwise unavailable in literature, semi-structured interviews 
were adopted. Semi-structured interviews are flexible interview methods where the 
interviewer has guide questions, but also discretion in the order of interrogation.170 
The semi-structured interview method was useful to elicit detailed information 
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from the interviewees, as the interviewer could seek elaboration and clarification 
of answers given.171  
 
The interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of relevant issues 
covered in the thesis, their willingness to participate, and availability (see 
Appendix 1 for list of interviewees). Significantly, the interviewees’ responses 
sufficiently covered the range of issues investigated. Irving Seidman highlights two 
criteria for determining how many interviewees are enough for a study: sufficiency 
and saturation of information.172 Sufficiency is where the numbers reflect the range 
of participants, while saturation is the point where the researcher starts hearing the 
same information and no longer learns anything new.173 
 
The main challenge in conducting the semi-structured interviews was access to the 
potential interviewees. The author sent out over 35 formal electronic mails and 
letters to potential interviewees to initiate contact prior to fieldwork, but only 11 
responses were received. Reasons for the low response rate to electronic mail could 
be limited access to internet services, lack of interest or awareness about plant 
variety protection, or simply lack of motivation to reply. However, one of the ways 
in which the author was able to obtain access to the interviewees was by attending 
a workshop organised to review the guidelines and regulations for Nigeria’s 
Biosafety Act.174 Johnson Ekpere (the author’s fourth interviewee) informed the 
author about this workshop during her interview with him, and assured her that 
many of her potential interviewees would attend, which was indeed the case. 
Ekpere introduced the author to them, which made subsequent scheduling of 
interviews easier.175 The second way in which the author obtained access to the 
interviewees, particularly top government officials, was by interning at the WTO 
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office in Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment. With this 
role, the author had direct access and referrals to the government officials working 
on plant variety protection-related issues in Nigeria. However, the author was 
unable to interview all the targeted interviewees, as some government officials and 
academics did not respond to interview requests or were unable to commit to a time 
for the interview due to busy schedules. Nonetheless, the comprehensive responses 
from the interviews granted outweighed the few refusals.  
 
The comparative study involved an analysis of the variations in plant variety 
protection in the Global South. The author examined Global South countries with 
both UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems and creative sui generis systems. The 
aim of this examination was to draw lessons on plant variety protection law-making 
for Nigeria. For the group of countries with UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems, 
the author examined examples from African regional organisations such as the 
African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI), and countries such as Kenya, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Morocco. For examples of countries with 
creative sui generis systems, the author examined India and Thailand’s plant 
variety protection systems.  
 
African countries with UPOV ‘plant breeders’ rights’ systems provide useful 
lessons for Nigeria for two reasons. First, these African countries and Nigeria 
subscribe to the African Model Law, which provides guidelines for countries 
seeking to design sui generis plant variety protection systems. Second, the African 
countries and Nigeria contribute to the African position at the TRIPS Council, 
which advocates for a sui generis plant variety protection system. Notwithstanding 
the African Model Law and Africa’s common position at the TRIPS Council, these 
African countries have joined UPOV. Therefore, understanding why they joined 
UPOV would provide invaluable lessons for Nigeria because it still has pending 
obligations to design a plant variety protection system under TRIPS. 
 
The Indian and Thai experiences are useful examples for a variety of reasons. First, 
India and Thailand, along with Nigeria and other Global South WTO members, 
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started with the same position on plant variety protection at the TRIPS Council. 
These Global South countries collectively advocated for creative sui generis 
systems as the most suited option to protect plant varieties. While India and 
Thailand translated their ‘rhetoric’ into domestic legal architecture, Nigeria is yet 
to do so. Examining how India and Thailand successfully translated the common 
Global South position at the TRIPS Council into domestic law provides useful 
lessons for Nigeria. Second, both India and Thailand have a large population of 
small-scale farmers, similar to Nigeria. Paying attention to how small-scale 
farmers’ interests are addressed in India and Thailand’s plant variety protection 
system can guide Nigeria. Third, both India and Thailand have private seed 
companies operating in their seed sectors, which is one of the Nigerian 
government’s agricultural policy objectives. The Nigerian government’s current 
agricultural policy seeks to promote private sector investments in agriculture.176 
Understanding how India and Thailand balance private seed companies’ and small-
scale farmers’ interests generates lessons for Nigeria.  
 
The analysis in this thesis also draws from a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources. The key primary sources include texts of TRIPS, the CBD, the ITPGRFA, 
the UPOV Convention, the African Model Law, national plant variety protection 
laws, and case law. Other official sources on the international treaties include the 
TRIPS, CBD, ITPGRFA, UPOV and WIPO documents. The research for this 
thesis benefited from secondary sources such as government, industry, and CSO 
documents, including working papers and policy reports from national workshops 
on IPRs in Nigeria, the African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Farmers’ Rights 
Resource Pages, GRAIN, Gaia Foundation, UK Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Crucible Group, South Centre, Association of Plant Breeders for 
the Benefit of Society (APBREBES), as well as the International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute (IPGRI), amongst others. Furthermore, textbooks, articles, and 
web sources on plant variety protection-related issues also provided useful sources 
of data. Both the primary and secondary sources were accessible from libraries 
(mainly the University of Warwick library and the British Library) and online.  
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Overall, the empirical study supplemented the limited literature on plant variety 
protection in Nigeria. It not only generated new data, it also broadened or clarified 
data from existing literature. Furthermore, both the comparative study and range 
of sources consulted helped to provide a richer understanding of the plant variety 
protection debates.   
 
1.5. Original Contributions 
 
This thesis provides original empirical, analytical, and methodological 
contributions to literature on plant variety protection. First, the thesis presents 
original empirical analysis of plant variety protection in Nigeria. Previous 
scholarly studies have discussed access and benefit sharing, farmers’ rights, and 
IPRs in Nigeria’s agricultural sector, however no study has discussed the historical 
and political economy context of plant variety protection in Nigeria.177 Thus, in 
being the first empirical study of plant variety protection in Nigeria, the thesis 
makes an original contribution to the existing literature. 
 
Second, the thesis develops a novel analytical framework for studying plant variety 
protection law-making in the Global South. The thesis proposes that factors that 
                                                 
177 For literature on access and benefit sharing, farmers’ rights, and IPRs in the  agricultural sector 
in Nigeria, see generally Olawale Ajai, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Biotechnology 
Regulation in Nigeria’ (1997) 6(1) Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environmental Law 42; Oludayo Amokaye, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Access to 
and Exploitation of Genetic Resources and the Land Tenure System in Nigeria’ (1999) 11(1) 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 86; Kent Nnadozie, ‘Access to Genetic 
Resources in Nigeria’ in Kent Nnadozie, Robert Lettington, Carl Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah 
King (eds), African Perspectives on Genetic Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and 
Institutions (Environmental Law Institute 2003); Kent Nnadozie, ‘Nigeria’ in Robert J Lewis-
Lettington and Serah Mwanyiki (eds), Case Studies on Access and Benefit Sharing (International 
Plant Genetic Resources Institute 2006); Victor M Ibigbami and Christopher Orji, ‘A Review of 
the Nigerian System of Intellectual Property’ in Institutionalisation of Intellectual Property 
Management: Case Study from Four Agricultural Research Institutions in Developing Countries 
(CAS-IP Rome 2009); C H Abo, J Abah, and N Danbaba (eds), Proceedings of the National 
Workshop on Intellectual Property (IP): Issues, Rights and Obligations (National Cereals Research 
Institute, Badeggi, Nigeria, 2010); Eric C Eboh, Baseline Study of Nigeria’s Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) for Agricultural Research Technologies and Innovations Generated in National 
Agricultural Research Institutes and Universities, Revised National Synthesis Report (West Africa 
Agriculture Productivity Programme and Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria, September 
2013); Josephine Bosede Ayoola, Gbolagade Babalola Ayoola, and D O Chikwendu, ‘An 
Assessment of Intellectual Property Rights in Nigeria Agriculture’ (2014) 3(6) International Journal 
of Innovative Research and Development 337. 
43 
 
contribute to plant variety protection law-making in the Global South include trade 
agreements, regional associations, seed companies, the UPOV office lobbies, and 
civil society activism. Any one of the first four factors can influence a country to 
join or adopt the UPOV ‘plant breeders’ rights’ system, but the fifth factor 
contributes to countries designing creative sui generis plant variety protection 
systems.178  
 
Third, this thesis provides a novel TWAIL analysis of plant variety protection, and 
it also presents a multi-layered analysis of TWAIL. In applying TWAIL to plant 
variety protection, the thesis shows the utility of supplementing it with insights 
from regime complex to understand the intricate web of legal regimes regulating 
plant variety protection. Drawing from TWAIL and regime complex, this thesis 
proposes creative sui generis systems that pull together varied interests of the Third 
World as suited to Global South WTO members such as Nigeria.  
 
The application of the three contributions to the Nigerian case study breaks new 
ground by uncovering why Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, 
why it ought to have one, and how it can design such system. Significantly, the 
thesis rejects the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system as ‘the single’ interpretation 
of sui generis under TRIPS as promoted by Europe and the US. It calls for Nigeria 
and other Global South countries to draw inspiration from creative sui generis 
systems such as those in place in India and Thailand, or the African Model Law.  
 
1.6. Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters including this introductory chapter and 
the conclusion. Chapter 2 explores the current situation in Nigeria concerning plant 
variety protection. This exploration helps to understand how the obligation to 
protect plant varieties applies to Nigeria and what type of plant variety protection 
system is best suited to Nigeria. The chapter begins with the international 
obligations Nigeria is signatory to, alongside relevant domestic institutions 
                                                 
178 See analysis in Chapter 6. 
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responsible for implementing these obligations. Although Nigeria does not have a 
plant variety protection system, this chapter highlights the existing legislation 
regulating the registration and release of new plant varieties. Furthermore, the 
chapter investigates seed systems and farming practices. It finds that over 80 per 
cent of the farmers in Nigeria are small-scale farmers who mostly engage in 
traditional farming practices and source their seeds from the informal seed sector. 
Thus, the chapter argues that the plant variety protection system suited to Nigeria 
is one that takes into consideration the interests of both private seed companies and 
small-scale farmers. What exactly are the different options for the protection of 
plant varieties under TRIPS? Why should Nigeria consider choosing a creative sui 
generis system over patents or UPOV ‘plant breeders’ rights’?  These questions 
and more are answered in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the different conflicting plant variety protection systems 
allowed under TRIPS, explaining the benefits and drawbacks of each of these 
systems for Nigeria. The systems examined are patents, UPOV plant breeders’ 
rights system, creative sui generis systems which incorporates legal principles 
suited to a country, or a combination of two or more of the aforementioned systems. 
Using the TWAIL lens, the chapter engages with the debates regarding each of 
these systems, particularly teasing out the divergences in the Global North and 
Global South debates. In answer to the central research question about the plant 
variety protection system best suited to Nigeria, the chapter finds that the sui 
generis system is best suited to Nigeria because it protects the interests of both 
small-scale farmers and private seed companies (commercial plant breeders). 
Indeed, Nigeria, as part of the African Group, along with other Global South WTO 
members, express preference for the sui generis option at the TRIPS Council. 
Nonetheless, Global South countries are increasingly relinquishing the choice 
offered under TRIPS by designing UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems. 
Consequently, Chapter 4 investigates factors that influence this proliferation of 




Chapter 4 begins with the African Model Law, which embodies the African 
position on plant variety protection. Notably, reflecting the TWAIL approach of 
creating bottom-up alternatives, the African Group went a step further to construct 
an African Model Law which presents creative sui generis guidelines for African 
countries seeking to design plant variety protection systems. However, rather than 
drawing inspiration from the African Model Law, African organisations such as 
OAPI, and countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Morocco, 
and South Africa have gone the UPOV way. African organisations such as the 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) have also initiated the process of 
joining UPOV. Although Nigeria is not a member of any of these regional 
associations, understanding the rationale for UPOV’s proliferation in Africa is 
useful, particularly because of the geographical closeness, similar cultures, and 
farming practices. In answer to the subsidiary research question about variations in 
plant variety protection systems in the Global South, this chapter finds that factors 
such as trade agreements, regional associations, pressure from seed companies, and 
UPOV office lobbies influence the proliferation of the UPOV plant breeders’ rights 
system and disregard for the African Model Law in Africa. However, as will be 
seen in Chapter 5, not all Global South countries have succumbed to the pressure 
to join UPOV.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates how and why India and Thailand translated the common 
Global South position – which advocated for a sui generis system – into domestic 
legislation. While India and Thailand experienced pressures to join UPOV similar 
to the African countries in Chapter 4, vibrant CSOs contributed to resisting UPOV 
lobbies and the successful design of creative sui generis systems. India and 
Thailand exemplify the TWAIL approach of implementing international laws in 
ways that address the needs and aspirations of marginalised peoples – in this case, 
small-scale farmers. This is because the Indian and Thai plant variety protection 
systems both incorporate provisions that reflect small-scale farmers’ interests, such 
as the protection of farmers’ varieties, as well as farmers’ rights to save and reuse 
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seeds. As such, this chapter further contributes to answering the subsidiary research 
question about variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South. 
 
Chapter 6 revisits the Nigerian case study. The analyses in Chapters 2 to 5 reveal 
that plant variety protection is not simply a linear process. That is, there are a 
variety of factors that influence the introduction of national plant variety protection 
systems. Notably, the thesis finds that while India and Thailand were designing sui 
generis systems, Nigeria was under a strict military regime which did not prioritise 
the fulfilment of international obligations. Furthermore, although Nigeria has not 
experienced any of the factors that influence the proliferation of UPOV plant 
breeder’s rights within Africa, such as trade agreements, regional associations, 
pressure from seed companies, and UPOV office lobbies, it also does not have 
vibrant CSOs that can push for a creative sui generis system in the country. While 
Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, the chapter unpacks the 
plant variety protection provisions in its IPC Bill. The analysis in this chapter 
contributes to answering the second central research question about how to 
introduce the proposed creative sui generis plant variety protection system suited 
to Nigeria.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by synthesising the main findings in Chapters 1 to 
6. It further sets out recommendations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2  
Background on Plant Variety Protection in Nigeria 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 1, Nigeria had up to 1 January 2000 to implement its 
obligations to protect plant varieties under TRIPS.1 To date, Nigeria does not have 
a plant variety protection system, and there does not seem to be any immediate 
consequence for missing this deadline. For one, no WTO member has taken 
Nigeria to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for failing to fulfil its obligation. 
Nonetheless, considering its pending TRIPS obligations, this chapter provides a 
background on Nigeria vis-à-vis plant variety protection. Significantly, this chapter 
sets the scene for the further political economy analysis on plant variety protection 
in Nigeria covered in Chapter 6. This is because the specific political economy 
issues to analyse is uncovered after understanding Nigeria’s realities, the plant 
variety protection system suited to the country, and the dynamics in the plant 
variety protection law-making discussed in Chapters 3 to 5. As such, this chapter 
begins to tell the Nigerian story by setting out its international obligations, existing 
legal framework for plant varieties, farming practices, and current agricultural 
policy.2 Importantly, this chapter aims to contribute to answering the first central 
research question which concerns the type of plant variety protection system best 
suited to Nigeria.  
 
                                                 
1 As a ‘developing country’ member of the WTO, Nigeria was entitled to a period of five years 
from the date TRIPS entered into force (1 January 1995) to fulfil its obligations. TRIPS, art 65. 
2 These background themes are derived from policy literature and commission reports on the 
implementation of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS in the Global South, such as Dan Leskien and Michael 
Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System’ (Issues in Genetic Resources No 6, International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, June 
1997) 69; Geoff Tansey, Trade, Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: Key Issues and 
options for the 1999 review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement: A Discussion Paper (Quaker 
Peace & Service London in association with Quaker United Nations Office 1999) 14; Dwijen 
Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (Study Paper 3a, 
United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002) 32;  N P Louwaars, R Tripp,  
D Eaton, V Henson-Apollonio, R Hu, M Mendoza, F Muhhuku, S Pal, and J Wekundah, Impacts 
of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in Developing 
Countries: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies (Report Commissioned by the World Bank, February 
2005) 63-65 <https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf> accessed 
28 June 2017; Carlos M Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries: A Tool for 
Designing a Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection System: An Alternative to UPOV 1991 
(APBREBES 2015) 7. 
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Drawing from regime complex, this chapter finds that the overlapping treaties 
covering plant variety protection is reflected at the national level, as there are 
various national institutions with mandates to implement different elements of 
these treaties. Second, Nigeria’s patent system prohibits patents for plant varieties. 
Despite intellectual property rights (IPRs) reform attempts, Nigeria does not have 
a sui generis plant variety protection system. However, it has laws that regulate the 
registration, release, and commercialisation of plant varieties. Yet, these laws do 
not fulfil the TRIPS obligations to protect plant varieties, as they are not IPRs laws. 
That is, they do not provide exclusive rights over the varieties for a specific 
duration. Third, although Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, 
it has a practice of granting private companies a 10-year moratorium to exclusively 
market new varieties.3 However, this moratorium is not enforceable because it is 
not backed by any Nigerian legislation. Fourth, the farming practices and seed 
system show that the type of plant variety protection system suited to Nigeria is 
one that balances the interests of both small-scale farmers and seed companies 
(commercial breeders’).4 This is because while Nigeria’s agricultural policy 
promotes a private sector-led agriculture sector, the TWAIL analytical lens applied 
to this background mapping shows that small-scale farmers not only save, reuse, 
exchange, and sell seeds, they also contribute to the informal seed sector.   
 
                                                 
3 Fieldwork interview with Zidafamor Ebiarede Jimmy, Deputy Director for Seed Production at the 
National Agricultural Seeds Council of Nigeria (Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author); 
Fieldwork interview with Yarama D Ndirpaya, Deputy Director and Program Manager of Natural 
Resource Management at the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (Abuja, 2015) (transcript 
on file with author). 
4 While the public sector is an important contributor to the seed sector in Nigeria as seen later in 
2.2 below, the focus of this thesis is small-scale farmers and seed companies (or commercial 
breeders). As such, the thesis does not address discussions about whether public institutions should 
be granted plant variety protection. For discussions about public institutions and plant variety 
protection, see for example, Mywish Maredia, Frederic Erbisch, Anwar Naseem, Amie Hightower, 
James Oehmke, Dave Weatherspoon, and Wolf Christopher, ‘Public Agricultural Research and the 
Protection of Intellectual Property: Issues and Options’ (1999) 2 (3 & 4) AgBioForum 247-252; 
Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Agriculture: An Analysis of the Economic 
Impact of Plant Breeders’ Rights’ (Actionaid UK, March 2000)  
<https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/content_document/ipr.pdf> accessed 21 July 
2017; The World Bank, Intellectual Property Rights: Designing Regimes to Support Plant Breeding 
in Developing Countries (Report No 35517-GLB, The World Bank, Agriculture and Rural 
Development Department, 2006) 35-44.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Part I sets out Nigeria’s obligations in relation 
to plant variety protection. It discusses the obligations in the context of national 
institutions with the mandates to implement them. Part II examines Nigeria’s patent 
system, the release, registration, and commercialisation laws, as well as the 
practice of granting moratoriums. Part III explores the informal seed system, 
including farmers’ varieties and traditional farming systems. Part IV assesses 
Nigeria’s current agricultural policy which promotes private sector investments in 
agriculture. Overall, this background chapter illuminates Nigeria’s current 
situation with regard to plant variety protection, thereby setting the scene for the 
entire thesis and contributing to answering the first central research question. 
 
2.1. Nigeria: Plant Variety Protection Regimes 
 
Nigeria is signatory to three treaties relevant to plant variety protection, namely 
TRIPS, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA.5 As noted in Chapter 1, Nigeria is a 
significant interlocutor for Africa and the Global South at the TRIPS Council and 
other international forums. For example, Nigeria was part of the ‘Group of Ten’ 
Global South countries actively involved in the TRIPS negotiations.6 During the 
TRIPS negotiations, the Nigerian delegate to the Brussels Ministerial Meeting – 
Senas J. Ukpanah, argued that the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) -WTO’s predecessor, ought to be confined to trade-related issues and not 
deal with IPRs protection and enforcement, as the latter would impose an 
unbearable burden on Nigeria by stifling the country’s aspiration towards access 
to technology.7 Similarly, Nigeria actively participated in pre-CBD meetings since 
                                                 
5 Nigeria signed the TRIPS on 15 April 1994, the CBD on 13 June 1992, and the ITPGRFA on 10 
June 2002. Although Nigeria is party to TRIPS and the CBD, it is not party to the ITPGRFA as it 
is yet to ratify it. 
6 See Chapter 1. The Group of Ten was led by Brazil and India. The other countries were Argentina, 
Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia. Jane Bradley, ‘Intellectual Property 
Rights, Investments, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations’ (1987) 
23 Stanford Journal of International Law 57, 81; Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and 
International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ (2002) 5(5) Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 765, 773. 




the second Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity in 1990.8 
Indeed, Nigeria was one of the countries that volunteered to undertake a 
biodiversity case study during the intergovernmental negotiations for the CBD.9 
Despite Nigeria’s active participation highlighted in the examples above, there is a 
striking disconnect between Nigeria’s contributions at the international level and 
its government’s actions at the national level. In other words, although Nigeria was 
vibrant in discussions leading to the conclusion of these international treaties, it 
has not translated this vibrancy to designing domestic legal frameworks for plant 
varieties.  
 
This chapter shows that one reason the vibrant international activism has not 
translated to national plant variety protection legislation is the lack of synergy 
among the national institutions with mandates to implement different provisions in 
the plant variety protection regime. Three key institutions – the Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), Federal Ministry of 
Environment (FME), and Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment 
(FMITI) – responsible for implementing obligations under the ITPGRFA, the 
CBD, and TRIPS are discussed below. While discussing these institutions, the 
consequences of not implementing the international obligations relevant to plant 
variety protection in Nigeria are also highlighted. 
 
2.1.1. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development    
 
The FMARD is responsible for coordinating agriculture and promoting rural 
development in Nigeria.10 Established in 1966 with a mandate to stimulate 
agricultural development in Nigeria, the FMARD oversees about 50 parastatals, 
                                                 
8 CBD, Pre-CBD Meetings < https://www.cbd.int/history/> accessed 06 June 2017; United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of its Second 
Session in Preparation for a Legal Instrument on Biological Diversity of the Planet (2nd session, 
19-23 February 1990) UNEP/Bio.Div.2/3 <https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/iccbd/bdewg-
02/official/bdewg-02-03-en.pdf> accessed 06 June 2017. 
9 The case studies were undertaken to get estimates of projected costs, benefits, and unmet needs 
for global biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. UNEP – Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity, Biodiversity Country Studies, Note by the 
Executive Director (23 April 1992) UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-INC.5/3 2 (‘Biodiversity Country Studies’). 
10 FMARD <http://fmard.gov.ng/about/> accessed 06 June 2017. 
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including agricultural agencies, agricultural research institutes, and federal 
colleges of agriculture.11 As the FMARD covers agriculture and rural 
development, it is the national point of contact for the ITPGRFA.12 However, the 
provisions of the ITPGRFA relevant to plant variety protection, including farmers’ 
rights to save, reuse, exchange, and sell farm-saved seeds, are not legally binding 
in Nigeria because it has not ratified the ITPGRFA.13  
 
Yarama Ndirpaya, Deputy Director and Program Manager of Natural Resource 
Management at the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN), the agency 
under the FMARD responsible for managing the agricultural research system in 
Nigeria, explains that: 
 
Efforts were made to domesticate the treaty [ITPGRFA] in times past. I 
recall a time when the ratification documents were drafted, the then 
Honourable Minister was to deposit the ratification documents at the [Food 
and Agriculture Organisation] FAO office in Rome, but unfortunately all 
efforts to lay hands on the documents have proved abortive with his 
removal. We [the ARCN] have been trying to get the document, so that the 
upcoming Minister of Agriculture will be sensitised. It is the purview of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Research Council to 
ensure that Nigeria ratifies that treaty. Even though I know Nigeria in the 
last administration has been trying to reduce the number of treaties Nigeria 
is signatory to, Nigeria is working towards the ratification of the 
ITPGRFA.14 
 
                                                 
11 Parastatals are organisations owned or controlled by national governments. The parastatals under 
the FMARD include 13 agencies, 17 agricultural research institutes, and 16 federal colleges of 
agriculture. 
12 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture – Nigeria <http://www.fao.org/plant-
treaty/countries/membership/country-details/en/c/359344/?iso3=NGA> accessed 06 June 2017.  
13 The opening paragraph of this part also highlights that although Nigeria has signed the ITPGRFA, 
it has not ratified it.  
14 Fieldwork interview with Ndirpaya (n 3). 
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Two points come to the fore here. First, Nigeria’s international activism on 
farmers’ rights is not mirrored in the national institution with the mandate to 
implement it. As such, Nigeria does not have a national legislation on farmers’ 
rights. Second, the absence of national legislation on farmers’ rights is not 
particularly disturbing because Nigeria also does not have a plant variety protection 
system. Therefore, farmers are not prohibited from saving, reusing, and 
exchanging farm-saved seeds.15  
 
2.1.2. The Federal Ministry of Environment 
 
The FME coordinates environmental matters in Nigeria.16 It was established in 
June 1999 to harmonise fragmented environmental issues previously handled by 
different ministries.17 Accordingly, it seeks to cooperate with relevant stakeholders 
on environmental matters, such as other government ministries, departments, 
agencies, CSOs, the private sector, and international organisations.18 With its focus 
on environmental issues, the FME is the national focal point for the CBD.19 A key 
provision from the CBD relevant to plant variety protection is access and benefit 
sharing.20 As discussed in Chapter 1, Global South actors including Nigeria 
                                                 
15 Farmers’ rights will be discussed in detail as one of the components of a sui generis system in 
Chapter 3.  
16 Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) <http://environment.gov.ng/about.html> accessed 06 
June 2017.  
17 ibid.  
18 ibid.  
19 CBD, Nigeria – Overview <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=ng> accessed 06 June 2017. 
The national focal point is the person or institution designated to represent a country at meetings of 
the CBD Conference of Parties (CBD-COP) and routine dealings with the CBD Secretariat. The 
dealings include activities such as communications, dissemination of information, representation at 
meetings, and facilitating national implementation of the CBD. 
20 Access and benefit sharing will be discussed in detail as one of the components of a sui generis 
system in Chapter 3. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Nagoya Protocol) sets out a transparent legal framework for the implementation of access 
and benefit sharing under the CBD. As opposed to the CBD which leaves it open for contracting 
parties to negotiate access and benefit sharing agreements, the Nagoya Protocol establishes 
conditions for access to genetic resources and equitable benefit sharing. Nigeria signed the Nagoya 
Protocol on 1 February 2012, but it is yet to ratify it. The Nagoya Protocol was adopted at the 10th 




advocated for access and benefit sharing principles to recognise and reward the use 
of plant genetic resources sourced from the Global South.21  
 
Nigeria has an access and benefit sharing regulation – the National Environmental 
(Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing) Regulation 2009 (National 
Environmental Regulation). The National Environmental Regulation was prepared 
by the National Environmental Standards and Regulation Agency (NESREA), 
which is an agency under the FME. However, the National Environmental 
Regulation is not operational because the FME does not recognise it. FME officials 
assert that the FME does not endorse the regulation because NESREA went beyond 
its powers in drafting it.22   
 
John Onyekuru, the CBD national focal point contact and Deputy Director of 
Forestry Conservation at the FME, maintains that it is only the FME that is 
conferred with the powers and mandate to make access and benefit sharing laws.23 
Onyekuru explains that the FME is the national competent authority for the 
approval of applications for access to genetic resources in Nigeria, therefore these 
applications have to be made directly to the FME, not to one of its agencies.24 This 
discord is a symptom of the lack of synergy amongst government institutions even 
within the same ministry.  
 
Although Nigeria does not have an operational access and benefit sharing 
framework, national and international research institutes that collect plant genetic 
resources from across Nigeria do so with approval of the National Centre for 
Genetic Resources and Biotechnology (NACGRAB).25 NACGRAB is the 
government agency responsible for genetic resources conservation and utilisation 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 1.  
22 Fieldwork Interview with John Onyekuru, CBD National Focal Point Contact and Deputy 
Director for Forestry Conservation at the Federal Ministry of Environment of Nigeria (Abuja, 2015) 
(transcript on file with author).  
23 ibid.  
24 ibid.  
25 The NACGRAB is actually an agency under the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology 
(FMST) 
<http://www.nacgrab.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=53> 
accessed 06 June 2017.  
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in Nigeria.26 Plant materials collected during explorations by these research 
institutions are stored in the NACGRAB or the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA) gene banks.27 Sunday Aladele, the Registrar of NACGRAB, 
explains that all materials collected and saved in the NACGRAB gene bank are 
saved with their full data, including the geographical source of origin.28 Similarly, 
Michael Abberton, the head of the Genetic Resources Center of the IITA, explains 
that the IITA addresses access and benefit sharing by carrying out their exploration 
and collection with the national authority: 
 
We collect everything with them [NACGRAB]. Then it comes to us [IITA]. 
We [IITA] would not collect in Nigeria or anywhere else without the 
consent of the national authority. The materials come to us under Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement [SMTAs] of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Then, it becomes part of our 
[IITA] collection, and becomes available for the whole world. We get the 
informed consent by operating with the national agency. We tell them [the 
farmers] right from the outset what we are doing, and we give them some 
compensation…. We disclose the origin and all the characteristics in line 
with SMTAs.29 
 
However, NACGRAB’s approval only covers plant genetic resources collected by 
national and international research institutes. This means that other interested 
parties, including private companies, can informally collect plant genetic resources 
from Nigeria. Indeed, the group of small-scale farmers interviewed in Iddah 
Community in Nigeria’s Kaduna State remarked that: ‘people have come to take 
our seeds and put it in a container…’30 When asked further, these farmers were not 
                                                 
26 ibid.   
27 IITA, a research for development organisation, is one of the 15 research centres in the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Consortium. The IITA 
headquarters is in Oyo State, Nigeria.  
28 Fieldwork Interview with Dr Sunday Aladele, Registrar of NACGRAB (Ibadan, 2015) (transcript 
on file with author). 
29 Fieldwork interview with Michael Abberton, Head of the Genetic Resources Centre of IITA 
(Ibadan, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 




aware of access and benefit sharing issues. They were happy to freely give away 
their seeds (plant genetic resources), along with associated knowledge about the 
seeds.31 Considering Nigeria’s large land mass covering 923,768 sq. km, its 
population of over 186 million people, the low level of awareness about access and 
benefit sharing amongst farmers, and the absence of an operational access and 
benefit sharing framework, it is easy to informally collect plant genetic resources 
from Nigeria.32 Kent Nnadozie rightly concludes that there are no official records 
or data of the private sector’s collection of plant genetic resources from Nigeria.33 
 
Nonetheless, the FME has received applications for permits from a US 
pharmaceutical company and a Japanese research institute to access genetic 
resources from Nigeria.34 Benedicta Falana, the CBD Access and Benefit Sharing 
national focal point contact in Nigeria, notes that as there is no formal procedure 
for granting access to genetic resources in Nigeria, applications are considered on 
an ad hoc basis.35 So far, the Minister of Environment, who is the national 
competent authority under the CBD, has granted two tentative permits for access 
to genetic resources in Nigeria in 2002 and 2015, respectively.36 However, the 
grounds on which these permits are granted are unclear, as there is no operational 




                                                 
31 ibid. 
32 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria: Population, Total (2016)’  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG> accessed 06 June 2017. 
33 Kent Nnadozie, ‘Access to Genetic Resources in Nigeria’ in Kent Nnadozie, Robert Lettington, 
Carl Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah King (eds), African Perspectives on Genetic Resources: A 
Handbook on Laws, Policies and Institutions (Environmental Law Institute 2003) 182. 
34 Fieldwork interview with Benedicta O Falana, CBD-ABS Primary National Focal Point Contact 
(Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
35 ibid.  
36 ibid. Tentative permits granted so far: (1) to Immune Modulation Inc (Immune), a pharmaceutical 
company in the US. On 10 July 2002, permit was granted for Immune to carry out bioprospecting 
on a plant, i.e. Hypostea rosea; and (2) retrospective permit granted to the National Institute of 
Agro-biological Science, Ibaraki, Japan. On 6 August 2015, permit was granted for the use of an 
African Chironomid, i.e. Polypendum vander planki. 
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2.1.3. The Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment  
 
The FMITI is responsible for coordinating the industrial, trade, and investment 
sectors in Nigeria.37 It was restructured in 2011 to promote economic growth.38 
The commercial law department of the FMITI oversees Nigeria’s Trademarks, 
Patents, and Designs Registry.39 In addition, the FMITI’s Department for Trade’s 
Multilateral Trade Division has a WTO unit that focuses on WTO-related matters. 
Thus, the FMITI is responsible for implementing TRIPS provisions in Nigeria. As 
Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, IPRs for new plant 
varieties are unavailable in the country. Simeon Onyerikwu, the Senior Trade 
Officer at the WTO Department of the FMITI, notes that one factor that contributes 
to the absence of plant variety protection in Nigeria is its lack of national IPRs 
policy.40 He explains that a national IPRs policy would shape Nigeria’s IPRs 
architecture, including plant variety protection.41 In essence, while Nigeria was 
active in the TRIPS negotiations, this is not reflected in its IPRs policy and 
legislation at the national level.  
 
Notably, the Nigerian delegation at the TRIPS Council has addressed concerns 
about plant variety protection in Nigeria. For example, the delegation explained at 
the TRIPS Council meeting from 5 to 7 March 2002 that Nigeria did not have a 
plant variety protection system at the time because it had only recently [in May 
1999] transitioned from military rule to a civilian administration, and the military 
did not pay much attention to fulfilling international obligations.42 The delegates 
                                                 
37 FMITI, About Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment  
<http://www.fmiti.gov.ng/index.php/the-ministry/about-fmiti> accessed 06 June 2017.  
38 ibid.  
39 The Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry is tasked with registering industrial property – 
trademarks, patents, and designs. It does not cover copyrights. Copyrights are registered in the 
Nigerian Copyright Commission, which is supervised by the Federal Ministry of Justice. 
Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry, Commercial Law Department, Federal Ministry of 
Industry, Trade, and Investment <http://www.iponigeria.com/#/> accessed 06 June 2017; Nigerian 
Copyright Commission <http://www.copyright.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/about-the-
commission> accessed 06 June 2017.  
40 Fieldwork interview with Simeon Onyerikwu, Senior Trade Officer at the WTO Department of 
FMITI (Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
41 ibid.  
42 WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of Legislation 
on 5-7 March 2002 (8 June 2004) IP/Q/NGA/1, IP/Q2/NGA/1, IP/Q3/NGA/1, IP/Q4/NGA/1, 2-3. 
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noted that with the return to civilian administration, the government had 
commenced efforts to enact TRIPS-compliant national legislation, including those 
in relation to protection of plant varieties.43 In response to questions posed by the 
United States (US), the European Union (EU), Canada, Japan, and Switzerland 
regarding Nigeria’s efforts to enact a TRIPS-compliant plant variety protection 
system, the delegates explained that the draft Bill on Plant Variety Protection, 
Farmers’ and Breeders’ Rights was at the drafting stage.44 However, as explained 
in 2.2 below, the Bill was not passed into law.   
 
The above discussions of the three main government ministries with mandates to 
implement treaties relevant to plant variety protection in Nigeria shows that the 
FMITI is the ministry that has the mandate to implement TRIPS obligations. While 
the FMARD and FME are responsible for implementing farmers’ rights as well as 
access and benefit sharing principles, which are key components of a creative sui 
generis system. Notably, the FMARD, FME, and FMITI policies all state that they 
commit to collaborating with other government institutions to fulfil their respective 
policy mandates.45 For example, the FMARD’s Agriculture Promotion Policy 
(2016-2020) acknowledges the relationship between agriculture and other sectors 
such as industry and environment.46 Thus, the FMARD commits to collaborating 
with ministries such as the FME and FMITI to meet its policy objectives.47  
 
While the FMARD, FME, and FMITI policy statements point towards 
coordination, in reality, these institutions are uncoordinated, particularly with 
                                                 
The other ways through which the military regime influenced the absence of a plant variety 
protection system in Nigeria will be seen in Chapter 6. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid 3.  
45 See for example, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), The 
Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016-2020): Building on the Successes of the ATA, Closing Key 
Gaps (FMARD 2016) (The Agriculture Promotion Policy) <http://fmard.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/2016-Nigeria-Agric-Sector-Policy-Roadmap_June-15-2016_Final.pdf> 
accessed 17 July 2017; Federal Ministry of Environment (FME), Nigeria: National Policy on the 
Environment Revised 2016 (FME, 2016). 




regard to plant variety protection-related issues. Ruth Okediji neatly concludes 
that: 
It is really at the domestic level that the coordination has to happen. It 
cannot happen multilaterally. But what you are seeing on the domestic 
ground is the reality that different agencies represent different international 
regimes. Environment [FME] does not go for intellectual property-related 
issues. Trade [FMITI] does not go for environment-related issues. Trade 
and Environment go to their respective international meetings, but come 
back with a different emphasis… There has to be an overarching normative 
framework within which each of these industries are working with.48 
 
Table 2.1: Key Government Ministries Relevant to Plant Variety Protection 
in Nigeria 
Ministry Departments/ Parastatals/Agencies 
Federal Ministry of Justice 
(FMJ) 
Nigerian Copyright Commission 
Federal Ministry of Industry, 
Trade, and Investment 
(FMITI) 
Trade Department 
Commercial Law Department – Trademarks, 
Patents and Designs Registry 
Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development (FMARD) 
Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria 
National Agricultural Seed Council  
National Agricultural Research Institutes  
Federal Ministry of 
Environment (FME) 
National Environmental Standards and 
Enforcement Agency 
Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology (FMST) 
National Biotechnology Development Agency 
National Centre for Genetic Resources and 
Biotechnology  
National Office for Technology Acquisition and 
Promotion  
Sources: The government ministries’ websites  
                                                 
48 Fieldwork interview Ruth Okediji (via Skype, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
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2.2. Legislation Regulating Plant Varieties in Nigeria 
 
To be clear, Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system. That is, it does 
not provide IPRs for plant varieties either through a patent or sui generis system. 
In fact, Nigeria’s Patents and Designs Act 1970 (PDA) expressly prohibits patents 
for plant varieties.49 Although IPRs reform attempts have sought to introduce 
comprehensive IPRs legislation, including sui generis plant variety protection 
systems, these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. Nonetheless, Nigeria has 
two laws that regulate plant varieties, namely the National Crop Varieties and 
Livestock Breeds (Registration, etc.) Act 1987 (NCVLBA) and the National 
Agricultural Seed Act 1992 (NASA).50 While these laws are not IPRs systems, they 
are noteworthy because they regulate the registration, release, and 
commercialisation of new plant varieties and seeds in Nigeria. Significantly, this 
thesis finds that the National Crop Varieties Registration and Release Committee 
established under the NCVLBA has a practice of granting private breeders of new 
varieties a 10-year moratorium to exclusively market new varieties released in 
Nigeria. This part discusses the abovementioned laws and practice. 
 
2.2.1. The Patents and Designs Act 
 
The only mention of plant varieties in Nigeria’s IPRs regime is in its PDA. Section 
1.1(a) of the PDA provides that an invention is patentable if it is ‘new, results from 
an inventive activity and is capable of industrial application.’51 As will be seen in 
Chapter 3, these three requirements for patentability are similar to the provisions 
for patentability under TRIPS.52 However, patentable subject matter under the 
PDA differs from TRIPS because Section 1.1(b) of the PDA further provides that 
an invention that ‘contributes to an improvement upon a patented invention’ is 
                                                 
49 The Patents and Designs Act (1970) (PDA) entered into force on 1 December 1971. PDA, ch P2.  
50 National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds (Registration, etc) Act (NCVLBA), Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004), ch N27; National Agricultural Seeds Act (NASA), Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004), ch N5. 
51 PDA, s 1.1(a).  
52 Conditions for patentability are set out under Article 27 of TRIPS. For discussions on patents in 
relation to plant varieties, see Chapter 3 of thesis.  
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patentable.53 This provision covers ‘patents for improvements.’ As such, further 
improvements or developments of patented inventions are also patentable, even 
without the permission or cooperation of the original patent holder.54 The PDA 
incorporates the ‘patents for improvements’ provision to incentivise indigenous 
inventors to develop or adapt foreign inventions to suit Nigerian conditions.55 
Nonetheless, patents on improvements are also required to fulfil the new, 
inventiveness, and industrial applicability requirements for patentability under the 
PDA.56 
 
Under Section 1.2 of the PDA, a new invention is one that ‘does not form part of 
the state of the art.’57 That is, an invention that is not considered common 
knowledge. An invention that results from an inventive activity is one that ‘does 
not obviously follow from the state of the art.’58 In other words, the invention 
should involve an inventive step that is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, 
while an invention is capable of industrial application ‘if it can be manufactured or 
used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.’59 Here, the invention is 
required to demonstrate that it can be translated into a product or a process.60 
However, the PDA provides that patents cannot be validly obtained in respect of 
plant or animal varieties.61 As such, even if new plant varieties fulfil the 
patentability requirements above, they are not patentable. 
 
The exclusion of patents for plant varieties in the PDA is drawn from Section 5 of 
the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property Law 
                                                 
53 PDA, s 1.1(b).  
54 United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), ‘Model Law for 
Developing Countries on Inventions’ (BIRPI Publication No 801(E), 1965) 19 (‘Model Law for 
Developing Countries on Inventions’). 
55 George Sipa-Adjah Yankey, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less Developed 
Countries: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria (Avebury 1987) 212 (International Patents and 
Technology Transfer to Less Developed Countries). 
56 PDA, s 1.1(b).  
57 PDA, s 1.2(a).  
58 PDA, s 1.2(a). 
59 PDA, s 1.2(c). 
60 Rangnekar notes that this principle is to prevent the patenting of discoveries in the sciences. 
Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Agriculture: An Analysis of the Economic 
Impact of Plant Breeders Rights’ (n 4).  
61 PDA, s 1.4(a). 
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Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions (BIRPI Model Law), 
published in May 1965.62 The BIRPI Model Law explanatory note clarifies that the 
exclusion does not preclude the protection of new plant varieties by other IPRs 
systems, such as the ‘plant breeders’ rights’ system under the UPOV Convention.63 
This BIRPI Model Law provision is a reflection of the European position on plant 
variety protection as seen in Chapter 1. Apart from the provision on plant variety 
protection, the PDA in general is modelled on the BIRPI.64 Sipa-Adjah Yankey 
notes that the modelling of the PDA on the BIRPI Model Law was not engendered 
by any national technology policy or plan because none existed at that time.65 He 
explains that the structuring of the PDA on the BIRPI Model Law was influenced 
by the active participation of Nigeria’s representative (D. O. Egbue from the 
Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry – now FMITI) in the pre-BIRPI Model 
Law Committee of Experts meetings.66   
 
The idea for the BIRPI Model Law originated in the 1963 Committee of Experts 
Study on Industrial Property Problems of Industrially Less Developed Countries 
that met in Geneva in 1963.67 The Committee unanimously adopted a 
recommendation which provided ‘that BIRPI should undertake to prepare a draft 
                                                 
62 Section 5 of the BIRPI Model Law provides that ‘patents cannot be validly obtained in respect 
of: plant or animal varieties.’ The BIRPI was the predecessor of the WIPO and was established in 
1893 after the two secretariats set up to administer the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property 1883 and Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
1886 merged. BIRPI was originally based in Berne, Switzerland, but it moved to Geneva in 1960. 
As new states gained independence during the post-1945 decolonialisation period, some states such 
as Nigeria joined the BIRPI by signing one or both of the treaties it oversaw. For discussions on the 
BIRPI and new states or the Global South, see generally, Christopher May, The World Intellectual 
Property Organisation: Resurgence and the Development Agenda (Routledge 2007); Christopher 
May, ‘The World Intellectual Property Organization and the Development Agenda’ (2008) 22(1) 
Global Society 97; Ruth L Okediji, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives 
of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System’ (2003) 7 Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 315. For the BIRPI Model Law, see BIRPI, ‘Model 
Law for Developing Countries on Inventions’ (n 54).  
63 The UPOV 1961 Convention was not yet in force in 1965 when the BIRPI Model Law was 
published. The UPOV I961 Convention entered into force on 10 August 1968.  BIRPI, ‘Model Law 
for Developing Countries on Inventions’ (n 54) 23. 
64 Yankey, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less Developed Countries (n 55) 210. 
65 ibid 211. 
66 ibid. D O Egbue was the Acting Registrar (Commercial Legislation) of the Federal Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry in Lagos. BIRPI, ‘Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions’ (n 
54) 11-12.  
67 BIRPI, ‘Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions’ (n 54) 11. 
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model law for the protection of inventions and technical improvement, taking into 
account the various existing systems, and accompanied by explanatory notes.’68 
BIRPI prepared the draft model law and commentary in early 1964 and submitted 
it to several intergovernmental and non-governmental international organisations, 
as well as to Global South and Global North members of the International Union 
for the Protection of Industrial Property.69 The draft law and commentary were also 
submitted to the Model Law Committee, composed of representatives of 22 Global 
South countries, including Nigeria.70 It is interesting to note that while the Model 
Law Committee was asked to discuss the provisions of the Model Law, it was not 
asked to decide whether or not the adoption of patent laws was desirable for Global 
South countries.71 Nonetheless, the PDA was the first patents and designs law in 
post-colonial Nigeria.72 Despite several IPRs reform attempts in Nigeria, the PDA 
has not been revised or amended since 1970; it is still in force to date.  
 
Before examining the NCVLBA and NASA, a brief detour will be taken to explore 
the IPRs reform attempts in Nigeria. This is important because it provides insights 
into the absence of a sui generis plant variety protection system in the country. 
 
 
                                                 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 Apart from Nigeria, other Model Law Committee countries were Algeria, Argentina, Ceylon, 
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kenya, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Venezuela. 
71 BIRPI, ‘Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions’ (n 54) 12.  
72 Prior to the PDA, patent laws were introduced during the colonial era in Nigeria. The British 
colonial authorities introduced the first patent law in the Colony of Lagos with the enactment of 
Patent Ordinance No 17 of 1900. Subsequently, Patent Proclamation No 27 of 1900 and Patent 
Proclamation No 12 of 1902 were enacted for the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria, 
respectively. After the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, these enactments 
were repealed and replaced by the Patent Ordinance No 30 of 1916 which was applicable to the 
whole of Nigeria. The 1916 Ordinance was repealed in 1925 and replaced by ‘The Registration of 
United Kingdom Patent Ordinance’. The Registration of United Kingdom Patent Ordinance of 1925 
altered the patent application procedure in Nigeria. Persons desirous of obtaining patents in Nigeria 
had to apply to the United Kingdom (UK) first, and then register the patent in Nigeria afterwards. 
This patent system, save for a few alterations, remained in force until 1970 – a decade after Nigeria 
gained her independence. For discussions on the history of patent laws in Nigeria, see generally 
Gaius Ezejiofor, ‘The Law of Patents in Nigeria: A Review’ (1973) 9 African Legal Studies 39; 
Yankey, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less Developed Countries (n 55); Owen 
T Adikibi, ‘The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria’ (1988) 16(4) World 
Development 511.  
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Intellectual Property Rights Reform Attempts 
 
Nigeria commenced a review of its IPRs regime as far back as the 1980s, even 
before TRIPS entered into force.73 At this time, Nigeria had three distinct IPRs 
laws – the Trade Marks Act 1965, the Copyright Act 1970, and the PDA. Of the 
three IPRs systems, only the Copyrights Act has undergone reforms. It has been 
reformed three times – in 1988, 1992, and 1998. Bankole Sodipo notes that the 
Nigerian copyright industry, including authors, publishers, composers, recording 
artists, and performing artists were responsible for pushing the copyright reforms.74 
In fact, artists united under the Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria 
(PMAN) organised a nation-wide protest march on 30 November 1988 to demand 
for copyright reform.75 This lobbying strategy was effective, as the first amended 
copyright law was passed three weeks after, on 19 December 1988.  
 
Unlike copyrights, attempts to reform trademark and patents laws have been 
unsuccessful.76 The Nigerian Law Reform Commission (Commission), a parastatal 
under the FMJ, proposed an ‘all-embracing’ IP legislation to cover trademarks, 
patents, designs, and utility model certificates, as well as an industrial property 
office to administer this legislation.77 This proposal, set out in a draft Industrial 
Property Bill in 1991, would have required merging the Trade Marks Act with the 
Patents and Designs Act.78 The Commission explained that the proposed 
legislation would make industrial property laws more accessible in Nigeria, as 
                                                 
73 The Federal Ministry of Justice (FMJ) was involved with the review of IPRs, particularly with 
copyright reforms. Bankole Sodipo, Piracy and Counterfeiting, GATT, TRIPS and Developing 
Countries (Kluwer 1994) 27 (Piracy and Counterfeiting, GATT, TRIPS and Developing Countries); 
Adebambo Adewopo, According to Intellectual Property: A Pro-Development Vision of the Law 
and the Nigerian Intellectual Property Law and Policy Reform in the Knowledge Era (Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 2012) 46 (According to Intellectual Property).  
74 Sodipo, Piracy and Counterfeiting, GATT, TRIPS and Developing Countries (n 73) 27-28. 
75 ibid 28. 
76 Adewopo, According to Intellectual Property (n 73) 47. 
77 Recall from Chapter 1 that industrial property excludes copyrights. The Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission was established by the Nigerian Law Reform Commission Act 1979 and is responsible 
for progressive development and reform of substantive and procedural law in Nigeria. Nigerian 
Law Reform Commission, Report on the Reform of Industrial Property Law (Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission 1991) (Report on the Reform of Industrial Property Law) 6. 
78 Nigerian Law Reform Commission, Report on the Reform of Industrial Property Law (n 77) 6. 
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users would only have to refer to a single legislation.79 Although extensive studies 
on the proposed legislation culminated in the preparation of a Working Paper and 
a National Workshop on industrial property law reforms, the Commission’s 
proposal did not result in the anticipated legal reforms.80 One reason for the lack 
of legal reform is that stakeholders in the patent and trademark industries, such as 
the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Society of 
Engineers (NSE), were not as vigorously involved in lobbying for reforms as their 
counterparts in the copyright industry. While organisations such as MAN and NSE 
submitted comments or observations on the proposed IPRs Bill, they did not 
engage in further activism like PMAN did.81  
 
The next notable phase of IPRs reform commenced in 2006. A National Intellectual 
Property Commission (NIPCOM) draft Bill was produced in late 2006 as an 
Executive Bill and as part of the federal government’s Reform Agenda.82 The 2006 
draft NIPCOM Bill built on the 1991 Industrial Property Bill, but it deviated from 
it by merging all existing IPRs laws, including copyrights, and also proposed the 
introduction of plant variety protection.83 As such, the broad NIPCOM Bill covered 
copyrights, patents, designs, trademarks, service marks, animal breeders, farmers’ 
rights, and plant varieties. The NIPCOM Bill further proposed a NIPCOM to 
                                                 
79 ibid 6.  
80 The working paper consisted of two parts. Part A reviewed and discussed the IPRs laws and legal 
principles involved in these laws. It also includes recommendations to improve the laws. Part B 
contains the proposed draft Industrial Property Act, comprising of seven parts, namely: Part I - 
Administration of the Act, Part II - Patents, Part III - Utility Model Certificates, Part IV - Industrial 
Designs, Part V - Trade Marks and Other Marks, Part VI - Transfer of Industrial Property Rights, 
Part VII - Miscellaneous and Supplemental Issues. The working paper was discussed at the National 
Workshop on Industrial Property Reforms held in Tafawa Balewa Square from 12-15 February 
1991. The Commission noted that attendance at the workshop was ‘most encouraging and 
participation was very lively.’ The working sessions were chaired by David Garrick - a legal 
practitioner, Hon Justice M B Belgore - Chief Judge at the Federal High Court, Hon Justice A G 
Karibi-Whyte - Justice of the Supreme Court, Dr Nylander - a legal practitioner, Hon Justice 
Anaemeka-Agu - Justice of the Supreme Court, Prof Uvieghara - Chairman of the Nigerian 
Copyright Council, Professor G A Olawoyin - a legal practitioner, and Chief P Kuye - a legal 
practitioner. Nigerian Law Reform Commission, Report on The Reform of Industrial Property Law 
(n 77) 8-19.  
81 The Law Reform Commission notes that organisations such as MAN and NSE’s response to the 
study paper on industrial property law reform was ‘very encouraging.’ Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission, Report on The Reform of Industrial Property Law (n 77) 7. 




administer these different IPRs systems. Adebambo Adewopo points out that the 
Bill was designed to comply with international obligations, encourage investments 
in technological innovation, and promote domestic IPRs practice.84 However, the 
draft NIPCOM Bill, like its 1991 counterpart, was unsuccessful. Adewopo argues 
that the ‘sheer lack of political will’ contributed to the failure of the NIPCOM 
Bill.85 That is, the lack of prioritisation of IPRs matters on the legislative agenda.86  
 
While the lack of political will is one of the reasons for the failure of the NIPCOM 
Bill, it is argued that another significant reason for its failure is the aversion to a 
comprehensive IPRs body governing all IPRs systems – that is, copyrights and 
industrial property.87 
 
Shafiu Adamu Yuari, Registrar at the Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry, 
provides detailed insights on the aversion to the copyrights and industrial property 
merger: 
 
There are internal contradictions amongst the different [IPRs] bodies, 
currently – the Nigerian Copyright Commission is different from the 
Trademark and Patent Registry... Government agencies act as rivals, so you 
find out that there is very stiff opposition for this merger. Whereas you have 
the copyright as a commission existing with a budget of its own, the patents 
and trademark registry is still a department within the Ministry [FMITI], 
and the Ministry [FMITI] will not be happy to give away a department to 
another body [Nigerian Copyright Commission]. So, this is also another 
aspect of it that is not widely written, but it has been there and it has been 
an issue that has been acting as a drag to the establishment of the 
commission [NIPCOM].88 
                                                 
84 ibid 49-50. 
85 ibid 50. 
86 ibid.  
87 Fieldwork interview with Shafiu Adamu Yuari, Registrar at the Trademarks, Patents, and Designs 
Registry of the Commercial Law Department of Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and 
Investment (Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author).  
88 ibid.  
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Indeed, the proposed merger of copyrights and industrial property in Nigeria raises 
a key question. Which ministry would oversee the merged IPRs commission? This 
question is pertinent because the Nigerian Copyright Commission is currently 
under the FMJ, while the Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry is under the 
FMITI. The answer to this question may depend on the actors promoting the 
reforms. That is, if actors from the copyright industry or copyright commission 
promote the IPRs Bill, then the FMJ would be their preferred ministry. Conversely, 
if actors from the industrial property industry or the Trademarks, Patents, and 
Designs Registry promote the Bill, then the FMITI would be their preferred 
ministry. The point here is this: actors play a significant role in shaping a national 
IPRs system.  
 
The subsequent Intellectual Property Commission Bill introduced in 2008, as well 
as other IPRs Bills have also been unsuccessful. These Bills have been promoted 
and sponsored by different government ministries, institutions, and bodies such as 
the FMITI, National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP), 
Intellectual Property Lawyers Association of Nigeria, Anti-Counterfeiting 
Collaboration of Nigeria, and the Section on Business Law of the Nigerian Bar 
Association. Notably, Nigeria has a recent Bill, the Industrial Property 
Commission (IPC) Bill, which was presented at its National Assembly in 2016.89 
While the outcome of this Bill cannot be predicted, it is unpacked in Chapter 6 
particularly because certain key plant variety protection provisions that were in the 
previous IPRs Bills have been deleted from it.90 Furthermore, the outcome of the 
IPC Bill may differ from its predecessors because actors from the pharmaceutical 
sector interested in patent reforms are involved in pushing for the IPC Bill.91  
                                                 
89 The Bill was presented by Honourable Chime Oji Agu at the House of Representatives of the 
Nigeria’s National Assembly on 8 June 2016. A Bill for an Act to Provide for the ‘Establishment 
of the Industrial Property Commission of Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap 436, LFN 1990 
and Patents and Designs Act, Cap 344, LFN 190 and make Comprehensive Provisions for the 
Registration and Protection of Trademarks, Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders 
and Farmers’ Rights and for Related Matters’ (HB 16.06.640, C 3399)  
<http://placbillstrack.org/upload/HB640.pdf> accessed 03 September 2017.  
90 See Chapter 6. 
91 Honourable Chime Oji Agu, who presented the Bill at Nigeria’s National Assembly, explained 
that it was the pharmaceutical sector that drew his attention to the importance of IPRs reforms. The 
author’s personal communication with Honourable Chime Oji Agu (September 2017). 
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Three lessons from the attempts at IPRs reforms are as follows. First, the actors 
involved in the IPRs reform matter. For instance, PMAN’s active lobbying 
contributed to copyright reforms. Second, IPRs is not a priority for the Nigerian 
government, as it does not even have an IPRs policy. Third, there is institutional 
rivalry between the Nigerian Copyrights Commission and the Trademarks, Patents, 
and Designs Registry. Each institution seeks to remain independent, yet proposed 
IPRs laws seek to merge them.   
 
This section has mapped out the IPRs landscape in Nigeria vis-à-vis plant variety 
protection. Having established that Nigeria does not have a patent or sui generis 
plant variety protection system, the laws regulating the registration, release, and 
commercialisation of plant varieties and seeds are examined in the next two 
sections.  
 
2.2.2. The National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds Act  
 
The NCVLBA governs the certification, registration, and release of new crop 
varieties and livestock breeds in Nigeria.92 It establishes a national register for crop 
varieties and livestock breeds where names of old and new crop varieties and 
livestock breeds are permanently registered.93 Furthermore, it establishes the 
National Crop Varieties Livestock Breeds Registration and Release Committee 
(Crop Varieties Release Committee), which is directly responsible for crop 
varieties and livestock breed validation, registration, naming, and release.94 
                                                 
92 The schedule to the NCVLBA provides that it is ‘An Act to introduce a register of the 
certification, registration and release of national crop varieties and livestock breeds and other 
matters related thereto.’ It was amended on 29 September 2016 to increase penalties for breach of 
its provisions as set out in Section 8; NGN200 and NGN5,000 fines were increased to NGN100,000 
and NGN500,000, respectively. Section 10 of the NCVLBA defines crop variety and livestock 
breed as crops or livestock breeds which are distinguishable from other kinds of the same crop or 
livestock because of their noticeable and stable characters. 
93 NCVLBA, s 1.  
94 NCVLBA, s 5. The Committee comprises of the following members: (i) a chairman who shall 
not be a person employed in the public service of the Federation or of a State to be appointed by 
the President; (ii) the Director, Federal Department of Agriculture; (iii) the Director of Agricultural 
Sciences (now Director, Bio-resources technology), FMST; (iv) the head of the Genetic Resources 
Unit (now Director/CEO NACGRAB), FMST; (v) the Director, National Seed Service; (vi) the 
Chairman, Committee of Deans of Faculties of Agriculture in Nigerian Universities; (vii) the 
President, Genetic Society of Nigeria; (viii) a representative of the Federal Agricultural Co-
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Responsibilities of the Crop Varieties Release Committee include the following: 
receiving and processing applications for the registration, naming, and release of 
crop varieties; maintaining and storing genetic resources of the registered crop 
varieties in collaboration with NACGRAB; formulating policies on validation, 
registering, naming, and releasing new crop varieties; as well as maintaining a 
national register for all crop varieties released in Nigeria.95 Registration of crop 
varieties is a pre-requisite for commercial transactions in Nigeria. Indeed, naming 
or releasing crop varieties in Nigeria without the written authority of the Registrar 
of the National Register for Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds is an offence. For 
individuals, this is punishable by either a fine of up to NGN100,000, imprisonment, 
or both fine and imprisonment.96 In like manner, corporate bodies can be fined for 
up to NGN500,000.97   
 
Before a crop variety is registered or released in Nigeria, it has to pass the 
distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) requirements, alongside the value 
for cultivation and use (VCU) tests.98 The DUS and VCU tests are set out in the 
2016 Guidelines for Variety Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties in 
Nigeria.99 These guidelines provide that a variety is distinct if it is clearly 
distinguishable from any other existing varieties in Nigeria. It is uniform if 
                                                 
ordinating Unit; (ix) two experienced breeders appointed on their personal merit by the Minister; 
(x) one large-scale crop farmer appointed on his personal merit by the Minister; and (xi) two general 
managers representing two River Basin Development Authorities from different ecological areas 
in rotation appointed by the Minister. Two further committee members were subsequently included: 
(xii) the Executive Secretary, ARCN; and (iv) the Director-General, National Biotechnology 
Development Agency (NABDA) (see Guidelines for Registration and Release of New Crop 
Varieties in Nigeria, 2016). 
95 NCVLBA, ss 5 and 6. 
96 NCVLBA, ss 2 and 8. The Registrar is the head of the Genetic Resources Unit of the FMST or 
his representative. 
97 ibid. 
98 NACGRAB, Guidelines for Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties in Nigeria 
(NACGRAB 2016) 8-9 (Guidelines for Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties in Nigeria). 
The DUS requirements are drawn from the UPOV Convention. Apart from the DUS and VCU tests, 
other factors the Variety Release Committee consider before registering and releasing new varieties 
are: whether the variety is not detrimental to human or animal health; that the name of the variety 
is not likely to be confused with a variety previously registered; that the name is not likely to offend 
the public; that the variety meets the variety purity standard established by the International Seed 
Testing Association (ISTA) for a variety of that specie; and that the new variety has superior traits 
over existing farmers’ varieties or varieties registered in Nigeria. 




individual varieties remain sufficiently uniform at the same growth stages in 
expression of their characteristics. Finally, it is stable if the genetic traits of the 
new variety remain stable through generations.100  
 
The DUS test is used to assess novelty and the botanical description of new 
varieties.101 Applications for new varieties are compared with similar existing 
varieties where (i) agronomic characteristics, such as yield, maturity date, and 
height, (ii) morphological characteristics, such as colour, shape, and size, and (iii) 
physiogenetical characteristics, such as tolerance to pest and disease, are evaluated 
at designated DUS testing sites for at least two years.102 Meanwhile, VCU tests 
ensure that crops registered as new varieties in Nigeria are beneficial to farming 
and industrial communities.103 VCU tests are undertaken to assess (a) adaptation 
and stability of crop varieties across varied environments, (b) agronomic 
performance, (c) reaction to pests and diseases, and (d) resistance or tolerance to 
abiotic stresses of the new crop varieties in comparison with existing varieties.104 
Niels Louwaars and Francois Burgaud note that the VCU testing system is 
generally meant to support the use of improved varieties in a country.105   
 
To ascertain whether a plant variety meets the DUS and VCU tests, three trials are 
conducted, i.e. on-station, multi-locational, and on-farm trials.106 The on-station 
trial – which can take more than a year – is conducted by the breeder of the new 
variety in the research institute or institution where the variety was developed.107 
In the on-station trial, the preliminary yield trial is carried out on the applicant’s 
varieties along with the existing varieties. The applicant’s varieties are given to 
entomologists or pathologists to study their reaction to pests and diseases. Food 
                                                 
100 ibid 8.  
101 ibid. 
102 ibid.  
103 ibid. 
104 ibid.  
105 Niels Louwaars and Francois Burgaud, ‘The Evolution of Registration Systems with a Special 
Emphasis on Agrobioversity Conservation’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties 
and Famers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan from Routledge 2016) 200. 





quality and post-harvest traits are evaluated, and the DUS tests are also carried out. 
Only varieties that pass this stage are recommended for multi-locational trial. 
Multi-locational trials are carried out for at least two years across different agro-
ecological zones in Nigeria or at several appropriate locations in case the variety is 
bred for a particular agro-ecology.108 During the multi-locational trial, the VCU 
test is examined. These include adaptability, stability, agronomic performance, and 
resistance or tolerance to biotic and abiotic stresses. It must be carried out in not 
less than 10 testing sites per year for comparison. Lastly, on-farm trials are used to 
test a new variety on a farmer’s field. The on-farm trials are carried out to 
investigate farmers’ perceptions about the applicant’s variety, such as whether 
farmers would accept the new varieties, whether the new varieties are better than 
existing varieties, and whether the new varieties can be adaptable. 109 This trial is 
carried out on a farmer’s field for a year or a growing season. Data gathered for a 
period of one year from at least 10 farmers’ fields across different agro-ecology is 
required to fulfil this step.110 
 
To date, there are 586 released and registered varieties in Nigeria.111 A high 
yielding cassava (NICASS 1) developed by Dr. S K Hahn from IITA was the first 
released variety registered in 1991.112 None of these varieties are from small-scale 
farmers because the DUS requirements and VCU tests are too stringent for small-
scale farmers’ varieties to pass. Thus, small-scale farmers are excluded from the 
registration and release of new varieties under the current regulatory framework in 
Nigeria. Indeed, the Guidelines for Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties 
in Nigeria expressly exclude small-scale farmers in its list of actors that can 
                                                 
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. 
110 However, for perennial or long gestation crop species (such as cocoa, oil palm, rubber, mango, 
citrus, etc.), the Guidelines recommend that the multi-locational and on-farm trials should be 
combined through a farmer’s participatory varietal selection. A minimum of two years’ production 
data in addition to on-station data should be presented for registration and release of the proposed 
varieties. 
111 NACGRAB, Varieties Released Catalogue  
<http://www.nacgrab.gov.ng/images/Varieties_Released_Catalogue.pdf> accessed 21 February 
2017.  
112 ibid.  
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develop a new variety for registration and release in Nigeria.113 Only National 
Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs) in Nigeria, universities in Nigeria, the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centres (CGIAR), 
private seed companies, and non-governmental organisations registered in Nigeria 
can release new crop varieties.114  
 
The NCVLBA discussed in this section, and NASA which is discussed in the next 
section, were both established through technical assistance from the FAO and the 
World Bank.115 The FAO provided technical assistance from 1975 to 1990 to 
introduce a formal seed system in Nigeria, while the World Bank provided 
assistance from 1991 to 1997 to further develop the formal seed system through 
the National Seed and Quarantine Project (NSQP).116 Interestingly, similar formal 
seed systems were also set up around Africa with the support of the FAO and the 
World Bank starting from the 1960s and 1970s.117 The Genetic Resources Action 
International Network (GRAIN) notes that the intention for the establishment of 
these seed laws was to remove trade barriers, encourage farmers to purchase 
certified seeds, and ultimately facilitate private sector involvement in the seed 
industry.118 Indeed, the World Bank Group NSQP Implementation Completion 
                                                 
113 NACGRAB, Guidelines for Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties in Nigeria (n 98) 
13-14. 
114 ibid. 
115 The World Bank, WAAPP/PPAAO and Agricultural Research Council, Innovating the Nigerian 
Agricultural Seeds Sector: A Proposed Action Plan for WAAPP - Nigeria (jointly developed by 
Nigerian Agricultural Seeds System Stakeholders through the WAAPP-Nigeria Task Force on 
Agricultural Seeds, May 2013) 11  
<http://waapp.gov.ng/images/InnovatingtheNigeriaAgriculturalSeedsSector.pdf> accessed 14 June 
2017 (Innovating the Nigerian Agricultural Seeds Sector); Context Network and Sahel Capital, 
Nigeria Early Generation Seed Study: Country Report (United States Agency International 
Development and Africa Lead II, August 2016) 14 <http://www.africaleadftf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Nigeria-EGS-Study-Final-Report-August-2016.pdf> accessed 14 June 
2017 (Nigeria Early Generation Seed Study). NCVLBA (Decree No 33 (14 October 1987) and 
NASA (Decree No 72 (23 November 1992) were both decrees promulgated by the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria.   
116 ibid.  
117 Similar seed laws were also introduced in other parts of the Global South, particularly in Asia 
and Latin America. GRAIN, ‘Africa’s Seed Laws: Red Carpet for the Corporations’ (Seedling, July 
2005) 28  
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/540-africa-s-seeds-laws-red-carpet-for-corporations> 
accessed 14 June 2017.  
118 GRAIN, ‘Africa’s Seed Laws: Red Carpet for the Corporations’ (n 117) 28. 
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Report on Nigeria records the promotion of private sector seed development as one 
of its achievements.119  
 
2.2.3. The National Agricultural Seed Act 
 
NASA complements the NCVLBA by establishing the National Agricultural Seed 
Council (Seed Council) to generally oversee the seed sector.120 The Seed Council 
is responsible for proposing seed programmes and policies, advising the national 
research system on seed demand and farmers’ needs, as well as encouraging the 
establishment of seed companies in Nigeria.121 In addition, the Seed Council 
supervises activities of the Crop Variety Registration and Release Committee and 
other seed committees, including the Seed Standards Committee and the Seed 
Industry and Skill Development Committee.122 As seen above, the Crop Variety 
Registration and Release Committee is responsible for the registration and release 
of crop varieties.123 The Seed Standards Committee makes recommendations to the 
Seed Council on seed standards and procedures, while the Seed Industry and Skill 
Development Committee makes recommendations to the Seed Council on matters 
related to skill development in the seed industry.124 In essence, the Seed Council 
and the Seed Committees established under NASA collaborate to govern the 
national seed system. 
 
                                                 
119 World Bank Implementation Completion Report. The World Bank Group, ‘Implementation 
Completion Report (ICR) Review – National Seed and Quarantine Project’ (prepared by Wilfred V 
Candler, 2 March 1998)  
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/8525679B00717
74D8525659200528218?OpenDocument> accessed 14 June 2017.  
120 The NASA provides that the Chairman of the Seed Council is the Minister of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, while the Permanent Secretary of the FMARD is the Vice Chairman. Other 
Council members include IITA representatives, four representatives from the State Ministries of 
Agriculture or State Seed Co-ordination Committee representatives, four representatives from the 
Nigerian Seed Industry, one representative from the Federal Ministry of Finance, one representative 
from a private financial lending institution, and one representative from the department of plant 
breeding and seed technology in a Nigerian university. NASA, s 2.  
121 NASA, s 3. 
122 ibid. 
123 See 2.2.3 above and NASA, s 7.  
124 NASA, ss 8-9.  
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NASA provides for formal registration as a condition for producing, processing, 
and marketing seeds for commercial purposes.125 Only registered seed production 
companies, seed enterprises on contract for seed companies, breeder seed 
production agencies, foundation seed growers, enterprise seed processors, and seed 
dealers are licensed to produce and market seeds commercially in Nigeria.126 Other 
than those registered, no one – such as a small-scale farmer – is permitted to 
produce, process, or market seeds for commercial purposes.127 However, Section 
22.2 of NASA states that the prohibition does not apply to anyone growing and 
delivering seeds directly to others without monetary consideration, or to non-
commercial sowing of seeds on personal farms.128 In other words, while small-
scale farmers are prohibited from producing, processing, or marketing seeds for 
commercial purposes, they are not precluded from engaging in non-commercial 
activities with seeds. 
 
In particular, three categories of seeds of released varieties are subject to seed 
certification in Nigeria: breeders’ seeds, foundation seeds or inbred lines, and 
certified seeds.129 NARIs produce the breeder seeds.130 The breeder seeds are 
sourced from research institutes in small quantities. The seed certification officers 
of the Seed Council assess the breeder seed to ensure that it possesses the required 
agronomic qualities. Next, the breeder seed is passed on to the National Seed 
Service (NSS) unit of the Seed Council which produces the foundation seeds. The 
NSS unit of the Seed Council produces the foundation seed ‘in line with prescribed 
procedure and standards for each type of seed.’ The certification officer ensures 
that these standards are followed. The Seed Council passes the foundation seed on 
to the agricultural development projects (ADPs) and private seed companies.131 
                                                 
125 NASA, s 22. 
126 NASA, s 21. 
127 NASA, s 22.1. 
128 NASA, s 22.2. 
129 NASA, s 14.  
130 This section is developed from the author’s fieldwork interview with Jimmy (n 3). 
131 ADPs were launched in Nigeria to increase agricultural production by providing seed extension 
services. The funding for ADPs was initially derived from the World Bank, federal government, 
and state governments (66 per cent, 20 per cent, and 14 per cent, respectively). The ADPs started 
in 1975 with pilot projects in three local government areas in Northern Nigeria: Funtua, Gusau, and 
Gombe. By 1989, ADPs had extended to all states in Nigeria. ADPs exist in all the 36 states of 
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The ADPs and private seed companies produce certified seeds on their farms or 
through contract growers. The certified seeds are then sold or distributed to the 
farmers through farm service centres, cooperatives, and ADPs. However, this 
process has been liberalised. Private seed companies can obtain breeders’ seeds 
directly from NARIs and international agricultural research centres to produce 
certified seeds through an out-growers scheme.132 Research institutes can also 




















                                                 
Nigeria, but they are mainly funded by the state governments. The World Bank Group, ‘Agricultural 
Development Projects in Nigeria’ (Independent Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group) 
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/FE7BA13642E3
E0D7852567F5005D85CF> accessed 15 June 2017; Daniel S Ugwu, ‘Contributions of Agricultural 
Development Programmes (ADPs) to Rural Livelihood and Food Security in Nigeria’ (2007) 2(4) 
Agricultural Journal 503-510 <http://docsdrive.com/pdfs/medwelljournals/aj/2007/503-510.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2017. 
132 Fieldwork interview with Jimmy (n 3). 
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Table 2.2: Selected (National and International) Agricultural Research 
Institutes: Nigeria 
 Research Institute  Selected Mandate Crop 
1 National Cereals Research 
Institute, Badeggi  
Rice, beniseed, and soybean 
2 National Root Crops Research 
Institute, Umudike 
Cassava, yam, ginger and potato 
3 Institute for Agricultural Research, 
Samaru 
Cowpea, groundnut, and maize 
4 Institute for Agricultural Research 
and Training, Ibadan 
Maize and kenaf 
5 Lake Chad Research Institute  Wheat, barley, and millet           
6 National Horticultural Research 
Institute, Ibadan 
Fruits, vegetables, and ornamental 
plants 
7 National Institute for Oil-Palm 
Research, Benin 
Oil palm, coconut, and ornamental 
palms 
8 Cocoa Research Institute of 
Nigeria, Oyo  
Cocoa, kola, and cashew 
9 Rubber Research Institute, Benin Rubber and latex-producing plants 
10 International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture, Ibadan 
Cassava, yam, and cowpea 
11 International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, 
Kano  
Cowpea, millet, and sorghum 
12 Africa Rice, Ibadan Rice 






Until the mid-1980s, breeding new varieties was exclusively undertaken by the 
public sector.133 However, the establishment of NCVLBA and NASA inspired 
private companies’ participation in the seed sector. The seed laws and the 
institution of the formal seed sector led to the establishment of private seed 
companies in Nigeria starting from the 1980s, including UAC Seed (Nigeria) Ltd., 
Pioneer Seed, UTC Seed Ltd., Ag-Seed Nigeria Ltd., and Temperance Seed 
Nigeria Ltd.134 However, by the 1990s to 2000s, these companies liquidated or 
pulled out due to small-scale farmers’ low demand for improved seeds from the 
formal seed sector.135  
 
As will be seen below, small-scale farmers in Nigeria rely on the informal seed 
sector.136 However, the number of registered private seed companies has gradually 
increased over the years. From 13 in 2011, the number of registered seed 
companies in Nigeria had increased to 134 in 2014.137 One reason for this surge, 
particularly from 2011, was the introduction of the Agricultural Transformation 
Agenda (ATA) that year, which promoted the use of improved seeds and private 
sector investment in agriculture.138 Private – national and multinational – seed 
companies currently operating in Nigeria include DuPont-Pioneer, Maslaha, 
Monsanto, Premier Seeds, Seedco, Nagari Seeds, and Syngenta.139 To further 
incentivise private sector participation in the seed sector, a moratorium is granted 
for new varieties released in Nigeria, as will be seen below. 
 
                                                 
133 P Kormawa, E Okorji, and R Okechukwu, Assessment of seed sub-sector policy in 
Nigeria (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 2002) 29-30. 
134 The World Bank, WAAPP/PPAAO and Agricultural Research Council, Innovating the Nigerian 
Agricultural Seeds Sector (n 115) 11.  
135 Jeffery W Bentley, Olupomi Ajayi, and Kehinde Adelugba, ‘Nigeria: Clustered Seed 
Companies’ in Paul Van Mele, Jeffery Bentley, and Robert G Guei (eds), African Seed Enterprises: 
Sowing Seeds of the Future (FAO, AfricaRice Center, and CAB International 2011) 50; The World 
Bank, WAAPP/PPAAO and Agricultural Research Council, Innovating the Nigerian Agricultural 
Seeds Sector (n 115) 11. 
136 See discussion on the informal seed system in 2.3 below. 
137 Bentley et al, ‘Nigeria: Clustered Seed Companies’ (n 135) 39; National Agricultural Seeds 
Council, Annual Reports: 2014  
<http://seedcouncil.gov.ng/uploads/2017/02/2014_annual_report.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017. 
138 FMARD, ‘Agricultural Transformation Agenda 2011.’  Nigeria’s current agricultural policy is 
discussed in 2.4 below.  
139 National Agricultural Seeds Council, Annual Reports: 2014 (n 137). 
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2.2.4. Plant Variety Protection: In Practice 
 
Although Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, it has a home-
grown system of rewarding private breeders’ research and investment. Yarama 
Ndirpaya, Deputy Director and Program Manager for Natural Resource 
Management at the ARCN, explains that: 
 
We operate two systems right now in this country. The publicly bred 
varieties that are bred and developed by public institutions, those are 
considered as public goods. Those varieties are open for everyone to use. 
But presently, we also have a number of private companies coming up to 
release varieties in Nigeria. Incidentally, I am a member of the technical 
committee of the Crop Variety Release Committee of Nigeria. What we 
have been doing in the committee so far is when a company develops a new 
variety, they are given a moratorium for about 10 years to market that 
material solely by them. No one else is allowed to market it. After that, it 
would go into public domain. In terms of varieties developed by public 
institutions, they are public goods.140 
 
The above statement shows that while private companies are not granted IPRs for 
new varieties, the Crop Variety Release Committee of Nigeria grants them a 10-
year moratorium, during which they have the exclusive rights to market the variety. 
While the moratorium is akin to an IPRs system, it is not an IPRs system because 
it is not entrenched in any national IPRs legislation. As such, it remains 
unenforceable in court. As discussed in Chapter 1, IPRs are legally enforceable 
rights granted by national authorities.141 As the moratorium is neither provided 
under any national IPRs legislation nor legally enforceable, it fails to qualify as an 
IPRs system. Zidafamor Jimmy, Deputy Director for Seed Production in the 
National Agriculture Seed Council (NASC) who is also a member of the technical 
                                                 
140 Fieldwork interview with Ndirpaya (n 3). 
141 See 1.1 in Chapter 1.  
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committee of the Crop Variety Release Committee, rightly points out that the 
moratorium is ineffective: 
 
Nigeria does not have an IPRs system for plant varieties. Even if a 
moratorium for the private companies exists, this cannot be enforced 
because if someone unlawfully sells or uses the variety, you cannot take the 
person to court or enforce your rights because the moratorium is not 
provided or written in a legal document.142  
 
To close this part, four points that emerge from the analysis of laws and practice 
regulating new plant varieties in Nigeria are as follows. First, Nigeria’s 
requirements for registration and release of varieties draw inspiration from the 
UPOV system, albeit with some exceptions. To reiterate, the registration and 
release provisions are not an IPRs system. They simply establish conditions for the 
introduction of new varieties in the formal seed system. Second, private companies 
that release new varieties have a moratorium to solely market the varieties, but this 
moratorium is unenforceable because it is not backed by law. Third, only released, 
registered, and certified varieties are officially commercialised under the 
NCVLBA and NASA. As such, the seed laws institutionally marginalise the 
informal seed system, which provides over 90 per cent of the seeds requirements 
in Nigeria.143 Indeed, Michael Halewood and Isabel Lapena conclude that seed 
laws are generally ‘developed with the market for formally bred seed in mind, not 
seeds of varieties developed and managed by local farmers over generations.’144  
                                                 
142 Fieldwork interview with Jimmy (n 3). 
143 The informal seed system is discussed in 2.3 below. It is important to note however that this 
percentage varies depending on the crop. Small-scale farmers tend to purchase improved varieties 
of grains more than improved varieties of root and tuber crops, because planting materials for root 
and tuber crops are easily recyclable. As such, there has been minimal demand for, or development 
of, root and tuber varieties. The World Bank, WAAPP/PPAAO and Agricultural Research Council, 
Innovating the Nigerian Agricultural Seeds Sector (n 115) 11; Context Network and Sahel Capital, 
Nigeria Early Generation Seed Study (n 115) 13-14; K O Oyekale, ‘Growing an Effective Seed 
Management System: A Case Study of Nigeria’ (2014) 3(2) Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Sciences 345, 345 (‘Growing an Effective Seed Management System’).  
144 Michael Halewood and Isabel Lapena, ‘Farmers’ Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges at 
the Crossroads of Agriculture, Taxonomy and Law’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 6 (‘Farmers 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights’). 
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The next part discusses the informal seed system and small-scale farming practices 
in Nigeria. 
 
2.3. Informal Seed System and Small-Scale Farming Practices in Nigeria 
 
The informal seed system is largely unregulated and flexible.145 It encompasses 
locally organised seed selection, production, and diffusion methods.146 Farmers, 
farming communities, commodity groups, CSOs, and local traders are the main 
actors in Nigeria’s informal seed system. Farmers select, save, reuse, exchange, 
and sell seeds. These farmers’ seeds or varieties are sourced from farmers’ 
harvests, exchanges with other farmers, and purchases from local markets.147 Using 
traditional or local knowledge, farmers broadly adopt processes similar to 
breeders’ processes in the formal system, such as seed selection, multiplication, 
dissemination, and storage.148 However, farmers’ varieties are not registrable under 
the NCVLBA because they do not meet the DUS conditions. Nonetheless, it is 
important to examine the informal seed system and farmers’ varieties in Nigeria 
                                                 
145 FAO, Seed Security Assessment in North Eastern States of Nigeria (FAO 2016) 10 (Seed Security 
Assessment in North Eastern States of Nigeria). 
146 ibid. 
147 ibid. Recall that farmer seeds are often referred to as landraces, mixed races, farmers’ varieties, 
local varieties, or traditional varieties. For detailed discussions on farmers’ varieties and informal 
seed systems generally, see Conny J M Almekinders and Niels P Louwaars, Farmers’ Seed 
Production: New Approaches and Practices (Intermediate Technology 1999); Conny J M 
Almekinders and Niels P Louwaars, ‘The Importance of the Farmers’ Seed Systems in a Functional 
National Seed Sector (2002) 4(1-2) Journal of New Seeds 15; Oliver T Coomes, Shawn J McGuire, 
Eric Garine, Sophie Cailon, Doyle McKey, Elise Demeulenaere, Devra Jarvis, Guntra Aistara, 
Adeline Barnaud, Pascal Clouvel, Laure Emperaire, Selim Louafi, Pierre Martin, Francois Massol, 
Marco Pautasso, Chloe Violon, and Jean Wencelius, ‘Farmer Seed Networks make a Limited 
Contribution to Agriculture? Four Common Misconceptions’ (2015) 56 Food Policy 41; Shawn 
McGuire and Louise Sperling, ‘Seed Systems Smallholder Farmers Use’ (2016) 8(1) Food Security 
179; Jeremy Cherfas, ‘Technical Challenges in Identifying Farmers’ Varieties’ in Michael 
Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law 
(Routledge 2016) 27-42; Carlo Fadda, ‘The Farmers’ Role in Creating New Genetic Diversity’ in 
Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy 
and Law (Routledge 2016) 43-55.  
148 Traditional or local knowledge here refers to age-long knowledge forms used in farming 
communities. On traditional knowledge in agriculture generally, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Of 
Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous 
and Local Communities’ (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 917; Chidi Oguamanam, 
‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Towards a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (2004) 15(1) Australian Intellectual Property Journal 34;  Ikechi Mgbeoji, Global 
Biopiracy: Patents, Plants and Indigenous Knowledge (Cornell University Press 2006); Doreen 
Stabinsky and Stephen B Brush (eds), Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and 
Intellectual Property Rights (Island Press 2007). 
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because over 80 per cent of the farmers in Nigeria are small-scale farmers.149 These 
small-scale farmers currently feed Nigeria, as they produce about 98 per cent of 
the food consumed.150  
 
This part ‘delves into the everyday life’ of small-scale farmers in Nigeria to 
understand how the implementation of TRIPS may affect their farming 
practices.151 In line with quintessential TWAIL scholarship, paying attention to 
marginalised peoples provides the interpretative prism to evaluate the 
implementation of international law.152 As Antony Angie points out, all TWAIL 
scholarships have two questions in common: ‘(i) how can international law be used 
to further the interests of the peoples of the Third World? (ii) how does a particular 
rule or regime empower or disempower peoples in the Third World?’153 Bearing in 
mind that the ‘peoples of the Third World’ here refers to the small-scale farmers, 
this part examines the informal seed system in Nigeria.154 It explores farmers’ 
varieties and traditional farming systems alongside the interface between the 




                                                 
149 The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics defines small-scale farmers as farmers with less than 
two hectares under cropping. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) - Commercial Agriculture 
Development Project (CADP), NBS/CADP Baseline Survey Report, (The National Bureau of 
Statistics-Commercial Agriculture Development Project, 2010) 17  
<https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/CADP%20Report%20Final.pdf> 25 July 2017; 
Context Network and Sahel Capital, Nigeria Early Generation Seed Study (n 115) 8; R N Mgbenka 
and E N Mbah, ‘A Review of Smallholder Farming in Nigeria: Need for Transformation’ (May 
2016) 3(2) International Journal of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development Studies 43, 43 
(‘A Review of Smallholder Farming in Nigeria’). 
150 Mgbenka and Mbah, ‘A Review of Smallholder Farming in Nigeria’ (n 149) 43. 
151 The ‘delve into everyday life’ quote is from Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between 
Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law’ (2011) 3(1) Trade, Law 
and Development 103, 123; Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post) Colonial: TWAIL 
and the Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45(2) Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America – Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (VRU) 1, 1. 
152 Antony Anghie and B S Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in International Conflict’ (2003) Chinese Journal of International Law 77, 78.   
153Antony Anghie, ‘TWAIL: Past and Future’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 
479, 480. 
154 See discussion on ‘Third World’ under ‘Methodology’ in Chapter 1.  
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2.3.1. Farmers’ Varieties 
 
Plant varieties developed by small-scale farmers are commonly referred to as 
farmers’ varieties.155 Farmers’ varieties are a key source of seeds for small-scale 
farmers in Nigeria for three reasons.156 First, farmers’ varieties are adaptable to 
local conditions. This is useful for farmers, particularly because the formal seed 
sector does not cater to all crops. Second, farmers’ varieties are easily accessible 
as informal seed channels exist even in remote farming communities. Third, 
farmers’ varieties are often more affordable than formal sector varieties. This 
provides access to seeds especially for resource-poor small-scale farmers.  
 
Farmers’ varieties are disseminated in Nigeria’s informal seed system through 
community seed networks or CSOs, seed dealers, and from farmer-to-farmer.157 
These three methods of dissemination are outlined in turn. First, community-based 
seed networks exist across Nigeria. For example, there are co-operatives in Kebbi 
state in Northern Nigeria where seeds from farmers are sold to both members and 
non-members at discounted prices.158 A local rice variety known as Oriza 
nogistaminata can only be purchased from community seed stores in the state. This 
rice variety is popular amongst small-scale farmers because it is reputed to survive 
floods and to contain medicinal properties against diabetes.159 Second, seed dealers 
distribute and sell seeds to farmers in local or community seed markets.160 Most 
seed dealers have basic knowledge of the seed industry, as they usually have 
previous work experience in registered seed companies or agricultural 
institutions.161 Third, small-scale farmers share, exchange, or sell their varieties to 
relatives, neighbours, friends, and other farmers.  
 
                                                 
155 Halewood and Lapena, ‘Farmers’ Varieties and Farmers’ Rights’ (n 144) 1.  
156 Conclusion from interviews with small-scale farmers in Nigeria.  
157 Ayodele Uwala, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ 
(Written correspondence, March 2017) (‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural 
Production in Nigeria’). 
158 ibid. 





Sharing, exchanging, or selling varieties is an integral part of farmers’ seed 
dissemination in Nigeria, as in other parts of the Global South. Over the centuries, 
farmers have developed methods of identifying varieties with desirable traits.162 
For example, farmers assess plant characteristics such as plant height, plant vigour, 
number of branches or tillers, growth patterns, and ability to withstand weed 
pressure.163 Farmers then obtain the desired varieties either through exchange or 
purchase.164 Moses Abila, one of the small-scale farmers interviewed in Iddah 
community, Kaduna, Northern Nigeria, explained that he either gives away or sells 
his well-performing varieties to other farmers: ‘if  he [another farmer] comes to 
help us harvest, then he gets grain for free. If not, he will buy it.’165 Yet, as will be 
seen below, this small-scale farmers’ practice of freely giving or exchanging farm-
saved seed is problematic for IPRs, as farmers may be limited from saving, reusing, 
exchanging, or selling seed under certain plant variety protection systems such as 
the plant breeders’ rights system under the UPOV 1991 Convention.  
 
Small-scale farmers interviewed during fieldwork for this thesis provided varied 
responses to the question about their source of seed. For example, James Magaji, a 
small-scale farmer in Iddah community, Kaduna State, explains that he plants a 
rice variety known as ‘Jankara’ which he got from his father.166 He explains that 
he plants the farmers’ variety because he and his family prefer eating it: ‘Jankara 
will swell up when you cook it.’167 Magaji further explains that he understands the 
origin of the Jankara variety as he watched his father plant it, thus he prefers to 
plant a variety he is familiar with.168 Conversely, Thomas Haruna, another small-
scale farmer in Iddah community, explains that he purchases improved rice 
varieties from seed companies because of the economic benefits from higher crop 




165 Fieldwork interview with Moses Abila, a small-scale farmer in Iddah Community (Kaduna, 
2015) (transcript on file with author).  
166 Fieldwork interview with James Magaji, a small-scale farmer in Iddah Community (Kaduna, 
2015) (transcript on file with author).  




yields and consumer preference.169 He explains that seed companies market their 
varieties as higher yielding than farmers’ varieties: ‘I believe what they say, I buy 
the seed to try and see.’170 He further explains that the ‘rice is shinier – more pure, 
and people buy it more.’171 Divergent perspectives on seed sources can be seen 
here. For the first farmer, his farming and food choice is a part of his cultural 
heritage, while the second farmer is driven by economic rewards. 
 
Abraham Ogungbile, the Managing Director of Premier Seeds, Nigeria, 
corroborates the economic perspective on small-scale farmers’ seed source and 
use. He explains that farmers understand ‘the difference between the improved 
seed and their local seed, farmers who see farming as a business and are desirous 
of making money will purchase improved seed.’172 Ogungbile concludes that 
farmers have a choice when sourcing for seeds. Therefore, farmers desirous of 
specific qualities in seed, such as high yield, would purchase seeds from the formal 
seed sector.173 
 
2.3.2. Traditional Farming Systems 
 
Traditional farming systems broadly encompass the techniques, methods, and 
knowledge used by small-scale farmers and farming communities.174 These long-
established systems include crop and soil health techniques as well as cultural 
farming methods.175 Small-scale farmers in Nigeria either use traditional farming 
                                                 
169 Fieldwork interview with Thomas Haruna, a small-scale farmer in Iddah Community (Kaduna, 
2015) (transcript on file with author). 
170 ibid. 
171 ibid. 
172 Fieldwork interview with Abraham Ogungbile, Managing Director of Premier Seed Nigeria Ltd. 
(Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
173 ibid. 
174 Traditional farming systems here refers to the totality of farming activities that exist or develop 
as part of the customs of farmers or farming communities, which are passed on from one generation 
to another.  
175 E M Igbokwe, ‘A Soil and Water Conservation System under Threat. A Visit to Maku, Nigeria’ 
in C Reij, I Scoones, and C Toulmin (eds), Sustaining the Soil: Indigenous Soil and Water 
Conservation in Africa (Earthscan Publication 1996) 219-43; B Junge, O Deji, R Abaidoo, D 
Chikoye, and K Stahr, ‘Farmers’ Adoption of Soil Conservation Technologies: A Case Study from 
Osun State, Nigeria’ (2009) 15(3) The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 257, 258. 
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techniques or combine these with modern technologies.176 In general, farmers 
regulate ecosystem dynamics using natural processes of cycling water, organic 
matter, and nutrients to maintain soil fertility without depending on chemical 
fertilisers.177 
 
Although farmers may not understand scientific lexicon or conduct laboratory 
experiments, they understand through experience how traditional systems 
sustainably improve farming. For crop and soil improvement techniques, Uwala 
notes that in Northern Nigeria, where mainly cereals such as millet and sorghum 
are grown, animal dung and poultry dropping are regularly applied to the soil as 
sources of nutrients for crops.178 In addition, Peter Bakare points out that small-
scale farmers practice crop rotation as a way of ‘giving the land fertiliser.’179 Crop 
rotation involves growing different types of crops on the same land from season-
to-season.180 For example, deep-rooted crops are planted before shallow-rooted 
crops. Cassava or yam, which are deep-rooted crops, could be planted in one year, 
followed by legumes such as white beans and groundnuts which are shallow- 
rooted crops.181   
 
Furthermore, Uwala and Bakare explain that small-scale farmers in Nigeria 
generally practice intercropping.182 Intercropping involves growing two or more 
crops simultaneously – on the same field – to promote interaction between them.183 
                                                 
176 N O Adedipe, P A Okunneye, and I A Ayinde, ‘The Relevance of Local and Indigenous 
Knowledge for Nigerian Agriculture’ (presented at the International Conference on Bridging Scales 
and Epistemologies: Linking Local Knowledge with Global Science in Multi-Scale Assessments, 
Alexandria, Egypt, 16-19 March 2004) 1 (‘The Relevance of Local and Indigenous Knowledge for 
Nigerian Agriculture’). 
177 ibid 3. 
178 Uwala, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ (n 157). See 
also Irene Hoffman, Dirk Gerling, Usman Kyiogwom, and Anke Mane-Bielfieldt, ‘Farmers’ 
Management Strategies to Maintain Soil Fertility in a Remote Area in Northwest Nigeria’ (2001) 
86 Agriculture, Ecosystems, and Environment 263.  
179 Fieldwork interview with Prince Peter Bakare (Abuja, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
180 ibid.  
181 Nonetheless, Bakare notes that the increase in population densities and demand for land has 
reduced this practice. Fieldwork interview with Bakare (n 179).  
182 Uwala, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ (n 157); 
Fieldwork interview with Bakare (n 179).  
183 ibid. On intercropping in Nigeria, see generally, I Ibeawuchi, ‘Intercropping – A Food 
Production Strategy for the Resources Poor Farmers’ (2007) 5(1) Nature and Science 46 
(‘Intercropping – A Food Production Strategy for the Resources Poor Farmers’). 
85 
 
For example, yam, maize, and cassava are often intercropped. The 
yam/maize/cassava intercrop is productive particularly because the maize growth 
cycle, which is from three to four months, is shorter than the growing season for 
cassava and yams, which is from seven to 12 months.184 Yam is usually the first 
crop planted because it has the longest growing season of the three crops, while 
cassava is generally inter-planted during the last phase of the yam-growing 
season.185 Maize (and other short season crops such as melons, cowpeas, okra, and 
pumpkin) is subsequently inter-planted through the yam garden.186  
 
These traditional farming systems are certainly not exhaustive. The ecological and 
climatic diversity as well as cultural differences in the 36 states of Nigeria generate 
a wide range of traditional farming systems. However, one of the shortcomings of 
traditional farming systems in Nigeria is lack of formal documentation. While 
experienced small-scale farmers or farming communities may have unique farming 
methods or techniques, these are hardly passed down through generations or 
formally documented.187 Similarly, farmers’ varieties developed on-farm for 
centuries are largely undocumented. For example, while varieties like ‘Jankara’ 
may be popular amongst farmers in specific parts of Kaduna State, it is largely 
unknown in other parts of Nigeria.188 This lack of proper documentation makes it 
difficult to recognise or reward small-scale farmers’ contributions to the seed 





                                                 
184 ibid 48. 
185 ibid. 
186 ibid.  
187 For discussions on traditional farming practices generally, see Bertus Haverkort and David 
Millar, ‘Constructing Diversity: The Active Role of Rural People in Maintaining and Enhancing 
Biodiversity’ (1994) 2 Etnoloecologica 51; Roht-Arriaza, ‘Of Seeds and Shamans’ (n 148), 931-
36. 
188 This is a farmers’ variety of rice identified by one of the small-scale farmers interviewed in 
Iddah Community, Kaduna State, Nigeria.  
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2.3.3. Interface: Informal Seed System and Plant Variety Protection 
 
Two issues that stem from the assessment of the informal seed system in Nigeria 
vis-à-vis plant variety protection are (i) saving, reusing, exchanging, and selling 
seeds, and (ii) protection of farmers’ varieties.189  
 
First, both farmers that use farmers’ varieties and improved varieties highlighted 
above explained that they save, reuse, exchange, and sell seeds. Recall that Magaji 
explained that he got his rice seeds from his father. These rice varieties would have 
been saved and passed down through generations. Similarly, Haruna, the small-
scale farmer who purchases improved varieties mentioned above explains that ‘I 
buy the seed, and after harvesting, I store it… I put it in a clay pot, seal with clay, 
till the next season.’190 For this farmer, although he purchases improved seeds, he 
still stores it using the traditional methods. Uwala confirms that small-scale farmers 
in Nigeria generally save seeds.191 He explains that these small-scale farmers 
preserve seeds in rhombuses or sealed containers hung on top of trees or over 
fireplaces in the kitchen.192 Small-scale farmers also sell farm-saved seeds. As seen 
in 2.3.1 above, farmers often purchase varieties with desirable traits from other 
farmers or local or community seed markets.  
 
In essence, a plant variety protection system that prohibits farmers from saving, 
reusing, exchanging, and selling farm-saved seeds would dismantle the informal 
seed system in Nigeria. From a regulatory perspective, Yarama concludes that ‘…it 
is going to be a suicidal effort to insist that farmers must go back to buy seed every 
year … If you have a material that is superior, farmers will always be willing to 
pay for it. Because it is the superiority of your material that should allow farmers 
return to buy the seed every year.’193 
 
                                                 
189 Access and benefit sharing was discussed in 2.1 above, under the FME and CBD. 
190 Fieldwork interview with Haruna (n 169).  
191 Uwala, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ (n 157). 
192 ibid 
193 Fieldwork interview with Ndirpaya (n 3). 
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Second, contrary to academic literature and CSOs’ interventions that call for the 
protection of farmers’ varieties, the small-scale farmers interviewed in Nigeria 
were unaware of IPRs protection for farmers’ varieties. However, after explaining 
plant variety protection, there were polarised views about it. One group of farmers 
indicated that they would be interested in protecting farmers’ varieties if they 
would receive financial remuneration. The other small-scale farmers opposed the 
idea of protecting farmers’ varieties. This group felt that farmers’ varieties and 
seeds are part of their cultural heritage which should be freely shared with other 
farmers. This position reflects the communal nature of farming practices and 
aversion to appropriation of life forms by farming communities in Nigeria.194  
 
However, expressing support for protection of farmers’ varieties, Ekpere echoes 
the sentiment of a number of other interviewees by arguing that: 
 
Farmers in Nigeria should have those rights [IPRs for plant varieties], and 
they should be construed legally as rights. Proprietary rights, community 
rights, individual rights, just as that ascribed to breeders… That farmer who 
plants yams, maize, etc. knows exactly what particular seed to keep for next 
year, and next year he grows it and he is assured of either similar or better 
crop than last year. That process is very similar or substantially equivalent 
to the breeding process of the crop breeder. It is exactly the same. You may 
not be able to say that farmer or breeder has a PhD in veterinary medicine 
or in agronomy, but he knows it, it is intellectual, he applies it and it works, 
and the principle of substantial equivalence says exactly that. That they 
don’t have to be exact but they have to be substantially equivalent, and if 
they are substantially equivalent, then they should be recognised, and they 
should be accepted for protection processes.195 
 
                                                 
194 Uwala, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ (n 157). 
195 Fieldwork interview with Johnson Ekpere, Former Secretary-General of the Scientific, 
Technical, and Research Commission of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU/STRC) and lead 
protagonist of the African Model Law (Ibadan, 2015) (transcript on file with author). Other 




The argument in favour of the protection of farmers’ varieties in Nigeria is 
generally that farmers conserve and develop farmers’ varieties adaptable to local 
agro-climatic conditions. Therefore, farmers’ efforts ought to be recognised and 
rewarded in a similar way as the actors in the formal seed sector. 
 
It is important to point out that the use of varieties from the informal seed sector, 
combined with intercropping or mixed cropping farming systems, results in 
assorted varieties which do not meet the existing DUS standards for registering 
new varieties in Nigeria.  Reflecting on the procedure for registering varieties in 
Nigeria, Aladele, the Registrar of NACGRAB, raised a number of concerns about 
the practicalities of registering farmers’ varieties. For example, he questioned 
farmers’ ability to provide substantial evidence in a scientific way in applications 
for registration of varieties. He further explained that to register new varieties, 
applicants are required to face a panel of scientists to defend the variety.196 One 
reply to the issues raised is that the NCVLBA, NASA, or subsequent IPRs systems 
seeking to allow the protection of farmers’ varieties could provide alternative 
procedures for registering farmers’ varieties.  
 
What follows is the final part of this background chapter on Nigeria, which shows 
how the current agricultural policy could effect changes to both the informal and 
formal seed systems.  
 
2.4. Agriculture Promotion Policy: 2016-2020 
 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 cover Nigeria’s international obligations, national legislation 
relevant to plant varieties, the informal seed system, and small-scale farming 
practices. This part assesses pertinent provisions in Nigeria’s current agricultural 
policy – the Agriculture Promotion Policy: 2016-2020 (APP). In particular, it 
draws attention to how the APP promotes private sector participation in Nigeria’s 
                                                 
196 Fieldwork interview with Aladele (n 28).  
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agriculture sector, which may trigger calls for specific plant variety protection 
systems suited to the private sector. 
 
The APP focuses on improving two main aspects of the agricultural sector, namely 
food production and export revenue.197 The government’s strategy to address these 
core issues is a private sector-led agricultural sector.198 To promote a private 
sector-led agricultural sector, the APP prioritises the development of legislative 
and institutional frameworks that facilitate agricultural investments in the 
country.199 While the APP does not specifically mention plant variety protection, 
one of its policy commitments is to review domestic seed laws and policies.200 
With regard to institutional framework, the FMARD is the key ministry mandated 
to implement provisions of the APP.201 However, the FMARD recognises the 
relationship between agriculture and other sectors such as industry, environment, 
power, energy, works, and water. Therefore, the FMARD is committed to working 
with other ministries when required, to implement the provisions of the APP.202   
 
Notably, the APP builds on the previous administration’s agricultural policies and 
programmes, including the ATA introduced in 2011, Vision 20:2020 introduced in 
2009, the 7-point agenda introduced in 2007, and the National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), introduced in 2004.203 A 
similar thread running through these agricultural policies and programmes is that 
they all seek to push for increased private sector participation in the agricultural 
sector. In particular, the APP builds on the ATA, which sought to refocus the 
                                                 
197 FMARD, The Agriculture Promotion Policy (n 45). 
198 ibid 27. 
199 ibid 26. 
200 ibid 39. 
201 ibid 13. 
202 ibid 13. 
203 See for example, Nigerian National Planning Commission, ‘Meeting Everyone’s NEEDS, 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy’ (Abuja 2004)  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Nigeria_PRSP(Dec2005).pdf> accessed 
17 July 2017; National Planning Commission ‘Nigeria Vision 20:2020, Economic Transformation 
Blueprint’ (2009) <http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/NationalPlans/nigeria-
vision-20-20-20.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017; Akinwumi Adesina, Agricultural Transformation 
Agenda: Repositioning Agriculture to Drive Nigeria’s Economy (FMARD 2012)  
<http://studylib.net/doc/12092363/agricultural-transformation-agenda--repositioning-agricul...> 
accessed 17 July 2017 (Agricultural Transformation Agenda). 
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Nigerian government’s attention from oil and gas to agriculture.204 It was the ATA 
that established the concept of ‘treating agriculture as a business’, which the APP 
builds on.205 By treating agriculture as a business, the ATA sought to reorient 
agriculture from a development project centred on government funding, to a profit-
driven enterprise with the private sector as the main growth driver.206 Significantly, 
the APP states that the concept of treating agriculture as a business will remain a 
cardinal part of Nigeria’s agriculture policies in the future.207 Despite its oil 
reserves, agriculture is the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy.208 It employs over 30 
percent of its labour force and contributes over 20 per cent to Nigeria’s GDP.209 
However, with the fall in oil prices, the current administration has turned to the 
agriculture sector.210 This is reflected in the APP’s objective to rebuild agriculture 
in Nigeria through private sector investments.211 
 
Alongside promoting private sector participation in agriculture, the APP 
acknowledges the role and contribution of small-scale farmers to Nigeria’s 
agricultural sector. Indeed, it introduces reforms and programmes to enhance 
small-scale productivity such as access to finance, access to inputs, and access to 
relevant agrarian information.212 However, the APP’s promotion of private sector-
                                                 
204 Adesina, Agricultural Transformation Agenda (n 203); Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the 
Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria (The MIT Press 2012) 139-40. 
205 Adesina, Agricultural Transformation Agenda (n 203) 3; FMARD, The Agriculture Promotion 
Policy (n 45) 12. 
206 Adesina, Agricultural Transformation Agenda (n 203) 2. 
207 FMARD, The Agriculture Promotion Policy (n 45) 12. 
208 FAO, ‘Nigeria at a Glance’ <http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-glance/en/>  
accessed 28 August 2017; The International Fund for Agricultural Development, ‘Rural Poverty in 
Nigeria’<https://operations.ifad.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/nigeria> 
accessed 25 July 2017 (‘Rural Poverty in Nigeria’). 
209 ibid; The World Bank, ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)’ (2010)  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=NG> accessed 25 August 
2017; The World Bank, ‘Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ (2016)  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=NG> accessed 28 August 
2017.  
210 For information on different national and international partnerships to rebuild the agriculture 
sector in Nigeria, see generally, FMARD <http://fmard.gov.ng/> accessed 06 June 2017; FAO, 
‘Nigeria at a Glance’ (n 208). See also the current administration’s policy which commits to 
diversify the economy, in part by rebuilding the agriculture sector: Manifesto of All Progressives 
Congress <http://www.allprogressivescongress.org/manifesto/> accessed 25 July 2017; All  
Progressives Congress, ‘Roadmap to a New Nigeria’ <http://www.thescoopng.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/210989962-Roadmap-to-a-New-Nigeria.pdf> accessed 25 July 2017.  
211 FMARD, The Agriculture Promotion Policy (n 45) 5-6. 
212 ibid 36-40. 
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led agriculture encourages commercial large-scale farmers and agribusinesses. 
Therefore, what the APP seeks to create is an agricultural sector where small and 
large-scale farmers as well as agribusinesses not only co-exist, but also thrive 
together. Drawing from this, it is argued that the plant variety protection system 
suited to Nigeria would also be one that caters to the interests of both small-scale 




This chapter attempts to contribute to answering the first central research question 
posed in this thesis which concerns the plant variety protection system best suited 
to Nigeria. Despite the obligation to protect plant varieties under TRIPS, Nigeria 
currently does not have a plant variety protection system. It also does not have 
operational access and benefit sharing or farmers’ rights principles as obliged 
under the CBD. A TWAIL and regime complex assessment of this background on 
Nigeria shows that there is lack of synergy amongst the government institutions 
implicated in plant variety protection and generally inactive actors to push for 
industrial property or sui generis reforms. Nonetheless, Nigeria has laws for the 
registration, release, and commercialisation of new varieties. It also has a practice 
of granting moratoriums of 10 years to allow private companies to exclusively 
market new varieties. However, this practice is unenforceable because it is not 
backed by the force of law. Following from TWAIL, attention is drawn to the 
informal seed sector and small-scale farming practices. Incorporating discussions 
on the informal sector no doubt presents a more comprehensive background on the 
state of plant variety protection in Nigeria.  
 
While the pending obligation under TRIPS is one reason for Nigeria to design a 
plant variety protection system suited to it, other more compelling reasons are its 
current agriculture policy which promotes private sector-led agriculture and its 
current IPRs reform developments. Nigeria’s current administration’s focus on 
agriculture as a driver for the economy has created both national and international 
interest in the sector, which may trigger calls for specific plant variety protection 
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systems that favour private seed companies. Furthermore, the current IPC Bill 
includes plant variety protection provisions skewed in favour of private seed 
companies. However, the chapter concludes that any plant variety protection 
system introduced in Nigeria ought to simultaneously protect the interests of small-
scale farmers and private seed companies (commercial plant breeders), as they both 
significantly contribute to the seed sector. The details set out in this chapter 
provides key insights into the Nigerian realities vis-à-vis plant variety protection. 
Significantly, it provides empirical background on which the original TWAIL and 
regime complex analysis of plant variety protection in the Global South is built.  
 
The next chapter will examine the different plant variety protection options under 
TRIPS. This examination not only covers the possible TRIPS-compliant plant 
variety protection options Nigeria may consider, it also uncovers the benefits and 
drawback of each system for Nigeria (and other similar Global South WTO 
members). The next chapter is important to the thesis because it employs the 
findings from this chapter – about the realities in Nigeria – to analyse the different 
possible ways of implementing the obligation to protect plant varieties under 
TRIPS. Thus, the next chapter also contributes to answering the first central 






Plant Variety Protection Options under TRIPS 
 
Nigeria can implement its obligation to protect plant varieties under TRIPS through 
a patent system, a sui generis system, or a combination of systems.1 Understanding 
the plant variety protection option suited to Nigeria requires a solid grasp of each 
system, which is useful to answer the first central research question posed in this 
thesis. The background provided in Chapter 2 concludes that Nigeria ought to 
design a plant variety protection system that simultaneously protects the interests 
of small-scale farmers and private seed companies.2 This chapter examines the 
plant variety protection options allowed under TRIPS to tease out the option that 
caters to both small-scale farmers and private seed companies operating in Nigeria. 
In line with the TWAIL characteristic preoccupation with unpacking international 
law from a Global South perspective, the coverage of law, conditions for 
protection, and scope of protection in each system is examined.3 This examination 
extracts the benefits and drawbacks of each system for Nigeria.   
 
The chapter finds that determining the plant variety protection option under TRIPS 
that is best suited for Nigeria is challenging because of the interrelated legal 
systems and principles relevant to plant variety protection. While TRIPS sets out 
the minimum standard for all WTO members to protect plant varieties, further legal 
systems and principles relevant to plant variety protection are set out in the UPOV 
Convention, the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and the Genetic Resources treaty currently 
under negotiation in WIPO.4 The existence of these overlapping treaties covering 
                                                 
1 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. 
2 See Chapter 2.  
3 Makau Mutua notes that one of the key objectives of TWAIL is to ‘understand, deconstruct and 
unpack the uses of international law as a medium to subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans’. 
Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) The American Society of International Law Proceedings 
of the 94th Annual Meeting, Washington DC 31, 31. 
4 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1991) 815 UNTS 89 
<http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm> accessed 04 July 2017;  
CBD (1992) 1760 UNTS 79, 31 ILM 818; International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food  
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plant varieties in non-hierarchical regimes reflects the regime complex for plant 
variety protection.5 Importantly, the chapter finds that a sui generis plant variety 
protection system is best suited to Nigeria. Sui generis simply means a special or 
unique system. The sui generis option provides the latitude for Nigeria to protect 
the interests of both small-scale farmers and private seed companies (commercial 
plant breeders’) in line with its national realities. As such, a creatively designed sui 
generis system would pull together the relevant legal principles from the UPOV 
Convention, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA. 
 
The chapter is divided into four parts. Part I examines the patent option for plant 
varieties set out in TRIPS. Part II elaborates on the ‘plant breeders’ rights’ system, 
a type of sui generis system set out in the UPOV Convention. The UPOV 
Convention is the only international treaty that focuses exclusively on plant variety 
protection. Part III explores the creative sui generis option. It explains how a 
creative sui generis system may be developed by pulling together a variety of legal 
systems and principles. Part IV briefly addresses the protection of plant varieties 
using a combination of systems. Ultimately, the analysis in Parts I to IV contributes 
to determining the plant variety protection system best suited to Nigeria.  
 
3.1. Patent System 
 
The inclusion of patents as a plant variety protection option under TRIPS was 
thanks to the United States (US).6 The US favoured the patent option because it 
offered broader protection and fewer exceptions than sui generis systems. 
Furthermore, the US had already extended patents to plant varieties through case 
law at the time of the TRIPS negotiations.7 Indeed, for the US, ‘anything under the 
                                                 
and Agriculture (3 November 2001) Res 3/2003 FAO Conference, 31st session 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf> accessed 04 July 2017 (ITPGRFA); World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Intergovernmental Committee  
<http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/> accessed 26 July 2017.  
5 See generally, Kal Raustiala and David Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic 
Resources’ (2004) 58(2) International Organization 277 (‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic 
Resources’). 
6 Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 131 (Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries). 
7 See Chapter 1. 
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sun made by man’ was patentable.8 In particular, it was the private sector, led by 
companies such as Monsanto, Du-Pont, IBM, and Pfizer which sought to expand 
globally that pressured the US to push for generally stronger IPRs systems in 
TRIPS.9 Kal Raustiala and David Victor point out that ‘since 1980 [following the 
Diamond v Chakrabarty decision], the conventional wisdom in the US has been 
that strong property rights – patents, in particular – are essential to the modern 
biotechnology-based innovation system.’10 Thus, the US, along with Japan, 
Switzerland, and the Nordic countries proposed broad patents for all plant and 
living organisms during the TRIPS negotiations.11 In contrast, the European Union 
(EU) and Global South countries rejected the proposal on patents for plant 
varieties.12 Despite the lack of consensus, the patent option was included in TRIPS.  
 
3.1.1. The Patent Option: TRIPS 
 
Coverage of the Law  
 
Article 27 of TRIPS provides that inventions in all fields of technology are 
patentable.13 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS further specifically provides that plant 
varieties are also patentable.14 However, TRIPS neither defines plant varieties nor 
                                                 
8 See generally, Sidney A Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Ananda M 
Chakrabarty et al (1980) 447 US 303 (Diamond v Chakrabarty); Anne E Crocker, ‘Will Plants 
Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on an International Level? A Look at the History of US 
and International Patent Law Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes after 
the US Supreme Court’s Decision in JEM AG Supply v Pioneer Hi-Bred’ (2003) 8 Drake Journal 
of Agricultural Law 251-94.  
9 Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 
(Earthscan 2002) 114-19. 
10 Raustiala and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 5) 287. 
11 Terence Stewart (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986-1992 (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers 1993) 2294; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development: Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005) 391. 
12 ibid. 
13 TRIPS, art 27. 
14 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS provides: ‘[WTO] members may also exclude from patentability: plants 
and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, members shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system 
or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years 
after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.’ 
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sets out the required coverage of protection for plant varieties; that is, the range of 
plant species or botanical genera patentable under TRIPS. As such, it would appear 
that WTO members that choose the patent option are required to protect plant 
varieties of all species and genera. 
 
Conditions for Protection 
 
Plant varieties that are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application are patentable.15 Neither TRIPS nor the Paris Convention – which 
TRIPS refers to with regard to patents – defines the new, inventive step, or 
industrial application conditions for patentability.16 Instead, Section 5 of TRIPS 
focuses on procedural requirements which distinguish patentable from non-
patentable subject matter.17 Although there are differences in patent legislations at 
the national level, an invention is generally novel if it constitutes new knowledge 
when compared to the state of the art at the time of the application.18 It involves an 
inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, and it has industrial 
application if it can be translated into a product or process useful in industry – thus 
restricting patents for ideas, scientific concepts, or discoveries.19 Furthermore, 
Article 29 of TRIPS provides that patent applications are required to disclose the 
invention in a manner that is sufficiently clear and complete to ensure that the 
invention can be carried out by a person skilled in the art.20 This disclosure 
                                                 
15 Article 27 of TRIPS provides: ‘subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.’ The footnote 
in Article 27 states that for purposes of the article, the terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of 
industrial application’ may be deemed by a member to be synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ 
and ‘useful’, respectively.  
16 Article 2 of TRIPS provides that in respect of Parts II, III, and IV of TRIPS (standards for patent 
protection is under Part II), WTO members shall comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1967 (Paris Convention).  
17 TRIPS, s 5, arts 27-38.  
18 See Chapter 2 for patentability of plant varieties under the Patents and Designs Act of Nigeria 
1970 (PDA). See also Dwijen Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-Based Inventions 
and Agriculture (Study Paper 3a, United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
2002), 25-26 (Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-Based Inventions and Agriculture).   
19 ibid.  
20 TRIPS, art 29. 
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condition may also require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out 
the invention.21  
 
Scope of Protection 
 
The patent owner has exclusive rights over the patents for 20 years.22 The exclusive 
rights conferred gives the owner the right to prevent third parties from making, 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented products or processes 
without consent.23 The patent owner also has the right to assign, transfer, or license 
the patent.24 However, WTO members may exclude patents for inventions 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, such as to protect human, animal, or 
plant life, or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment within their territory.25 
In Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems,26 the Technical Board of Appeal of the 
European Patent Office clarified that the concept of morality is related to the belief 
that some behaviour is right and acceptable, while others are wrong.27 This belief 
is founded on the totality of accepted norms deeply rooted in a particular culture.28 
The twin concepts of ordre public and morality are interpreted differently at the 
national level as TRIPS does not require uniform substantive definitions of these 
concepts. Indeed, the African Group at the TRIPS Council submits that patents for 
plant varieties are immoral and contrary to the fabric of African culture.29  
 
                                                 
21 TRIPS, art 29.  
22 The 20-year period is counted from the filing date of the invention. TRIPS, art 33.  
23 TRIPS, art 28(1). 
24 TRIPS, art 28(2). 
25 TRIPS, art 27.  
26 (1995) T 0356/93 (EPO).  
27 The case involved a patent application for a genetically modified herbicide-resistant plant. In the 
case, the Technical Board of Appeal held that the invention did not fall under the prohibition on 
patents for plant varieties provided in Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention (EPC). As 
such, it was patentable, subject to some modifications.  Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems (1995) 
T 0356/93 (EPO).  
28 Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems (n 27).  
29 African WTO member states formed a coalition in the WTO named the African Group. The 
African Group speaks with one voice, using a single coordinator or negotiating team. Joint 
Communication from the African Group. WTO, ‘Taking Forward the Review of Article 27.3(b) of 




Furthermore, WTO members may provide limited exceptions to exclusive patent 
rights, provided the exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent and the legitimate interest of third parties are taken into 
account.30 A WTO dispute settlement panel in Canada—Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products explained that the conditions under this limited 
exception are cumulative.31 That is, each condition – (i) limited exception, (ii) 
unreasonable conflict with normal exploitation of patent, and (iii) legitimate 
interests of third parties – is a separate and independent requirement that must be 
satisfied. 32 Failure to comply with any of the conditions results in the rejection of 
the Article 30 exception.33 Significantly, the panel concluded that any exception 
that substantially curtails the patent owner’s exclusive rights cannot be considered 
a ‘limited exception’ under Article 30 of TRIPS.34 This WTO panel interpretation 
of Article 30 shows that the limited exception provision prioritises the interests of 
the patent owner.  
 
As TRIPS only provides minimum global standards, there are variations in 
implementing the patent standards in WTO member states. These variations and 
differences have also evolved over time, as seen from the examples of the US and 
the EU in Chapter 1.35 Recall that the US extended patents to plant varieties 
through case law – Diamond v Chakrabarty,36 Ex Parte Hibberd,37 and JEM AG 
Supply v Pioneer Hi-Bred,38 whereas patents for plant varieties are expressly 
prohibited under Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention (EPC).39 
                                                 
30 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs 
and Sustainable Development (n 11) 433-37. 
31 The complaint was by the European Community (EC) and its member states. Canada—Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (2000) WT/DS114/R, [7.20], 152  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf> accessed 24 June 2017 (Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products).   
32 Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (n 33) [7.20], 152.                              
33 ibid.                              
34 ibid [7.36], 156.                              
35 See Chapter 1 for the history of plant variety protection.  
36 Diamond v Chakrabarty (n 8). 
37 Ex Parte Hibberd et al (1985) 227 USPQ 443.  
38 JEM AG Supply Inc, DBA Farm Advantage Inc et al v Pioneer Hi-bred International Inc (2001) 
534 US 124.  
39 See Chapter 1 for the history of plant variety protection. Other countries that allow patents for 
plant varieties include Australia and Japan. These case law and legislative provisions remain the 
position of law in the US and Europe to date.  
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However, developments in Europe – such as Directive 98/44/EC on legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions (Biotechnology Directive) and the 
Novartis v Transgenic Plant case – show that the exclusion of patenting plant 
varieties is interpreted narrowly under the EPC.40  
 
The Biotechnology Directive maintains in principle the EPC prohibition on the 
patenting of plant varieties.41 However, it deviates from the EPC as it adds that 
‘inventions which concern plants or animals shall be patentable if the technical 
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.’42 
That is, patents are prohibited for a single plant or animal variety, but may be 
granted if the claim covers two or more varieties.43 The decision in the Novartis v 
Transgenic Plant case strengthens the Biotechnology Directive, as the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal held that ‘a claim wherein specific plant varieties are not 
individually claimed is not excluded from patentability under Article 53(b) EPC, 
even though it may embrace plant varieties.’44 In other words, where the patent 
claim is for a plant innovation that broadly covers two or more plant varieties, the 
innovation is patentable, provided it is not restricted to one (single) plant variety.  
Meanwhile, the express prohibition on the patentability of plant varieties is 
prevalent in the Global South. For example, the African Model Law, along with 
legislations in countries such as India, Thailand, and Nigeria prohibit patents for 
plant varieties.45 
                                                 
40 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Invention; Novartis v Transgenic Plant (2000) G01/98 (EPOR) 303. 
See also decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G2/12 and G/13. 
41 Article 4.1 of the Biotechnology Directive states: ‘The following shall not be patentable: plant 
and animal varieties.’  
42 Biotechnology Directive, art 4.2. In addition, Recital 31 of the Biotechnology Directive provides 
that ‘a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole genome) is not 
covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded from patentability, even it 
comprises new varieties of plants.’ 
43 For discussions on the Biotechnology Directive and plant varieties, see generally, Dan Leskien, 
‘The European Patent Directive on Biotechnology’ (1998) 36 Biotechnology and Development 
Monitor 16; Dan Leskien, ‘Administrative Council of the European Patent Office Amends 
Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention: Biotechnological Inventions’ 
(August 1999) BIO-IPR <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1919-epo-moves-to-use-eu-
directive-on-life-patenting?c=true> accessed 26 June 2017. 
44 Novartis v Transgenic Plant (n 40) 303.  
45 See, for example, the African Model Legislation for the Protection of Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers, and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources 
2000 (African Model Law), art 9; PDA, s 1.4(a). 
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Overall, it is important to note that patentable subject matter under TRIPS as set 
out in Article 27 broadly covers products and processes in all fields of 
technology.46 It does not pay attention to specific issues surrounding the protection 
of plant varieties – such as the significance of plant varieties to food production, 
the informal seed sector, or traditional farming systems. Indeed, the main actors 
that patent plant materials are the multinational seed companies such as Monsanto, 
Syngenta, DuPont, Dow, Bayer, and BASF. In fact, these six companies account 
for 60 per cent of world seed sales.47 There is also a growing trend of mergers and 
acquisitions among the big seed and chemical companies.48 This trend has resulted 
in highly concentrated markets and dependence on these companies for essential 
plant material, which influence price-fixing. Two of the biggest seed and chemical 
companies, Bayer and Monsanto, are currently discussing a merger.49 The 
combination of Bayer and Monsanto would substantially reduce competition in the 
                                                 
46 TRIPS, art 27. 
47 The top three firms – Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta – control over 53 per cent of the world 
seed market. Philip H Howard, ‘Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry’ 
(2015) 55 Crop Science 1.  
48 The trend in mergers and acquisitions in the agricultural and seed sectors follow two previous 
phases of consolidation: first in the mid-1980s, and the second from the late 1990s to later 2000s. 
For example, in the second phase – AstraZeneca and Novartis Seeds merged to form Syngenta in 
2000, BASF took over Cyanamid in 2000, while Bayer acquired Aventis Crop Sciences in 2002. 
Over the years, Monsanto has acquired almost 40 agricultural biotechnology firms and seed 
companies, including Agrecetus, Asgrow, Cargill’s International Seed Division, Calgene, DeKald 
Genetics Corporation, Delta & Pine Land, and Holdens. See generally, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, Tracking the Trend towards Market Concentration: The Case of the 
Agricultural Input Industry (Study prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 20 April 2006) 
UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2005/16 (Tracking the Trend towards Market Concentration); Diana L 
Moss, ‘Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition between a Rock and a Hard Place? (23 October 
2009) The American Antitrust Institute  
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI_Platforms%20and%20Transgenic%20S
eed_102320091053.pdf > accessed 26 June 2017; Philip Howard, ‘Visualizing Consolidation in the 
Global Seed Industry 1996-2008’ (2009) 1 Sustainability 1266; Diana L Moss, ‘Transgenic Seed 
Platforms: Competition between a Rock and a Hard Place?’ Addendum (The American Antitrust 
Institute, 5 April 2010); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing: [8], Lanham: Congressional 
Documents and Publications (20 September 2016)  
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Addendum%20to%20AAI%20White%20Pap
er_Transgenic%20Seed.4.5_040520101107.pdf> accessed 26 June 2017.  
49 Monsanto accepted Bayer’s USD 66 billion offer of acquisition on 14 September 2016. Eric 
Sfiligoj, ‘Bayer-Monsanto Happens’ (2016) 179(10) Croplife 4. Similarly, Dow and DuPont are 
also in the process of a merger, which Dupont states is expected to close by August 2017. The Dow-
DuPont merger has received clearance from the US Department of Justice and from Brazil, China, 
and Europe. Dupont, ‘Dow and DuPont Receive Antitrust Clearance from US Department of Justice 
for Proposed Merger of Equals’ (Dupont, 15 June 2017) <http://investors.dupont.com/investor-
relations/investor-news/investor-news-details/2017/Dow-and-DuPont-Receive-Antitrust-
Clearance-from-US-Department-of-Justice-for-Proposed-Merger-of-Equals/default.aspx> 
accessed 26 June 2017.  
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already intertwined seed and chemical markets.50 Unsurprisingly, the broad patent 
provisions under TRIPS which sets out the same standards for protecting all fields 
of technology has given rise to debates about its extension to plant varieties.  
 
3.1.2. Debates on Patents for Plant Varieties: Lessons for Nigeria  
 
To start with, proponents of patents for plant varieties within the Crucible Group 
argue that intellectual property, including patent protection is a social necessity.51 
That is, plant inventors have the right to prevent the unauthorised use of their plant 
varieties in the same way that industrial inventors have the right to protect their 
possessions and property.52 These proponents explain that patents are important to 
protect investments in developing new plant varieties, which is susceptible to 
unauthorised use as ‘others can multiply or photocopy the work of several years in 
a single field over just one growing season.’53 Put differently, these proponents 
argue that researchers and investors who commit resources to develop plant 
inventions ought to recover their investment. For instance, Monsanto, a 
multinational agricultural company and leading producer of genetically engineered 
seed, states that it ‘seeks IPRs including patents and often plant breeder’s rights, to 
                                                 
50 Centre for Food Safety, ‘Tell President Trump: No Dangerous Monsanto-Bayer Mega Merger’ 
<http://salsa3.salsalabs.com/o/1881/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=19826> accessed 
26 June 2017. The Crucible II Group notes that government anti-trust laws could be used to curb 
excessive consolidation in the seed industry. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 
Policy Options for Genetic Resources: People Plants and Patents Revisited (International 
Development Research Centre 2000) 17 (Seeding Solutions: Volume 1).  
51 The Crucible Group encompasses members with a wide cross-section of socio-political 
perspectives and agricultural experiences that assembled to ‘hammer out ideas and 
recommendations’ on intellectual property (IP) for plants. The Crucible Group members: Bo 
Bengtsson, Tewolde Berhan Egziabher, Erskine Childers, Carlos Correa, Don Duvick, Paul Egger, 
Chusa Gines, Sven Hamrell, Jaap Hardon, Geoff Hawtin, Bente Herstad, Henk Hobbelink, Amir 
Jamal, Klaus Lampe, Francisco Martinez-Gomez, Camila Montecinos, Pat Roy Mooney, Katy 
Moran, Andrew Mushita, Bob Phelps, Michael Pimbert, Sarojeni Rengam, Tim Roberts, George 
Rothschild, Rene Salazar, Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom, Hans Wessels and Vo-Tong Xuan. The first 
meeting held from 16 to 21 June 1993 in Uppsala, Sweden. The three Crucible Group publications 
in 1994, 2000, and 2001 are referenced in this thesis. The Crucible Group, People, Plants and 
Patents: The Impact of Intellectual Property on Trade, Plant Biodiversity and Rural Society 
(International Development Research Centre 1994) 57- 63 (People, Plants and Patents). 




cover many of the traits and seed varieties it develops … to ensure it is paid for its 
products and the investments put into developing them.’54  
 
Yet there is growing resistance to patenting plant materials and plant varieties both 
from civil society organisations (CSOs) and activists within the Global North and 
Global South. Within the Global North, non-state actors actively oppose patents 
for plant varieties and food crops. For example, Plantum NL, Europe’s largest 
breeder organisation, argues that patents pose a threat to the development of open 
innovation within the plant breeding sector.55 Generally, CSOs such as the Centre 
for Food Safety, La Via Campesina, the Genetic Resources Action International 
Network (GRAIN), No Patents on Seeds, Navdanya, and the African Centre for 
Biodiversity all oppose patents for plant varieties and plant materials.56 Two 
arguments against patenting plant varieties and plant materials are as follows.   
 
First, the prohibition on farmers’ practice of saving and reusing seeds. The seed 
companies that patent plant varieties usually have contracts with farmers that 
prohibit the farmers from saving seeds. Seed saving is a historical practice for 
small-scale farmers, as seen from the Nigerian example in Chapter 2.57 
Nevertheless, seed companies meticulously investigate farmers’ fields for breaches 
of contracts. For example, Monsanto lists on its website that it has filed suits 
against farmers 147 times from 1997 to date.58 It is important to note that this list 
only comprises actions against farmers that reached the courts; majority of the 
cases are settled outside of court. Although highly publicised cases involving 
Monsanto, such as Monsanto Co v McFarling (US), Bowman v Monsanto Co (US), 
                                                 
54 Monsanto, ‘Patents’ <https://monsanto.com/products/product-stewardship/patents/> accessed 25 
June 2017.  
55 Plantum NL, ‘Plantum NL Position on Patent –and Plant Breeders’ Rights’  
<http://cucurbitbreeding.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/plantum-nl-position-on-patent-and-
plant-breeders-rights.pdf> accessed 26 June 2017.  
56 For example, see Genetic Resources Action International Network (GRAIN), ‘Of Patents and 
Pirates’ (GRAIN Report 2000); La Via Campesina/GRAIN, ‘Seed Laws that Criminalise Farmers: 
Resistance and Fightback’ (8 April 2015) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5142-seed-laws-
that-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback> accessed 04 July 2017.  
57 See Chapter 2 for discussion on the informal seed system.  
58 Monsanto, ‘Saved Seed and Farmer Lawsuits’ (11 April 2017)  




and Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser (Canada), ended up with judgments 
delivered in favour of Monsanto, the important takeaways from these and other 
seed company cases is that the patent system prohibits the age-long traditions of 
farmers’ saving and reusing seeds.59  
 
In essence, patenting plant varieties would require farmers in Nigeria to purchase 
seeds every planting season, which would be carefully policed by the profit-
oriented seed companies.60 While a counter-argument is that small-scale farmers 
should simply focus on growing their traditional varieties, it will be recalled from 
Chapter 2 that only certified seeds – which exclude farmers’ varieties – are 
officially registered, released, and commercialised in Nigeria. Thus, introducing a 
patent system in Nigeria could further limit farmers’ sources of livelihood which 
revolves around saving, reusing, and selling farm-saved seeds along with its 
products. 
 
Second, the broad scope of patents granted and the exclusion of the breeders’ 
exemption. Plant varieties are ‘characterised by essentially all of its genes.’61 
Therefore, patenting plant varieties may restrict the use of both the body of genes 
which make up the variety and the isolated traits or genes embodied in it, which 
hinders research and breeding of new plant varieties.62 In other words, patents may 
encompass claims not only to the new plant variety, but also individual components 
of such variety, including genes, seeds, tissue cultures, cells, DNA sequences, and 
                                                 
59 Monsanto Company v Homan McFarling (2007) Fed Cir 05-1570-1598; Vernon Hugh Bowman 
v Monsanto Company et al (2013) US 133 S Ct 1761; Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises 
Limited v Monsanto Canada Incorporated and Monsanto Company (2004) 1 SCR 902, 2004 SCC 
34. 
60 See generally, the Centre for Food Safety reports: Centre for Food Safety, Monsanto vs US 
Farmers (2005) <http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport11305.pdf> 
accessed 25 June 2017; Centre for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, Seed Giants vs US Farmers 
(2013) <http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf > accessed 25 June 
2017. 
61 Tim Robert, ‘Patenting Plants Around the World’ (1996) European Intellectual Property Review 
531, 533 (‘Patenting Plants Around the World’). 
62 Carlos Correa, Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights (Background 
Study Paper No 8, Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, April 1999) 1, 13 
(Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights).  
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specific plant parts.63 Jack Kloppenburg notes that in the US case Ex Parte 
Hibberd, Hibberd’s patent application included over 260 separate claims.64 The 
ability to make multiple claims broadens the protection granted for the invention 
and also permits the individual licensing of particular components of the plant 
variety.65 Thus, a patent on a plant variety can protect: (i) the inventive technique 
for producing the plant variety, (ii) the DNA sequence embedded in the plant 
variety, (iii) the whole plant variety which expresses certain genetic characteristics, 
and (iv) the progeny of these plant varieties.66   
 
Furthermore, the patenting of plant varieties is not limited to one specific variety. 
The patent holder has the right to prevent use of all plant varieties that carry the 
particular patented genetic materials or are the result of the patented technique.67 
Robin Pistorius and Jeroen van Wijk note that several US patents on plants provide 
protection for all transgenic plants of an entire species or even protect plants of 
different species produced though the patented technology.68 For example, the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has issued patents which cover all 
sunflower products with low levels of saturated fatty acids, and for transgenic crops 
that are developed to express the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxin (a natural insect 
resistance).69 The patenting of plant varieties may also prevent third parties from 
using the patented varieties for research and breeding.70 The patent owner may 
prevent multiplication of the variety, tests crosses, subsequent research and 
development with the crosses, or use of the patented material as the parent of 
another variety both for breeding and even experimental purposes.71 No new plant 
                                                 
63 Jack Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 1492-2000 (2nd 
edn, University of Wisconsin Press 2004) 263 (First the Seed).  
64 ibid.  
65 ibid 264. 
66 Robin Pistorius and Jeroen van Wijk, The Exploitation of Plant Information: Political Strategies 
in Crop Development (CABI Publishing 1999) 140 (The Exploitation of Plant Information). 
67 ibid 140-41.  
68 ibid 141.  
69 ibid. These patents are both held by Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc.: (i) Publication number 
EP0496504 A1: Sunflower Products Having Lower Levels of Saturated Fatty Acids (published 29 
July 1992); (ii) Publication number: W02005094340 A2: Patents for Method of Reducing Insect 
Resistant Pests in Transgenic Crops (published 13 October 2005).  
70 Correa, Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights (n 62) 13. 
71 Robert, ‘Patenting Plants Around the World’ (n 61) 533; Correa, Access to Plant Genetic 
Resources and Intellectual Property Rights (n 62) 13. 
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variety is ‘created from scratch’, thus a patent system may limit access to genetic 
materials in Nigeria which is necessary for plant breeding.72  
 
Apart from the reasons above, practical questions about institutional capacity arise. 
Nigeria is not a patent examining country; in other words, Nigeria’s patent office 
does not examine patent applications. Therefore, the officers in Nigeria’s 
Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry would not be in a position to determine 
whether patent applications are over-reaching. In addition, Nigeria does not have 
a specialist IPRs judicial system to resolve disputes. Nonetheless, two main 
arguments that could be raised in favour of patenting plant varieties in Nigeria are 
promotion of private sector investment in plant breeding and technology transfer 
to the country.73 It is argued that these benefits (and more) are achievable under a 
sui generis system, as will be seen in 3.3 below. As such, while a patent system 
may favour the fledging private sector investment in agriculture, it is unsuited to 
Nigeria for the reasons detailed above.  
 
3.2. Plant Breeder’s Rights System 
 
The UPOV plant breeder’s rights system is a type of sui generis plant variety 
protection system that WTO members may choose to fulfil their TRIPS obligation. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that UPOV was established to harmonise the different plant 
variety protection systems in Europe.74 Indeed, the European origins and 
dominance in UPOV is axiomatic.75 Although the EU pushed for the incorporation 
of UPOV as the sui generis system during the TRIPS negotiations, this was 
unsuccessful.76 Jayashree Watal notes that one reason UPOV was not included in 
                                                 
72 Correa, Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights (n 62) 8. 
73 See generally arguments in favour of patents for plant varieties in The Crucible Group, People, 
Plants and Patents (n 51) 55-63; Pedro Roffe, ‘Bringing Minimum Global Intellectual Property 
Standards into Agriculture: The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)’ in Geoff Tansey and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control of Food: A Guide 
to International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security 
(Earthscan 2008) 63. 
74 See Chapter 1 on the introduction to UPOV.   
75 UPOV, The First Twenty-Five Years of the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants: December 2 1961 - December 2 1986 (UPOV 1987) 82-96.  
76 Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (n 6) 140. 
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Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS was because there was no consensus amongst the Global 
North about the details of the sui generis system.77 Watal further notes that another 
possible reason was that the UPOV 1991 Convention had not yet entered into force 
during the negotiations.78 As such, reference to the UPOV 1978 Convention was 
considered inadequate, while reference to the UPOV 1991 Convention was 
considered premature.79  
 
The primary focus of this section is the plant breeder’s rights under the UPOV 
1991 Convention, which is the version currently in force.80 Nonetheless, previous 
versions of the treaty are referred to where necessary. Unlike TRIPS which merely 
mentions a sui generis option without providing details about the system, the 
UPOV Convention sets out detailed provisions on its plant breeders’ rights system.  
 
3.2.1 The UPOV Plant Breeders’ Rights Option  
 
Coverage of the Law  
 
The UPOV 1991 Convention covers all plant genera and species.81 However, it 
provides a dual track procedure for expanding coverage, depending on whether the 
contracting state is a new or old member. UPOV members previously party to the 
1961, 1972, or 1978 Conventions are required to protect all plant genera and 
species within five years of the entry into force of the UPOV 1991 Convention.82 
New UPOV members not party to the 1961, 1972, or 1978 Conventions are also 
entitled to a gradual expansion. The new members are to apply provisions of the 
UPOV 1991 Convention to at least 15 plant genera or species from the day they 
become party to the Convention, and to extend the protection to all plant genera or 




80 The UPOV 1961 Convention has been revised three times (1972, 1978, and 1991) since it entered 
into force. Previous versions, including the UPOV 1978 Convention, are closed for membership.  
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, UPOV Lex  
<http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/upov_convention.html> accessed 26 June 2017. 
81 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 3. 
82 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 3.2.  
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species after 10 years of UPOV membership at the latest.83 Protected plant genera 
and species were limited to 13 in the UPOV 1961 Convention, and 24 in the UPOV 
1978 Convention.  
 
Significantly, the UPOV Convention defines plant variety. As mentioned in 3.1 
above, TRIPS does not define the term. Notwithstanding, there is no TRIPS 
obligation for WTO members to adopt the UPOV definition of plant variety. While 
the UPOV 1978 Convention did not define plant variety, Article 1 of the UPOV 
1991 Convention defines a plant variety as: 
 
a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, 
which grouping irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a 
breeder’s right are fully met can be (i) defined by the expression of the 
characteristics resulting from a given genotype, or combination of 
genotypes, (ii) distinguished from any other plant grouping by the 
expression of at least one of the said characteristics, and (iii) considered as 
a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.84 
 
A Working Group was established by the UPOV Conference meeting in plenary 
on 5 March 1991 to examine the definition of ‘variety.’85 Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), and 
the EU were invited to delegate a representative to the Working Group.86 Chaired 
by Joel Guiard (from France), the Working Group was mandated to present a 
technically satisfactory and objective definition of ‘variety’, taking into 
consideration the ‘relevance of the definition to the relationship between patents 
and plant variety rights.’87 As seen in the Novartis v Transgenic example above, 
                                                 
83 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 3.  
84 Emphasis added. UPOV 1991 Convention, art 1.  
85 For discussions on the formulation of the ‘plant variety’ definition in the UPOV 1991 
Convention, see UPOV, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, 1991 (UPOV Publication No 
346 (E) 1992) 137-40 (Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants). 
86 Noticeably, all the countries in the Working Group were from the Global North. 
87 UPOV, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (n 85) 137. 
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the definition of ‘plant variety’ is an important feature of any plant variety 
protection system. This is because the definition adopted determines the type and 
scope of protection afforded to plant innovations. The Working Group generally 
agreed to adopt the UK’s proposed definition of ‘variety’ as contained in 
DC/91/23, which covered definitions in (i) and (ii) above, while Mr. Guiard 
suggested (iii) above.88 The definition sought to cover all types of varieties, 
therefore it did not mention any specific propagation process.   
 
Nonetheless, the Working Group clearly sought to distinguish the definition of 
variety from the conditions for protecting a new variety.89 To achieve this, the 
Working Group added the provision irrespective of whether the conditions for the 
grant of a breeder’s rights are fully met, as emphasised in the definition above. As 
such, the definition focuses on the genotype of the new variety; that is, the genetic 
constitution of the variety. Applying the definition as set out in Article 1 would 
mean that not all ‘plant varieties’ fulfil the conditions for protection set out in 
Article 5 of the UPOV 1991 Convention. This is because plant innovations that fall 
under the definition of ‘plant varieties’ may not meet the further conditions for 
protection.90 In other words, the broadly couched definition of plant varieties 
covers both ‘distinct’ and ‘stable’ conditions under Article 5 of the UPOV 1991 
Convention, but it does not require the variety to be ‘uniform.’ Thus, the UPOV 
system legally recognises farmers’ varieties, although, as seen below, failure to 
                                                 
88 The original delegation of the United Kingdom’s proposal for the definition of variety in 
DC/91/23 stated that ‘variety means a plant group [of plants] within a single botanical taxon, which 
group, [irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right are fully met,] (a) 
can be defined by the expression of characteristics [that are the expression of] resulting from a given 
genotype or combination of genotypes and (b) can be distinguished from other plant groups [of 
plants of the same botanical taxon] by the expression of at least one of the said characteristics. [A 
particular variety may be represented by several plants, a single plant or by one or several parts of 
a plant, provided that such part or parts can be used for the production of entire plants of the 
variety].’ UPOV, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (n 85) 105 and 138. 
89 UPOV, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (n 85) 139. 
90 Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-Based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 29.  
109 
 
meet the ‘uniformity’ condition means that these farmers’ varieties cannot be 
protected under UPOV.91 
 
Conditions for Protection  
 
While the definition of plant varieties above may be interpreted to include farmers’ 
varieties, the ‘new’, ‘distinct’, ‘uniform’, and ‘stable’ conditions for protection 
under the UPOV 1991 Convention clearly exclude farmers’ varieties.92 A plant 
variety is new if it has not been previously offered for sale or commercialised, 
either for earlier than one year in the country where the application is filed, or four 
years in other contracting member states.93 Again, where TRIPS does not define 
the ‘novelty’ condition for patents, the UPOV Convention expressly sets out a 
definition. However, the standard for determining novelty under UPOV focuses on 
the commercial novelty, which is considered a low threshold for assessing 
novelty.94 Notably, the novelty requirement is one of the barriers to the protection 
of farmers’ varieties under UPOV. As seen in Chapter 2, farmers’ varieties in 
Nigeria are commonly known varieties in a particular locality or farming 
community which have been in existence for a long time.95 
 
Distinct plant varieties are clearly distinguishable from other varieties commonly 
known at time of application.96 Breeders can protect varieties that are minimally 
different from existing varieties provided they are clearly distinguishable from the 
other varieties. Put differently, breeders can protect ‘cosmetically differentiated 
varieties.’97 Thus, the distinct condition also provides a low threshold when 
compared to inventive step in patents. For example, the colour of an apple fruit can 
clearly distinguish it from other apple varieties. This colour difference would fulfil 
                                                 
91 Dan Leskien and Michael Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: 
Options for a Sui Generis System’ (Issues in Genetic Resources No 6, International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute, June 1997) 48. 
92 Conditions for the Grant of Breeder’s Right: UPOV 1991 Convention, art 5. 
93 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 6. 
94 Leskien and Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 91) 50; 
Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 38. 
95 See Chapter 2 for discussion on farmers’ varieties in Nigeria.  
96 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 7. 
97 Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 38. 
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the ‘distinct’ condition. As such, the UPOV 1991 Convention does not focus on 
the agronomic value or inventive process of developing the new variety. Indeed, 
the UPOV 1991 Convention excluded the phrase ‘by one or more important 
characteristics’ which was provided in the UPOV 1978 Convention to ensure that 
only distinct varieties with agronomic value were protected.98  
 
A plant variety is uniform if, subject to normal variations in its propagation, its 
relevant characteristics remain sufficiently uniform.99 This definition recognises 
the different processes of plant propagation by adding that the uniformity condition 
is assessed based on a comparison with other varieties of the same species.100 
Similar to the ‘distinct’ condition, the legal requirement of uniformity pays less 
attention to the agronomic qualities. Instead, it rewards the narrowing of plant 
genetic diversity.101 One key criticism of the ‘uniformity’ condition raised by 
activists such as Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney is that it contributes to the erosion 
of genetic diversity.102  
 
Closely linked to ‘uniformity’ is the ‘stability’ condition. Uniform plant varieties 
are usually stable as well.103 The ‘stability’ condition requires the relevant 
characteristics of the plant variety to remain the same after repeated propagation 
or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle.104 
The stability condition requires investing increased resources in developing new 
                                                 
98 Article 6.1(a) of the UPOV 1978 Convention states: ‘… whatever may be the origin, artificial or 
natural, of the initial variation from which it has resulted, the variety must be clearly distinguishable 
by one or more important characteristics from any other variety whose existence is a matter of 
common knowledge at the time when protection is applied for….’ 
99 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 8. 
100 Graham Dutfield, ‘Turning Plant Varieties into Intellectual Property: The UPOV Convention’ 
in Geoff Tansey and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control of Food: A Guide to International 
Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security (Earthscan 2008) 
35. 
101 On uniformity of plant varieties, see generally, Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, Shattering: Food, 
Politics, and the Loss of Genetic Diversity (The University of Arizona Press 1990). 
102 ibid.  
103 UPOV, General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability and 
the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV TG/1/3, 19 April 
2002) 23 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/publications/en/tg_rom/pdf/tg_1_3.pdf> 
accessed 25 June 2017 (General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and 
Stability and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plant).  
104 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 9. 
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varieties; thus, it is mainly fulfilled by industrialised breeders and seed companies 
who have the resources required for such breeding.105 A combination of the 
uniform and stable conditions also contributes to barring the protection of farmers’ 
(unstable and assorted) varieties under UPOV. 
 
The distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) conditions, otherwise referred 
to as the technical criteria for plant breeder’s rights, are often examined 
collectively.106 Notably, the UPOV office is clear that contracting parties are to 
strictly adhere to the novelty and DUS conditions, as the grant of breeder’s rights 
is not subject to further – or other – conditions.107 In other words, despite the 
differences in farming systems around the world, all UPOV members are required 
to adopt the same conditions for protecting new varieties. In sum, while the 
farmers’ varieties in Nigeria qualify as plant varieties under UPOV, they do not 
meet the DUS conditions for protection.  
 
Scope of Protection 
 
Plant breeder’s rights are granted for a minimum period of 20 years for plants and 
25 years for trees and vines.108 The scope of protection shapes a plant breeder’s 
technological and economic control over the new variety. Under the UPOV 1991 
Convention, plant breeders have extensive rights over their propagating material, 
harvested material, and essentially derived varieties (EDVs).109 Plant breeder’s 
rights on propagating material of the protected variety extends to production or 
reproduction (multiplication), conditioning for the purposes of propagation, 
offering for sale, selling, or other marketing, exporting, importing, and stocking 
for any of the abovementioned purposes. For harvested materials, the right extends 
to entire plants and parts of plants, as well as to products that are made directly 
                                                 
105 Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 39. 
106 See generally, UPOV, General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and 
Stability and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants (n 103). 
107 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 5(2). 
108 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 19. 
109 For Scope of Breeder’s Right, see UPOV 1991 Convention, art 14. For Plant Breeder’s Right, 
see UPOV 1991 Convention, ch 5, arts 14-19. 
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from harvested material; while for EDVs, the rights extend to varieties derived 
from the protected varieties. In particular, the provision on EDVs sought to address 
the criticism that the commercial ‘novelty’ provision promotes cosmetic 
breeding.110 
 
Despite the extensive scope of breeder’s rights under the UPOV 1991 Convention, 
there are three compulsory exceptions to breeder’s rights (i) acts done privately 
and for non-commercial purposes;111 (ii) acts done for experimental purposes;112 
and (iii) acts done for the purposes of breeding other varieties (subject to provisions 
on EDVs).113 In particular, the second and third compulsory exceptions are 
important to promote plant breeding, as plant breeders often rely on existing plant 
materials to develop new varieties. However, a limitation of these compulsory 
exceptions is breeder’s rights to EDVs highlighted above. Commercialisation of 
EDVs require prior authorisation from the breeder with rights to the initial 
protected varieties. 
 
In addition to the compulsory exceptions, the UPOV 1991 Convention provides an 
optional exception which allows members to restrict breeders’ rights, provided it 
is within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of legitimate interests 
of the breeder.114 This exception allows farmers to use the harvested products of 
protected varieties planted on their own holdings for further propagation. First, it 
is important to note that this exclusion is optional. This means that UPOV members 
are not obligated to provide exclusions for farmers to reuse protected products of 
harvests. This provision is one of the key differences between the UPOV 1978 
Convention and the UPOV 1991 Convention. Second, the UPOV 1991 Convention 
fails to define ‘within reasonable limits’ and ‘subject to the safeguarding of the 
legitimate interests of the breeder.’ 
 
                                                 
110 See discussion on conditions for protection under 3.2.1 above. 
111 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15.1(i). 
112 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15.1(ii). 
113 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15.1(iii). 
114 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15(2). 
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In Europe, ‘legitimate interests of the breeder’ is interpreted as ensuring ‘the 
breeder receives equitable remuneration.’115 The Community Plant Variety Rights 
(CPVR) authorises farmers’ use of propagating material of a protected variety 
(except hybrid or synthetic variety) for purposes of propagation on their own 
holding.116 However, Article 14(2) of the CPVR limits this exception to particular 
agricultural plant species.117 Furthermore, Article 14(3) of the CPVR provides that 
farmers pay an equitable remuneration to the breeder lower than the amount 
charged for the licensed production of propagating material of the variety in the 
area. Nevertheless, small-scale farmers are exempted from this.118  
 
While ‘legitimate interests of the breeder’ is not defined in the US Plant Variety 
Protection Act 1970 (PVPA), the US Supreme Court in Asgrow v Winterbroer 
clarifies the extent to which farmers can save and reuse seeds in the US.119 The US 
Supreme Court in Asgrow v Winterbroer held that under the PVPA, farmers can 
only save and sell for reproductive purposes the amount of seeds of a protected 
variety necessary for replanting on their own farms.120 Prior to the case, it was 
generally interpreted that farmers were within the farmers’ exemption if they 
saved, reused, or sold 49 per cent of produce from planting a specific protected 
variety – this practice was known as ‘brown-bagging.’121 The Asgrow case which 
informed the interpretation of the PVPA was part of the US’ process of conforming 
to the UPOV 1991 Convention. 
                                                 
115 Graham Dutfield, Food, Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property: The Role of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (Quaker United Nations 
Office, February 2011) Global Economic Issue Publications, Intellectual Property Issue Paper No 
1, 9 (Food, Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property). 
116 Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94, latest amendment Council Regulation (EC) 15/2008 of 20 
December 2007 on Community Plant Variety Rights (Community Plant Variety Rights), art 14. 
117 The specified agricultural plant species divided under fodder plants, cereals, potatoes, and oil 
and fibre plants are set out Article 14(2) (a) to (d) of the Community Plant Variety Rights. 
118 Small-scale farmers are defined in Article 14(3) of the Community Plant Variety Rights as 
farmers who do not grow plants on an area bigger than the area which would be needed to produce 
92 tonnes of cereals, and for other plant species, farmers who meet comparable criteria.  
119 Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), Title 7, ss 2321-582; Asgrow Seed Co v Denny Winterboer 
and Becky Winterboer (1995) 513 US 173. 
120 Asgrow Seed Co v Winterboer (n 119). 
121 Debra Blair, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and its Impact on the US Seed Industry’ (1999) 4 
Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 297, 313; Dutfield, ‘Turning Plant Varieties into Intellectual 
Property’ (n 100) 39; Carlos M Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries: A Tool 
for Designing a Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection System: An Alternative to UPOV 1991 
(APBREBES 2015) 7 (Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries). 
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Production or reproduction 
Conditioning for the purposes of propagation 
Offering for sale 
Selling or other marketing 
Exporting 
Importing 










Harvested material, including entire plants and 
parts of plants  
Any product made directly from the harvested 
material 
Acts in respect of harvested materials, or 
certain products made directly from harvested 
materials if obtained through the unauthorized 
use of propagating materials or harvested 
material of protected varieties 




to save seed: 
Implicit right, 
it is not 
prohibited 
Optional. Contracting parties may allow 
farmers save harvested seed of protected 
varieties and reuse on their own holding, 
provided it is within reasonable limits and it 
safeguards the legitimate interests of the 
breeder 




Although UPOV started with just seven European countries in 1961, its 
membership had grown to 74 by 2016.122 UPOV members, now both from the 
Global North and Global South, have different seed systems and farming practices. 
Debates on UPOV are explored below, with the aim of extracting lessons for 
Nigeria. 
 
3.2.2. Debates on Plant Breeders’ Rights System: Lessons for Nigeria  
 
UPOV states that its mission is to promote an effective plant variety protection 
system to encourage the development of new plant varieties for the benefit of 
society.123 In reality, what UPOV promotes is the commodification of plant 
varieties to favour commercial breeders. As seen above, its conditions for 
protection provide low thresholds for assessments. While UPOV is correct in 
clarifying that it seeks to encourage the development of new plant varieties, 
perhaps it is more accurate to state that it focuses on promoting the 
commercialisation of new plant varieties.  
 
To promote awareness about its plant breeder’s rights system, UPOV released a 
report on the impact of plant variety protection in five case study countries – 
Argentina, China, Kenya, Poland, and the Republic of Korea.124 As one would 
expect, the report pointed out the benefits of plant variety protection systems, such 
as increased breeding activities and programmes, increased number of new 
varieties, increased applications by foreign breeders, and improved access to 
foreign varieties.125 For example, in the 10-year period following Argentina’s 
revision of its plant variety protection system and accession to UPOV (from 1994 
                                                 
122 In addition to the existing UPOV members, 15 states and one intergovernmental organisation 
have initiated the procedure for acceding to the UPOV Convention, and 25 states and one 
intergovernmental organisation have been in contact with the UPOV office to assist with 
developing their plant variety protection systems based on UPOV. See UPOV, Members of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants UPOV Convention (1961), as revised at Geneva (1972, 1978, 
and 1991) Status on 5 April 2016  
<http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf> accessed 28 June 2017. 
123 UPOV Mission Statement.  
124 UPOV, UPOV Report on the Impact of Plant Variety Protection (UPOV 2005). 
125 ibid 88-90. 
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to 2003), the average number of plant breeder’s rights granted to foreigners was 
62. This number tripled from 17, which was the average number of rights granted 
to foreign breeders (from 1984 to 1993) based on bilateral agreements in place 
before the UPOV-styled plant variety protection system. A close reading of the 
report shows how the UPOV-styled model focuses on the commercial plant 
breeders and investments in a few commercially important crop species.  
 
Five concerns from the above examination of the UPOV 1991 Convention from a 
Global South perspective are as follows.126 First, the focus on commercial plant 
breeders overlooks the small-scale farmers who dominate the farming and seed 
systems in the Global South. Recall that Chapter 2 shows that over 90 per cent of 
seeds are sourced from the informal seed sector.127 UPOV’s primary focus on seed 
companies (commercial plant breeders) is evidenced by its DUS conditions for 
protection which farmers’ varieties cannot meet. Although UPOV states that it 
encourages breeding of new plant varieties for all types of farmers, the DUS 
conditions clearly exclude farmers’ (unstable and assorted) varieties.128 
 
Second, the possibility of limiting farmers’ ability to save and reuse seeds further 
disadvantages small-scale farmers.129 It reinforces UPOV’s primary focus on 
‘plant breeders’, as it provides that the farmers’ ability to save and reuse seed is 
subject to the legitimate interests of the plant breeder.130 As seen in Chapter 2, the 
informal seed system is a main source of seeds in Nigeria.131 This informal seed 
system is also predominant around the Global South.132 However, the small-scale 
                                                 
126 On further arguments against UPOV 1991 Convention from a Global South perspective, see 
generally: Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121). 
127 See Chapter 2.  
128 On UPOV attempts to encourage breeding, see UPOV, Seminar on Plant Variety Protection and 
Technology Transfer: The Benefits of Public-Private Partnership (Geneva, 11-12 April 2011) 
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_357_3.pdf> accessed 28 June 2017.  
129 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15(2).  
130 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15 (2). 
131 See Chapter 2.  
132 N P Louwaars, R Tripp, D Eaton, V Henson-Apollonio, R Hu, M Mendoza, F Muhhuku, S Pal, 
and J Wekundah, ‘Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regime on the Plant 
Breeding Industry in Developing Countries: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies’ (Report 
Commissioned by the World Bank, February 2005)  




farmers’ practice of saving seed is not limited to the Global South. Indeed, Thor 
Kofoed, the keynote speaker in the UPOV symposium on the benefits of plant 
variety protection for farmers and growers, states that is important to allow farmers 
to continue saving seed.133 He pointed out that:  
 
In Europe, we have been talking about the small farmers’ exemption. Of 
course I can understand that breeders want to have the royalties from all the 
seed that has been sold to the farmers, but let these farmers continue with 
farm-saved seed.134 
 
Third, the extensive breeders’ rights which even covers EDVs is concerning 
because it limits the ability of farmers to adapt protected varieties to local 
conditions. Recall that EDVs are varieties that are predominantly derived from the 
initial protected varieties.135 Paradoxically, while breeders have rights over 
protected varieties used as initial sources of derivation for other varieties (EDVs), 
the use of farmers’ varieties to develop new breeders’ varieties are neither 
recognised nor rewarded.136 In other words, plant breeders can freely use farmers’ 
varieties to develop new varieties, but farmers are prohibited from freely using and 
adapting protected varieties to local conditions.137 For example, while breeders can 
freely access farmers’ varieties in Nigeria to develop new varieties which are 
subsequently protected, applying the EDVs provision restricts farmers’ ability to 
use, adapt, or develop protected varieties. In essence, EDVs create double 
standards.138 
 
                                                 
133 UPOV, Symposium on the Benefits for Plant Variety Protection for Farmers and Growers 
(Geneva, 2 November 2012) 9 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_357_4.pdf> 
accessed 28 June 2017.  
134 ibid. 
135 For EDVs, see UPOV 1991 Convention, art 14(5). 
136 Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 31. 
137 Normita G Ignacio, Joy Angelica Santos-Doctor, and Rosette Ferrer, ‘Essentially Derived 
Varieties and the Perspective of Farmer-Breeders’ (Contribution to the UPOV Seminar on 
Essentially Derived Varieties, 22 October 2013)  
<http://www.apbrebes.org/files/seeds/Essentially%20derived%20varieties%20and%20the%20per
spective%20of%20farmer.pdf> accessed 24 July 2017.  
138 Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 31.  
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Fourth, and related to the third concern, is UPOV’s rigid position of rejecting the 
incorporation of provisions from other international treaties relevant to plant 
variety protection, such as the CBD or the ITPGRFA. UPOV membership is 
conditional upon a country designing or reforming its national legislation to 
conform with the UPOV Convention.139 In particular, the UPOV Council has to 
approve of the national legislation before the instrument of accession is 
deposited.140 While UPOV recognises the CBD and the ITPGRFA, it maintains 
that they are international treaties which serve functions that are different from 
UPOV.141 UPOV maintains that at the national level, countries can have separate 
laws covering issues such as access to genetic resources and farmers’ rights issues 
covered in the CBD and the ITPGRFA. For example, UPOV’s former Vice 
Secretary-General Barry Greengrass affirms that farmers’ rights are not within the 
purview of UPOV: 
 
The subject of farmers' rights is mainly the business of the FAO and its 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources … It is up to the institutions that 
are concerned with farmers’ rights to explain what farmers’ rights mean 
and what rights should be given to what farmers. It is not UPOV's 
business.142  
 
It is argued that while it may not be UPOV’s business to define or grant farmers’ 
rights, it is the business of a county to secure the interests of its peoples, which 
includes designing legal systems suited to its realities. The UPOV position misses 
the point of the access to genetic resources principles and farmers’ rights which 
                                                 
139 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 30(2). 
140 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 34(3). 
141 UPOV, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Reply of UPOV to the Notification 
of June 26 2003 from the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)’ 
(adopted by the Council of UPOV at its 37th ordinary session on 23 October 2003) 
<http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/news/en/2003/pdf/cbd_response_oct232003.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2017.  
142 UPOV, UPOV National Seminar on the Nature and Rationale for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants under the UPOV Convention, Manila, December 1994 (UPOV 1995) 27, as 
quoted in GAIA/GRAIN, ‘Ten reasons not to join UPOV: Global Trade and Biodiversity in 
Conflict’ (15 May 1998) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1-ten-reasons-not-to-join-
upov#18> accessed 04 July 2017.  
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seek to counterbalance the extensive breeders’ rights. As will be seen below, 
incorporating these legal principles in a plant variety protection system along with 
breeders’ rights not only rewards small-scale farmers’ contributions and curtails 
extensive breeders’ rights, but also safeguards their traditional farming practices 
and livelihood.143 Furthermore, the UPOV suggestion of having separate national 
legislations for breeder’s rights and other issues – such as farmers’ rights and 
benefit sharing – would at the minimum lead to further fragmentation of laws at 
the national level.144 Recall from Chapter 2 that there is lack of synergy amongst 
the different government institutions relevant to plant variety protection in 
Nigeria.145   
 
Fifth is the concern that UPOV as well as the US and EU promote harmonised 
systems of protecting plant varieties around the world based on the UPOV 1991 
Convention, yet socio-economic realities vary from country to country.146 As such, 
promoting a single way of conceptualising and protecting plant varieties would 
certainly benefit some countries more than others. For instance, it would benefit 
countries with advanced breeding facilities and industrialised farming practices, 
along with fully equipped national IPRs offices to carry out the prerequisite 
examinations and tests for registering new plant varieties. In sum, it should not be 
forgotten that while plant breeder’s rights under the UPOV 1991 Convention is ‘a’ 
type of sui generis system for protecting plant varieties, it is not ‘the’ (only) sui 
generis system.  
 
Policy interventions warn against Global South countries joining the UPOV 1991 
Convention.147 In particular, these policy interventions agree that UPOV is not a 
                                                 
143 See 3.3 below.  
144 See the former UPOV Vice-Secretary General Barry Greengrass’s quote above.  
145 See Chapter 2.  
146 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property and the Life Sciences Industries: A Twentieth Century 
History (Ashgate 2003)192; see also Chapter 4.  
147 The Crucible Group, People, Plants and Patent (n 51); The Crucible II Group, Seeding 
Solutions: Volume 1 (n 50); The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2, Policy Options 
for Genetic Resources: People Plants and Patents Revisited (International Development Research 
Centre 2001) (Seeding Solutions: Volume 2); Leskien and Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System’ (n 91); Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (2002); United 
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universal regime that suits all countries. Rather, they recommend that these 
countries can develop alternative sui generis systems tailored to their national 
realities.148 These realities include seed systems, small-scale farmers’ livelihoods, 
and IPRs institutional capacity.149 Nothing prevents Global South countries that 
have reservations about UPOV from heeding these policy interventions, as Article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS gives WTO members the latitude to imaginatively design sui 
generis systems as explored below. What is more, a country can borrow provisions 
from UPOV Conventions when designing a plant variety protection system without 
becoming party to UPOV. In fact, as will be seen below and in Chapter 4, even 
countries with creative sui generis systems borrow provisions from UPOV, 
especially the UPOV 1978 Convention. 
 
3.3. Creative Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection System  
 
A sui generis system is one of the options for protecting plant variety under TRIPS. 
As seen above, the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system is not ‘the only’ type of 
sui generis system as TRIPS does not specify or mention UPOV. While TRIPS 
requires the sui generis system to be an IPRs system, it does not restrict the 
incorporation of non-IPRs provisions.150 Unlike the UPOV option which shapes 
and monitors national laws, the creative sui generis option gives a country the 
latitude to shape its own laws as it deems fit. This latitude is particularly useful for 
Global South WTO members; it allows them to incorporate provisions from the 
ITPGRFA and the CBD that are beneficial to their small-scale farmers and national 
interests.  
                                                 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Towards a Balanced “Sui Generis” Plant Variety 
Regime: Guidelines to Establish a National PVP Law and an Understanding of TRIPS-plus Aspects 
of Plant Rights’ (UNDP 2008); Oliver De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the right to food),  Seed 
Policies and the Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity an Encouraging Innovation (United 
Nations General Assembly, A/64/170, 2009); Anja Christinck and Morten Walloe Tvedt, The 
UPOV Convention, Farmers’ Rights and Human Rights: An Integrated Assessment of Potentially 
Conflicting Legal Frameworks (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
GmbH 2015); Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121). 
148 ibid. 
149 For example, Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 77. IPRs 
institutional capacity includes human and financial resources in IPRs offices as well as judicial 
capacity. 
150 Leskien and Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 91) 30. 
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Before discussing the coverage of the law, conditions for protection, and scope of 
protection under a creative sui generis system, the next section explores farmers’ 
rights, access and benefit sharing, as well as disclosure of origin, which are legal 
principles drawn from the ITPGRFA, the CBD, and the Genetic Resources treaty 
currently under negotiation in WIPO. These principles can be incorporated in a sui 
generis system. 
 
3.3.1. Farmers’ Rights, Access-Benefit Sharing, Disclosure of Origin 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a variety of actors both from the Global South and 
Global North raised concerns about the extension of IPRs to plant varieties.151 
These developments culminated in the introduction of farmers’ rights, along with 
access and benefit sharing in the ITPGRFA and the CBD.152 The actors involved 
in pushing for these alternative legal principles employed the regime shifting 
strategy.153 Laurence Helfer notes that regime shifting enables state and non-state 
actors to relocate law-making processes to international forums that favour their 
concerns and interests.154 These alternative legal principles not only expand the 
legal principles, institutions, and actors relevant to plant variety protection, they 
                                                 
151 As discussed in Chapter 1, actors involved in the pushing for farmers’ rights in the early 1980s 
include countries such as Mexico, India, and Ethiopia, civil society organisations (CSOs) such as 
the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), GRAIN, and Community Technology 
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included himself, Cary Fowler, Hope Shand, Henk Hobbelink, Renee Vellve, Camila Montecinos, 
Rene Salazar, Vandana Shiva, Andrew Mushita, Patrick Mulvany, Liz Hoskins, Neth Dano, and 
Edward Hammond. Patrick Mooney, ‘International Non-governmental Organizations: The 
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Biodiversity Convention Negotiation Process and Some Comments on the Outcome’ (1997) 27(3) 
Environmental Policy and Law 175, 183-85. 
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153 See generally, Laurence Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Law Making’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1; 
Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (2009) 7(1) 
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also create outcomes that have effects in other forums. For example, the farmers’ 
rights alongside access and benefit sharing principles in the ITPGRFA and CBD 
broaden the possibilities for implementing other agreements such as the sui generis 




Farmers’ rights counter-balance patents and plant breeder’s rights.155 The farmers’ 
rights principle, first endorsed by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) in 1989, recognises and rewards farmers’ role in conserving 
and developing genetic resources.156 Under FAO Resolution 5/89, farmers’ rights 
are defined as ‘rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of 
farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, 
used in plant breeding.’157 FAO Resolution 3/91 further expanded on farmers’ 
rights by providing that it is to be implemented through an international fund to 
support plant genetic conservation and utilisation programmes, particularly in the 
Global South.158 These FAO Resolutions were adopted as annexes to the 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (International Undertaking). 
                                                 
155  See Chapter 1 on origins of plant variety protection. For detailed discussions on farmers’ rights, 
see Craig Borowiak, ‘Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds’ 
(2004) 32(4) Politics and Society 511; Svanhild-Isabelle Batta Bjornstad, ‘Breakthrough for “the 
South”? An Analysis of the Recognition of Farmers’ Rights in the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report 13/2004); 
Regine Andersen, ‘Historical Context: Evolving International Cooperation on Crop Genetic 
Resources’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges 
in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 99-128; Regine Andersen, ‘Farmers’ Rights: Evolution of 
the International Policy Debate and National Development’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ 
Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 129-151; 
Farmers Rights Resource Pages for Decision-Makers and Practitioners  
<http://www.farmersrights.org/> accessed 09 July 2017.  
156 Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, ‘Milestones in the History of the Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture’ <http://www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa/cgrfa-about/cgrfa-history/en/> 
accessed 29 June 2017; FAO, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture: The Development of Farmers Rights in the Context of the International Undertaking 
and Article 9 (IT/GB-2/07/Inf.6, August 2007) 2-3 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-be152e.pdf> accessed 
29 June 2017. 
157 FAO Conference, Farmers Rights’ Resolution 5/89, Annex to the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. 
158 FAO Conference, Farmers Rights’ Resolution 3/91, Annex to the International Undertaking on 
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However, the International Undertaking is a non-binding international 
agreement.159  
 
It was the ITPGRFA, a legally binding international treaty adopted by the FAO 
Conference in 2001 that stamped farmers’ rights into the legal architecture for plant 
varieties.160 Yet the ITPGRFA does not define farmers’ rights. Regine Andersen 
notes that the ITPGRFA negotiators were unable to agree on a definition of 
farmers’ rights because farmers’ situations and interests differ from country to 
country.161 As such, perceptions on farmers’ rights also differ.162 Nevertheless, 
while the ITPGRFA does not set out an official definition of farmers’ rights, it 
establishes common grounds for understanding the principle.  
 
Article 9.1 of the ITPGRFA begins by stating that contracting parties recognise the 
enormous contribution that farmers and farming communities have made and 
continue to make to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources. 
The open-endedness of this provision means that ‘farmers’ rights’ is not limited 
only to the provisions set out in Article 9 of the ITPGRFA. Legal provisions that 
reflect the contributions of farmers and farming communities to the conservation 
and development of plant genetic resources may also be referred to as farmers’ 
rights. Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the ITPGRFA go on to set out four categories of 
farmers’ rights provisions. First, it provides for the right to protect traditional 
knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.163 Second, 
it provides for the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on 
matters related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture.164 Third, it provides for the right to equitably participate 
in sharing benefits arising from the utilisation of plant genetic resources for food 
                                                 
159 See Chapter 1 on the introduction of the International Undertaking. See also International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Resolution 8/83. 
160 The ITPGRFA, which was adopted in November 2001, entered into force in June 2004. 
161 Andersen, ‘Farmers’ Rights: Evolution of the International Policy Debate and National 
Implementation’ (n 155) 131. 
162 ibid. 
163 ITPGRFA, art 9(2). 
164 ITPGRFA, art 9(2). 
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and agriculture.165 Fourth, it provides for farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange, 
and sell farm-saved seed or propagating material, subject to national law and as 
appropriate.166  
 
The first farmers’ right provision above may be interpreted as a form of IPRs 
because it provides for the protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant 
genetic resources. However, the three other rights are non-IPRs, as they do not 
provide exclusive rights over an intangible property, but rather set out measures of 
how to achieve farmers’ rights. The right to participate in decision-making is 
closely linked with the food sovereignty movement, which promotes the rights of 
peoples to define their own food and agricultural systems.167 Access and benefit 
sharing is closely linked with the CBD, which is discussed below.168 The right to 
save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed or propagating material listed 
provides an exception to plant breeders’ rights provisions.  
 
Although the ITPGRFA does not specifically mention any other international 
treaty for plant varieties apart from the CBD, its preamble delineates its 
relationship with other international treaties relevant to plant variety protection. 
First, it states that the ITPGRFA and other international agreements relevant to it 
should be mutually supportive, with a view to sustainable agriculture and food 
security. 169 Second, the ITPGRFA should not be interpreted as implying to change 
in any way the rights and obligations of contracting parties under other 
international agreements.170 Third, the ITPGRFA does not intend to create a 
hierarchy between it and other international treaties.171 However, the ITPGRFA 
provides that the responsibility for realising farmers’ rights rests with national 
                                                 
165 ITPGRFA, art 9(2). 
166 ITPGRFA, art 9(2). 
167 Declaration of Nyeleni, Selingue, Mali (27 February 2007)  
<http://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290> accessed 09 July 2017; Raj Patel, ‘What does Food 
Sovereignty Look Like?’ (2009) 36(3) Journal of Peasant Studies 663, 663.   
168 See discussion on access and benefit sharing below. The ITPGRFA and the CBD have 
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governments in accordance with their needs and proprieties.172 Unlike TRIPS that 
sets out deadlines, the ITPGRFA leaves its implementation open to the contracting 
parties’ discretion. Similarly, unlike UPOV which provides specific standards for 
‘plant breeders’ rights’, farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA is subject to national 
interpretations. Keith Aoki and Kennedy Luvai argue that by leaving contracting 
parties the choice of implementing farmers’ rights, the ITPGRFA is a ‘vague 
commitment’ to the aspiration for farmers’ rights.173  
 
Farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA appear to be a small achievement for the Global 
South actors and international activists that pushed for it. The scope of farmers’ 
rights is yet to be clearly defined, while its conceptualisation and enforcement still 
pose challenges. Nonetheless, the ITPGRFA reinvigorated global debates on 
farmers’ rights.174 Only a few countries such as India, as will be seen in Chapter 5, 
have attempted to incorporate farmers’ rights.175 The African Model Law also sets 
out guidelines for incorporating farmers’ rights provisions in national 
legislations.176  
 
Access and Benefit Sharing 
 
While the ITPGRFA provides for farmers’ rights as seen above, both the CBD and 
the ITPGRFA set out access and benefit sharing principles. Access and benefit 
sharing refers to the means through which genetic resources may be accessed and 
how the benefits resulting from their use are shared between the parties that use the 
                                                 
172 ITPGRFA, art 9.2. 
173 Keith Aoki and Kennedy Luvai, ‘Reclaiming ‘Common Heritage’ Treatment in the International 
Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex’ (2007) Michigan State Law Review 35, 53-55. 
174 The Third Session of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA adopted a resolution on farmers’ 
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resources (users) and the parties that provide the resources (providers).177 As will 
be seen below, access and benefit sharing under the CBD is facilitated through 
bilateral agreements, whereas the ITPGRFA establishes a multilateral system to 
facilitate access and benefit sharing.  
 
The access and benefit sharing principle under the CBD reaffirms states’ sovereign 
rights over their natural resources – including genetic resources.178 In particular, 
Article 15 of the CBD sets out conditions for the grant of access to genetic 
resources, as well as fair and equitable distribution of benefits arising from their 
use. First, it provides that ‘access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed 
terms.’179 The inclusion of the provision on ‘mutually agreed terms’ indicates the 
expectation of a negotiation between the contracting party granting the access and 
the party desiring to use the generic resources.180 As such, access to genetic 
resources and the associated benefit sharing is conditional on successful bilateral 
negotiations between the parties. Bilateral agreements are the principal means 
through which parties authorise access to genetic resources and agree on benefits 
arising from the use of the genetic resources. Second, ‘access to genetic resources 
shall be subject to prior informed consent of the contracting party providing such 
resources, unless otherwise determined by that party’.181 This provision requires 
informed consent of the providing party prior to the user’s access of the genetic 
resource. Before granting authorisation for use of the genetic resource, the provider 
can ask the user to set out implications of access, such as by specifying who would 
use the genetic resources and how it would be used. This information may 
determine whether access is granted.182 However, the inclusion of ‘unless 
otherwise determined by that party’ indicates that the prior informed consent 
                                                 
177 CBD: ABS, ‘Introduction to access and benefit-sharing’ (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Canada 2011) 1, 3 <https://www.cbd.int/abs/infokit/revised/web/all-files-
en.pdf> accessed 09 July 2017. 
178 CBD, arts 3 and 15.1.  
179 CBD, art 15.4.  
180 Lyle Glokwa, Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin, and Hugh Synge in collaboration with Jeffrey A 
McNeely and Lothar Gundling, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN 
Environmental Law Centre, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 30, 1994) 80 (A Guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity). 
181 Emphasis added. CBD, art 15.5. 
182 Glokwa and others, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (n 180) 81. 
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condition is optional. In other words, a user is only required to obtain prior 
informed consent if the providing party requires it.  
 
Article 15 of the CBD leaves it open for national governments to design access and 
benefit sharing legislation. Thus, the exact details of access and benefit sharing are 
open for negotiations between users and providers of the genetic resources through 
bilateral agreements. The CBD cautions that its legal principles do not conflict with 
the rights and obligations of any contracting party derived from existing 
international agreements, except where the exercise of those rights would cause 
serious damage or threat to biological diversity.183 Consequently, it obliges 
member states to ensure that their IPRs systems are ‘supportive of and do not run 
counter to the CBD objectives.’184   
 
As the CBD leaves it open for parties to negotiate and design legal frameworks for 
access and benefit sharing, Global South countries generally found it challenging 
to implement the CBD provisions.185 Susan Bragdon, Kathryn Garforth, and John 
Haapala explain that in the initial post-CBD period, starting from the early to the 
mid-1990s, Global South countries such as the Philippines and Costa Rica that 
attempted to design and implement national access and benefit sharing structures 
found that ‘it was an exceedingly complex exercise, requiring the collaboration of 
experts in science, law and business.’186 They add that Global South countries 
generally lacked the required expertise to design access and benefit sharing laws, 
and to negotiate the relevant contracts.187 Furthermore, the Global South countries 
lacked the ability to track the use of resources that had been sourced from their 
jurisdictions and to monitor whether the terms of the negotiated access and benefit 
sharing agreements were adhered to by the users.188 To address these challenges, 
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two further frameworks were adopted to facilitate the implementation of access 
and benefit sharing principles at the national level: the Bonn Guidelines on Access 
to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of 
their Utilization in 2002 (Bonn Guidelines), and the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit Sharing in 2010 (Nagoya Protocol). 189 
 
The Bonn Guidelines were designed as voluntary guidelines to assist CBD parties 
in drafting legal, policy, or administrative frameworks on access and benefit 
sharing.190 Significantly, the Bonn Guidelines encouraged disclosure of origin of 
genetic resources in applications for IPRs where the subject matter of the 
application concerns or makes use of genetic resources in its development.191 This 
disclosure of origin principle is currently being negotiated at WIPO, as will be 
discussed below. The Bonn Guidelines recommended the disclosure of origin 
provision as a means to track compliance with prior informed consent and mutually 
agreed conditions on which access to genetic resources are granted.192 However, 
dissatisfied with the voluntary nature of the Bonn Guidelines, Global South actors 
                                                 
189 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
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adopted in 2002. For a detailed discussion on the Bonn Guidelines, see generally, Kent Nnadozie, 
Robert Lettington, Carl Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah King (eds), African Perspectives on Genetic 
Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and Institutions (Environmental Law Institute 2003) 37-
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191 CBD, ‘Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation of Access and Benefit Sharing 
Arrangements’, Access and benefit-sharing as related to genetic resources. Bonn Guidelines on 
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pushed for legally binding principles on access and benefit sharing.193 This was 
achieved through the Nagoya Protocol.  
 
The Nagoya Protocol transformed the access and benefit sharing principle by 
providing an internationally legally binding framework to promote the transparent 
and effective implementation of access and benefit sharing.194 Put differently, the 
Nagoya Protocol provides detailed guidelines for both users and providers of 
genetic resources, which provides legal certainty when negotiating access and 
benefit sharing agreements. Kabir Bavikatte and Daniel Robinson point out that 
‘the Nagoya Protocol is the result of an ongoing struggle to assert the rights of 
indigenous peoples and local communities to their natural resources, which may 
be described as a counter-hegemonic movement – against the neoliberal 
institutionalisation of biological resources.’195 
 
In addition to the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol, the ITPGRFA also provides for 
access and benefit sharing.196 However, rather than access and benefit sharing 
through bilateral agreements which the CBD provides, access and benefit sharing 
under the ITPGRFA is through a multilateral system.197 The ITPGRFA’s 
multilateral system creates a genetic resources commons where plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture are placed in an accessible global gene pool 
which is freely available for the use of all ITPGRFA contracting parties for 
research, breeding, and training.198 The multilateral system covers plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA, which 
currently covers 64 food crops and forages.199 Access to genetic resources in the 
global gene pool is facilitated through standard material transfer agreements 
                                                 
193 Kabir Bavikatte and Daniel Robinson, ‘Towards a People’s History of the Law: Biocultural 
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(SMTAs),200 which are standard contracts with a transparent set of terms and 
conditions to regulate the transfer of materials under the multilateral system.201 
SMTAs also incorporate the CBD provisions of prior informed consent and 
mutually agreed terms.202 While the ITPGRFA does not restrict access to materials 
in the global gene pool, contracting parties are prohibited from protecting the 
genetic resources as IPRs system (patents or sui generis systems) in the form that 
they are received.203   
 
Under the ITPGRFA’s multilateral system, users of genetic resources are required 
to share benefits derived from the use of the genetic resources through the benefit 
sharing mechanisms established under the treaty.204 These mechanisms include 
exchange of information, transfer of technology, capacity building, and sharing of 
monetary benefits from commercialisation of the materials developed.205 The 
monetary benefits are transferred to an international fund in the multilateral system 
which is disbursed to farmers who conserve and sustainably use plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture in all countries, especially farmers in the Global 
South.206 Notably, the benefit sharing mechanism under the ITPGRFA differs from 
the CBD. As previously seen, monetary benefits under the ITPGRFA go back to 
the multilateral system and not to the providing parties directly, as is the case with 
the CBD. Countries that ratify the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, and the ITPGRFA 
will apply the provisions of the multilateral system to those seeking access to the 
food crops and forages in Annex I of the ITPGRFA, and apply the CBD or the 
Nagoya Protocol to all other genetic resources.207 However, countries that have 
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only ratified either the CBD (or the Nagoya Protocol) will apply the relevant 
provisions of these agreements as applicable.208 Indeed, the inclusion of access and 
benefit sharing provisions in both the CBD and the ITPGRFA is attributable to not 
only the historical links between both institutions but also to the Global South 
actors that lobbied for this provision.  
 
To close this discussion, access and benefit sharing principles under the ITPGRFA 
and the CBD seek to recognise and reward the sources of origin of genetic 
resources. Prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms are two important 
conditions on which access and benefit sharing is granted under the CBD. Access 
and benefit sharing under the CBD has evolved towards clarity through the Nagoya 
Protocol. Similarly, access and benefit sharing under the ITPGRFA clearly sets out 
SMTAs to facilitate the access and benefit sharing process.  
 
Disclosure of Origin 
 
Closely linked to the prior informed consent condition for access and benefit 
sharing in the CBD discussed above is the proposed principle of disclosure of 
origin. The principle requires applicants for patents or sui generis rights to specify 
the provider of the genetic resource from which the new variety they seek to protect 
is derived.209 Unlike farmers’ rights as well as access and benefit sharing which are 
governed under the ITPGRFA and the CBD, ‘disclosure of origin’ is not yet 
established under any international treaty. Global South proponents of the 
‘disclosure of origin’ principle, such as India and Brazil, have submitted proposals 
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in support of this principle to the WTO, FAO, CBD, and WIPO.210 However, the 
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore (Intergovernmental Committee) 
has become the main forum for debates and negotiations on ‘disclosure of 
origin.’211 A draft treaty text on disclosure of origin titled ‘Consolidated Document 
Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources’ is under negotiations at 
WIPO.212 While discussions about the protection of traditional knowledge in 
WIPO go back to the 1960s, discussions about the relationship between IPRs and 
genetic resources in the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee stemmed from 
concerns raised by the CBD Conference of the Parties (CBD-COP).213 Chidi 
Oguamanam notes that the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee represents a 
forum for continued exploration of the perennial North-South tension in IPRs.214 
 
As with the other legal systems and principles discussed above, there are divergent 
views on the disclosure of origin principle. Global North countries such as the US, 
Canada, and Japan expressed concerns that a mandatory disclosure of origin 
requirement in IPRs applications would introduce uncertainties in the application 
process, which may lead to invalidation of IPRs or which may complicate the 
                                                 
210 See generally, Sarnoff and Correa, Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin 
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Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge 2017) 
(Protecting Traditional Knowledge).  
212  Second Revision of the Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic 
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benefit sharing process.215 On the other hand, Global South countries such as India, 
Brazil, Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa, and the African Group in general are in 
support of the disclosure requirement in IPRs applications, including patents and 
plant variety protection systems.216 The delegation of Nigeria, speaking on behalf 
of the African Group, emphasised that the African Group’s objective is to enhance 
transparency through the establishment of minimum international standards for 
mandatory disclosure of the source of origin of genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge.217 However, there are divisions about how to frame the 
disclosure of origin principle. The EU supports the mandatory disclosure of origin 
principle, which it argues should be a formal requirement for granting patents, thus 
deviating from the US, Canada, and Japan’s position, yet it submits that the 
disclosure of origin requirement should be confined to patent applications and not 
apply to intellectual property (IP) in general.218 The EU specifically maintains that 
plant variety protection is dealt with under UPOV, and should thus be excluded 
from the discussions at WIPO.219 
 
It is argued that with a sui generis plant variety protection system, the ‘disclosure 
of origin’ principle could contribute to compliance with the prior informed consent 
and mutually agreed terms set out as conditions for access and benefit sharing in 
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the CBD.220 In sum, although the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee treaty 
negotiations have been ongoing for over a decade and a half, there is still no 
consensus on the ‘disclosure of origin’ principle.221 
 
3.3.2. The Sui Generis Option  
 
It is important to note here that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ coverage of the law, 
conditions for protection, and scope of protection template for a sui generis plant 
variety protection system. As TRIPS does not define or set out elements of a sui 
generis system, WTO members can design national sui generis systems based on 
their distinct farming practices, seed systems, and regional or international 
obligations.  
 
Coverage of the Law  
 
TRIPS neither explicitly indicates the required coverage for a sui generis system 
nor limits the sui generis provisions to a specific number of species. This implies 
that a sui generis system can provide for the protection of all species and genera. 
Dan Leskien and Michael Flitner explain that: 
 
…it seems clear that member states have to provide for the protection of 
plant varieties of all species and botanical genera. Any other interpretation 
of article 27.3b of TRIPS would have to indicate for how many species or 
for which type of species member states have to grant sui generis protection 
and there is no such provision under TRIPS.222 
 
                                                 
220 See preceding section. See also CBD, ‘Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation 
of Access and Benefit Sharing Arrangements’ (n 191) 284. 
221 Oguamanam, ‘Ramifications of the WIPO IGC for IP and Development’ (n 214) 341. 
222 Leskien and Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 91) 28. 
Similarly, the Crucible Group concluded that ‘as TRIPS does not qualify species or genera, it would 
appear that WTO members must offer protection for plant varieties of all species and genera, or 
else this option may not be considered TRIPS-compliant.’  
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Similarly, the Crucible Group concludes that since TRIPS does not prioritise any 
group of species or genera, it would appear that to have a TRIPS-compliant sui 
generis system, WTO members must offer protection for plant varieties of all 
species and genera.223 Notably, a creative sui generis system could cover wide-
ranging categories of plant varieties, including new varieties and extant varieties 
(varieties already existing in the public domain). As will be seen in Chapter 5, the 
range of extant varieties protected under India and Thailand’s creative sui generis 
systems include farmers’ varieties, local domestic plant varieties, general domestic 
plant varieties and wild plant varieties. The key point here is that choosing the sui 
generis option provides latitude for Nigeria and other Global South countries to 
define and protect varieties as they deem fit.  
 
Conditions for Protection 
 
As the conditions for protection under a sui generis system is also undefined in 
TRIPS, national legislations often take the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system as 
a reference point.224 However, it has been seen in 3.3 above that UPOV’s DUS 
conditions for protection are better suited to a commercial plant breeder’s new 
varieties.225 Farmers’ varieties, which are inherently unstable and assorted, are 
certainly unsuited to the DUS conditions.226 The consequence of having the 
UPOV-styled conditions for protection is that it excludes farmers’ varieties from 
the subject matter of protection under a national plant variety protection system. 
Therefore, to have a sui generis system that covers the protection of both new plant 
breeder’s varieties and farmers’ varieties, a national plant variety protection system 
could have different conditions for each category of plant varieties.227  
 
For example, the DUS conditions could apply to new plant varieties developed by 
breeders, private companies, and other agricultural research institutes.228 Farmers’ 
                                                 
223 The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2 (n 147) 138. 
224 Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 37. 
225 See 3.3 above. 
226 Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 18) 39. 
227 Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 48-49. 
228 See also Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 50. 
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varieties or extant varieties conserved, bred, or developed by farmers or farming 
communities are unlikely to meet the DUS conditions for protection.229 Thus, for 
farmers’ varieties and extant varieties, the DUS conditions could be replaced with 
an ‘identifiable’ condition. ‘Identifiability’ highlights the need to identify specific 
attributes of varieties to be protected.230 In other words, each generation of the plant 
variety which is clearly different from other existing varieties can be ‘identified’ 
and protected. However, as the sui generis option provides flexibilities, the specific 
details of the ‘identifiability’ condition could be set out in the national laws. 
 
Scope of Protection 
 
As with the coverage of law and conditions for protection discussed above, the 
scope of protection in a sui generis system is also not specified under TRIPS. The 
scope of protection refers to the rights derived from the grant of protection. These 
rights determine the extent of control available to the right holder. One of the main 
arguments for promoting sui generis plant variety protection systems in the Global 
South as maintained in this thesis is that it allows countries to incorporate 
provisions suited to small-scale farming practices. Thus, in designing a sui generis 
system, these three concerns could be addressed at the national level. First, socio-
economic concerns about saving, reusing, exchanging, and selling farm-saved seed 
of protected varieties. Recall that saving, reusing, exchanging, and selling farm-
saved seed was one of the key arguments of the Global South in the FAO, which 
eventually culminated in its inclusion as part of farmers’ rights under Article 9 of 
the ITPGRFA.231 Second, the duration of protection for the different categories of 
varieties. For example, each category of variety could have different durations of 
protection. Third, the extent of plant variety right holders’ control over protected 
varieties. For example, research, experimental or educational exemptions, public 
order or public morality exemptions, or generally, exemptions to avoid harmful 
effects on biodiversity, food security, or prejudice to the farming systems.  
                                                 
229 See also Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture (n 
18) 39; Correa, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries (n 121) 50. 
230 Leskien and Flitner, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 91) 53. 




In addition to tailoring the coverage of the law, conditions of protection, and scope 
of protection of sui generis systems in line with national realties, Global South 
countries can incorporate other farmers’ rights provisions under the ITPGRFA, 
access and benefit sharing provisions under both the CBD and the ITPGRFA, as 
well as any other suitable provisions.  
 
3.3.3. Debates on Sui Generis System: Lessons for Nigeria 
 
As shown above, choosing the sui generis option under TRIPS gives a country the 
latitude to incorporate legal principles suited to its national realties. In effect, a 
country can ‘mix-and-match’ legal systems and legal principles to produce its 
desired plant variety protection system. Apart from the latitude afforded, which is 
the key benefit of choosing a sui generis system, other benefits are as follows.  
 
First, and linked with the latitude mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a country 
is free to creatively design a sui generis system that implements relevant provisions 
of the ITPGRFA, the CBD, and the UPOV Convention, without limitations or 
restrictions.  
 
Second, with a creatively designed sui generis system, a country is not at risk of 
being in an international system that could be revised to grant breeders more 
extensive rights, as was the case in the UPOV 1991 Convention revision. As the 
UPOV Convention is a pro-breeder system, one could argue that – drawing from 
the rationale for its establishment and even its 1991 revision – further revisions 
may also be towards strengthening plant breeders’ rights since this is the very ethos 
of the plant breeder’s rights system, as the name implies. More importantly, as 
UPOV is controlled by the influence of Global North countries, Global South 
members are not in a position to effectively contribute to making decisions suited 
to their farming practices and seed systems. Thus, a creatively designed sui generis 




Third, a creatively designed sui generis system which covers protection of different 
categories of plant varieties – such as new breeder’s varieties and farmers’ varieties 
– provides a wider range of varieties in the seed market. This is useful for farmers 
because empirical evidence from the US shows that commercial plant breeders 
tend to invest in only a few crops.232 For instance, where commercial plant breeders 
improve only a few crops, and plant variety protection systems as well as seed laws 
allow formal commercialisation of only varieties that meet the DUS conditions, 
there would only be a limited choice of varieties to formally purchase in the seed 
markets. However, a wider range of protected varieties under a sui generis plant 
variety protection system offers farmers more choice.  
 
Nonetheless, there are concerns about choosing the sui generis option. First, on the 
other side of the debate that a sui generis system offers latitude and choice, is the 
concern about the actual process of designing a sui generis system. TRIPS does 
not set out provisions of a sui generis plant variety protection system and there is 
no international sui generis treaty for protecting plant varieties apart from UPOV. 
Therefore, Global South countries seeking to embark on designing sui generis 
systems have to creatively pull together suitable provisions, including definitions 
and legal principles, to formulate coherent plant variety protection systems. As this 
process involves both extensive expertise and resources, the flexibility allowed in 
the sui generis option could at the same time be problematic. For example, from 
the above examination of farmers’ rights alongside access and benefit sharing, the 
open-ended nature of farmers’ rights under the ITPGRFA as well as the tangled 
and overlapping provisions on access and benefit sharing in the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA was seen. The ambiguity in these legal principles – that is, the legal 
principles being open to more than one interpretation – further exacerbates the 
process of designing a sui generis system. Another concern in the design process 
                                                 
232 Economic analysis of Keith Fuglie and others show that 81 per cent of the total certificates 
granted in the US from 1971 to 1994 were issued for four crops – soya beans, corn, wheat, and 
cotton varieties. Keith Fuglie, Nicole Ballenger, Kelly Day Rubenstein, Cassandra Klotz, Michael 
Ollinger, John Reilly, Utpal Vasavada and Jet Yee, ‘Agricultural Research and Development: 
Public and Private Investments under Alternative Markets and Institutions’ (Agricultural Economic 
Report No AER-735, May 1996) 38. See also Biswajit Dhar, Sui Generis Systems for Plant Variety 
Protection: Options under TRIPS, A Discussion Paper (Quaker United Nations Office 2002) 23. 
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is the importance of careful attention to choosing the three frames in the analysis 
above – coverage of the law, conditions of protection, and scope of protection 
under a sui generis system.   
Closely linked to the first concern is the second concern on technical support to 
creatively design a sui generis plant variety protection system. One benefit Global 
South countries that join the UPOV have is the technical support from the UPOV 
office.233 However, Global South countries that opt for the sui generis system do 
not have the same access to support, because there is no international body similar 
to the UPOV office that is responsible for overseeing a creatively designed sui 
generis system. Notwithstanding, Global South countries seeking to design 
creative sui generis systems benefit from guidelines such as the African Model 
Law or precedents from other countries that have designed creative sui generis 
systems, such as India and Thailand. 
 
Third, while one can easily refer to the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system as a 
type of sui generis system for protecting plant varieties, it is difficult to explain 
what a ‘creatively designed’ sui generis system suited to the Global South entails. 
In other words, since there is no standard international ‘creatively designed’ sui 
generis system, such systems vary at the national level. The complex and esoteric 
issues concerning plant variety protection makes it more challenging to design sui 
generis systems that cater to competing interests at the national level. A 
combination of the first and second drawbacks of creatively designing a sui generis 
system above, along with the lack of clarity or template, shows that it may be easier 
to go the UPOV way. While the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system may appear 
to be the easier option, it is argued that though more challenging to design, the sui 
generis option gives room to carefully design a system tailored to suit a country’s 
realities and aspirations. 
 
So far, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 above have examined the patent system, the UPOV plant 
breeder’s rights system, and creative sui generis system, which are all ways 
through which a WTO member can fulfil its obligation to protect plant varieties 
                                                 
233 Dutfield, Food, Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property (n 115) 9. 
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under TRIPS. The last plant variety protection option under TRIPS – which 
provides that WTO members can protect plant varieties by any combination of 
systems – is briefly addressed next.234  
 
3.4. Combination of Systems  
 
A combination of patents and a sui generis system could be (i) patents and a UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system, or (ii) patents and a creative sui generis system. The 
benefits and drawbacks teased out for each of the systems would also be applicable 
in a combination of systems. More importantly, a combination of systems would 
result in an even more extensive IPRs system for plant varieties. For example, in 
the US, one can protect plant varieties under the Plant Patent Act 1930 (PPA), the 
PVPA, or patent systems. The combination of these systems expands IPRs for plant 
varieties, further strengthening seed companies’ control over the protected 
varieties.235 Geoff Tansey rightly points out that the combination of patents and 
any of the sui generis options is ‘of the most advantage to industrialised countries 
with active seed breeding and biotechnology industries.’236  
 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to draw attention to the provision on 
the mandated review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. Discussions on the mandated 
review cemented the Global South position on plant variety protection as seen 
below.  
 
Pending Review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS 
 
Following the delicate consensus on plant variety protection in TRIPS which 
informed the latitude in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS as explored above, the negotiators 
                                                 
234 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS obliges all WTO members to provide for the protection of plant 
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.  
235 See generally, Keith Aoki, Seed Wars: Controversies and Cases on Plant Genetic Resources 
and Intellectual Property (Carolina Academic Press 2008) 27-60. 
236 Geoff Tansey, Trade, Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: Key Issues and Options for 
the 1999 Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement – A Discussion Paper (Quaker Peace 
& Service London in association with Quaker United Nations Office 1999) 11.  
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agreed that the provision would be subject to an early review. Indeed, the last 
paragraph of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS states that ‘the provisions of this 
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement.’237 During the TRIPS Council meeting in April 1999, there were 
semantic arguments about ‘review’.238 The Global South WTO members called for 
a review of the provisions in Article 27.3(b), arguing that ‘review’ opened up the 
possibility for amending the provision itself,239 while the Global North argued that 
the ‘review’ envisaged in the proviso in Article 27.3(b) was not a substantive 
review of the provision itself, but simply a review of the implementation of the 
provision at the national levels.240 Following the arguments about the term 
‘review’, the mandated review which was scheduled for 1999 failed to take 
place.241  
 
Notwithstanding, the pending review has raised vibrant discussions about plant 
variety protection at the TRIPS Council. Specifically, the WTO Ministerial 
Conference at Doha in November 2001 addressed the mandated review of Article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS.242 The Doha Ministerial Declaration instructed the TRIPS 
Council to examine inter alia, (i) the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD, 
                                                 
237 TRIPS, art 27.3(b). 
238 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs 
and Sustainable Development: Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 395 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development). 
239 The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1 (n 52) 100; International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development (n 
238) 395. 
240 ibid. 
241 For discussions on the mandated TRIPS review, see generally, International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development (n 
238) 395-97; The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1 (n 52) 100-02; Watal, Intellectual 
Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (n 6) 180-82; WTO, ‘TRIPS: Reviews, 
Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues: Background and the Current Situation’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm> accessed 26 July 
2017; WTO, ‘TRIPS Issues: Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity’  
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm> accessed 26 July 2017 (‘TRIPS 
Issues’). The WTO Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 instructed the TRIPS Council 
to examine the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, adopted 
on 14 November 2001 (Ministerial Conference, 4th Session Doha on 9-14 November 2001, 20 
November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para 19  
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf> accessed 26 July 2017 
(Doha Ministerial Declaration). 
242 WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para 19. 
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(ii) the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and (iii) other relevant 
issues raised by WTO members regarding the review and implementation of 
Article 27.3(b).243 The 2001 Doha Declaration charted the course for more nuanced 
debates about the review of Article 27.3(b), as well as the relationship between 
TRIPS, the UPOV 1991 Convention, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA. Notably, the 
US maintains its preference for a patent system for all plant inventions, including 
plant varieties.244 The US and the EU, along with other Global North WTO 
members, propose that Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS be revised to mention the UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights as the only sui generis plant variety protection option under 
TRIPS.245 Conversely, the Global South WTO members oppose both patents for 
plant varieties and the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system.246  
 
The African Group’s submission to the TRIPS Council of June 2003 exemplifies 
the Global South’s arguments on the review of Article 27.3(b), alongside the 
connections between TRIPS, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA.247 To start with, the 
African Group proposed that Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS be amended to prohibit 
patents on life forms. Furthermore, it proposed that the TRIPS Council provide a 
clear confirmation that WTO members are free to design creative sui generis 
systems which norm-borrow from the CBD and the ITPGRFA.248  As such, the 
African Group, along with other Global South WTO members such as India and 
Thailand, propose a revision of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to harmonise it with 
farmers’ rights as well as access and benefit sharing principles.249 Although the 
review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS is still pending, it is clear that Global South 
WTO members maintain the common position that a creatively designed sui 
                                                 
243 ibid. For documents on the review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS and the relationship between 
TRIPS and the CBD, see WTO, ‘TRIPS Issues’ (n 241). 
244 See for example, WTO, ‘Communications from the United States’ (Preparations for the 1999 
Ministerial Conference, 19 November 1998) WT/GC/W/115. 
245 See for example, WTO, ‘Communication from the European Communities and their Member 
States’ (A Concept Paper on the Review of Article 27.3b of TRIPS, 17 October 2002) IP/C/W/383.  
246 WTO, ‘Taking Forward the Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement’ (n 29). 
247 ibid. 
248 ibid, 2-3. 
249 For documents on the review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS and the relationship between TRIPS 
and the CBD, see generally, WTO, ‘TRIPS Issues’ (n 241). 
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generis system is best suited for the small-scale centred farming prevalent in the 
Global South.  
 
3.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the different plant variety protection options under 
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. The adoption of the TWAIL lens in the form of small-
scale farmers’ interests provides insights into the benefits and drawbacks of each 
system for Nigeria. Specifically, the TWAIL analysis revealed that a creatively 
designed sui generis plant variety protection system is the best suited option for 
Nigeria under TRIPS. This is because the sui generis option provides the latitude 
to incorporate provisions that balances the interests of small-scale farmers and 
private seed companies (commercial plant breeders) who both contribute to the 
seed sector in Nigeria. The creative sui generis system could pull together 
provisions from the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and the UPOV Convention.  
 
The regime complex theory illuminates the partially overlapping and interrelated 
legal systems and principles covering plant varieties as examined in this chapter. 
The systems and principles examined are the patent system, the UPOV plant 
breeders’ system, and the creative sui generis system, alongside farmers’ rights, 
access and benefit sharing, and disclosure of origin principles. These systems and 
principles are all set out in different treaties, namely TRIPS, UPOV, the ITPGRFA, 
the CBD, and the WIPO Genetic Resources treaty currently undergoing 
negotiations. Significantly, this chapter has shown that while the obligation to 
protect plant varieties arises from Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, the implementation of 
this obligation at the national level requires detailed understanding of the breadth 
of each option, as well as the connection of each option with other relevant treaties.  
 
Notably, this chapter contributes to answering the first central research question 
the thesis poses, which concerns the type of plant variety protection system best 
suited to Nigeria. The conclusion in this chapter that a creative sui generis system 
is best suited to Nigeria also aligns with the Global South position at the TRIPS 
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Council, as seen in 3.3 above. However, although the Global South WTO members 
have a common preference for a creative sui generis system, there are variations in 
translating this preference into domestic legal architecture. That is, there is a 
difference between the Global South WTO members’ rhetoric at the TRIPS 
Council and their actions at the national level.  
 
The subsequent Chapters – 4 and 5 – attempt to explain the rationale for this 
difference between Global South WTO members’ rhetoric and actions. Chapter 4 
analyses the proliferation of the UPOV 1991 Convention plant breeder’s rights 
system within Africa – which clearly differs from the African Group and Global 
South’s common position at the TRIPS Council, while Chapter 5 analyses the 
design and introduction of creative sui generis plant variety protection systems by 
India and Thailand, which align with the Global South’s common position at the 
TRIPS Council. In doing so, Chapters 4 and 5 answer the subsidiary research 
question. By and large, the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 provide useful lessons for 
Nigeria because the findings therein provide insights to Nigeria’s current plant 
variety protection status quo, as well as to how Nigeria can design and introduce 
the creative sui generis system suited to it.
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Chapter 4  
Africa’s Journey to UPOV: African Model Law, Not Fit for Purpose? 
 
The preceding chapter examined the plant variety protection options under Article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS. It concluded that the sui generis option is best suited to Nigeria 
because it provides the latitude to protect the interests of both small-scale farmers 
and private seed companies (commercial plant breeders). That conclusion aligns 
with the African Group’s position at the TRIPS Council. The African Group 
rejected the patent system and the UPOV 1991 Convention’s plant breeder’s rights 
system because they were considered unsuitable for the small-scale centred 
farming practices prevalent in Africa. Yet, there is a proliferation of the UPOV 
1991 Convention in Africa. This chapter, which focuses on the proliferation of the 
UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems in Africa, contributes to answering the 
subsidiary research question. Findings from this chapter are important for analysis 
on the Nigerian case study for the two reasons below. 
 
First, Nigeria and the other African countries favoured the sui generis option under 
TRIPS, and articulated this position at the TRIPS Council. Understanding why 
some African countries have adopted the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system 
which diverges from the African position provides lessons for Nigeria, as it is yet 
to fulfil its TRIPS obligation to protect plant varieties. Second, the African Group 
did not merely assert preference for the sui generis option at the TRIPS Council, 
but actually translated its rhetoric into comprehensive sui generis plant variety 
protection guidelines, embodied in the Organisation of African Unity’s Model Law 
for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers, and Breeders, and 
for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources (African Model Law).1 In 
other words, the African Group demonstrated a clear understanding of the plant 
variety protection discourse at the global level, and prepared an effective counter-
narrative in response to the dominant patent and plant breeder’s rights narratives 
                                                 
1 Organisation of African Unity’s Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources 
(2000) <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/oau/oau001en.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017 
(African Model Law). 
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of the United States (US) and Europe. Understanding why some African countries 
have adopted UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems despite the existence of this 
African Model Law also provides invaluable lessons for Nigeria.  
 
Drawing from TWAIL insights on the implementation of international law to suit 
Third World interests and the regime complex theory insights on actors’ strategies 
in law-making where there are overlapping treaties covering one subject matter, 
the chapter finds that four interrelated factors contribute to the proliferation of the 
UPOV plant breeder’s rights system in Africa. These are (i) trade and investment 
agreements, (ii) regional associations, (iii) pressure from seed companies, and (iv) 
UPOV office lobbies. Within Africa, UPOV currently has six members, i.e. five 
countries and one regional organisation: Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, Morocco, 
South Africa, and the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI). Four of 
the five countries have trade agreements and economic partnership agreements that 
require them to join UPOV. Only Kenya does not. It was the private sector seed 
companies that pressured Kenya to join UPOV.  
 
Apart from OAPI, two other regional organisations – the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) – have initiated the process of acceding to the 
UPOV 1991 Convention. In particular, regional organisations are a key way-in to 
Africa for UPOV because 44 of the 54 African countries belong to OAPI, ARIPO, 
and SADC. As such, if ARIPO and SADC become UPOV members, about 80 per 
cent of African countries would become party to UPOV. The four above-
mentioned factors that contribute to UPOV’s proliferation in Africa, combined 
with the factors that contribute to the design of creative sui generis systems in the 
Global South which is explored in Chapter 5, provide the analytical frame for the 
further analysis of the Nigerian case study in Chapter 6.    
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part I explores the background and rationale 
for the African Model Law. This tells the story of how the African Model Law was 
developed and why it is suited to small-scale centred farming practices in Africa. 
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Part II traces avenues through which African countries are pressured to adopt the 
plant breeder’s rights system under the UPOV 1991 Convention. Part III examines 
UPOV membership at the national level within Africa, focusing mainly on Kenya. 
The Kenyan example is puzzling because it acceded to the UPOV 1991 Convention 
despite its position as a leading interlocutor on behalf of the African Group at the 
TRIPS Council and its participation in the development of the African Model 
Law.2 This puts TWAIL into perspective, as TWAIL scholars such as Antony 
Anghie and Bhupinder Chimni argue that Global South countries ‘often act in ways 
that are against the interests of their peoples.’3 In other words, the implementation 
of international law in the Global South may disadvantage Global South peoples. 
One would expect that with Kenya’s position as a leading interlocutor for the 
African Group and its participation in the development of the African Model Law, 
its national plant variety protection legislation would reflect the African position. 
But as will be seen in Part III below, this is far from the case.  
 
4.1. The African Model Law 
 
To start with, agriculture is an important sector in Africa. Some of the key crops 
grown across Africa include cassava, cashews, cocoa, coffee, cotton, maize, millet, 
palm produce, peanuts, rice, rubber and sorghum. Africa also has abundant natural 
resources, including more than half of the world’s uncultivated land mass and 
untapped water resources.4 In 2016, agriculture contributed over 17 per cent to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa.5 As seen in Chapter 2, 
agriculture contributed over 20 per cent to the GDP of Nigeria in 2016.6 Similarly, 
                                                 
2 See for example, WTO, ‘Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, Review of 
Provisions of Article 27.3(b)’ (8 November 1999) IP/C/W/163. As will be seen below, the second 
meeting of the Organisation of African Unity’s Scientific, Technical and Research Commission 
(OAU/STRC) was convened in conjunction with the Kenyan Industrial Property Institute (KIPI). 
3 Antony Anghie and B S Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) Chinese Journal of International Law 77, 78. 
4 The World Bank, Growing Africa: Unlocking the Potential for Agribusiness (AFTP/AFTAI, The 
World Bank, January 2013) 16-17  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/africa-agribusiness-report-2013.pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2017. 
5 The World Bank, ‘Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa’  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZG > accessed 28 July 2017.  
6 See chapter 2. 
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agriculture contributed 37.23 per cent to Ethiopia’s GDP, 35.60 per cent to Kenya’s 
GDP, and 41.28 per cent to Togo’s GDP in 2016.7 The 2016 statistics mirror 
agriculture’s historic contribution to the GDP of African countries. Indeed, in the 
1980s to the 1990s, agriculture contributed over 20 per cent to the overall GDP in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.8 The importance of the agriculture sector in Africa is further 
reinforced by the fact that small-scale farmers and farming communities residing 
in rural areas depend on the sector for their livelihood.9  
 
In essence, agriculture is a direct source of food and cash crops for African 
countries, a significant contributor to African countries’ economic performance, as 
well as a major source of employment on the continent. Considering the 
importance of agriculture on the continent, the Organisation of African Unity (now 
African Union (AU)) designed the African Model Law. The African Model Law 
sets out guidelines for African countries seeking to fulfil international obligations 
under TRIPS, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA, while protecting the interests of small-
scale farmers and farming communities, as discussed below. 
 
4.1.1. Background on the African Model Law 
 
The African Model Law was designed in response to the extension of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) to plant varieties at the international and global levels.10 
Discussions about an African Law commenced in the early 1990s, shortly after the 
                                                 
7 The World Bank, ‘Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa’ (n 5). 
8 ibid. 
9 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Agriculture in Africa: Transformation and Outlook  
(NEPAD, November 2013) 25  
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2013africanagricultures.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017. 
See also Racheal Wynberg, ‘Privatising the Means for Survival: The Commercialisation of Africa’s 
Biodiversity’ (Biowatch, South Africa, with contributions from GAIA/GRAIN, Issue No 5, April 
2000)<https://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/33-privatising-the-means-for-survival-the-
commercialisation-of-africa-s-biodiversity?print=true>accessed 28 July 2017; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of Smallholder Farmers in Sustainable 
Commodities Production and Trade (UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/62/9, 30 July 2015) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdb62d9_en.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017. 
10 Johnson Ekpere, ‘African Model Law on the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources’ in Kent Nnadozie, 
Robert Lettington, Carl Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah King (eds), African Perspectives on Genetic 
Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and Institutions (Environmental Law Institute, 2003) 
275 (‘African Model Law’).  
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CBD was adopted in 1992 and the UPOV Convention was revised in 1991.11 
During this period, the TRIPS and the ITPGRFA negotiations were also on-
going.12 Drafters of the African Model Law sought to reconcile conflicting 
international obligations to provide a basis for discussions or further negotiations, 
and to facilitate compliance by the AU member states.13 The African Model Law 
achieved these objectives through a comprehensive sui generis system that pulled 
together relevant provisions from the different international treaties that were 
suited to African countries.14 However, the African Model Law is neither 
restrictive nor rigid. It simply provides flexible sui generis plant variety protection 
guidelines for AU member states.15  
 
African countries and the African Group participated in the TRIPS, the CBD, and 
the ITPGRFA negotiations.16 As such, there was an awareness of the implications 
of plant variety protection within Africa. Johnson Ekpere, the former Secretary 
General of the Organisation of African Unity’s Scientific, Technical and Research 
Commission (OAU/STRC), explains that the OAU/STRC was the primary 
regional institution involved in discussions about plant variety protection, 
especially access and benefit sharing issues.17 Farmers’ and traditional healers’ 
associations, with support from national and international civil society 
organisations (CSOs), raised concerns about the protection and ownership of 
traditional medicinal plants at the 5th OAU/STRC Meeting of Experts and 
Symposium on Traditional African Medicines and Medicinal Plants hosted in 
Kampala, Uganda in 1996.18 Following the adoption of the CBD in 1992 which 
                                                 




15 Johnson Ekpere, ‘The OAU’s Model Law: The Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources’ (OAU/STRC 
2000) 1 (‘The OAU’s Model Law’). 
16 See Chapters 1 and 3. 
17 Johnson Ekpere was the Secretary of the OAU/STRC during the development of the African 
Model Law. Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 276. 
18 The 5th OAU/STRC Meeting was the first time that discussions about genetic resources were 
considered by policy-makers at the African level. Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 276; Johnson 
Ekpere, ‘Sui Generis Legislation and Protection of Community Rights in Africa’ in Sophia Twarog 
and Promila Kapoor (eds), Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National 
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stimulated debates about access to biological resources in the Global South, these 
farmers’ and traditional healers’ associations questioned the uncompensated export 
of indigenous biodiversity from Africa.19 In particular, the CSOs had sensitised the 
farmers’ and traditional healers’ associations about the inequities in IPRs systems, 
especially the use of African traditional knowledge and medicinal plants to develop 
protected medicinal products or processes in the pharmaceutical sector.20 Although 
the 1996 OAU/STRC meeting focused on medicinal plants, it was the first time 
that African policy-makers discussed ownership and control of biological 
resources.21 The 1996 OAU/STRC meeting concluded that the STRC would 
coordinate the drafting of a model law on the protection of traditional knowledge 
and medicinal plants.22 
 
The OAU/STRC held a subsequent meeting in 1997 to further discuss access to 
medicinal plants, the protection of traditional knowledge, and IPRs. The 1997 
OAU/STRC meeting, held in Nairobi, Kenya and convened in conjunction with 
the Kenyan Industrial Property Institute (KIPI), recommended that the STRC:  
 
(i) initiate and coordinate the process of drafting of a model law to regulate 
and protect indigenous knowledge regarding medicinal plants;  
(ii) establish a working group of experts to explore means to coordinate and 
harmonise national policies for medicinal plants and to craft a common 
policy for sustainable use of the plants; 
(iii) assist AU members to develop appropriate legislation to govern 
ownership, access, use, and conservation of medicinal plants; and  
                                                 
Experiences and International Dimensions (UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 2004) 236.  
19 Noah Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge: Exploring Legal 
Frameworks for Community, Farmers, and Intellectual Property Rights in Africa’ (2005) 53 
Ecological Economics 493, 495-96 (‘Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’); Noah 
Zerbe, ‘Contesting Privatization: NGOs and Farmers Rights in the African Model Law’ (2007) 7(1) 
Global Environmental Politics 97, 109 (‘Contesting Privatization’). 
20 Zerbe, ‘Contesting Privatization’ (n 19) 109.  
21 ibid.  
22 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 495. 
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(iv) encourage AU member states to study the implication of TRIPS on 
pharmaceutical production, protection of medicinal plants, and 
traditional knowledge.23  
 
One of the key issues raised during the 1996 and 1997 OAU/STRC meetings was 
the contradiction between the CBD and TRIPS. The CBD recognises the collective 
sovereign right of states and local communities over biological resources, while 
TRIPS confers individual IPRs. For Africans, communities are custodians of 
biological resources and related knowledge systems. These resources and 
traditional knowledge are held in trust by the present generation for use of both 
present and future generations.24 Ekpere notes that ‘biological diversity and related 
knowledge systems have sustained African societies since long before the advent 
of science.’25 Thus, the CBD’s focus on national sovereignty and community rights 
aligns with the African and Global South communal culture, while the TRIPS or 
UPOV private rights monopolies reflect the Global North’s individualistic 
orientations.26  
 
Tewolde Egziabher explains that in general, plant and medicinal innovations in 
Africa results from the totality of the discoveries and inventions of members of 
communities.27 Consequently, the inventor or discoverer does not personalise the 
achievement. In fact, the innovation or discovery is further improved by 
contributions from its users. These innovations are often free for anyone to use.  In 
certain instances, some communities had specialised knowledge for treating the 
sick through medicinal plants or ‘magic.’28 It is only these special knowledge 
                                                 
23 Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 276. 
24 ibid 277. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
27 Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Interests of the South’ in Vandana Shiva (ed), Biodiversity Conservation: 
Whose Resources? Whose Knowledge? (Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage 1994) 
198 (‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Intellectual Property Rights and the Interests of the 
South’). For discussions on community resources and IPRs, see generally, Johanna Gibson, 
Community Resources: Intellectual Property, International Trade and Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge (Ashgate 2005). 
28 Egziabher, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Interests of the South’ (n 27). 
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systems that are protected and inaccessible to the other members of the community. 
Access to the special knowledge is usually through apprenticeship.29 Nonetheless, 
no systemic oral or written record is kept of the innovations, use of the innovations, 
or peoples involved in developing the innovations. In line with the communal 
culture prevalent in Africa, plant variety protection was uncommon in African 
countries prior to TRIPS. However, membership of the WTO drew them into 
obligations to protect plant varieties. As such, the thorny issue – or conundrum – 
for the OAU/STRC was how to design a suitable guideline to secure the rights of 
local communities, especially those of farmers and traditional healers, over their 
biological resources along with their associated traditional knowledge.30 
 
In response to the discussions and recommendations from the 1996 and 1997 
OAU/STRC meetings mentioned above, the STRC convened a working group of 
experts to deliberate on the issues and to draft appropriate documents. Two factors 
contributed to the STRC working group’s eventual outcome. First, the STRC found 
that the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority (EEPA) and the Institute of 
Biodiversity Conservation and Research (IBCR) were in the process of developing 
a community rights system for Ethiopia.31 Thus, the STRC partnered with the 
Ethiopian institutions, which expanded the scope of the STRC working group 
beyond medicinal plants to include all plant genetic resources.32 With this 
collaboration, the STRC had strong support from the Ethiopian government. In 
particular, Egziabher, an Ethiopian activist, academic, and General Manager of the 
EEPA, worked closely with Ekpere from the STRC.33 Second, there were growing 
global campaigns on IPRs, farmers’ rights, as well as access and benefit sharing 
                                                 
29 ibid.  
30 Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 278. 
31 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 496. 
32 ibid. 
33 Tewolde Egziabher was also actively involved in the CBD and the ITPGRFA negotiations. He 
was the chief negotiator for the African Group at the ITPGRFA. Tewolde Berhan Gerbe Egziabher, 
Elizabeth Matos, and Godfrey Mwila, ‘The African Group: Creating Fair Play Between North and 
South’ in Christine Frison, Francisco Lopez and Jose T Esquinas-Alcazar (eds), Plant Genetic 
Resources and Food Security: Stakeholder Perspectives on the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Earthscan 2011) 44 (‘The African Group’); Zerbe, 
‘Contesting Privatization’ (n 19) 109  
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principles.34 International CSOs such as the Third World Network (TWN), Genetic 
Resources Action International Network (GRAIN), the Gaia Foundation, and Rural 
Foundation Advancement International (RAFI) supported the STRC initiatives to 
develop documents that addressed the implementation of the CBD and TRIPS in 
Africa. 
 
With support from the African governments and international CSOs mentioned 
above, the STRC working group developed three draft documents by 1998:35 (i) a 
Model Legislation on Community Rights and Access to Biological Resources 
based on the Ethiopian System of Community Rights and Access;36 (ii) a 
Declaration on Community Rights and Access to Biological Resources;37 and (iii) 
a draft Convention for the Protection, Conservation, and Sustainable Use of 
African Biological Diversity, Genetic Resources, and Related Knowledge.38 The 
topics of each document reveals the range of issues covered. In general, the 
documents addressed conservation and protection of medicinal plants alongside 
plant genetic resources, farmers’ rights, and community rights. As the three 
documents were closely linked, they were combined into one draft law: the African 
Model Law. 
 
This draft African Model Law, sponsored by the Ethiopian government, was 
presented at the 34th AU Summit of Heads of State and Government in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso from 8 to 10 June 1998. At the meeting, the AU state 
representatives adopted the draft African Model Law as presented.39 However, the 
Summit called for member states to initiate consultative meetings at the regional, 
sub-national, and national levels to further expand and clarify the Model Law to 
                                                 
34 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 496. 
35  Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 276; Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous 
Knowledge’ (n 19) 496-97.  
36 Ekpere, ‘African Model Law’ (n 10) 276. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 267-77; Organisation of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
‘Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government’ <https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9543-
1998_ahg_dec_124-131_xxxiv_e.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017 (‘Declaration and Decisions Adopted 
by the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government’). 
154 
 
comply with obligations in the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and TRIPS.40 For example, 
the Model Law did not provide for the protection of plant breeder’s rights, which 
was one of the provisions the working group subsequently developed.41 The 
Summit further encouraged the AU states to develop an African ‘Common 
Position’ to safeguard the interests of AU member states in international forums.42  
The Common African Position centred on three elements. First, opposition to 
patents on life forms, including plant varieties. Egziabher explains that Africa 
banned patents for life forms to ‘keep its farming communities free to make their 
own decisions about food production, influenced of course, by their own 
governments.’43 Put differently, the ban on patents was to protect farmers from 
direct control by private seed companies.44 Second, harmonisation of TRIPS, the 
CBD, and the FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. Third, 
the establishment of a system to protect traditional knowledge and benefit sharing.  
The Common African Position sought to focus on the actual needs of the African 
farmers, farming communities, and traditional healers rather than imposing Global 
North legal systems embodied in patents and UPOV plant breeder’s rights systems.  
  
Following the recommendations of the OAU Heads of State and Government at 
the Summit in 1998, further workshops to expand and develop the African Model 
Law were held around Africa in 1999 and 2000. For example, experts from eastern 
and southern Africa held a regional workshop in Lusaka, Zambia in June 1999 to 
discuss the African Model Law’s compatibility with the CBD, TRIPS, and the 
                                                 
40 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 497. 
41 Peter Munyi, Marcelin Tonye Mahop, Pierre du Plessis, Johnson Ekpere, and Kabir Bavikatte, A 
Gap Analysis Report on the African Model Law on The Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers, Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources 
(Commissioned by the Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African 
Union Commission, February 2012) 10 (A Gap Analysis Report on the African Model Law). 
42 Organisation of African Unity, ‘Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fourth 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government’ (n 39). 
43 Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, ‘The African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of 
Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources in Relation to International Law and Institutions’ (Paper from Ethio-Forum 2002 
Conference, 14 February 2002) <http://chora.virtualave.net/tewolde-rights.htm> accessed 28 July 
2017 (‘The African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities’).  
44 ibid.  
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International Undertaking of the FAO.45 Furthermore, the structure of the African 
Model Law was reorganised, while farmers’ rights, breeder’s rights, and benefit 
sharing provisions were developed at an AU regional workshop in Algiers, Algeria 
in June 2000.46 This workshop in Algeria produced the final version of the African 
Model Law.47 
 
4.1.2. Unpacking the African Model Law 
 
Coverage of the Law 
 
The African Model Law protects three types of varieties: community varieties, 
farmers’ varieties, and new breeders’ varieties.48 These are discussed in turn. 
Community varieties are varieties conserved and developed by local communities. 
Local communities are human populations who reside in distinct geographical 
areas with distinct ownership over their biological resources, innovations, 
practices, knowledge, and technologies.49 Article 16 of the African Model Law 
requires states to recognise the rights of these local communities over their 
biological resources, including plant varieties.50 As such, community varieties are 
collectively owned by the community. The communities have community IPRs 
over their community varieties, practices, innovations, knowledge, and 
technologies.51  
 
Community rights provisions in the African Model Law are inspired by Article 8(j) 
of the CBD, which provides for contracting states to respect, preserve, and 
                                                 
45 Edward D Zulu, Rosemary M Makano, and Anessie Banda, ‘National Experiences and Plans to 
Implement a Sui Generis System of Protection in Zambia’ (Paper presented at the UPOV-WIPO-
WTO Joint Regional Workshop on ‘The Protection of Plant Varieties under Article 27.3(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement in Nairobi from 6-7 May 1999’) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2121-
zambia-s-approach-to-sui-generis-rights> accessed 3 August 2017; Graham Dutfield, Intellectual 
Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2004) 153. 
46 Ekpere, ‘The OAU’s Model Law’ (n 15) 2.  
47 African Model Law.  
48 African Model Law, pts IV, V, and VI, arts 15-56. 
49 African Model Law, art 1. 
50 Article 1 of the African Model Law provides that biological resources include genetic resources.  
51 African Model Law, pt IV, arts 16-22 further expands on community rights. 
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maintain the traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices of local 
communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity.52  Global South actors, including the African countries and CSOs, were 
instrumental in the incorporation of provisions on community rights in the CBD.53 
Noah Zerbe explains that community rights in the CBD and the African Model 
Law were envisioned to act as a check on the capacity of private actors to 
monopolise innovations developed from the traditional knowledge and practices of 
local communities.54 Therefore, community rights reward the historical role of 
local communities in maintaining biological diversity, and also provides material 
incentives for communities to continue such practices.55  It is important to note that 
neither TRIPS nor UPOV provides for the protection of community varieties. 
Rather, TRIPS and UPOV grant private individual rights.  
 
Also in contrast to TRIPS and UPOV, the African Model Law expressly provides 
for the protection of farmers’ varieties, but it does not define the term.56 Scholars 
such as Carlos Correa, Michael Halewood, and Isabel Lapena generally define 
farmers’ varieties as plant varieties conserved and developed by farmers.’57 The 
protection of farmers’ varieties in the African Model Law is traceable to FAO 
Resolution 5/89, which endorsed the protection and conservation of farmers’ plant 
genetic resources.58 As discussed in Chapter 1, CSOs, activists, African countries, 
                                                 
52 Egziabher, ‘The African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities’ (n 
43).  
53 ibid.  
54 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 499. 
55 ibid. 
56 While TRIPS does not expressly mention farmers’ varieties, the sui generis option can be 
interpreted to include farmers’ varieties. See discussions on the sui generis plant variety protection 
option under TRIPS in Chapter 3. African Model Law, art 25 provides for the protection of farmers’ 
varieties. 
57 Michael Halewood and Isabel Lapena, ‘Farmers’ Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges at 
the Crossroads of Agriculture, Taxonomy and Law’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 1; Carlos 
Correa, ‘Sui Generis Protection for Farmers’ Varieties’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 167-170  (‘Sui 
Generis Protection for Farmers’ Varieties’). 
58 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Resolution 5/89 (1989), Annex 
to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.  
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and Global South actors were instrumental in pushing for the farmers’ rights 
provisions at the FAO.59 
 
Drawing from the UPOV 1978 Convention, the African Model Law provides for 
the protection of new varieties developed by plant breeders.60 While the African 
Model Law also does not define new plant breeder’s varieties, the conditions and 
scope of protection further expand on this provision. None of these categories of 
varieties specifically mentions the plant species and botanical genera for which 
IPRs are granted. Therefore, it can be implied that all plant genera and species are 
to be protected under a national law designed after the African Model Law. The 
recognition of these three categories of varieties reflects the attempts by the drafters 
of the African Model Law to recognise local communities’, farmers’, and 
commercial plant breeders’ contributions to the development of plant varieties.  
 
Conditions for Protection 
 
The African Model Law provides different conditions of protection for the three 
categories of varieties. Varieties qualify as community varieties if they are 
identified, interpreted, and ascertained by the local community concerned.61 These 
community varieties are protected even if: (i) a written or oral description of the 
variety or its associated traditional knowledge and information exists; (ii) samples 
of the variety are conserved in a gene bank or other similar conservation sites; or 
(iii) community members generally use the variety.62 In essence, the key condition 
for registering a community variety is its identification by a local community. 
Common local use or ex-situ conservation of the variety does not preclude 
registration of community varieties.63 Similarly, farmers’ varieties are varieties 
with specific attributes which a community identifies.64 Article 25(2) of the African 
                                                 
59 See Chapter 1.  
60 African Model Law, arts 28-29.  
61 African Model Law, art 23.  
62 African Model Law, art 23.  
63 Ex-situ conservation is the preservation of biological diversity, including genetic resources 
outside their natural habitat. See African Model Law, art 1.  
64 African Model Law, art 25(2).  
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Model Law expressly states that farmers’ varieties are not required to fulfil the 
distinct, uniform, and stable conditions for protection. However, the provisions on 
community and farmers’ varieties are unclear about the specific attributes 
communities are required to consider. Carlos Correa astutely points out that ‘the 
absence of general criteria [in the African Model Law] to establish eligibility [for 
community and farmers’ varieties] might lead to significant uncertainty and 
competing claims about ownership.’65 
 
Borrowing from the UPOV 1978 Convention, breeder’s varieties are considered 
new if they are identifiable, stable, and sufficiently homogenous.66 A new variety 
is identifiable if it has one or more identifiable characteristics which are clearly 
distinguishable from other varieties commonly in existence at the date of 
application for the plant breeder’s right.67 The variety is stable in its essential 
characteristics if after repeated reproduction or propagation, it remains true to its 
description.68 The variety is sufficiently homogenous if, subject to variations 
expected from particular features of its propagation, it remains the same.69 Ekpere 
explains that the aim for the protection of new breeder’s varieties and breeder’s 
rights in the African Model Law was to recognise both individual and institutional 
investments in developing new plant varieties by providing economic rewards.70   
 
Scope of Coverage 
 
The African Model Law does not provide a duration of protection for both 
community and farmers’ varieties. Nonetheless, communities have the right to 
collectively benefit from the use of community and farmers’ varieties, practices, 
and traditional knowledge.71 Local communities have the inalienable right to 
access, use, exchange, or share community varieties in line with customary 
                                                 
65 Correa, ‘Sui Generis Protection for Farmers’ Varieties’ (n 57) 169.  
66 African Model Law, art 29. 
67 African Model Law, art 29(a). 
68 Or where an applicant has defined a particular cycle of reproduction or multiplication, it remains 
true to its description at the end of each cycle. African Model Law, art 29(b). 
69 African Model Law, art 29(c). 
70 Ekpere, ‘The OAU’s Model Law’ (n 15) 20-21. 
71 African Model Law, art 16. 
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practices and laws.72 Similarly, local communities also have the exclusive rights to 
multiply, cultivate, use, sell, or license farmers’ varieties.73 Access to community 
varieties is subject to the prior informed consent of the concerned communities, 
who have the right to refuse access to their varieties.74 Apart from the prior 
informed consent principle, the African Model Law provides that states and 
communities are entitled to a share of the earnings derived from the use of their 
biological resources or knowledge, directly or indirectly, in a product or production 
process.75 In particular, at least 50 per cent of benefits from the use of community 
biological resources are to be channelled to the local communities.76  
 
Conversely, the African Model Law clearly sets out the duration for protecting new 
breeder’s varieties. Plant breeders have exclusive rights over annual crops for a 
duration of 20 years, and exclusive rights over trees, vines, and other perennial 
crops for a duration of 25 years.77 Furthermore, plant breeders have exclusive rights 
to produce propagating material of the variety for sale, to license, or to sell new 
plant varieties.78 Yet this exclusive right is subject to farmers’ rights and public 
policy exceptions which are also provided in the Model Law.  Two key exceptions 
to breeders’ rights are the following: (i) farmers’ rights to use new breeders’ 
varieties to develop farmers’ varieties; and (ii) farmers’ rights to save, use, 
multiply, and process farm-saved seed of protected varieties which are also 
provided in the Model Law.79 Notwithstanding, farmers are prohibited from selling 
farm-saved seed or propagating material of a breeders’ variety in the seed industry 
on a commercial scale.80 In addition to the farmers’ rights exceptions, breeders’ 
rights are subject to restrictions required to protect completion practices, food 
security, nutritional, health, biological diversity, and farming community 
                                                 
72 African Model Law, art 21. 
73 African Model Law, art 25(2).  
74 African Model Law, arts 18-19.  
75 African Model Law, arts 12 and 22.  
76 African Model Law, art 22.  
77 African Model Law, art 34. These time frames commence from the day on which the application 
for a plant breeder’s rights for the plant variety is accepted.  
78 African Model Law, art 30. 
79 The African Model Law recognises seed reuse and exchange as a central component of small-
scale centred farming practices prevalent in Africa. African Model Law, art 26. 
80 African Model Law, art 26(2).  
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requirements or to promote other public interests.81 These exceptions seek to 
balance breeder’s rights with political and socio-economic interests.  
 
4.1.3. The African Model Law and Plant Variety Protection Regimes 
 
The wide-ranging coverage of the law, conditions, and scope for protection above 
reflect the intentions of the drafters of the Model Law to implement different treaty 
obligations in a single document. The preceding section explained that the African 
Model Law provides for community rights, farmers’ rights, and breeders’ rights 
along with access and benefit sharing principles drawn from the CBD, the FAO 
International Undertaking, and the UPOV 1978 Convention. These provisions 
were interpreted to suit African realities. One key insight from the regime complex 
analysis of plant variety protection in this thesis is that the fragmentation of 
regimes covering plant varieties at the international level is also reflected at the 
national level. There are different national institutions responsible for 
implementing international treaties. In Nigeria, for example, there is a lack of 
synergy amongst the ministries of agriculture, environment, and trade that have 
mandates to implement the different plant variety protection treaties. Thus, what 
the African Model Law does is to collate the different relevant legal systems and 
legal principles in one document, thereby facilitating coordination amongst the 
institutions through the law. In essence, the African Model Law shows national 
law and policy-makers how to implement the conflicting obligations in the 
different regimes in one document. More importantly, it embodies the African 
position in international forums.  
 
A brief look into history reveals that provisions on farmers’ rights as well as access 
and benefit sharing were introduced in the CBD and the ITPGRFA because the UN 
– under which these treaties were negotiated – was more favourable to the Global 
South’s demands.82 The Global North’s dominance in TRIPS and UPOV meant 
that the Global South was unable to push for the provisions that favoured their 
                                                 
81 African Model Law, art 26(3), 31, and 33. 
82 See Chapters 1 and 3.  
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national realities. As such, the African Model Law represents the plant variety 
protection treaty that the African negotiators in the international fora sought to 
establish. Indeed, Ekpere explains that:  
 
…The intention was to create a body of regulation that enables providers 
of biological resources benefit from what has been negotiated at the CBD, 
FAO treaties, what is implicit in article 27.3(b), and what was discussed at 
the time in the Cartagena Protocol…. What I personally felt was that if 
users were busy creating conditions that meet their own special needs, then 
providers should also be able to conceptualise the possibility of coming 
together with arrangements that protect their own interests. That was the 
singular driving force behind the African Model Law. It creates an omnibus 
kind of model that if articulated into an implementable legislative 
instrument, will be able to deal with all users who come to the providers 
with any of the fragmented treaties, seeking access.83 
 
However, plant variety protection regimes have expanded since the African Model 
Law was adopted. For example, the Nagoya Protocol – arising from the access and 
benefit sharing principles in the CBD – was adopted in 2010.84 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Nagoya Protocol expressly sets out detailed guidelines on access 
and benefit sharing principles which are absent in the African Model Law.85 
Notably, the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol renewed interest in the African 
Model Law.86 The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment met in 
Cairo in March 2015, and adopted a set of guidelines on the coordinated 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in Africa.87 The guidelines seek to build 
on the provisions of the African Model Law by analysing and filling gaps resulting 
                                                 
83 Fieldwork interview with Johnson Ekpere, Former Secretary-General of the Scientific, Technical, 
and Research Commission of the OAU/STRC (Ibadan, Oyo State, 10 August 2015) (transcript on 
file with author). 
84 See discussions on the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol in Chapter 3. 
85 ibid. 
86 Munyi and others, A Gap Analysis Report on the African Model Law (n 41) 5.  
87 African Union Practical Guidelines for the Coordinated Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
in Africa.  
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from subsequent legal developments relevant to plant variety protection and 
biological resources at the global and regional level.88   
 
Looking through the TWAIL and regime complex theory lenses, the benefit of 
drawing inspiration from the African Model Law for a country like Nigeria is that 
it provides a holistic but flexible sui generis plant variety protection system that 
complies with the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and TRIPS obligations, and also prioritises 
the interests of Africans. From a TWAIL perspective, the African Model Law 
presents sui generis guidelines that considers the actualised experiences of the 
Third World peoples as the interpretative prism through which the rules of 
international laws are evaluated or implemented.89 From a regime complex 
perspective, the African Model Law addresses one of the key consequences of the 
overlapping regimes for plant varieties, which is how to reconcile the conflicting 
legal systems and principles set out in the non-hierarchical international 
institutions at the national level.90 
 
Accordingly, the African Model Law provides a way-in to law-making for the 
different national institutions (ministries, agencies, departments) concerned with 
plant variety protection by providing guidelines on how to design a comprehensive 
plant variety protection system. This is useful because, rather than the different 
national institutions contemplating on how to design a sui generis system from 
scratch, the African Model Law provides a template or guideline for this. Chidi 
Oguamanam rightly advocates for the continued relevance of the African Model 
Law for African countries seeking to design plant variety protection systems, as it 
is suited for the different stakeholders in the agricultural sector in Africa.91 
 
                                                 
88 ibid. 
89Anghie and Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility 
in Internal Conflicts’ (n 3) 78. 
90 Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (2009) 
7(1) Perspectives on Politics 39, 40. 
91 Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Breeding Apples for Oranges: Africa’s Misplaced Priority over Plant 
Breeders Rights’ (2015) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 1, 1. 
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4.1.4. Adoption of the African Model Law 
 
Although the African Model Law represents one of the most comprehensive 
regimes to reconcile the conflicting provisions in the different plant variety 
protection treaties, it is not widely adopted in Africa.92 On the contrary, African 
countries are increasingly joining UPOV, as will be seen below. Four notable 
obstacles to the adoption of the African Model Law are: (i) inadequate use and 
prioritisation of domestic financial resources to translate the African Model Law 
into national laws; (ii) dearth of experts to design the national laws;93 (iii) paucity 
of information at the national and local levels in African countries about the issues 
covered in the African Model Law; and (iv) external pressure on African countries 
from the US, the European Union (EU), and UPOV to abandon the African Model 
Law. 
 
The AU experienced the first two obstacles first-hand. For example, Noah Zerbe 
points out that the francophone African IPRs organisation OAPI designed a UPOV 
1991 Convention-compliant plant breeder’s rights system while the AU was still 
preparing a French translation of the Model Law.94 He explains that at the 
November 1999 AU workshop in Addis Ababa, the AU was notified that the 
French translation of the Model Law was incomplete.95 However, hampered by 
lack of financial and technical capacity, the AU was only able to complete the 
French translation of the Model Law at its regional workshop in Algiers, Algeria 
in June 2000.96 As mentioned in 4.1.1 above, it was at the 2000 workshop that the 
structure of the African Model Law was reorganised.97 The final English and 
                                                 
92 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 502. African countries like 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have plant variety protection systems that incorporate sui generis legal 
principles such as farmers’ rights, breeders’ rights exceptions, and disclosure of origin provisions. 
However, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organisation (ARIPO), which is in the process of acceding to the UPOV 1991 Convention. 
Although Ethiopia has a plant variety protection system which incorporates sui generis legal 
principles, it is not a WTO member. 
93 African countries fail to retain even the few experts in the field.  
94 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 503.  
95 ibid. 
96 ibid, 
97 See 4.1.1 above. 
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French versions of the African Model Law were also concluded at this workshop. 
However, by the time the final French version was ready in 2000, OAPI had 
already designed a plant breeder’s rights system.98 Carolyn Deere notes that the 
staff of national IPRs offices in francophone African countries were ‘already 
captive audience of the OAPI and UPOV secretariats.’99 OAPI and UPOV further 
persuaded the Ministry of Agriculture officials in these francophone African 
countries of the benefits of the plant breeder’s rights system under the UPOV 1991 
Convention.100 Significantly, there was no national or regional consultations during 
the IPRs review process, thus CSOs and activists could neither contribute to it nor 
express reservations.101 
 
Another symptom of the first two obstacles was the AU’s invitation to WIPO and 
UPOV in June 2002 to review the African Model Law adoption process, in order 
to collaborate with these institutions.102 The AU had sought to request for technical 
assistance to further develop some provisions of the African Model Law and to 
promote the implementation of the Model Law within Africa.103 This was not 
                                                 
98 The African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) is the francophone intellectual property 
organisation in Africa. UPOV Lex, ‘African Intellectual Property Organisation – Agreement 
Revising the Bangui Agreement of 2 March 1977 on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property 
Organisation’ (Bangui Central African Republic, 24 February 1999)  
<http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/details.jsp?id=12622> accessed 4 August 2017.  
99 OAPI is discussed further in 4.2 below. It was the national IPRs offices staff that were directly 
involved with the IPRs revision process. Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS 
Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 271 (The Implementation Game). 
100 Deere, The Implementation Game (n 99) 271. 
101 ibid. See CSOs’ submissions on this: Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), 
‘Legal Terminator Threatens Francophone Africa’s Farmers: Right to Save Seed in Poor Countries 
May Be Eliminated as 15 African States are Pressured to Accept UPOV 91’ (RAFI 17 February 
1999) 
<http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/382/01/news_upov91.pdf> 
accessed 4 August 2017 (‘Legal Terminator’); Nana Rosine Ngangoue and B Oeudraogo, ‘Small 
Farmers Seed Rights Up for Grabs?’ (March 1999) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2009-
oapi-caves-in-to-upov> accessed 4 August 2017; Third World Network (TWN), ‘Joint NGO 
Statement of Support for the Africa Group Proposals on Reviewing the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 
Article 27.3b’ (August 1999)  
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Joint_NGO_Statement_of_Support_0899.htm> accessed 4 August 
2017. 
102 Genetic Resources Action International Network (GRAIN), ‘IPRs Agents Try to Derail OAU 
Process: UPOV and WIPO Attack Africa’s Model Law on Community Rights to Biodiversity’ 
(GRAIN June 2001) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/89-ipr-agents-try-to-derail-oau-




actualised, as rather than providing suggestions and expertise on how to develop 
the provisions and promote the Model Law within Africa, WIPO and UPOV 
criticised the Model Law, questioning its legality and appropriateness.104  
 
WIPO asserted that the African Model Law’s prohibition of patents on life forms 
is contrary to Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, which specifically provides the patent 
option for plant varieties and other life forms such as microorganisms.105 However, 
the AU argued that its exclusion of patents on life forms was pursuant to the ordre 
public and morality exception provided in Article 27.2 of TRIPS.106 WIPO also 
challenged the community rights provisions in the African Model Law. WIPO 
argued that the concept of community rights in the African Model Law was 
insufficiently defined, as it lacked clarity unlike a patent system.107 While this 
argument is tenable to the extent that the community rights provisions in the 
African Model Law lacks certain details such as the duration of community rights, 
two replies to this argument are as follows. First, the AU was aware that there were 
limitations in certain provisions of the African Model Law, such as the community 
rights section. It was partly for this reason that the AU had invited WIPO and 
UPOV to contribute to further develop the provisions of the African Model Law, 
not to change them. Second, as highlighted above, the provisions of the African 
Model Law are not final. Countries can expand and fine-tune the guidelines set out 
in the African Model Law to make up for its inadequacies.  
 
For its part, UPOV offered a revised draft of the African Model Law which 
conformed with its 1991 Convention.108 A GRAIN report on the 1999 AU meeting 
points out that UPOV revised over 30 of the provisions in the African Model 
Law.109 In particular, UPOV found the provisions on farmers’ rights completely 
                                                 
104 ibid. 
105 TRIPS, art 27.3(b). 
106 See discussion on the patent option in Chapter 3.  
107 Zerbe, Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 504.   
108 GRAIN, ‘IPRs Agents Try to Derail OAU Process’ (n 102). 
109 ibid. The African Model Law has 68 provisions. 
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unacceptable and ‘ineffective’, as it favours small-scale farmers rather than private 
breeders and seed companies, which UPOV seeks to protect. 110 
 
CSOs such as the African Biodiversity Network (ABN), Gaia Foundation, GRAIN, 
RAFI, and TWN attempted to address the third obstacle highlighted above – the 
paucity of information about the issues covered in the African Model Law – by 
raising awareness about this at both the national and international levels.111 In fact, 
ABN is an African CSO established in 1996 to promote the adoption of the African 
Model Law within Africa.112 From the late 1990s, the ABN hosted regional and 
national workshops to spread information about the African Model Law, while also 
lobbying national governments.113 Similarly, scholars such as Ekpere, Egziabher, 
and Zerbe have contributed to raising awareness about the African Model Law by 
providing important insights into its underlying rationale which is to balance the 
rights of local communities, farmers, and breeders.114 These interventions are 
useful for law and policy-makers as well as for other stakeholders interested in 
understanding the African Model Law provisions.  
 
The fourth obstacle to the adoption of the African Model Law highlighted above, 
which is pressure on African countries from the US, the EU, and UPOV to accede 
to the UPOV 1991 Convention, is explored next. 
 
                                                 
110 GRAIN, ‘IPRs Agents Try to Derail OAU Process’ (n 102). 
111 Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19) 503. The CSOs have hosted 
workshops and published papers seeking to promote the African Model Law, for example, GRAIN, 
‘Beyond UPOV: Examples of developing countries preparing non-UPOV sui generis plant variety 
protection schemes in compliance with TRIPS’ (25 July 1999)  
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/14-beyond-upov> accessed 01 August 2017; Glenn Ashton, 
Is Africa about to lose the right to her seed? (23 April 2013)  
<https://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4700-is-africa-about-to-lose-the-right-to-her-seed>    
accessed 01 August 2017. 
112 African Biodiversity Network (ABN), <http://africanbiodiversity.org/> accessed 1 August 2017. 
113 ibid. 
114 See for example, Egziabher, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Interests of the South’ (n 28); Egziabher, ‘The African Model Law for the Protection 
of the Rights of Local Communities’ (n 43); Ekpere, ‘The OAU’s Model Law’ (n 15); Ekpere, 
‘African Model Law’ (n 10); Zerbe, Biodiversity, Ownership and Indigenous Knowledge’ (n 19); 
Zerbe, ‘Contesting Privatization’ (n 19); Egziabher, Matos, and Mwila, ‘The African Group’ (n 33). 
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4.2. UPOV’s Way-in to Africa 
 
This part traces the avenues through which UPOV has been gradually proliferating 
in Africa. It seeks to understand why the same African countries which embraced 
the African Model Law in 1998 have acceded to the UPOV 1991 Convention that 
they collectively opposed because of its focus on plant breeders and limited 
reference to small-scale farmers.115 The first section of this part maps out trade 
agreements and economic partnerships with the US and the EU which require 
African countries to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention. The second section 
discusses UPOV’s growing traction through African regional intergovernmental 
organisations. 
 
4.2.1. Trade and Investment Agreements  
 
Although TRIPS was successfully incorporated in the WTO set of compulsory 
trade agreements in 1995, the delicate consensus in Article 27.3(b) created a 
latitude. It was this latitude that informed the African Model Law, a sui generis 
system designed by Africans to suit African countries’ realities. However, the US 
and the EU narrowed certain Global South WTO members’ choice under Article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS through bilateral trade agreements and economic partnerships. 
As will be seen below, these trade agreements and economic partnerships push the 
US and the EU agendas of establishing plant breeder’s rights systems in the UPOV 
1991 Convention as ‘the’ sui generis option under TRIPS by specifically requiring 
the African countries to join UPOV. The strategy of pushing specific agendas 
through bilateral agreements is otherwise referred to as vertical regime-shifting.116 
Vertical regime-shifting involves negotiating laws, rules, and implementation at 
levels below the multilateral level, such as at bilateral or regional levels.117 Global 
                                                 
115 All African countries are members of the AU. Morocco withdrew from the OAU (AU’s 
predecessor) in 1984, because Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic – a disputed state – was admitted 
as an OAU member. However, the AU readmitted Morocco as a member state on 30 January 2017.  
116 Peter K Yu, ‘International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property 
Schizophrenia’ (2007) 1 Michigan State Law Review 1, 15-16. See also Susan Sell, ‘TRIPS Was 
Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP’ (2011) 18(2) Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law 447, 451. 
117 ibid.  
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North countries often engage in vertical regime-shifting when they are unable to 
achieve their goals at the multilateral level.118 As will be seen below, Morocco, 
South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia have trade agreements or economic 
partnerships that require them to join UPOV. 
 
The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) requires Morocco to provide 
specific IPRs by ratifying or acceding to a variety of international IPRs agreements, 
including the UPOV 1991 Convention.119 The historic and comprehensive FTA 
was signed on 15 June 2004 and entered into force on 1 January 2006.120 Notably, 
this was the US’ first FTA with an African country, and second country within the 
Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region. One of the reasons the US chose 
to sign the bilateral agreement with Morocco was to promote trade liberalisation 
outside the WTO framework.121 In particular, the George Bush administration 
(2001 to 2009) sought to promote trade liberalisation within the Global South.122 
As Morocco was the 2003 chair of the G-77 and Africa Group within the WTO, 
the US chose Morocco as its first African free trade partner.123 The US concluded 
that Morocco was in a position to influence other Global South countries to support 
US’ positions during WTO negotiations.124 Similarly, Morocco is party to the 
                                                 
118 ibid.  
119 From 2002, the US Congress required trade agreements to include levels of IPRs similar to those 
in force in the US. US Trade Act 2002, s 2102. Chapter 15 of the US-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) sets out provisions on IPRs. Article 15.2(e) provides for Morocco to ratify or 
accede to UPOV 1991 Convention.  
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file797_3849.p
df> accessed 28 November 2016. Other international IPRs agreements the US required Morocco to 
ratify or accede to include the Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 (amended in 1979), the Convention 
Relating to the Distribution of Programme – Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite 1974, the 
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
1989, the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for 
the Purposes of Patent Procedure 1977 (as amended in 1980), the Trademark Law Treaty 1994, the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996.  
120 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Morocco Free Trade Agreement  
<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta> accessed 13 December 
2016.  
121 Raymond J Ahearn, ‘Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement’ Congressional Research Service 
(RS21464, 26 May 2005) 2 and 4 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21464.pdf> accessed 13 
December 2006 (‘Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement’). 
122 ibid 2. 
123ibid; Group of 77 at the United Nations (UN), ‘Chairmanship of the Group of 77’  
<http://www.g77.org/doc/presiding.html> accessed 4 August 2017.  
124 Other reasons for the US-Morocco FTA include the US’ objective of strengthening its 
relationship with Morocco due to the war against terrorism. Furthermore, the US sought to promote 
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Euro-Mediterranean Agreement which also obliges it to accede to the UPOV 1991 
Convention.125 With pressure from the US and the EU, Morocco designed a UPOV 
1991 Convention-compliant plant breeders’ rights system approved by the UPOV 
office. It deposited its instrument of accession to the UPOV 1991 Convention on 8 
September 2006 and became a member of UPOV on 8 October 2006.126  
 
The EU has similar trade agreements with Tunisia and South Africa which require 
them to provide the IPRs systems in line with the highest international standards.127 
The EU-Tunisia Agreement specifically requires Tunisia to accede to the UPOV 
1991 Convention.128 The EU-Tunisia Agreement is part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements the EU concluded with seven southern Mediterranean 
countries between 1998 and 2005.129 The agreements seek to gradually liberalise 
                                                 
openness, tolerance, and economic growth around the Muslim world. Jean F Crombois, ‘The US-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement’ (2005) 10(2) Mediterranean Politics 219, 220. For more 
discussions on the US-Morocco FTA, see generally, Mustapha Sadni Jallab, Lahsen Abdelmalki, 
and Rene Sandretto, ‘The Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and Morocco: The 
Importance of a Gradual and Asymmetric Agreement’ (2007) 22(4) Journal of Economic 
Integration 852; Akka Ait El Mekki  and  Wallace E Tyner, ‘The Moroccan American FTA Effects 
on the Agricultural and Food Sectors in Morocco’ (Paper presented at the 7th Annual Conference 
on Global Economic Analysis, Trade, Poverty, and the Environment, 17-19 June 2004, Washington, 
DC). 
125 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (19 March 
2000) OJEC L70/2, Annex 7, art 1  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127906.pdf> accessed 4 August 2017. 
126 UPOV, ‘Accession by the Kingdom of Morocco’ (UPOV Notification No 99, 8 September 
2006). 
127 ‘Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part (4 December 
1999) OJ L311, art 46; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of 
the other part (30 March 1998) OJEC L97/2, art 39(1). 
128 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the Other Part; ‘Council 
and Commission Decision of the Council and the Commission of 26 January 1998, on the 
conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other 
part’ (98/238/EC, ECSC, 30 March 1998) OJ L 97/1, Annex 7 (1) provides that by the end of the 
fourth year after the entry into force of the Agreement Tunisia shall accede to the UPOV 1991 
Convention. See also: GRAIN, ‘TRIPS-Plus through the Back Door: How Bilateral Treaties Impose 
much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO’ (27 July 2001)  
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5-trips-plus-through-the-back-door> accessed 13 December 
2016; GRAIN, ‘Tunisia joins UPOV’ (21 August 2003)  
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2080-tunisia-joins-upov> accessed 13 December 2016. 
129 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ‘Countries and Regions’  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-
partnership/index_en.htm> accessed 13 August 2017.  
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trade in the Mediterranean area and promote economic, social, and cultural 
cooperation between the EU and each of the partner states. For Tunisia, like other 
Global South countries, the preferential access to the EU market and potential of 
increased EU aid attracted it to sign the agreement, albeit with the obligation to 
strengthen its IPRs.130 Accordingly, Tunisia designed its UPOV 1991 Convention-
compliant plant breeders’ rights system and deposited its instrument of accession 
to the UPOV 1991 Convention on 31 July 2003.131 Tunisia became a member of 
UPOV on 31 August 2003.132  
 
For its part, Tanzania’s accession to the UPOV 1991 Convention in October 2015 
was thanks to its membership of the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition (NAFSN).133 One of Tanzania’s law reform commitments under the 
NAFSN was to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention. The NAFSN, launched in 
2012, aims to promote agricultural productivity and reduce poverty by increasing 
private investment in agriculture in Africa.134 To achieve increased agricultural 
productivity, participating countries commit to a package of reforms to promote 
private sector involvement in agriculture, including seed law reforms.135 Tanzania 
and Nigeria, along with eight other African countries, are members of the 
NAFSN.136 Nigeria’s reform commitments and its implication on plant variety 
protection in the country are discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
                                                 
130 Joseph F Francois, Matthew McQueen, and Ganeshan Wignaraja, ‘European Union-Developing 
Country FTAs: Overview and Analysis’ (2005) 33(10) World Development 1545, 1545. For a 
discussion on the EU-Tunisia agreement, see generally, Bechir Chourou, ‘The free-trade agreement 
between Tunisia and the European Union’ (2007) 3(1) The Journal of North African Studies 25.  
131 UPOV, ‘Accession by the Republic of Tunisia’ (UPOV Notification No 89, 31 July 2003). 
132 ibid.  
133  G8, ‘G8 Cooperation Framework to Support the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” 
in Tanzania’ 5  
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/TanzaniaCooperationFramework.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2016 (‘The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa’). The 
United Republic of Tanzania deposited its instrument of accession on 22 October 2015 and became 
a UPOV member on 22 November 2015 (UPOV Press Release 102, Geneva, 22 October 2015). 
134 G8, ‘The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa’ (n 133). 
135 ibid. 
136 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Tanzania. New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition <https://new-alliance.org/> accessed 
13 August 2017.  
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The above are examples of trade agreements or economic partnerships that 
expressly require African countries to accede to the UPOV Convention as ‘the’ sui 
generis system for protecting plant varieties. However, not all trade agreements 
explicitly mention UPOV. For example, the US African Growth and Opportunities 
Act (AGOA) provides that the US President can designate a specific African 
country as AGOA-eligible if the country has established or is making progress to 
establish the elimination of barriers to US trade and investments, including by 
protecting IPRs.137 Similarly, the EU Economic Partnership Agreements with the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) provides inter alia for 
parties to recognise the need to ensure an adequate and effective level of protection 
of IPRs, industrial and commercial property rights, and other rights covered by 
TRIPS.138 As will be seen next, another key way through which UPOV plant 
breeders’ rights system is proliferating in Africa is through regional organisations 
such as OAPI, ARIPO, and SADC. 
 
4.2.2. Regional Intergovernmental Organisations 
 
OAPI and ARIPO are the two main intergovernmental organisations responsible 
for coordinating IPRs in Africa. OAPI coordinates the IPRs system in francophone 
Africa, while ARIPO coordinates the IPRs system mainly in anglophone Africa.139 
Unlike OAPI and ARIPO, SADC is not an IPRs organisation. It was formed mainly 
to promote economic liberation and evolved into an economic development 
institution.140 OAPI became the first African intergovernmental organisation to 
                                                 
137 Trade and Development Act 2000 (Public Law 106-200, 106th Congress, 18 May 2000), s 104(a) 
(1) (C) (ii); African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-
development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa> accessed 01 
December 2016.       
138 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States of the one part, and the European Community and its Members States, of the other part, 
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (15 December 2000) OJ, art 46(1)  
<http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Cotonou2000.pdf> accessed 30 November 2016.  
139 Organisation Africaine De La Propriete Intellectuelle (OAPI) <http://www.oapi.int/> accessed 
30 November 2016; ARIPO <http://www.aripo.org/about-aripo/membership-member-states> 
accessed 30 November 2016. ARIPO’s membership was initially restricted to only English-
speaking African countries, but it has subsequently accepted non-English speaking members such 
as Mozambique (Portuguese), Sao Tome and Principe (Portuguese), and Somalia (Somali and 
Arabic). 
140 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community  
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join UPOV on 10 July 2014,141 while ARIPO has initiated the procedure for joining 
UPOV.142 ARIPO has a draft plant breeders’ rights legislation which the UPOV 
office has reviewed and confirmed to be UPOV 1991 Convention-compliant. 
SADC has contacted the UPOV office to request for assistance with constructing 
a plant breeders’ rights legislation, and it has prepared draft plant variety protection 
legislation.143  
 
The rest of this section covers these organisations’ journeys to UPOV. This is 
important because it shows how three regional organisations which have a 
combined membership of 44 countries have either joined or initiated the process 
of joining the UPOV 1991 Convention. Indeed, the regional organisations are a 
faster way of spreading the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system in Africa. 
However, Nigeria is not a member of any of these regional organisations; it only 
has observer status in ARIPO. Nonetheless, understanding this avenue through 
which UPOV proliferates in Africa is useful for Nigeria to make it aware of how 












                                                 
<http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf> accessed 01 December 2016.  
141 UPOV, ‘Members of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
UPOV Convention (1961), as revised at Geneva (1972, 1978 and 1991): Status on April 15 2016’ 
<http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf> accessed 01 December 
2016 (‘Members of the International Convention’). 




African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) 
 
OAPI was established by the Bangui Agreement of 2 March 1977.144 It provides a 
central IPRs registration system for its 17 francophone African member states.145 
Four of its member states are classified as developing countries under TRIPS, the 
remaining 13 are classified as least developed countries.146 Therefore, only four 
OAPI member states were obliged to comply with TRIPS at the initial deadline in 
2000, and the majority have until 2021 to fulfil their TRIPS obligations.147 
Notwithstanding, as seen in 4.1.4 above, the French government and the UPOV 
office actively encouraged OAPI to revise its Bangui Agreement to comply with 
the UPOV 1991 Convention.148 Annex X of the revised Bangui Agreement 
established a regional plant breeders’ rights system in line with the UPOV 1991 
Convention.149 The UPOV office approved the provisions of the plant breeders’ 
rights system as compliant with its 1991 Convention in its 17th extraordinary 
session held in Geneva on 7 April 2000.150 The 1999 revised Bangui Agreement 
                                                 
144 The Bangui IPRs Agreement sets out the IPRs regime for the French-speaking African countries. 
Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organisation, 
Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African and Malagasy 
Office of Industrial Property (Bangui, Central African Republic, 2 March 1977), revised on 24 
February 1999, entered into force on 28 February 2002  
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2000) 2-3 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_extr_17/c_extr_17_6.pdf> accessed 30 
November 2016. OAPI is the second intergovernmental organisation to join UPOV and its 72nd 
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UPOV on 29 June 2005.   
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entered into force in 2002, but the plant breeders’ rights system in Annex X did not 
enter into force until 2006. This was because OAPI lacked the capacity to 
implement its provisions.151 For example, it neither had the financial resources nor 
the expertise to successfully administer a UPOV-styled plant breeders’ rights 
system. With the French government and the UPOV office’s technical and 
financial support, Annex X of the Bangui Agreement entered into force in 2006.152 
OAPI deposited its instrument of accession to UPOV on 10 June 2014 and became 
party to the UPOV 1991 Convention on the same day.153 UPOV’s Secretary-
General Francis Gurry pointed out that ‘the accession of OAPI is a milestone in 
the history of UPOV and promises to help strengthen the system of plant variety 
protection around the world and to broaden international cooperation in this 
area.’154 
 
OAPI’s accession to UPOV received glowing support from its protagonists, while 
the OAU Secretariat and CSOs such as GRAIN and RAFI criticised this move.155 
As discussed in 4.1 above, OAPI designed a UPOV-compliant plant breeder’s 
rights system despite the existence of the African Model Law, which was a sui 
generis plant variety protection guideline suited to African countries’ realities. 
OAPI itself notes that joining UPOV will increase foreign investment in plant 
breeding and seed industries in its member states.156 Similarly, Were Gazaro, a 
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patent examiner and head of patent service in OAPI, submits that the OAPI Plant 
Breeders’ Rights system provides opportunities for plant breeders in its member 
states, which will in turn grant farmers access to improved varieties resulting in 
improved quantity and quality of products, and leading to ‘overall economic 
development.’157  
 
The plant breeders’ rights provisions in the Bangui Agreement modelled after the 
UPOV 1991 Convention contradicts the African Heads of State decision in 1998 
to establish plant variety protection systems in Africa based on the African Model 
Law, as well as the African Group’s (which includes OAPI member states) 
common position at the TRIPS Council and other international forums.158 The 
Bangui Agreement ratification period also coincided with the EU Cotonou 
Agreement and the US AGOA that sets out stronger IPRs systems as one of the 
conditions for trade agreements which OAPI countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and 
Gabon sought to benefit from.159 
 
Carolyn Deere argues that national economic interests clearly fail to explain why 
OAPI chose to revise its Bangui Agreement.160 In addition, Deere explains that 
external pressure does not sufficiently explain OAPI’s choice. She argues that more 
credible reasons are the institutional arrangements for IPRs decision-making in 
francophone Africa and the pro-IPRs capacity building.161 WIPO, WTO, UPOV, 
the French Intellectual Property office (INPI), and the European Patent Office 
(EPO) are the main providers of capacity-building in the region.162 Their main 
goals are to promote early and swift compliance with TRIPS, and the need for 
protecting IPRs in general.163 Using their technical knowledge as well as 
infrastructural and financial support to government offices and officials in the 
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region, the donors influence staff of the OAPI secretariats and national offices 
through three main techniques: (a) socialisation, i.e. frequent seminar and 
conference participation; (b) co-option, i.e. personal or institutional incentives; (c) 
conversion, i.e. trainings; or through a combination of the three.164 Overall, the 
donor international organisations influenced a group of IP officials in OAPI and 
OAPI member states who support stronger IPRs in the region.165 The influence of 
the international organisations on OAPI officials is reflected in Gazaro’s remarks 
highlighted above.  
 
In addition, the decision-making phase leading up to OAPI joining UPOV was a 
closed process. For example, the OAPI Secretariat presented the revised Bangui 
Agreement to OAPI member states without formal substantive state negotiations 
or parliamentary debates.166 One reason for this is that IPRs decision-making are 
generally considered technical issues in francophone Africa, handled primarily by 
IPRs officials in OAPI or donor agencies such as WIPO or INPI.167 As such, details 
of IPRs systems or implementing TRIPS provisions are generally not included in 
broader national policies.168 In fact, parliamentarians in francophone African 
countries knew little about IPRs, and were therefore unable to monitor or 
participate in IPRs policy or decision-making.169 There were also other significant 
events ongoing at the national level.  At least four OAPI member states were in the 
middle of a civil war and similar domestic unrests, impeding the space for 
substantive debates about suitable IPRs systems.170 Furthermore, the OAPI 
member states did not have national or regional IPRs policies to inform their 
decisions about fulfilling TRIPS obligations.171 There was also no proof of 
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consultations with stakeholders throughout the revision process.172 For instance, 
the AU secretariat and international CSOs with expertise and experience in the 
dynamics of IPRs law-making were not consulted. 
 
Overall, OAPI’s decision to join UPOV was driven by the influence of external 
institutions and lack of harmonisation within Africa. This lack of harmonisation 
resulted in the contradictions between the African Group’s submissions to forums 
such as the TRIPS Council, the African Model Law, and OAPI’s Bangui 
Agreement. However, the lack of harmonisation and contradictions are not peculiar 
to OAPI, as ARIPO also appears to be reversing from the African Model Law. 
 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO)  
 
ARIPO was established in 1976 following the recommendation from a regional 
seminar on patents and copyrights for a regional IP organisation for anglophone 
African countries.173 The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) and WIPO assisted the anglophone African countries with the 
establishment of the regional organisation.174 A draft Agreement on the Creation 
of the Industrial Property Organisation for English-speaking Africa (ESARIPO) 
was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1976.175 
The name of the organisation was subsequently changed to African Regional 
Industrial Property Organisation in 1985 following an amendment of the Lusaka 
Agreement to open the organisation’s membership to all African member states of 
the UNECA and AU.176 The organisation’s name was changed a second time in 
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2003 to include copyright and related rights, with the African Regional ‘Industrial’ 
Property Organisation changed to African Regional ‘Intellectual’ Property 
Organisation.177 ARIPO has 19 members and a head office in Harare, 
Zimbabwe.178 Unlike OAPI that only has one IPRs instrument – the Bangui 
Agreement – for all IPRs genres, ARIPO has separate IPRs instruments for each 
type of IPRs. The Harare Protocol is on Patents and Industrial Designs, the Banjul 
Protocol is on Marks, the Swakopmund Protocol is on the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore, while the Arusha Protocol – which is yet 
to enter into force – is on the Protection of New Plant Varieties.179 
 
The Arusha Protocol on the Protection of New Plant Varieties dates back to 2009, 
when the ARIPO Council of Ministers approved the initiation of work to develop 
a plant variety protection protocol, with a request to the ARIPO office to 
immediately implement the decision.180 At the request of the ARIPO office, the 
UPOV office provided technical assistance that guided ARIPO in the preparation 
of a draft Plant Variety Protection Protocol which complied with the UPOV 1991 
Convention.181 After considering different draft laws, the ARIPO Council of 
Ministers approved a ‘Draft Legal Framework for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants’ (Draft Legal Framework) in 2013, which the UPOV office confirmed as 
                                                 
177 ibid 10. The name was changed following a decision of the Administrative Council at its 27th 
Session held in 2003. 
178 ARIPO’s 19 members are Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
179 The Administrative Council of ARIPO adopted the Harare Protocol in December 1982, the 
Banjul Protocol in 1993, and the Swakopmund Protocol in 2010. ARIPO, ‘The ARIPO Protocols’ 
<http://www.aripo.org/about-aripo/legal-framework> accessed 25 November 2016. 
180 Tshimanga Kongolo, African Contributions in Shaping the Worldwide Intellectual Property 
System (Ashgate 2013) 104; Ncube, Intellectual Property Policy, Law and Administration in Africa 
(n 144) 107; ARIPO, ‘Consideration of the Revised ARIPO Legal Framework for Plant Variety 
Protection’ (Kampala, Uganda, 28-29 November 2013); UPOV, ‘Examination of the Conformity 
of the Draft ARIPO Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants with the 1991 Act of the 
UPOV Convention’ (31st Extraordinary Session, Geneva, 11 April 2014)   
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_extr_31/c_extr_31_2.pdf> accessed 25 November 
2016.   
181 UPOV, ‘Examination of the Conformity of the Draft ARIPO Protocol for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants with the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention’ (n 180). The UPOV office provided 
assistance based on the UPOV/INF/6 ‘Guidance for the Preparation of Laws based on the 1991 Act 
of the UPOV Convention’.  
179 
 
compliant with the UPOV 1991 Convention in 2014.182 The UPOV office 
concluded that ARIPO members would be allowed to deposit their instruments of 
accession to the UPOV Convention if the Draft Legal Framework is adopted 
without changes and enters into force.183 This Draft Legal Framework was adopted 
as the ‘Arusha Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (Arusha 
Protocol) by the ARIPO Diplomatic Conference in 2015.184 However, the Arusha 
Protocol is not yet operational. It will enter into force 12 months after at least four 
ARIPO members deposit their instrument of ratification or accession. Similar to 
OAPI, majority of the ARIPO members (13 out of 19) are categorised as least 
developed countries under TRIPS.185 Thus, they are not under pressure to fulfil the 
TRIPS obligations because least developed countries have at least until 2021 to 
fulfil their TRIPS obligations.186  
 
Although ARIPO aligned itself with the African Model Law in 1999 after its 
francophone counterpart OAPI designed a plant breeder’s rights system modelled 
on the UPOV 1991 Convention, the adoption of the Arusha Protocol clearly 
changed this position.187 Indeed, the development of the Arusha Protocol has some 
similarities with OAPI’s Bangui Agreement.188 International institutions such as 
UPOV, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the EU Community Plant 
Variety Office (CPVO), the OAPI, the French National Seed and Seedling 
Association, and the seed industry associates attended expert meetings and advised 
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on the draft legislations.189 As seen above, the UPOV office provided guidance and 
assistance in the development of the draft legislation in 2011 and its revised version 
in 2013.190 Thus, despite its 1999 statement about aligning with the African Model 
Law, ARIPO failed to consult with the AU while constructing its draft 
legislation.191 CSOs also had minimal participation in the ARIPO plant variety 
protection law-making process.192 CSOs were only invited to ARIPO workshops 
two times: in July 2013 and in October 2014.193 The failure to consult the AU and 
the limited participation of CSOs could be linked to the Global North state and 
non-state actors influence in the law-making process.194  
 
The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) along with other CSOs and 
interested stakeholders have actively criticised and attempted to stop the progress 
of the Arusha Protocol.195 These CSOs indicate that certain provisions of the 
ARIPO Arusha Protocol exceed the UPOV 1991 Convention provisions. For 
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example, the Arusha Protocol provides for the protection of all plant genera and 
species from the date it comes into force, while the UPOV 1991 Convention only 
specifies that its provisions should apply to at least 15 plant genera or species when 
it enters into force.196 The inclusion of this provision may be linked to the range of 
actors that supported ARIPO in the preparation of the Protocol, such as the USPTO 
and the EU CVPO. CSOs also raised the ‘usual’ concerns about the effects of the 
draft law on the small-scale centred farming practices in the ARIPO member states 
as highlighted below.197  
 
First, the CSOs raised concerns about the unsuitability of the UPOV 1991 
Convention for African countries.198 This is linked to concerns that UPOV does 
not recognise the traditional and cultural farming practices in Africa. Second, the 
CSOs raised concerns about non-recognition of access and benefit sharing 
principles set out in the CBD.199 The CSOs sought to ensure that plant genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge in Africa are not 
misappropriated.200 Third, the CSOs raised concerns about absence of farmers’ 
rights and farmers’ involvement in decision-making processes, as set out in the 
ITPGRFA.201 The CSOs assert that farmers’ rights, such as the rights to save, reuse, 
exchange, and sell farm-saved seeds, are important to small-scale farming in 
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Africa. Fourth, the CSOs raised concerns about the distinctiveness, uniformity, and 
stability (DUS) criteria for protection which marginalises farmers’ and farming 
communities’ varieties.202 In this regard, the CSOs also raised concerns about 
replacing traditional varieties with uniform commercial varieties.203 Overall, the 
CSOs concluded that the Arusha Protocol contradicts the African position in 
international fora and the African Model Law.204  
 
Despite the CSOs interventions, the Arusha Protocol has not been revised. Indeed, 
UPOV still lists ARIPO as one of the ‘one of the intergovernmental organisations 
which have initiated the procedure of acceding to the UPOV Convention.’205 
Nonetheless, the ARIPO Arusha Protocol has not entered into force. As discussed 
next, CSOs also raise concerns about SADC’s similarly structured Draft Protocol 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (PVP Protocol), which is also 
modelled on the UPOV 1991 Convention.206 
 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
As highlighted in the opening paragraph of this section, SADC is not an IPRs 
organisation like OAPI and ARIPO. It was founded inter alia to promote economic 
growth, enhance the quality of life, and to promote peace in the Southern African 
region.207 The nine founding members, who were also frontline (that is, anti-
apartheid) states, instituted strategies to reduce economic dependence on South 
Africa.208 On 1 April 1980, these frontline states formed the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the predecessor to SADC in 
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Lusaka, Zambia.209 SADCC, formed mainly to promote economic liberation, 
evolved into an economic development body following the signing of the 
Declaration and Treaty of SADC in Namibia on 17 August 1992.210  SADC 
currently has 15 member states, including South Africa which joined in 1994 at the 
end of the apartheid.211  
 
SADC is particularly active in promoting trade relations with the Global North. 
Indeed, it was the first African regional organisation to conclude an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the EU, under the EU Cotonou Agreement.212 
Furthermore, it leads the movement for a Free Trade Zone in Africa along with the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African 
Community (EAC).213 Chidi Oguamanam points out that with SADC’s global 
outlook, its plant variety protection initiative is unsurprising to analysts.214 SADC 
relies on a number of its Treaty provisions such as ‘achieving complementarity 
between national and regional strategies and programs’ to justify its draft Protocol 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants in the SADC region in 2012.215 The 
UPOV official members page shows that SADC has contacted the UPOV office to 
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request for assistance in drafting its plant variety protection law modelled on the 
UPOV 1991 Convention.216  
 
Similar to the oppositions to ARIPO’s Arusha Protocol, CSOs called for the 
rejection of SADC’s PVP Protocol.217 CSOs raised similar concerns highlighted in 
the discussion on ARIPO’s Arusha Protocol above, which revolve around the 
unsuitability of the UPOV 1991 Convention provisions to small-scale centred 
farming practices.218 CSOs also raised concerns about SADC’s lack of consultation 
and communication with the AU and CSOs, farmers during the drafting of the PVP 
Protocol.219 However, as opposed to OAPI and ARIPO, SADC addressed the lack 
of public participation and consultation concerns, and has made changes to its PVP 
Protocol in line with the CSOs’ interventions. SADC invited AFSA and other 
CSOs to its March 2014 Regional Workshop in Johannesburg, South Africa to 
review the draft PVP Protocol.220  
 
After intense and contentious discussions, AFSA succeeded in influencing SADC 
member states to amend certain key provisions in the draft PVP Protocol, including 
‘disclosure of origin’ and ‘farmers’ rights.’221 For example, the draft PVP Protocol 
did not provide for disclosure of origin. However, AFSA members asserted that a 
disclosure of origin provision, which requires users of biological resources to 
disclose the source of those resources in IPRs applications, ensured that farmers’ 
                                                 
216 UPOV, ‘International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (Publication No 437, 
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217 ‘Civil Society Concerned with the Draft Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
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219 AFSA, ‘AFSA makes Small Gains for Famers’ Rights in Draft SADC PVP Protocol (A Briefing 
Paper) 4 <http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AFSA-Briefing.pdf> accessed 23 
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workshop. AFSA, ‘AFSA makes Small Gains for Famers’ Rights in Draft SADC PVP Protocol (n 
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or community varieties used to develop improved varieties are identified and 
rewarded.222 The SADC Secretariat noted that, as it did not intend to exploit 
farmers, it would include a provision in the PVP Protocol requiring applicants to 
state that the resources and materials acquired for breeding, evolving, or 
developing varieties were lawfully acquired.223 
 
While the draft PVP Protocol provided farmers’ rights (as exceptions to breeder’s 
rights), AFSA argued that these rights were inadequate as they limited small-scale 
farmers’ practices. Articles 27 and 28 of the draft PVP Protocol state that plant 
breeders have exclusive rights to produce and multiply propagating material of the 
protected variety, package for purposes of propagation, and sell, market, export, 
import and store the protected variety. Breeders also have exclusive rights to 
harvested materials, including the entire plants and parts of plants. The exception 
to breeders’ rights directly relevant to farmers’ rights as provided in Article 28(d) 
of the draft PVP Protocol states that: 
 
Acts done by subsistence farmers for the use for propagating purposes, on 
their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by 
planting, on their own holdings the protected variety or varieties covered in 
Article 27(3) (a) (i) or (ii) of this Protocol. 
 
AFSA members explained that this plant breeders’ rights exception (or farmers’ 
rights) was modelled on Article 15(2) of the UPOV 1991 Convention, and it 
prohibits small-scale farmers from exchanging, bartering, or selling products of 
their harvests derived from replanting farm-saved seeds of protected varieties.224 
A compromise plant breeders’ rights exception was redrafted, as follows:  
 
Acts done by a farmer to save, sow, re-sow or exchange for non-
commercial purposes his or her farm produce, including seed of a protected 
                                                 
222 ibid. See also discussions on ‘disclosure of origin’ in Chapter 3.  
223 AFSA, ‘AFSA makes Small Gains for Famers’ Rights in Draft SADC PVP Protocol’ (n 219) 6. 
224 ibid 7. 
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variety, within reasonable limits and subject to the legitimate interests of 
the holder of the breeder’s right. The reasonable limits and the means of 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of the holder of the breeder’s right 
shall be prescribed.225 
 
Although this provision expands the initial draft provision, it is open-ended, as its 
benefits to small-scale farmers depend on how the ‘non-commercial purposes’ and 
‘reasonable limits and safeguarding the legitimate interests of the holder of the 
breeder’s right’ clauses are interpreted in the SADC PVP regulations.  
 
Apart from OAPI, ARIPO, and SADC discussed in this section, the EAC is also 
considering drafting a plant variety protection system in line the UPOV 1991 
Convention.226 Kenyan consultant Evans Sikinyi stated in his presentation during 
a seminar on the enforcement of plant breeders’ rights in Africa – which was held 
in Vietnam from 7 to 8 September 2016 – that EAC member states have started 
initiatives to develop plant variety protection systems modelled on the UPOV 1991 
Convention.227 This EAC push towards UPOV is unsurprising, as five of the six 
EAC members are also members of ARIPO, which as seen above has also adopted 
a PVP Protocol. Indeed, Kenya and Tanzania – both active members of the EAC 




                                                 
225 Redrafted Article 28(d) of the draft SADC PVP Protocol. AFSA, ‘AFSA makes Small Gains for 
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4.3. African Countries in UPOV 
 
4.1 and 4.2 above cover the African Union’s position on plant variety protection 
embodied in the African Model Law and the avenues through which UPOV has 
gained entry into Africa. This part examines UPOV membership at the national 
level in Africa. This is important in the exploration of the African countries’ 
increasing divergence from the African Model Law and move towards UPOV 
because it shows the third avenue through which UPOV is proliferating within 
Africa, which is pressure from the seed companies. Out of UPOV’s five African 
member states, only South Africa and Kenya were members of UPOV prior to 
TRIPS.228 Morocco, Tanzania, and Tunisia joined UPOV post-TRIPS.229 4.2 above 
explains the reasons for these countries’ UPOV membership. Morocco, Tanzania, 
and Tunisia have trade agreements with the US and/or EU which require them to 
accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention. South Africa has the most industrialised 
plant breeding sector in Africa, and also has a trade agreement with the EU which 
requires it to protect IPRs with the highest international standards.  
 
The puzzling national plant variety protection legislation here is Kenya. Unlike the 
other African countries, Kenya does not have any direct trade agreements with the 
US or the EU requiring it to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention. Furthermore, 
Kenya aligns with the African position at the TRIPS Council and the African 
Model Law.230 In fact, Kenya is a significant interlocutor on behalf of the African 
Group at the TRIPS Council.231 Yet, when fulfilling its obligations to protect plant 
varieties under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, its audacious ‘Geneva rhetoric’ is not 
reflected in its ‘national reality.’232 Notably, Kenya is also party to both the CBD 
and the ITPGRFA, while its Constitution mandates it to enact legislation that 
                                                 
228 All African members of UPOV except South Africa are party to the UPOV 1991 Convention. 
South Africa is party to the UPOV 1978 Convention. 
229 See discussion in 4.2 above.  
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recognises and protects the ownership and use of indigenous seeds and plant 
varieties in Kenya.233 Drawing from the TWAIL perspective of looking at the past 
to understand the present, the rest of this part engages in a historical overview of 
the development of plant variety protection in Kenya to tease out the factors and 
actors that influenced it to design a UPOV 1991 Convention-compliant plant 
variety protection system.  
 
4.3.1. Kenya: Seed Companies 
 
Kenya became a UPOV member on 13 May 1999, after it acceded to its 1978 
Convention.234 However, it had enacted a Seeds and Plant Varieties Protection Act 
(SVPA) in 1972, which entered into force in 1975. By the time the WTO was 
established in 1995, Kenya was one of the few Global South countries that had a 
plant variety protection system.235 Kenya further revised the SVPA in 2012 to 
conform with the UPOV 1991 Convention; it became party to the UPOV 1991 
Convention on 11 May 2016.236 As highlighted above, Kenya is actively involved 
in debates about plant variety protection at the TRIPS Council. At the TRIPS 
Council, Kenya boldly advocates for a full review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS by 
drawing attention to the connection between IPRs, biodiversity, farmers’ rights, 
and traditional knowledge.237 In fact, Kenya recommends the African Model Law 
as a useful guideline for designing sui generis plant variety protection systems.238 
However, contrary to Kenya’s position at the TRIPS Council, its SVPA 2012 is 
                                                 
233 Kenya acceded to the ITPGRFA in July 2003; it entered into force in June 2004. Constitution of 
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modelled after the UPOV 1991 Convention, which contradicts the African Model 
Law. Nonetheless, one notable feature of Kenya’s plant variety protection 





Kenya’s historic links with Britain, leading to foreign interest in its horticulture 
and floriculture sector, exposed it to pressures to institute a national plant variety 
protection system.240 The growth of the horticulture sector in Kenya is traceable to 
the early 20th century when Kenya became a British colony.241 Commercial 
horticultural production started with the Imperial British East African Company’s 
experiments with temperate fruits around 1893.242 After Kenya’s independence in 
1963, the Horticultural Crop Development Agency (HCDA) established in 1967 
desired to develop the horticultural sector.243 Multinational corporations such as 
Del Monte resumed operation in Kenya in 1968, which led to the exportation of 
horticultural products.244  Exportation of horticultural products grew from about 3 
per cent of the total agricultural exports in 1974 to 14 per cent by 1990.245 Kenya 
is also a leading exporter of rose cut flowers to the EU, with a market share of 38 
                                                 
239 Section 26 of the Industrial Property Act 2001 provides that plant varieties regulated under the 
Seeds and Plant Varieties Act are not patentable. Notwithstanding, parts of the plant or plant 
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per cent.246 The predominantly foreign-owned floriculture and horticulture 
companies along with the HCDA lobbied for a national plant variety protection 
system.247 While Britain did not introduce a plant variety protection system in 
Kenya during the colonial period, the SVPA enacted in 1972 was modelled on the 
United Kingdom’s Plant Varieties and Seeds Act 1964. Indeed, the absence of a 
plant variety protection system in Kenya during the colonial period is unsurprising, 
as Britain itself only introduced a national plant variety protection system in 1964, 
which was one year after Kenya had gained independence. Nonetheless, Britain 
provided technical and legal support for the construction of the SVPA.248  
 
During TRIPS Negotiations (1986-1994) 
 
While the TRIPS negotiations were ongoing from 1986 to 1994, there were 
significant changes in Kenya’s seed sector which had an impact on the SVPA. To 
start with, the World Bank and FAO-sponsored establishment of seed systems 
around Africa in the early 1990s highlighted in Chapter 2 was also evident in 
Kenya in the early 1990s.249 In particular, Kenya occupied a significant position in 
the seed industry relations in Africa. The Seed Trade Association of Kenya 
(STAK), established in 1982, is the headquarters for the African Seed Trade 
Association.250 Thus, STAK is a channel for promoting international and regional 
cooperation as it is a member of the International Seed Federation, as well as a 
regional site for discussions about seed trade. STAK was actively involved in 
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organising and hosting national and regional conferences with key international 
actors such as UPOV during the TRIPS negotiations period. In fact, UPOV co-
hosted a seminar in Kenya in 1993 which led to the establishment of the Plant 
Breeders Association of Kenya (PBAK).251 PBAK lobbies, along with a National 
Food Policy adopted by the Kenyan government in 1993, triggered the enactment 
of the Seeds and Plant Varieties (Plant Breeders’ Rights) Regulations in 1994.252 
While the SVPA was enacted in 1972, the Regulations for administering it was 
only enacted in 1994. Importantly, by the time TRIPS entered into force on 1 
January 1995, Kenya had an operational plant variety protection law and regulation 




Although the SVPA already fulfilled Kenya’s obligation to protect varieties under 
TRIPS, plant breeders pressed Kenyan lawmakers to amend the SVPA in line with 
the UPOV 1991 Convention.254 As highlighted above, UPOV held a seminar in 
Kenya in 1993 which opened up Kenya’s engagement with the UPOV office. 
However, Kenya started formal accession talks with UPOV only in 1996. Other 
factors that cemented the idea of reforming the SVPA in line with the UPOV 1991 
Convention included the visit of Kenyan regulators to the US Plant Variety Office 
in 1997 and a workshop organised by PBAK in 1998 which had the Commissioner 
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of New Zealand’s Plant Variety Rights Office in attendance.255 At both events, the 
Kenyan law and policy-makers were apprised of the benefits of acceding to the 
UPOV 1991 Convention. Recall that OAU/STRC meetings were also held in 1996 
and 1997, and in fact, Kenya co-hosted the 1997 meeting.256  
 
As such, by the late 1990s, there were conflicting plant variety protection ideas 
circulating in Kenya:  pro-UPOV 1991 Convention and Pro-African Model Law 
ideas. Johnson Ekpere sheds light on the Kenyan situation vis-à-vis the African 
Model. Ekpere explains that: 
 
One of the major headaches for us [OAU/STRC] during discussions 
leading up to African Model Law was that participants from Kenya were 
not stable. We had representatives from different ministries attending – 
ministry of agriculture, trade or environment…257  
 
This provides insights regarding the divergences between Kenya’s regional or 
international submissions and its law-making process at home. Simply put, there 
were different actors involved, and no overarching strategy to harmonise the 
divergent positions or outcomes.   
 
Apart from the plant breeders’ push for SVPA reforms, the revision of the Kenyan 
Constitution in 2010 also contributed to the plant variety protection reforms.258 
Article 11.3(b) of the Kenyan Constitution 2010 provides for the Kenyan 
Parliament to ‘recognise and protect the ownership of indigenous seeds and plant 
varieties, their genetic and diverse characteristics and their use by the communities 
of Kenya.’ This provision recognises the importance of farmers’ indigenous seeds 
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and varieties to farming in Kenya. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, indigenous 
seeds and plant varieties cannot fulfil the DUS conditions for protection under a 
UPOV 1991 Convention-compliant plant breeder’s rights system. To reconcile its 
plant breeders’ calls for SVPA reforms with the constitutional provision for the 
protection of indigenous seeds and plant varieties, the SVPA 2012 created the 
National Plant Genetic Resources Centre (NPGRC) to govern the protection of 
indigenous seeds and plant varieties as mandated by the Constitution.259 
Nonetheless, since the SVPA complies with the UPOV 1991 Convention 
provisions and merely signposts applicants to the NPGRC, the UPOV office 
approved the revised SVPA. Kenya deposited its instrument of accession to the 
UPOV 1991 Convention on 11 April 2016; it became party to the UPOV 1991 
Convention on 11 May 2016.260  
 
The next section provides a brief overview of the SVPA 2012. This simply outlines 
the coverage of the law, conditions for protection, and scope of protection under 
the SVPA 2012.261 It does not substantially discuss these provisions as the aim of 
this part is to uncover how and why Kenya joined UPOV. 
 
 4.3.2. Kenya: Seeds and Plant Varieties Protection Act 2012 
 
In line with the UPOV 1991 Convention, the SVPA 2012 provides that plant 
breeder’s rights may be granted for varieties of all plant genera and species.262 
However, the SVPA deviates from UPOV, as this provision is discretionary. To 
qualify for protection, the varieties are required to meet the DUS conditions under 
UPOV.263 Plant breeders’ rights are generally granted for 20 years for plants, and 
25 years for vines and trees.264 With these rights, plant breeders can exclusively 
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produce or reproduce, condition for propagation, offer for sale, sell or market, 
export, import, or stock the protected varieties for any of the above purposes.265 
Plant breeder’s rights are also extended to harvested materials and products and 
essentially derived varieties as defined under the UPOV 1991 Convention.266  
  
Also, similar to the UPOV 1991 Convention, the SVPA prioritises breeder’s rights 
over small-scale farmers’ interests. It provides that ‘within reasonable limits and 
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, farmers may 
use the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own 
holdings, the protected variety.’267 In essence, under the SVPA 2012, farmers are 
explicitly allowed to save and reuse saved products of harvests from protected 
varieties only on their own holdings or farms. As such, farmers are prohibited from 
exchanging or selling farm-saved seeds. Yet, as Peter Munyi points out, ‘these 
practices [saving, re-using, exchanging and selling farm-saved seeds] are 
engrained in the smallholder farmer systems in Kenya.’268 
 
While the SVPA 2012 does not provide for access and benefit sharing principles 
as set out under the CBD, Kenya has a separate legal framework for this: the 
Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Conservation of Biological 
Diversity and Resources, Access to Genetic Resources, and Benefit Sharing) 
Regulations 2006 (EMCR).269 The EMCR provides that access to genetic resources 
in Kenya is subject to an access permit and it provides a benefit sharing structure.270 
Furthermore, the focal point for farmers’ rights principles under the ITPGRFA is 
the Genetic Resources Research Institute (GeRRI) established under the Kenya 
Agricultural and Livestock Research Act 2013 of the Ministry of Agriculture 
Livestock Fisheries (MOALF). However, a Kenyan report on its National Strategy 
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on Genetic Resources notes that the ITPGRFA ‘has not been domesticated due to 
lack of national policies and legal frameworks.’271 Furthermore, the report points 
out that Kenya has poor institutional structures, overlapping mandates, and lack of 
clear institutional policies on access to genetic resources.272  
 
What is clear from the above is that although the Kenyan Constitution recognises 
the importance of small-scale farmers’ and indigenous varieties, the SVPA 2012 
adopts the UPOV 1991 Convention plant breeder’s rights system. Since the SVPA 
focuses mainly on plant breeder’s rights provisions, Kenya attempts to implement 
the other constitutional provisions on indigenous varieties, as well as farmers’ 
rights and access and benefit sharing principles, in alternative legislations and 
institutions such as the NPGRC, EMCR, and GeRRI. However, as highlighted in 
4.1 above, what this creates is a fragmentation of national legislations and 
institutions covering one subject matter, which may be challenging to co-ordinate. 
Indeed, traces of the lack of co-ordination among the national institutions in Kenya 
is glimpsed from the differences between its national law-making process and its 
regional or international submissions. It was principally for this reason that the 
African Model Law was designed. The drafters of the African Model Law sought 
to guide African countries in designing comprehensive national legislations that 
fulfilled conflicting international obligations concerning plant variety protection.  
 
4.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter contributes to the explanation on the variations in plant variety 
protection systems in the Global South by analysing the proliferation of the UPOV 
1991 Convention in Africa. This is important to the central focus of this thesis, 
which is plant variety protection in Nigeria, because Nigeria has pending 
obligations under TRIPS to protect plant varieties, yet it currently does not have a 
plant variety protection system. Furthermore, Nigeria is a member of the African 
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Group at the WTO. Thus, understanding why there is a proliferation of the UPOV 
1991 Convention plant breeder’s rights system within Africa, despite the African 
Group’s rejection of this ‘commercial breeders’ focused system at the TRIPS 
Council provides valuable lessons for Nigeria.  
 
Using the TWAIL lens, the chapter pays attention to the attempts to implement 
TRIPS in Africa in ways that protect small-scale farmers’ interests. The chapter 
has shown that African countries designed the African Model Law as a 
comprehensive sui generis template or guideline to cater to the small-scale centred 
farming practices prevalent within Africa. The African Model Law signified the 
continent’s common position in forums such as the TRIPS Council and the United 
Nations (UN). Yet, the developments at the national level reveal the disregard for 
the African Model Law within the continent. For example, in the process of 
translating the African Model Law from English to French, OAPI designed a 
UPOV 1991 Convention-compliant plant breeder’s rights system. Furthermore, 
Kenya boldly presented the African Group’s position at the TRIPS Council where 
it advocated for the African Model Law as a creative sui generis guideline for plant 
variety protection, yet it had a UPOV-styled plant variety protection system. Kenya 
also subsequently acceded to the UPOV 1991 Convention.  
 
The combination of the TWAIL with the regime complex theory lens (insights 
from actors’ strategies where there are overlapping treaties covering one subject 
matter such as trade agreements) has shown that trade and investment agreements, 
regional associations, pressure from seed companies, and UPOV office lobbies 
have contributed to the proliferation of the UPOV 1991 Convention within Africa. 
There are currently five African states and one regional intergovernmental 
organisation – namely Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, and 
OAPI – that are UPOV members. Two other regional intergovernmental 
organisations – ARIPO and SADC – have initiated the process of acceding to the 
UPOV 1991 Convention.  ARIPO and SADC’s accession to the UPOV 1991 
Convention would mean that in addition to OAPI (which is already a UPOV 
member), 44 of the 54 African countries – which is about 80 percent of Africa – 
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would be party to UPOV. These findings helps to answer the subsidiary research 
question posed in this thesis concerning the factors that influence plant variety 
protection law-making in the Global South. In addition, this is important to Nigeria 
because it draws attention to the growing UPOV-plant breeders’ rights trend in the 
African countries around it. 
 
The next chapter explores how India and Thailand, which aligned with the African 
Group at the TRIPS Council, have translated the Global South creative sui generis 
plant variety protection system aspiration into domestic legal architecture. This 
also provides useful lessons for Nigeria because it shows that Global South 
countries can actually introduce the sui generis systems they advocate for at the 
international and global forums. To explain how and why India and Thailand 
successfully introduced their creatively designed sui generis systems, the next 
chapter highlights the role of CSOs in the plant variety protection law-making 
process. India and Thailand faced pressures similar to those faced by the African 
countries as discussed in this chapter. However, the TWAIL lens applied in the 
analysis shows that one of the key contributors to the difference in the eventual 
plant variety protection system in India and Thailand was the vibrant interventions 
of CSOs. The findings from the next chapter is important for Nigeria because it 
further contributes to the explanation of the factors that influence the variations in 














Creative Sui Generis Systems: Lessons from India and Thailand 
 
Unlike 80 per cent of Africa leaning towards the UPOV as seen in the preceding 
chapter, India and Thailand are examples of Global South WTO members that have 
designed creative sui generis systems. The Indian and Thai examples are important 
for this thesis because they provide further insights into the factors that influence 
the variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South. Thus, the 
findings from this chapter contribute to answering the subsidiary research question. 
Knowing that Global South WTO members have developed successful counter-
narratives and have introduced creative sui generis plant variety protection systems 
clearly demonstrates that the Global South common position at the TRIPS Council 
is translatable into domestic legal architecture. The Indian and Thai examples 
further demonstrate the creative utilisation of the latitude under Article 27.3(b) of 
TRIPS.  
 
India and Thailand’s creative sui generis plant variety protection systems provide 
useful examples for Nigeria for three reasons. First, India, Thailand, and Nigeria 
have similar preferences for a creative sui generis plant variety protection system 
at the TRIPS Council. Second, India, Thailand, and Nigeria have similar 
agricultural sectors, particularly the prevalence of small-scale farmers who save, 
reuse, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed. Third, India, Thailand, and Nigeria are 
ethnically diverse Global South countries with similar challenges in domestic law-
making, including the existence of various institutions and actors with conflicting 
interests relevant to plant variety protection. Furthermore, India and Nigeria share 
a colonial past; both countries were colonised by Britain. Although Thailand was 
never colonised, it has experienced bouts of political instability including military 
coup d’états, similar to Nigeria.  
 
Consequently, this chapter investigates how India and Thailand navigated through 
the regime complex for plant variety protection and the political economy of law-
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making to translate their preference for a sui generis system into national plant 
variety protection systems.1 In line with this, the chapter is broadly concerned with 
two issues: the plant variety protection law-making in each country and the 
substantive plant variety protection laws. The chapter argues that the vibrant civil 
society organisations (CSOs) in India and Thailand were instrumental in 
advocating for their creative sui generis systems. Indian and Thai CSOs 
successfully circulated ideas about farmers’ and community rights to project the 
voices and interests of small-scale farmers, which reflects Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal’s TWAIL call to pay attention to reforms to international law from 
social movements.2 This is important because it provides lessons to Nigeria – and 
other Global South WTO members – on how CSOs can influence and shape plant 
variety protection law-making and laws.  
 
As will be seen, while pro-plant breeders’ rights proponents circulated ideas 
through seminars and workshops in India and Thailand, the pro-farmers’ rights 
movement equally circulated ideas through seminars, workshops, rallies, protests, 
and media campaigns. Indeed, the pro-farmers’ rights activists demystified the 
plant variety protection discourse, transforming it from an esoteric trade 
specialist’s subject to a grassroots political movement. Put differently, the farmers’ 
rights activists created awareness about how the plant variety protection system 
could affect small-scale farming practices, thus raising the public’s consciousness 
about the debates.  Unlike the African examples in the previous chapter, the vibrant 
CSO presence in India and Thailand resisted their governments’ attempts to 
introduce bilateral trade agreements that required them to join the UPOV 1991 
Convention. For example, CSOs in Thailand protested against the government’s 
attempt to sign bilateral trade agreements with the United States (US) and 
                                                 
1 For regime complex of plant variety protection, see for example: Kal Raustiala and David Victor, 
‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004) 58(2) International Organizations 277, 
279. See also discussions on regime complex in Chapter 1. 
2 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘International Law and Social Movements: Challenges to Theorizing 
Resistance’ (2002-2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 397, 400 (‘International Law 
and Social Movements’).  
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European Union (EU), which both required Thailand to join the UPOV 1991 
Convention.3 
 
The chapter is broadly divided into two parts. The first focuses on India, the second 
on Thailand. Each part consists of an overview on farming practices and three 
sections. Section 1 examines the historical evolution of plant variety protection, 
which is divided into pre-TRIPS, during TRIPS negotiations, and post-TRIPS 
developments. Section 2 unpacks the substantive plant variety protection systems. 
Section 3 discusses further attempts to join UPOV despite the introduction of 
creative sui generis systems.  
 
5.1. Plant Variety Protection: India  
 
Agriculture is key to India’s economy, with 51.6 per cent of its labour force 
employed in the agricultural sector.4 In 2016, agriculture accounted for about 17.3 
per cent of India’s GDP.5 The key crops grown in India are rice, wheat, and maize.6 
In fact, India is the world’s largest rice exporter.7 As at 2016, India had a population 
of about 1.324 billion people; over 65 per cent of this population live in rural areas 
and depend on the agricultural sector for their livelihood.8 Administratively, India 
is divided into 29 states, seven union territories – including the National Capital 
Territory of Delhi – and over 600,000 villages. Like in Nigeria and other Global 
                                                 
3 This is discussed in 5.2.3 below.  
4 The World Bank, ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)’ (2010)  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=IN> accessed 25 August 2017.  
5 The World Bank, ‘Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ (2016)  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=IN> accessed 28 August 
2017.  
6 The World Bank, ‘India: Issues and Priorities for Agriculture’ (17 May 2012)  
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05/17/india-agriculture-issues-priorities> 
accessed 25 August 2017; Government of India, Economy Survey 2016-17: Agriculture and Food 
Management (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Economic Division, August 2017) 166 (Economy Survey 2016-17)  
<http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2016-17/eprefaceVol2.pdf> accessed 25 August 2017.  
7 United States (US) Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agriculture Service, ‘Rice: World 
Markets and Trade’ (August 2017) <https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/grain-rice.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2017. 
8 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), India-FAOSTAT  
<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/100> accessed 23 August 2017; The World Bank Group, 
‘Population, Total’ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IN> accessed 
23 August 2017. 
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South countries, small-scale farmers – farmers with less than two hectares – 
account for over 70 per cent of the farming population in India.9 These small-scale 
farmers are significant actors in the agriculture sector, as they produce over 80 per 
cent of India’s annual seed requirements.10 Thus, policy interventions as well as 
CSOs such as Gene Campaign consistently emphasise the importance of 
preserving farmers’ traditional practice of saving, selecting, and reusing seeds.11 
Indeed, farmers’ traditional practices of saving seeds and selective re-sowing has 
contributed to the preservation of plant varieties, such as the medicinal rice variety 
known as Navara found in Kerala, South India.12  
 
In addition to small-scale farmers as highlighted above, public research institutions 
and private seed companies are also key players in the Indian agriculture sector. 
The Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), established in 1929, 
coordinates agricultural research and education in India.13 The ICAR institutions, 
                                                 
9 Government of India, Economy Survey 2016-17: Agriculture and Food Management (n 6) 167; N 
P Louwaars, R Tripp, D Eaton, V Henson-Apollonio, R Hu, M Mendoza, F Muhhuku, S Pal and J 
Wekundah, ‘Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant Breeding 
Industry in Developing Countries: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies’ (Report Commissioned by the 
World Bank, February 2005) 48  
<https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf> accessed 28 June 
2017; Ramesh Chand, P A Lakshmi Prasanna, and Aruna Singh, ‘Farm Size and Productivity: 
Understanding the Strengths of Smallholders and Improving their Livelihoods’ (25 June 2011) 
XVLI 26 and 27 Economic and Political Weekly 5, 6-7; see also Chapter 2 for details on small-
scale farmers’ seed sources and the informal seed sector in Nigeria. 
10 Suman Sahai, ‘India’s Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001’ (10 February 
2003) 84(3) Current Science 407, 409. However, it is important to note that this percentage varies 
depending on the crop. 
11 See for example,  Louwaars and others, ‘Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights 
Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in Developing Countries’ (n 9) 131; Dwijen Rangnekar, 
Assessing the Economic Implications of Different Models for Implementing the Requirements to 
Protect Plant Varieties: A Case Study of India (Impacts of the IPR Rules on Sustainable 
Development ‘IPDEV’ 2006); Anitha Ramanna, Farmers Rights in India: A Case Study (The 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, May 2006); Gene Campaign, ‘Advocacy to Protect Farmers Rights’ 
<http://genecampaign.org/farmers-rights/> accessed 25 August 2017.  
12 The Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Authority, which is responsible for 
regulating the registration of plant varieties in India, established a Plant Genome Saviour 
Community Award to recognise and celebrate farmers engaged in the conservation of genetic 
resources. Shri P Narayanan Unny of Navara Eco Farm was awarded the Plant Genome Farmer 
Recognition in February 2009 for preserving the Navara variety. The Authority grants a maximum 
of 20 recognitions a year. See list of awardees here: Plant Genome Saviour Farmer Recognition 
<http://www.plantauthority.gov.in/PGSFRCG.htm> accessed 19 August 2017. For more on the 
Navara, see Unnys Navara Eco Farm, About Navara <http://navara.in/about_navara> accessed 19 
August 2017.  
13 Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) <http://www.icar.org.in/en/aboutus.htm> 
accessed 19 August 2017.  
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consisting of a network of 101 research institutes and 71 agricultural universities, 
undertakes public sector agricultural research and plant breeding along with State 
Agricultural Universities (SAUs).14Although private seed companies’ involvement 
in the Indian agriculture sector (which started in 1912 with the establishment of 
Sutton and Sons) has a longer history than the ICAR, the earliest seed companies 
were mainly involved in importing vegetable and flower seeds from European 
countries.15 As will be seen below, it was the seed policy reforms in the 1980s 
which spurred private sector plant breeding and opened up India to multinational 
seed companies. There are currently about 400 to 500 private national and 
multinational seed companies engaged in seed production and marketing in India.16  
 
Therefore, farmers, public institutions, and private seed companies all play 
significant roles in the Indian seed sector.17 Farmers have traditionally been the 
main actors involved in saving and selecting seeds with specific traits to produce 
varieties suited to their requirements and local conditions.18 The public institutions 
focus on seed development, production, and distribution of low value crops such 
as wheat, paddy rice, as well as other cereals, pulses, and oilseeds, while the private 
sector plays a leading role in high value crops such as vegetables, flowers, 
horticultural crops, hybrids, and genetically modified crops.19 However, the Indian 
Seed Policy 2002 promoted private sector involvement in the production and 
marketing of all crops, including low value crops.20 
 
 
                                                 
14 ICAR, ‘ICAR Institutions, Deemed Universities, National Research Centres, National Bureaux 
and Directorate/Project Directorates’ <http://www.icar.org.in/en/node/325> accessed 19 August 
2017; Mrinalini Kochupillai, Promoting Sustainable Innovations in Plant Varieties (Springer 2016) 
97. 
15 Gurdev Singh, S R Asokan and V N Asopa, Seed Industry in India: A Management Perspective 
(Oxford and IBH Publishing Co 1990) 6; Niranjan Rao, ‘Indian Seed System and Plant Variety 
Protection’ (21-27 February 2004) 39(8) Economic and Political Weekly 845, 847.  
16 Seednet India Portal, ‘Indian Seed Sector: Role of Public and Private Seed Sector’  
<http://seednet.gov.in/Material/IndianSeedSector.htm> accessed 24 August 2017. 
17 Philippe Cullet, ‘Revision of the TRIPS Agreement Concerning the Protection of Plant Varieties: 
Lessons from India Concerning the Development of a Sui Generis System’ (1999) 2 Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 617, 631.  
18 ibid. 
19 ibid; National Seed Plan. 
20 Indian National Seeds Policy 2002.  
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During the colonial period – from 1858 to 1947 – the British colonial 
administrators established a system of testing new varieties by multiplying small 
amounts of those varieties on farms.21 These new varieties were distributed through 
extension systems.22 However, a plant variety protection system was not 
introduced during this period. The first legal developments in India’s seed sector 
started in the 1960s, after the establishment of a National Seeds Corporation (NSC) 
placed under the administrative control of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture in 
1963.23 In 1966, about two decades post-independence, the Indian government 
passed its first seed law: the Seeds Act of 1966.24 The Indian government also 
enacted an Industrial Policy Act in 1969 which prohibited large companies – 
companies with more than INR 1 billion in assets – from doing business in the seed 
industry.25 Similarly, in 1979, companies with over 40 per cent foreign ownership 
were banned from doing business in the seed industry.26  In addition, commercial 
importation of agricultural input (including seeds) produced in India was banned, 
while exportion of seeds was restricted.27  
 
Accordingly, the formal production and distribution of seeds was controlled by 
government agencies, the primary ones being the NSC and the State Farm 
Corporation of India (SFCI).28 Suresh Pal and Robert Tripp point out that in line 
                                                 
21 Carl Pray and Bharat Ramaswani, ‘Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry: 
Competition, Research and Impact on Farmers’ (2001) 2(3/4) International Food and Agribusiness 
Management Review 407, 409 (‘Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry’).  
22 ibid.  
23 National Seeds Corporation Limited: A Government of India Undertaking – ‘Mini Ratna’ 
Company <http://www.indiaseeds.com/> accessed 12 August 2017. 
24 Seeds Act 1966, Act No 54 of 1966.  
25 Pray and Ramaswani, ‘Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry’ (n 21) 409. 
26 Large Indian firms were firms with more than INR 1 billion or about USD 133 million in assets. 
Pray and Ramaswani, ‘Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry’ (n 21) 409.  
27 ibid. 
28 Jagjit Kaur Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill: India’s Plant Variety Protection System and Implications 




with India’s seed policy, the aforementioned government agencies (NSC and 
SFCI) pursued the twin goals of (i) efficiency, that is, serving market-oriented large 
farmers, and (ii) equity, that is, serving small farmers and marginal areas.29 The 
outcome of the research conducted by the government agencies and its associated 
institutions were in the public domain, and could not be monopolised using 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Jagjit Kaur Plahe explains that it was partly due 
to the public sector’s predominant role in plant breeding that the Indian government 
did not introduce plant variety protection systems.30 
 
Meanwhile, the Indian government initiated a National Seeds Project (NSP) funded 
by the World Bank from 1976 to 1985.31  The NSP was introduced to provide high 
yielding varieties (HYVs), otherwise called Green Revolution varieties for 
farmers. However, farmers’ demand for HYVs was low. According to Devinder 
Sharma, one of the reasons raised for this low demand was the ‘inefficiency of the 
public sector’ in disseminating the seeds of the HYVs to farmers.32  Sharma argues 
that in reality, there was a low demand for the HYVs because these varieties were 
not required in the first place.33 As will be seen below, the ‘inefficiency of the 
public sector’ was used as a justification for the subsequent changes in laws and 
policies to promote ‘efficient’ private sector participation in the seed industry. 
Interestingly, rather than end the NSPs, both the Indian government and World 
Bank continued to promote the production and dissemination of the HYVs.34  
 
One specific mention of plant variety protection in India’s domestic legal 
architecture during the pre-TRIPS period was in the Indian Patents Act 1970, 
                                                 
29 Suresh Pal and Robert Tripp, ‘India’s Seed Industry Reforms: Prospects and Issues’ (2002) 57(3) 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 443, 443.  
30 Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill’ (n 28) 77.  
31 The World Bank, ‘Project Completion Report, India: National Seeds I & II Projects (Loan 1273-
IN and Credit 816-IN)’ (Report No 6836, 15 June 1987) (Project Completion Report, India) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/654461468258301314/pdf/multi-page.pdf> accessed 
12 August 2017.  
32 GRAIN with Devinder Sharma, ‘India’s New Seed Bill’ (July 2005) (‘India’s New Seed Bill’) 
<https://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/457-india-s-new-seed-bill> accessed 12 August 2017.  
33 ibid.  
34 ibid.  
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which was India’s first post-colonial patent law.35 Similar to the Nigerian Patents 
and Designs Act which was also enacted in 1970, Section 3 of the Indian Patents 
Act prohibited patents for plant varieties.36 Also similar to Nigeria, India was a 
member of the Model Law Committee of Experts invited by the United Bureaux 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property Law (BIRPI) to review the BIRPI Model 
Law for Industrially Less Developed Countries.37 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
BIRPI Model Law prohibited patents for plant varieties, which could have inspired 
or contributed to the similar prohibitions in India.38 
 
During TRIPS Negotiations (1986-1994) 
 
Although discussions about plant variety protection came to public attention only 
in the final phases of the TRIPS negotiations, as will be seen below, initiatives to 
introduce a plant variety protection system in India commenced much earlier. By 
the late 1980s, India had reformed both its industrial policies and seed laws. With 
these reforms, India changed its regulations on seed imports as well as the barriers 
to entry into the seed sector for large Indian companies and foreign firms. In 
particular, the Indian government reversed its prohibition on large Indian and 
foreign-owned seed companies from participating in the seed industry in 1987.39 
Furthermore, a New Seed Industry Development Policy launched in 1988 allowed 
seed companies to import commercial seeds of foreign varieties of grains and 
                                                 
35 Unlike Nigeria however, the Indian Patent Act has been amended three times, particularly in 
1999, 2002, and 2005 (i.e. Patents (Amendment) Act 1999, Patents (Amendment) Act 2002, and 
Patents (Amendment) Act 2005). The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, published in the Gazette of 
India on 5 April 2005, is the current Patents Act in force.  
36 For discussions on patents for plant varieties under the Indian Patents Act, see generally, Cullet, 
‘Revision of the TRIPS Agreement Concerning the Protection of Plant Varieties’ (n 17) 620-21. 
See also Chapter 2 for discussions on Nigeria’s Patents and Designs Act 1970. 
37 See Chapter 2. See also United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(BIRPI), Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions (BIRPI Publication No 801(E), 1965) 
11.  
38 BIRPI Model Law, s 5. The Indian government also set up two committees to investigate patent 
systems suited to India prior to the enactment of the Indian Patent Act. See Report of the Patents 
Enquiry Committee I (1950) (Tek Chand Report) and Shri Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar, ‘Report 
on the Revision of the Patent Laws’ (Government of India 1959). See also Cullet, ‘Revision of the 
TRIPS Agreement Concerning the Protection of Plant Varieties’ (n 17) 620-630. 
39 Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill’ (n 28) 77.  
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oilseeds for two years.40 After the two-year lapse, the seed companies were 
required to produce seed in India.  
 
Two key developments between 1989 and 1991 further expanded private sector 
participation in the Indian seed industry. The World Bank funded another NSP 
from 1989, while the Indian government introduced an Industrial Policy in 1991.41 
The World Bank NSP and the 1991 Industrial Policy stimulated greater private 
sector investment in the Indian industry.42 These changes led to joint ventures 
between Indian seed companies and foreign companies, as well as the foreign seed 
companies’ establishment of subsidiaries in India.43 For example, foreign seed 
companies such as Monsanto, Pioneer, and Cargill started operations in India, 
while large Indian companies such as EID Parry and Hindustan Lever collaborated 
with the foreign companies.44 
 
The above legal and policy changes which opened up the Indian seed industry to 
both domestic and foreign seed companies inspired calls for the extension of IPRs 
systems to plant varieties even before TRIPS entered into force.45 Demands for the 
extension of IPRs to plant varieties were led by the seed companies along with the 
Seed Association of India (SAI), which was established in 1985.46 The seed 
                                                 
40 India - Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, New Policy on Seed 
Development 1988 (New Delhi, 16 September 1988)  
<http://seednet.gov.in/PDFFILES/NEW_POLICY_NPSD.pdf> accessed 12 August 2017.  
41 The NSP became effective on 28 September 1989, and it was closed on 30 June 1996. The World 
Bank, ‘Implementation Completion Report, India: Third National Seeds Project’ (Credit 1952: IN, 
Report No 16546, 5 May 1997)  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235381468292312892/pdf/multi-page.pdf> accessed 
12 August 2017. 
42 The maximum allowed equity participation for foreign companies and investors increased from 
40 to 51 per cent. Pramod Agrawal, ‘Seed Industry Regulations and Seed Industry Development in 
India’ in David Gisselquist and Jitendra Srivastava (eds), Easing Barriers to Movement of Plant 
Varieties for Agricultural Development (World Bank Discussion Paper No 367, World Bank 1997) 
105; Pal and Tripp, ‘India’s Seed Industry Reforms: Prospects and Issues’ (n 29) 443-44.  
43 Rao, ‘Indian Seed System and Plant Variety Protection’ (n 15); Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill’ (n 28) 
77. 
44 Biswajit Dhar and Sachin Chaturvedi, ‘Introducing Plant Breeders’ Rights in India: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Proposed Legislation’ (1998) 1(2) Journal of World Intellectual Property 245, 
247; Rao, ‘Indian Seed System and Plant Variety Protection’ (n 15) 848.  
45 Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill’ (n 28) 77-78.  
46 The Seed Association of India (SAI) comprises representatives of medium to large firms. It is 
one of the main seed industry associations in India. As discussed in Chapter 1, the foreign-owned 
seed companies, mostly from the United States (US) such as Monsanto and Cargill, had successfully 
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companies and SAI expressed concerns that the Indian Patent Act prohibited 
‘methods of agriculture or horticulture’ and India had no sui generis plant variety 
protection system.47  
 
To address the prohibition of patents for plant varieties and calls for the 
establishment of IPRs systems for plant varieties, SAI and the Ministry of 
Agriculture organised a seminar in March 1989 titled ‘Plant Variety Protection: 
Pros and Cons.’48 The seminar brought together officials from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, individuals from private domestic and foreign seed companies, as well 
as representatives from UPOV.49 These participants’ discussions focused on (i) the 
advantages and disadvantages of different types of plant variety protection 
systems, and (ii) whether to introduce patents or plant breeder’s rights systems in 
India. In essence, the participants failed to consider whether plant variety 
protection was even needed in India at all. The failure to debate the introduction or 
otherwise of a plant variety protection system in India can be attributed to the range 
of seminar participants that framed the discussions. In particular, with the UPOV 
representatives’ participation, it was unsurprising that the seminar recommended 
the UPOV plant breeder’s rights system as best suited for India.50  
 
The 1989 seminar helped to shift the discourse on plant variety protection in India. 
Prior to the seminar, opposition to plant variety protection from the public sector 
dominated the discussions on the subject.51 However, the seminar provided a 
platform to engage in discussions regarding the positive consequences of plant 
variety protection systems. One of the arguments from the pro-UPOV plant 
breeders’ rights advocates at the seminar was that the public sector’s inability to 
                                                 
pushed for the extension of both patents and plant variety protection systems in their home countries 
during this period. The Patent Act was introduced in the US in 1930, a Plant Variety Protection Act 
in 1970, and Patents from 1980 through the seminal Diamond v Chakrabarty decision. See Chapter 
1. 
47 Indian Patent Act 1970, s 3.  
48 Shaila Seshia, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights: Law-Making and Cultivation of 
Varietal Control’ (6-12 July 2002) Economic and Political Weekly 37(27) 2741, 2744 (‘Plant 
Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights’). 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid 2745. 
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meet the growing seed demand in India could be reversed with the introduction of 
a plant breeders’ rights system because it would incentivise research and breeding 
of new varieties by both the public and private sectors.52 This argument prompted 
the public sector to rethink its position on plant variety protection.53  Significantly, 
the seminar created a policy network of pro-plant breeder’s rights advocates as well 
as links with the UPOV office, which influenced calls for the enactment of a UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system in India.  
 
With the increased awareness about plant variety protection following the seminar, 
the Indian government commissioned the FAO to study the ‘desirability and 
feasibility’ of introducing plant breeder’s rights legislation in India.54 The FAO 
report recommended that any plant variety protection system introduced in India 
ought to simultaneously recognise plant breeders’ rights as articulated in UPOV 
and farmers’ rights as articulated in the FAO International Undertaking.55 The FAO 
recommendation highlighting the importance of farmers’ rights was also reinforced 
in a four-day dialogue on farmers’ rights organised by the M S Swaminathan 
Research Foundation (MSSRF) in 1994. The MSSRF dialogue – otherwise referred 
to as the Swaminathan dialogue – brought together private seed companies, 
agricultural research universities, officials from the Indian government, CSOs, as 
well as representatives of intergovernmental organisations such as the FAO and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).56  
 
                                                 
52 ibid. 
53 ibid.  
54 Seshia, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights’ (n 48) 2746; Dwijen Rangnekar, 
‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001’ in Michael 
Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law 
(Earthscan 2016) 285 (‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act 2001’). 
55 See Chapter 3 for discussions on plant breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights. Seshia, ‘Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers’ Rights’ (n 48) 2746; Rangnekar, ‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of 
Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001’ (n 54) 285.  
56 See generally, M S Swaminathan and Vineeta Hoon, ‘Methodologies for Recognising the Role 
of Informal Innovation in the Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources: An 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue’ (M S Swaminathan Research Foundation for Research on Sustainable 
Agricultural and Rural Development, CRSARD Madras, Proceedings No 9, 1994)  
<http://eprints.icrisat.ac.in/13165/1/RP-9914.pdf> accessed 12 August 2017 (‘Methodologies for 




Just as the recommendation of the SAI 1989 seminar highlighted above reflects the 
dominant actors’ (i.e. seed companies, UPOV) interests, the draft Plant Variety 
Recognition and Rights Act produced by compiling the MSSRF dialogue 
participants’ comments and suggestions reflects the interests of the dominant 
actors (i.e. CSOs). The MSSRF draft Plant Variety Recognition and Rights Act 
incorporated significant provisions pushed for by CSOs, such as the recognition of 
farmers’ rights and the establishment of a Community Gene Fund. For example, 
the MSSRF draft provides that:  
 
Farmers’ rights stem from the contributions of farm women and men and 
rural and tribal families to the creation, conservation, exchange and 
knowledge of genetic and species diversity of value in plant breeding.57  
 
Furthermore, the draft MSSRF recognised farmers as innovators, and 
recommended the establishment of a Community Gene Fund where payments for 
use of farmers and farming communities’ genetic resources are saved: 
 
There shall be an autonomous Trust to administer a Community Gene Fund 
deriving its funds from the contributions due to farm, rural, tribal families 
and communities under the Farmers’ Rights component of this Act. The 
Fund, which will be exempt from income tax, can also receive contributions 
from national and international seed companies and others interested in 
strengthening genetic conservation by local communities.58 
 
These provisions which seek to protect small-scale farmers’ and farming 
communities’ interests are drawn from the FAO International Undertaking.59 It is 
important to highlight here that the MSSRF was particularly knowledgeable about 
farmers’ rights, and committed to introducing these principles in India’s plant 
                                                 
57 ibid 20.  
58 ibid 17. 
59 See Chapter 3 for discussion on farmers’ rights. 
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variety protection system. This is thanks to MSSRF’s founder: Mankombu 
Sambasivan (M. S.) Swaminathan.  
 
M. S. Swaminathan was the chairman of the United Nations (UN) FAO Council 
between 1981 and 1985. It was under his chairmanship that the FAO developed the 
farmers’ rights principles and text of the International Undertaking. He was also 
the chairman of the Keystone Dialogue series from 1988 to 1991, which brought 
together a variety of stakeholders from opposing positions in the IPRs for plant 
varieties debates such as representatives from international institutions, 
governments, seed companies, and CSOs to discuss farmers’ rights.60 Although the 
Keystone Dialogue reached certain conclusions on farmers’ rights, such as the 
establishment of a fund to encourage farmers and rural communities’ role in 
genetic conservation, these conclusions were merely declaratory.61 Thus, once 
discussions about plant variety protection commenced in India, M. S. Swaminathan 
was keen to incorporate the farmers’ rights principles he had actively contributed 
to conceptualising at the FAO in his home country’s legislation. M. S. 
Swaminathan’s strategy was to push for farmers’ rights at the national level, even 
though it was yet to be adopted under any legally binding treaty at the global 
level.62 As such, the Indian system intended to set an example of farmers’ and 
farming communities’ rights, both for other Global South countries and for plant 
variety protection reforms at the international level.63  
 
                                                 
60 See for example, Keystone Centre, Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic 
Resources, Madras Plenary Session, Final Consensus Report of the Keystone International 
Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources (Second Plenary Session, Madras, India, 29 January - 
2 February 1990); Keystone Centre, Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic 
Resources, Oslo Plenary Session, Final Consensus Report: Global Initiative for the Security and 
Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources (Third Plenary Session, Oslo, Norway, 31 May – 4 
June 1991) (Final Consensus Report). 
61 Keystone Centre, Final Consensus Report (n 60) 13. 
62 The International Undertaking was not legally binding, while the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture had not entered into force during the period of the 
MSSRF dialogue. See Chapter 3. 
63 Swaminathan and Hoon, ‘Methodologies for Recognising the Role of Informal Innovation in the 
Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 56) iv; Jayashree Watal, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Indian Agriculture (Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
Relations, Working Paper No 44, July 1998) 16. 
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Apart from MSSRF, other CSOs were also actively involved in promoting farmers’ 
interests in India as seen below.64 Two notable CSO-led public demonstrations 
during the TRIPS negotiations were as follows. First, members of Karnataka Rajya 
Ryota Sangha (KRSS), a farmers’ organisation in India’s Karnataka state, raided 
Cargill Seeds India’s offices in December 1992.65 The protesters, who destroyed 
office equipment and records, feared that the introduction of a plant variety 
protection system in India could increase seed prices. Second, a rally in New Delhi 
of between 18,000 and two million farmers against the proposed plant variety 
protection provisions in TRIPS, which could have restricted farmers’ seed use at 
the national level.66 The rally, termed a beej Satyagraha (seed protest), invoked 
historic Mahatma Gandhi ideas and the ethos from the nationalist movement such 
as Satyagraha and ‘Quit India.’67 
 
Satyagraha, introduced by Mahatma Gandhi in the early 20th century, literally 
means ‘insistence on truth.’68 Satyagraha is a form of non-violent or civil 
resistance which Gandhi deployed during the Indian independence movement.69 
Similarly, the Quit India slogan was coined at the peak of the national movement 
against British domination.70 These historic nationalist ideas were interlinked with 
contemporary discourses about national sovereignty over genetic resources and 
farmers’ rights promoted by the Global South in the CBD and the FAO.71 The mix 
of the poignant past struggles with the aspiration for the future not only contributed 
                                                 
64 For details on CSOs involved in farmers’ rights debates in India, see Ramanna, ‘Farmers Rights 
in India’ (n 11) 21-23.  
65 Seshia, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights’ (n 48) 2745. 
66 The rally held on 3 March 1993. Prior to the rally, farmers were arrested in Bangalore and Madras, 
and there was a ban on the rally, which was only lifted on 1 March 1993. Vandana Shiva, ‘Indian 
farmers rally against Dunkel Draft and MNCs’ (1993) North South Development Monitor 
<http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/agricult/03051093.htm> accessed 12 August 2017.  
67 Satyagraha was introduced by Mahatma Gandhi in the early 20th century, which insists on holding 
on to truth. Gandhi referred to it as ‘truth force’, ‘life force’, or ‘soul force.’ The Quit India slogan 
was coined at the peak of the national movement against British domination. 
68 M K Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Dover Publications Inc 2001) 78 (Non-
Violent Resistance). 
69 ibid. 
70 See generally, Mahatma Gandhi, Quit India (R K Prabhu and U R Rao eds) (Padma Publications 
1942); Francis G Hutchins, India’s Revolution; Gandhi and the Quit India Movement (Harvard 
University Press 1973).  
71 See discussions on access-benefit sharing and farmers’ rights in Chapter 3.  
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to the rally’s success, it also raised public consciousness about the issues 
underlying the plant variety protection debates. 
 
As a result, by the early 1990s, there were competing perspectives on plant variety 
protection in India: the pro-farmer’s rights activists and the pro-UPOV plant 
breeder’s rights proponents. Given the level of awareness on plant variety 
protection in India, the Indian government had a Herculean task of balancing 
stakeholders’ divergent demands. The Indian government proposed the first draft 
Bill titled ‘Plant Variety Protection Act’ in 1994, but it was heavily criticised by 
both the Seed Association and CSOs. The Bill provided for the protection of plant 
breeders’ rights, drawing from both the UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions, as well 
as community and farmers’ rights provisions from the CBD and the FAO 
International Undertaking.72 The Bill provided for exclusive rights of breeders to 
produce, market, export, and import propagating material of protected varieties for 
a period of 15 years, similar to the UPOV 1978 Convention.73 In line with the 
UPOV 1991 Convention, the Bill strengthened breeders’ rights by extending it to 
essentially derived varieties, which are varieties derived from protected varieties.74 
Deviating from the UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions, the Bill provided for 
farmers’ rights, including the rights to save, reuse, exchange, and sell (non-
branded) farm-saved seeds as set out in the FAO International Undertaking. Yet, 
the farmers’ rights did not provide for ownership or registration of farmers’ 
varieties.75  
 
The Bill was opposed by both the plant breeder’s rights and farmer’s rights 
advocates. The principal opposition to the Bill from the pro-breeder’s rights group 
was from SAI, which suggested the removal of certain farmers’ rights provisions, 
such as the rights to sell farm-saved seed of protected varieties. SAI argued that 
                                                 
72 Biswajit Dhar, Beena Pandey, and Sachin Chaturvedi, ‘Farmers’ Interests Recognized in Indian 
PBR Bill’ (23 June 1995) 23 Biotechnology and Development Monitor 18-21 (‘Farmers’ Interests 
Recognized in Indian PBR Bill’).  
73 See Chapter 3 for a table on the difference between the UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions. Dhar, 
Pandey, and Chaturvedi, ‘Farmers’ Interests Recognized in Indian PBR Bill’ (n 72).  
74 See Chapter 3 for details on essentially derived varieties. Dhar, Pandey, and Chaturvedi, 
‘Farmers’ Interests Recognized in Indian PBR Bill’ (n 72).  
75 Dhar, Pandey, and Chaturvedi, ‘Farmers’ Interests Recognized in Indian PBR Bill’ (n 72).  
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the main purpose of plant variety protection would be defeated if farmers were 
allowed to sell seed of protected varieties.76 Conversely, CSOs such as MSSRF, 
KRRS, Gene Campaign, along with the Research Foundation for Science, 
Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) opposed the Bill, asserting that the proposed 
farmers’ rights provisions were not strong enough.77 In particular, the founders of 
these CSOs, M S Swaminathan (MSSRF), M D Nanjundaswamy (KRSS), Suman 
Sahai (Gene Campaign), and Vandana Shiva (RFTSE) were at the forefront of 
generating and circulating ideas about farmers’ and community rights issues. Some 
of the inadequacies that the CSOs highlighted were (i) the exclusion of farmers’ 
varieties from the protectable subject matter, and (ii) the inadequate benefit sharing 
provisions, particularly as the proposed Plant Variety Protection Authority which 
was to implement the benefit sharing provisions had no farmers’ representatives.78 
By the time the TRIPS negotiations were completed in 1994, there was still an 




As seen above, although debates about plant variety protection commenced in India 
even before TRIPS entered into force, the entry into force of TRIPS on 1 January 
1995 heightened pressure for India to establish a plant variety protection system. 
Following the impasse between the seed industry and CSOs on the 1994 Bill, the 
Ministry of Agriculture prepared subsequent draft Bills in 1996 and 1997, which 
were also opposed.79 CSOs rejected both Bills, arguing that they did not set out 
adequate farmers’ rights provisions.80 The farmers’ rights provisions CSOs 
demanded for included the rights to protect farmers’ varieties. With the rejection 
of the 1996 and 1997 drafts, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared another Bill in 
1999. The 1999 Bill was sent to a Joint Committee of Parliament, which organised 
                                                 
76 ibid. 
77 See generally, Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Tripping in Front of UPOV: Plant Variety Protection in India’ 
(October-December 1998) 48(4) Social Action 432. 
78 Anitha Ramanna and Melinda Smale, ‘Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources under 
India’s New Law’ (2004) 22(4) Development Policy Review 423, 428 (‘Rights and Access to Plant 
Genetic Resources under India’s New Law’). 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid.  
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public consultations from January to August 2000 at different locations in India to 
garner stakeholders’ – including CSOs, seed industry, and scientists’ – opinions 
about the Bill.81  
 
After collating stakeholders’ opinions, the Joint Committee prepared a Bill in 2000. 
Significantly, the Joint Committee included a new chapter on farmers’ rights and 
clarified the benefit sharing provisions. The chapter on farmers’ rights included 
provisions for registering farmers’ varieties. Furthermore, the benefit sharing 
provisions expanded compensation claims for use of farmers and communities’ 
varieties. Following these revisions, the stakeholders generally approved the 2000 
Bill. The seed industry moderated its position on farmers’ rights, while the CSOs 
appreciated the inclusion of farmers’ rights as a counterbalance to breeders’ 
varieties.82 The 2000 Bill was introduced in Parliament and eventually passed into 
law in August 2001 as the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 
(PPVFRA).83  
 
The PPVFRA protects the interests of both plant breeders and farmers. As such, it 
is an example of a creative sui generis system Global South countries imagined in 
their debates at the TRIPS Council.84 M. S. Swaminathan notes that the PPVFRA 
is ‘unique because it is the first time anywhere in the world that the rights of both 
breeders and farmers have received integrated attention.’85 Swaminathan explains 
that farmers and breeders are allies in the struggle for sustainable food production; 
as such, their rights should be mutually reinforcing and not antagonistic, as 
demonstrated in the PPVFRA example.86 Indeed, the PPVFRA was the first 
national legislation that explicitly recognised farmers’ rights. While the African 
Model Law, which also provides for farmers’ rights, was adopted in 1998 by 
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82 K S Jayaraman, ‘Indian Seed Bill Forges New Ground’ (October 2001) 19 Nature Biotechnology 
895, 895.  
83 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (PPVFRA).  
84 See discussions of the Global South’s position on plant variety protection in Chapter 3.  
85 M S Swaminathan, ‘Farmers Rights: From Law into Action’ (25 August 2001) The Hindu  





African Heads of State, it is simply a regional guideline.87 Dwijen Rangnekar 
concludes that the PPVFRA’s drafting history reveals the struggles to push the 
canon for the right of marginalised developers of plant genetic resources.88  Put 
differently, rather than accepting a plant variety protection system that only 
provides for a plant breeders’ rights system as presented in the earlier Bills, CSOs 
in India achieved the feat of including in the PPVFRA the rights of farmers and 
communities who contribute to plant variety development, as shown below. 
 
5.2.2 Unpacking the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act  
 
Designing a plant variety protection system is a taxing technical and legal process. 
Therefore, the Indian Ministry of Agriculture liaised with the UPOV Secretariat to 
draw from their wealth of legal and technical experience.89 The scientific 
knowledge and information exchanged between the Ministry of Agriculture and 
UPOV shaped the plant breeders’ rights provisions in the PPVFRA. The farmers’ 
rights along with the access and benefit sharing provisions are drawn from the CBD 
and the FAO International Undertaking. However, the PPVFRA goes beyond the 
provisions set out in the different international agreements it borrows from. In other 
words, the PPVFRA does not merely incorporate provisions of international 
agreements, rather its provisions are tailored to suit the Indian context.  
 
Coverage of the Law 
 
The PPVFRA protects four types of plant varieties: new varieties, extant varieties, 
farmers’ varieties, and essentially derived varieties (EDVs).90 New varieties are 
not expressly defined, but they are required to meet UPOV-styled (commercial) 
novelty, distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) conditions for protection 
                                                 
87 See Chapter 4 for detailed discussions on the African Model Law.  
88 Rangnekar, ‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 
2001’ (n 54). 
89 In the process of drafting the PPVFRA, the plant variety protection laws of 15 to 16 UPOV 
member countries were reviewed. Seshia, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights’ (n 48) 
2745. 
90 PPVFRA, ss 14-15. 
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(discussed in the next section).91 In addition, only the genera or species specified 
by the Indian government through notification in the Official Gazette are eligible 
for protection as new varieties under the PPVFRA.92 Thus, the Indian government 
can restrict the protection of certain plant varieties. The protection of new varieties 
fulfils the TRIPS obligation under Article 27.3(b). While this provision draws from 
the UPOV 1991 Convention, it also differs from it because Article 3 of the UPOV 
1991 Convention obliges new UPOV members to protect all plant genera and 
species within 10 years of accession to the Convention.93  
 
Extant varieties are varieties that are already in circulation in India. These include 
(i) varieties notified under Section 5 of the Seeds Act 1966, (ii) farmers’ varieties, 
(iii) varieties about which there is common knowledge, or (iv) any other variety 
which is in the public domain.94 The protection of extant varieties was included in 
the PPVFRA to reward past innovations and contributions to plant variety 
improvements, especially from the public sector.95 As seen in (ii) above, farmers’ 
varieties are a subcategory of extant varieties. In addition, Section 2(l) of the 
PPVFRA specifically defines a farmers’ variety as a variety which has been 
traditionally cultivated and evolved by farmers in their fields, or a wild relative or 
landrace of a variety about which farmers possess common knowledge.96 
Significantly, the PPVFRA recognises farmers as breeders (i.e. a person or group 
of persons or a farmer or group of farmers).97 It seeks to recognise farmers’ 
breeding abilities in the same way as breeders engaged in formal research and 
breeding. The farmers’ rights provisions are inspired by Resolution 5/89 of the 
                                                 
91 PPVFRA, s 15.  
92 PPVFRA, ss 14 and 29.2.  
93 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 3.  
94 PPVFRA, s 2(j).  
95 Ramanna and Smale, ‘Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources under India’s New Law’ (n 
78) 429; Plahe, ‘TRIPS Downhill’ (n 28) 81.  
96 Section 2(k) of the PPVFRA defines a farmer as any person who cultivates crops by cultivating 
the land himself or by directly supervising the cultivation of land through any other person, or 
conserves and preserves, severally or jointly, with any other person any wild species or traditional 
varieties or adds value to such wild species or traditional varieties through selection and 
identification of their useful properties. 
97 Definition of breeder as set out in PPVFRA, s 2(c).  
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FAO International Undertaking, which provides for the protection and 
conservation of farmers’ plant genetic resources.98  
 
Furthermore, Section 2(i) of the PPVFRA provides that a variety is essentially 
derived when it: (i) is predominantly derived from an initial variety, or from a 
variety that itself is predominantly derived from such initial variety; (ii) is clearly 
distinguishable from such initial variety; and (iii) conforms to such initial variety 
in the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or 
combination of genotype of such initial variety. This EDV provision is directly 
drawn from the UPOV 1991 Convention.99 The EDV provisions were included in 
the PPVFRA to ensure that the first innovator benefits commercially from 
subsequent innovations derived from the use of the first innovation. While it was 
seen in Chapter 3 that EDVs were introduced in the UPOV 1991 Convention to 
strengthen plant breeders’ rights, Anitha Ramanna and Melinda Smale argue that 
farmers and farming communities could also use the EDV concept to make claims 
for their farmers’ or community varieties used as progenitors to breed new 
varieties.100 
 
Conditions for Protection  
 
Section 14 of the PPVFRA provides conditions for the protection of three types of 
varieties: new varieties, extant varieties, and farmers’ varieties. The conditions for 
protecting EDVs are similar to those of new varieties. The conditions for protection 
of new varieties broadly follow the UPOV 1991 Convention’s template of 
(commercial) novelty and DUS.101 However, there are certain notable differences. 
                                                 
98 FAO Conference, Farmers’ Rights Resolution 5/89, Annex to the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. See Chapter 1 for discussions on the International Undertaking. 
99 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 14.5. 
100 Ramanna and Smale, ‘Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources under India’s New Law’ 
(n 78) 429.  
101 See UPOV 1991 Convention, arts 5-9 and PPVFRA, ss 14-15. Under Section 15(3) of the 
PPVFRA, a new variety is deemed to be: (a) novel, if, at the date of filing of the application for 
registration for protection, the propagating or harvested material of such variety has not been sold 
or otherwise disposed of by or with the consent of its breeder or his successor for the purposes of 
exploitation of such variety—(i) in India, earlier than one year; or (ii) outside India, in the case of 
trees or vines earlier than six years, or in any other case, earlier than four years, before the date of 
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For example, the ‘distinct’ requirement under Section 15.3(b) of the PPVFRA 
requires that the variety be clearly distinguishable by at least one essential 
characteristic from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common 
knowledge.102 Essential characteristics are defined as heritable traits of a plant 
variety determined by the expression of one or more genes of other heritable 
determinants that contribute to the principal features, performance, or value of the 
variety.103 This additional agronomic evaluation of a new variety departs from the 
UPOV construction of ‘distinctiveness.’104 Article 7 of the UPOV 1991 
Convention only provides that a variety is distinct if it is clearly distinguishable 
from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the 
time the plant breeder’s rights application is filed. As such, the distinct provision 
clearly differs from the UPOV template. Also beyond the UPOV conditions are 
requirements for applicants to submit – along with the applications for registering 
varieties – a sworn affidavit and a declaration that the genetic or parental material 
acquired for breeding or improving the variety was lawfully acquired.105 The 
affidavits are to state that the variety does not contain any gene or gene sequence 
involving a terminator technology.106  
 
Extant varieties, which are varieties in the public domain, are not required to meet 
the (commercial) novelty condition. Nonetheless, the other three conditions for 
protection – distinct, uniform, and stable – apply to extant varieties.107 As farmers’ 
varieties are a class of extant varieties, it would appear that farmers’ varieties are 
also required to meet the ‘distinct, uniform, and stable’ conditions. However, the 
PPVFRA does not point to its regulations or specify how the DUS conditions are 
                                                 
filing such application; (b) distinct, if it is clearly distinguishable by at least one essential 
characteristic from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge in any 
country at the time of filing of the application; (c) uniform, if subject to the variation that may be 
expected from the particular features of its propagation it is sufficiently uniform in its essential 
characteristics; (d) stable, if its essential characteristics remain unchanged after repeated 
propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle.  
102 PPVFRA, s 15.3(b).  
103 PPVFRA, s 2(h).  
104 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 7. 
105 These requirements also apply to other plant varieties. PPVFRA, ss 18.1(c) and (h).  
106  PPVFRA, ss 18.1(c) and (h).  
107 PPVFRA, s 15.2. A three-year moratorium for registering extant varieties is granted once a 
species is notified under the PPVFRA.  
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to be applied when assessing farmers’ varieties. Nagarajan, Yadav, and Singh, who 
are officials in the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority 
(Authority) of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, conclude that the DUS 
conditions are unsuited for protecting farmers’ varieties, and thus ‘need a fresh 
look.’108 In other words, it is important to develop a pragmatic procedure for 
registering farmers’ varieties under the PPVFRA.109  
 
Scope of Protection 
 
Plant breeders are granted protection for registering new varieties for an initial 
duration of nine years for trees and vines, which is renewable for up to 18 years 
from the date of registration.110 For all other crops, protection of new varieties is 
granted for an initial period of six years, renewable for up to 15 years.111 Extant 
varieties are protected for up to 15 years from the date of notification by the central 
government under Section 5 of the Seeds Act 1966.112 While the duration of 
protection for farmers’ varieties is not explicitly provided, one could conclude that 
a maximum protection duration of 15 years applies to farmers’ varieties for two 
reasons. First, farmers’ varieties are a sub-category of extant varieties, and since 
extant varieties are protected for up to 15 years, the same provision may apply to 
farmers’ varieties. Second, Section 6(iii) of the PPVFRA provides that the ‘total 
period of validity shall not exceed – in other cases, fifteen years from the date of 
registration of the variety.’113 Although the duration of protection for EDVs are 
also not explicitly set out, they are similar to those of new varieties highlighted 
above.  
 
The breeder of a new variety – his successor, agent, or licensee – has exclusive 
rights to produce, sell, market, distribute, import, or export the new varieties, which 
                                                 
108 S Nagarajan, S P Yadav, and A K Singh, ‘Farmers’ Variety in the Context of Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001’ (25 March 2008) 94(6) Current Science 709, 713 
(‘Farmers’ Variety in the Context of Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001’). 
109 ibid. 
110 PPVFRA, s 24.6. 
111 PPVFRA, s 24.6.  
112 PPVFRA, s 24.6(ii). 
113 PPVFRA, s 6(iii). 
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is similar to the UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions.114 The scope of protection 
conferred for breeders of extant varieties, farmers’ varieties, and EDVs are not 
expressly set out in the PPVFRA. Scholars such as Ramanna, Smale, and 
Rangnekar conclude that the scope of protection for extant varieties, farmers’ 
varieties, and EDVs are similar to the scope of protection for new varieties.115 
These breeders’ rights are also subject to some exceptions included in the UPOV 
Convention, such as the research exemption set out in Section 30 of the 
PPVRFA.116  
 
However, the PPVFRA goes beyond the UPOV Convention by introducing other 
provisions that limit breeders’ rights, such as access and benefit sharing provisions 
from the CBD, as well as farmers’ rights to save, exchange, or sell farm-saved 
seeds of protected varieties from the FAO International Undertaking.117 For benefit 
sharing, Section 26 of the PPVFRA provides that upon receipt of a certificate of 
registration for plant varieties, the Authority is required to publish the contents of 
the certificate and invite claims of benefit sharing to the registered variety.118 
Individuals, groups, firms, governmental, or non-governmental organisations are 
permitted to submit claims of benefit sharing to the published variety within a 
specified period.119 The Authority is required to send the copy of the claim to the 
breeder of the registered variety who may oppose the claim.120 After liaising with 
the claimant and the breeder, the Authority explicitly indicates the amount of the 
benefit sharing, if any, for which the claimant is entitled.121 The amount of benefit 
                                                 
114 PPVFRA, s 28.  
115 Ramanna and Smale, ‘Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources under India’s New Law’ 
(n 78) 430; Rangnekar, ‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act 2001’ (n 54) 290-91.  
116 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15.1(ii).  
117 PPVFRA, ss 26 and 39. 
118 PPVFRA, s 26.1. 
119 The individuals and groups are required to be citizens of India, while the firms, governmental, 
or non-governmental organisations are to be established in India. PPVFRA, s 26.2. 
120 PPVFRA, s 26.3. 
121 While making the decision, the Authority will take into account the extent and nature of the use 
of genetic material of the claimant in the development of the variety relating to which the benefit 
sharing is claimed, as well as the commercial utility and demand in the market of the variety relating 
to which the benefit sharing is claimed. PPVFRA, s 26.5. 
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sharing to a variety determined by the Authority is deposited by the breeder in the 
National Gene Fund.122  
 
The Gene Fund then provides financial resources to generally support farmers and 
farming communities in conserving plant genetic resources. In particular, farmers 
who have conserved and improved landraces and wild varieties of economic plants 
are entitled to recognition and reward from the Gene Fund.123 Furthermore, Section 
39.1(iv) of the PPVRFA provides that farmers are entitled to save, use, sow, re-
sow, exchange, share, or sell farm produce, including seed of protected varieties, 
in the same way as they were entitled to before the entry into force of the PPVFRA. 
However, farmers are prohibited from selling branded seeds of protected 
varieties.124  
 
As of July 2017, the Authority had received a total of 15,053 applications for plant 
variety registration and had granted 2,688 plant variety protection certificates.125 
The first farmers’ varieties were successfully registered by three farmers – Indrasan 
Singh, Arun Kumar, and Dev Nath Verma – in 2009 for their rice varieties 
Indrasan, Hansraj, and Tilak Chandan.126 This is historic because the registration 
of these three varieties makes India the first country in the world to register 
farmers’ varieties. The first new varieties were registered by Maharashtra Hybrid 
                                                 
122 The benefit sharing determined here on a reference made by the Authority in the prescribed 
manner, is recoverable as an arrear of land revenue by the District Magistrate within the local limits 
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222 
 
Seed Company (Mahyco) in 2009 for bread wheat varieties with male sterile and 
restore lines: Triticum aestivum L, W 6001 and Triticum aestivum L, W 6301.127 
While the first extant varieties were registered by JK Agri Genetics Ltd in 2009 for 
pearl millet, rice, and sorghum: JKBH-26(MH-595), JKRH-401(IET 18181, JKRH 
2000), and JKSH-22 (JKSH-161).128 
 
5.2.3 Rethinking UPOV Membership and Seeds Bill 
 
Although the Indian Parliament passed the PPVFRA in 2001, the Indian 
government delayed its notification until 2005. It is important to note that until the 
central government in India notifies a legislation, it is not enforceable, even after 
it had been passed by the Indian Parliament. The central government notified 
Sections 2 to 13, as well as Sections 95 to 97 of the PPVFRA on 11 November 
2005; these sections entered into force on the same day.129 This notification led to 
the establishment of the Authority, as Section 3 of the PPVFRA provides for the 
creation of a PPVFRA Authority. The Authority subsequently set out regulations 
for plant variety registration on 7 December 2006, but it was not until 20 February 
2007, which is six years after the PPVFRA was passed, that the actual plant variety 
registration process became fully operational in India.130 One of the main reasons 
for the Indian government’s delay in implementing the PPVFRA was that it was 
also initiating the process to join UPOV.131 The Indian government made two 
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notable attempts to join UPOV – the first in 1998, before the PPVFRA was passed 
and the second in 2002, a year after the PPVFRA was passed. The Indian 
government also attempted to introduce a Seed Bill which undermined the farmers’ 
rights provisions in the PPVFRA. Each of these attempts is discussed in turn. 
 
On 22 April 1998, the Indian government informed UPOV of its intention to accede 
to the UPOV 1978 Convention.132 India could only deposit its instrument of 
accession if the UPOV Council approved its law. This is because Article 32.3 of 
the UPOV 1978 Convention requires the UPOV Council to assess whether national 
laws conform to the UPOV Convention. Two days after India informed UPOV of 
its intention to accede to the UPOV 1978 Convention, the UPOV 1991 Convention 
entered into force.133 However, the UPOV Council exempted India from acceding 
to its 1991 Convention. India was granted a special opportunity to accede to the 
UPOV 1978 Convention; this opportunity was open until 24 April 1999. Yet, India 
did not avail itself of this leeway. Instead, as seen in the post-TRIPS developments 
above, India carried out extensive stakeholder opinion collation about plant variety 
protection, and passed the PPVFRA in 2001.  
 
Just one year after passing the PPVFRA, the Indian government revisited its 
attempt to join UPOV.134 On 31 May 2002, the Indian Cabinet approved the 
government’s decision to accede to the UPOV 1978 Act.135 Without delay, by June 
2002, the Indian government requested UPOV to examine whether the PPVFRA 
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conforms with the UPOV 1978 Convention.136 UPOV made a preliminary 
examination of the PPVFRA in October 2002, raising a number of questions which 
are not in the public domain,137 but from the examination of UPOV in Chapter 3 
and the PPVFRA above, some provisions in the PPVFRA which contravene the 
UPOV plant breeder’s rights system can be pinpointed. These include (i) protection 
of farmers’ varieties and extant varieties, (ii) farmers’ rights to sell seed of 
protected varieties, (iii) registration conditions – declaration of prior informed 
consent along with affidavit stating that the application does not contain gene or 
gene sequence involving terminator genes, and (iv) the benefit sharing 
provision.138  
 
One wonders why after engaging in extensive consultations during law-making, 
the Indian government simply attempted to abandon its historic sui generis plant 
variety protection system by going the UPOV way. Jagit Plahe argues that an 
answer to this is that the Indian government was under pressure from the seed 
industry to strengthen the rights of commercial plant breeders by joining UPOV.139 
Although the government attempted to go the UPOV way, CSOs who were also at 
the forefront of pushing for farmers’ rights in the PPVFRA opposed this. In 
particular, Gene Campaign, one of India’s vibrant CSOs dedicated to promoting 
farmers’ and community rights, states that it ‘made several attempts to discuss the 
dangers of UPOV with officials of India’s Agriculture Ministry and appealed to 
them not to take this retrograde step.’140 As these attempts proved abortive, Gene 
Campaign turned to legal recourse to challenge the Indian government’s decision 
to join UPOV.  
 
Gene Campaign filed a Writ of Petition in the form of a Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL) at the Delhi High Court on 1 October 2002 to block the government’s 
                                                 
136 UPOV, ‘Gazette’ (No 96, December 2003) 12  
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decision to join UPOV.141 Gene Campaign further requested the Court to (i) declare 
illegal the Indian government’s decision to join UPOV as it violates the PPVFRA, 
(ii) direct the government not to take any action which contravenes farmers’ rights 
provisions in the PPVFRA, and (iii) direct the government to ensure that none of 
its future acts impairs or dilutes the farmers’ rights provisions in the PPVFRA.142 
On the second point, Gene Campaign referred to Section 86 of the PPVFRA which 
states that ‘the provisions of this Act shall be binding on the Government.’ Gene 
Campaign concluded that the PPVFRA generally reflects India’s official position 
in the TRIPS Council, which seeks to reconcile TRIPS with the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA.143  
 
In the High Court, the government’s lawyers maintained that UPOV membership 
was important to protect breeder’s rights, while Gene Campaign advocated to 
maintain farmers’ rights.144 The High Court granted a stay on the government’s 
move to join UPOV, which is significant to maintaining the farmers’ rights 
provisions in the PPVFRA.145 Nonetheless, it is important to note that UPOV still 
lists India as one of the countries that has initiated the procedure of acceding to the 
UPOV Convention.146 This implies that India has not withdrawn its UPOV 
application. 
 
Despite Gene Campaign’s 2002 PIL requesting the government not to strengthen 
breeders’ rights through future acts, the Indian government attempted to introduce 
a Seeds Bill in 2004 which undermines farmers’ rights provisions in the 
PPVFRA.147 Prabhash Ranjan explains that the Seeds Bill, when analysed in 
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isolation, appears to cover regulation, production, and supply of seeds.148 However, 
a close study of the Bill reveals that it introduces provisions that are either in 
conflict with the PPVFRA or limit certain provisions such as farmers’ rights.149 
Two notable provisions in the Seeds Bill are as follows. First, it requires mandatory 
registration of all plant varieties and seeds sold in India, as opposed to the voluntary 
registration in the PPVFRA.150 This provision, which generally covers all varieties 
including farmers’ varieties, limits farmers’ ability to sell or exchange unregistered 
seeds as provided in the PPVFRA.151 Second, it provides for the sale of only those 
seeds that meet certain registration standards, including a minimum limit of 
germination, physical purity, and genetic purity.152 This provision also limits 
farmers’ ability to sell seeds, as they may find it difficult to determine whether their 
farm-saved seeds meet these technical standards.153 Significantly, the Bill excludes 
provisions on benefit sharing and prior informed consent, which are in the 
PPVFRA. These exclusions could facilitate unhindered commercialisation of 
farmers’ varieties.  
 
The vibrant Indian CSOs such as Gene Campaign, RFSTE, and All India Kisan 
Sabha (AIKS) once again blocked the government’s move to undermine farmers’ 
rights through the Bill.154 Suman Sahai from Gene Campaign questioned the Bill’s 
primary focus on interests of commercial breeders and seed companies to the 
detriment of small-scale farmers.155 She argues that as the informed consent of 
farmers is not required during registration, seed companies could use farmers’ 
varieties without recognising the source of their new varieties or sharing profits.156 
Vandana Shiva from RFSTE pointed out that India had fulfilled its TRIPS 
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obligations with the PPVFRA, therefore there were no further international 
obligations requiring it to pass the Seed Bill.157 Atul Kumar Anjan from AIKS 
explained that his organisation opposed the Bill because it undermined farmers’ 
rights. He further sent his comments on the Bill to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee and followed its developments.158 The CSOs’ interventions proved to 
be successful as the Seeds Bill 2004 was stalled.   
 
A final point in the analysis in this section is that debates on the Seeds Bill uncover 
the importance of paying attention to other non-IPRs laws that that may have an 
impact on national plant variety protection systems. This is important because it is 
another avenue for achieving certain dominant agendas, such as the seed industry’s 
preference for stronger breeders’ rights. Without a defined national hierarchy of 
national legislations as in the Indian case, stakeholders can choose any legislation 
that best suits their interests. As such, the existence of two conflicting laws can 
create conflicting rights which may either lead to disputes left to the courts to settle 
or undermine weaker actors – often the farmers’ – interests. In other words, even 
though the PPVFRA provides for farmers’ rights, the Seeds Bill 2004 could have 
trumped the implementation of farmers’ rights in India if it was passed by 
Parliament.  
 
5.2. Plant Variety Protection: Thailand  
 
Similar to India, Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country, with 32.8 per 
cent of its labour force employed in the agriculture sector.159 Rice is Thailand’s 
major export revenue commodity; after India, Thailand is the world’s second 
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largest rice exporter.160  Without doubt, rice is a significant crop in Thailand.161  
Kwanchai Gomez points out that ‘in Thailand, rice is the essence of life… it is in 
tradition, folklore, ritual and even language… Life without rice is simply 
unthinkable.’162 Other key crops grown in Thailand include cassava, maize, 
pineapple, soybeans, and sugarcane.163 In 2016, agriculture accounted for about 
8.3 per cent of Thailand’s GDP.164 Administratively, Thailand is divided into four 
regions, comprising 76 provinces and a special administrative area in Bangkok. 
Within the provinces, there are 787 districts or district branches and about 66,404 
villages.165 The World Bank estimated the Thai population in 2016 at 
68,863,514.166 Over 60 per cent of this Thai population reside in rural areas, with 
about 90 per cent of the rural population depending on small-scale farming for their 
livelihood, particularly rice cultivation.167  
 
The small-scale farmers generally save, reuse, exchange, and sell seeds like other 
small-scale farmers in the Global South.168 Apart from the small-scale farmers, the 
private and public sectors are also significant actors in the Thai agricultural sector. 
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One of the earliest private seed companies in Thailand – Chia Thai, which focused 
on importing and introducing improved vegetable seed varieties, was established 
in 1921.169 There are now about 100 private seed companies in Thailand.170 The 
Thai government’s involvement in the agricultural sector is mainly through the 
Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) established in 1972 and 
its 23 seed centres spread across all the regions in Thailand.171 These institutions 
coordinate agricultural research and development in Thailand. However, the Thai 
government encourages private sector dominance of seed production. Therefore, 
public institutions do not produce the same types of seeds as those produced by the 
private sector.172 
 




Although Thailand circumvented colonisation, the bordering countries of modern 
day Thailand were colonised by Britain and France.173 Other Southeast Asian 
countries such as Myanmar (also known as Burma) and Malaysia were colonised 
by Britain, while Laos and Cambodia were colonised by France. Thailand was the 
only Southeast Asian country that was not colonised by Europeans. However, 
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Thailand made territorial concessions to the British and French to maintain its 
independence. Furthermore, Thailand made key diplomatic decisions to maintain 
its independence, such as (i) lifting the traditional ban on rice export in 1851, and 
(ii) signing of the Bowring Treaty between King Mongkut (Rama IV) and Great 
Britain in 1855, which required Thailand to develop free trade economic policies.174 
Prior to 1851, the previous monarch had sought to preserve Thai rice for Thai 
people, ignoring Western calls to open up Thailand.175  
 
From the above, one notable feature in Thailand is the significant role of its 
monarchy. Thailand had absolute monarchs who were responsible for making all 
the laws of the land until 1932.176 This changed after a bloodless revolution in 1932, 
when a group of foreign-educated students and military personnel demanded that 
the king (King Prajadhipok) grant the people a Constitution.177 King Prajadhipok 
granted this, transforming Thailand into a constitutional monarchy in 1932. As a 
result, the Thai monarch is regarded as a symbolic or ceremonial head of state, 
while a prime minister is the head of the Thai government.178 Nonetheless, the Thai 
people still revere their monarchs. In particular, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who 
was monarch from 1946, took a keen interest in agriculture and rural 
development.179 King Bhumibol had toured the country after ascending the throne 
and was aware of Thai farmers’ hardships. From the 1950s, King Bhumibol 
promoted sustainable farming practices. He introduced the Sufficiency Economy 
philosophy which became the basis of national laws, policies, and programmes.180  
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Sufficiency Economy emphasises balancing the interests of all stakeholders or 
choosing ‘the middle way.’181 In general, three pillars of the Sufficiency Economy 
philosophy are moderation, reasonableness, and risk management.182 Moderation 
urges sufficiency at a level of not doing too little or too much at the expense of 
oneself or others,183 such as producing and consuming at a moderate level. 
Reasonableness promotes making decisions rationally by considering all factors 
involved and carefully anticipating the outcomes of such actions.184 Risk 
management focuses on preparing to handle the likely impacts and considering the 
probability of future situations.185 Application of Sufficiency Economy requires an 
all-round knowledge of the subject matter as well as integrity, honesty, patience, 
and perseverance.186 King Bhumibol encouraged the adoption of his Sufficiency 
Economy philosophy both as a model for national economic development and on 
a personal level.  
 
However, two World Bank engagements with Thailand gradually expanded the 
Thai agricultural sector. First, Thailand received a World Bank loan in 1950 for a 
large-scale irrigation project to promote agriculture production.187 Second, the 
World Bank published reports on public development programmes for Thailand in 
1957 and 1958, which informed the first Thai National Economic and Social 
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Development (NESD) Plan 1961.188 The NESD Plan set out a nationwide 
expansion of agricultural production. Notably, before the NESD was launched in 
1961, Thailand was a predominantly small-scale centred agricultural economy, 
with over 80 per cent of the population engaged in the agricultural sector, and rice 
as the main crop for both domestic consumption and export.189 However, this 
changed with the government’s focus on increased agricultural production, starting 
from the NESD in 1961 which introduced a private sector-led economic 
industrialisation, including in agriculture.190  
 
Following the focus on increased production, HYVs or green revolution varieties 
were introduced in the late 1960s.191 However, just like in India, the HYVs were 
not popular amongst Thai small-scale farmers. Surichai Wun Gaeo explains that 
reasons for farmers’ limited use of high yield rice varieties in the 1970s included 
high costs of inputs such as fertiliser and agrochemicals necessary for planting the 
varieties.192 Furthermore, the Thai government’s NESD plans, tax policies, and 
duty privileges facilitated the influx of foreign and domestic agribusinesses 
alongside seed companies in Thailand from the 1970s.193 For example, one of the 
largest domestic agribusinesses – Charoen Pokphand Foods PCL – was registered 
in Thailand in 1978.194 In addition, multinational seed companies such as Cargill 
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Seeds, Pacific Seeds, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and Uniseeds established subsidiaries in 
Thailand also from the late 1970s and early 1980s.195 
 
The first Thai patent law, the ‘Patent Act B.E 2522’, entered into force on 12 
September 1979. Similar to India and Nigeria, the Thai Patent Act prohibits patents 
on plant varieties.196 Notably, Thailand, like India and Nigeria, was one of the 
countries that was invited to review the BIRPI Model Law for Industrially Less 
Developed Countries.197 As seen from 5.2.1 above and Chapter 2, the BIRPI Model 
Law prohibits patents for plant varieties, which could have inspired the similar 
prohibition in Thailand.  
 
During TRIPS Negotiations (1986-1994) 
 
Despite the growth of agribusinesses and seed companies in Thailand from the 
1970s, King Bhumibol continued to promote initiatives to safeguard the interests 
of small-scale farmers. In line with his Sufficiency Economy philosophy, he 
developed a ‘New Theory’ on agriculture in 1992.198 The New Theory proposes 
that farmers apply the key principles of the Sufficiency Economy philosophy to 
their farming practices to protect them from the impact of globalisation, such as 
price fluctuations and farming conditions, including droughts, flooding, and plant 
diseases.199 One of the suggestions under the ‘New Theory’ was for farmers to 
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Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, ‘Sufficiency Economy 
Implications and Applications’ (n 181).  
199 The Chaipattana Foundation, ‘The New Theory’  
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engage in communal agriculture, where the community is at the centre of 
production, harvesting, processing, and marketing of crops.200 As will be seen 
below, King Bhumibol’s philosophy and ideas inspired CSOs such as Biodiversity 
Sustainable Agriculture Food Sovereignty Action Thailand (BIOTHAI) to promote 
farmers’ and community interests during debates about implementing TRIPS 
obligations in Thailand.201 Prapimphan Chiengkul notes that King Bhumiphol was 
widely admired in Thailand for his dedication to agriculture and rural development 
projects. As such, his philosophy spurred counter-hegemonic movements in the 
Thai agriculture sector.202  
 
While King Bhumibol’s philosophy informed ideas about the protection of 
farmers’ and community interests, ideas about plant breeders’ rights started 
circulating in Thailand from July 1994. This was as a result of a seminar organised 
by the UPOV office in cooperation with the Thai Department of Agriculture,203 
and with the assistance of New Zealand’s Ministry of Trade.204 The UPOV Vice 
Secretary, along with the Commissioner of Plant Variety Rights of New Zealand, 
participated in a working group on the introduction of plant variety protection in 
                                                 
<http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=412
1&Itemid=296> accessed 21 August 2017.  
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community farming (expansion/marketing phase) discussed above. The other two key suggestions 
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60 per cent are for crop planting, while the remaining 10 per cent is set aside as the service area for 
dwelling, paths, ramps, kitchen, and livestock pens. (iii) Advancement/processing/adding value 
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agricultural products.  
201 BIOTHAI, Biodiversity Sustainable Agriculture Food Sovereignty Action Thailand 
<http://www.biothai.org/> accessed 21 August 2017.   
202 Chiengkul, The Political Economy of the Agri-Food System in Thailand (n 193) 58-59.  
203 The seminar was held in Bangkok, Thailand on 28 July 1994. UPOV, ‘Council: Twenty-Ninth 
Ordinary Session Geneva, 17 October 1995: Annual Report of the Secretary-General for 1994’ 
(C/29/2, 10 August 1995) 6 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_29/c_29_2.pdf> 
accessed 21 August 2017.  
204 UPOV, ‘Council: Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session Geneva, 17 October 1995: Annual Report of 
the Secretary-General for 1994’ (n 203) 6.  
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Thailand, organised by the Thai MOAC on 29 July 1994.205 On the same day, the 
UPOV and New Zealand officials also visited the Thai Department of Intellectual 
Property within the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).206 As discussed in Chapter 2, 
different national ministries and institutions, including agriculture, trade, and 
environment, are relevant to plant variety protection. This is no different in 
Thailand. As will be seen below, the ministries of agriculture and commerce played 
significant roles in the Thai plant variety protection law-making process.  
 
Growing consciousness about plant varieties and seed trade in Asia also led to the 
establishment of the Asia and Pacific Seed Association (APSA) in September 
1994. APSA was formed at the Asian Seed Conference which held in September 
1994 in Thailand.207 The Seed Association of Thailand (SAT) was active in 
organising both the Asian Seed Conference and the establishment of APSA.208 
While APSA has links with organisations such as the WTO, FAO, and UPOV, it 
clearly favours the UPOV 1991 Convention as its preferred plant variety protection 
system.209 APSA concludes that a plant breeder’s rights system styled on the 
UPOV 1991 Convention not only encourages domestic investment in plant 
breeding, it also attracts foreign investments.  
 
Accordingly, the UPOV office alongside multinational seed companies and Thai 
plant breeders pushed for an UPOV-styled plant breeder’s rights system in 
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Thailand. Responding swiftly, the Thai MOC and MOAC prepared different draft 
plant variety protection Bills in 1994.210 Gabrielle Gagne and Chutima 
Ratanasatien point out that the Thai government was uncertain about which 
institution had the competence to draft the Bill, as the mandates of the MOC and 
MOAC are both relevant to plant variety protection.211 The similarly structured 
Bills narrowly focused on protecting plant breeders’ rights in line with the UPOV 
1978 and 1991 Conventions, providing for the protection of only new plant 
varieties. Notably, the Bills neither recognised nor rewarded farmers’ and farming 
communities’ contributions to conserving and developing plant varieties. The 
significant difference between the Bills was the governing ministry for the Act. 
The MOC would have been responsible for governing plant variety protection 
under the MOC Bill, while the MOAC would have been responsible under the 
MOAC Bill.212  
 
CSOs, farmer groups, and academic activists such as BIOTHAI and Assembly of 
the Poor (AOP) rejected these Bills.213 Their main reason for rejecting the Bills 
was that the narrow focus on plant breeders’ rights to the exclusion of farmers’ and 
community’ rights as well as access and benefit sharing would adversely affect 
farmers’ and farming communities’ interests. The CSOs were concerned that the 
exclusion of these farmers and community rights meant that the Thai plant variety 
protection system would exclude the protection of plant varieties unique to 
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Thailand such as Jasmine rice.214 Thus, by the conclusion of the TRIPS 
negotiations in 1994, Thailand, like India, did not have a plant variety protection 
system. Nonetheless, at the TRIPS Council, Thailand aligned with the Global 
South position for a creative sui generis system that incorporates farmers’ rights as 




In response to the CSOs’ opposition, the Thai government set up a National 
Committee for Plant Variety Protection Bill Drafting (Committee) in 1997. The 
Committee was made up of wide-ranging stakeholders, including CSOs, farmers, 
plant breeders, the private sector, and academics, who were tasked to redraft the 
bill.216 One reason for the Thai government’s inclusion of wide-ranging 
stakeholders could be King Bhumibol’s Sufficiency Economy philosophy which 
emphasises the importance of balancing the interests of all stakeholders in law- or 
policy-making.217 Indeed, Jakkrit Kuanpoth notes that the Sufficiency Economy 
philosophy provided the foundation for the Thai government to deal with 
globalisation concerns, which include domesticating TRIPS.218 Furthermore, from 
1997, there was increased public awareness of plant variety protection in Thailand 
as a result of the media attention it received.219 For example, the media covered 
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Thailand’ in John Gillespie and Randall Peerenboom (eds), Regulation in Asia: Pushing Back on 
Globalization (Routledge 2009) 198 (‘Pushing against Globalization’). 
219 BIOTHAI and GRAIN, ‘Signposts to Sui Generis Rights’ (Resource materials from the 
International Seminar on Sui Generis Rights Co-organised by BIOTHAI and GRAIN, Bangkok, 1-
6 December 1997, February 1998) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2-signposts-to-sui-
generis-rights> accessed 22 August 2017 (‘Signposts to Sui Generis Rights’). 
238 
 
stories about attempts by a Japanese company to patent a Thai traditional plant and 
by an American company to patent a strand of Jasmine rice (Jasmati).220  
 
With the level of public awareness generated, CSOs and academic activists 
resolved to cooperate with other similar Global South state and non-state actors to 
exchange ideas about designing sui generis plant variety protection systems. Thus, 
Thai CSOs led by BIOTHAI, with support from GRAIN, organised a ‘South-South 
brainstorming on sui generis rights.’221 The BIOTHAI and GRAIN international 
seminar on sui generis systems rights held at Thammasat University’s Rangsat 
Campus near Bangkok, Thailand from 1 to 6 December 1997.222 45 representatives 
of academic, indigenous, peasant, non-governmental, and governmental 
organisations from 19 countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America attended 
the seminal event.223  
 
The Thammasat seminar dissected the definition of the sui generis option in Article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS.224 As TRIPS is an IPRs instrument, the seminar participants 
agreed that a TRIPS-compliant sui generis system should inevitably be an IPRs 
system. Similarly, the seminar participants agreed that the sui generis option 
provides flexibility to design plant variety protection systems that safeguard 
farmers’ and farming communities’ interests as well as their livelihoods.225 The 
seminar participants adopted the ‘Thammasat Resolution’, which presents a 
holistic understanding of the sui generis plant variety protection option under 
TRIPS from a Global South perspective.226 While the Thammasat Resolution 
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affirmed that sui generis plant variety protection systems suited to the Global South 
include community and collective rights (such as farmers’ rights) which apply to 
indigenous peoples, peasants, family farmers, and local communities, it clearly 
states that these rights are indivisible and intergenerational.227 As such, community 
and farmers’ rights should not be misinterpreted as or denatured into IPRs.228 
 
Two points clearly emerge from this conclusion in the Thammasat Resolution. 
First, while the Thammasat Resolution states that its sui generis community rights 
are not IPRs, it does not provide alternative TRIPS-compliant IPRs systems or 
principles. This is problematic because the participants also oppose patents on life 
forms, including plant varieties. With the elimination of the patent option and the 
adoption of a non-IPRs sui generis system, the seminar participants presented a 
normative interpretation of the sui generis system, rather than a practical guide to 
designing a TRIPS-compliant sui generis system in the Global South. Second, 
there are clear divergences within the Global South on the meaning of farmers’ and 
community rights. For example, the Indian PPVFRA provides IPRs protection for 
farmers’ varieties, as seen above.229 Furthermore, the farmers’ and community 
rights provisions were not fully developed in the African Model Law, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.230 Thus, while the Global South countries clearly promote farmers’ 
and community rights, their conceptualisation of these principles are fluid.  
 
Nonetheless, the Thai CSOs’ interventions were instrumental to changes in the 
MOC and MOAC Bills. Thailand’s 1997 constitutional reform also enhanced the 
CSOs’ calls to protect community rights. Section 46 of the 1997 Thai Constitution 
provides for the participation of traditional communities in the management, 
maintenance, preservation, and exploitation of natural resources.231 To start with, 
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the National Drafting Committee combined the main principles in the MOC and 
MOAC Bills. In addition, it incorporated the community rights provisions 
demanded by CSOs and academic activists. Consequently, the Bill departed from 
the UPOV model, as the community rights provisions are not compliant with the 
UPOV plant breeders’ rights system.232 A Thai Parliament discussion on the Bill 
was held in 1998, while the final version was passed in 1999.233 
  
5.2.2. Unpacking the Plant Varieties Protection Act 
 
The PVPA protects both plant breeders’ new varieties and local communities’ 
varieties. One of the objectives of the Thai PVPA drafters was to ensure that all 
plant varieties within Thailand are subject to state sovereignty, and can be 
protected under either new or local communities’ categories.234 Rather than grant 
exclusive IPRs over farmers’ varieties as in the case of India, Thailand sought to 
provide another form of recognition, focusing collectively on communities’ 
interests.235 From the discussion above, this is in line with the Thammasat 
Resolution.236 Provisions on the protection of new varieties are drawn from the 
UPOV 1978 Convention, while provisions on the protection of local communities’ 
varieties are inspired by the CBD. Yet, like the Indian PPVFRA, the PVPA also 
deviates from the international agreements it borrows from.  
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Coverage of the Law 
 
The PVPA protects four types of plant varieties: new varieties, local domestic plant 
varieties, wild plant varieties, and general domestic plant varieties.237 Similar to 
the Indian PPVFRA, the PVPA does not expressly define new varieties.238 The 
new varieties are required to meet UPOV-styled DUS conditions for registration.239 
However, Section 14 of the PVPA specifies that only plants published in the 
Government Gazette by the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, with the 
approval of the Plant Variety Protection Commission, are eligible for protection 
under the PVPA.240 Thus, similar to the Indian PPVFRA, the PVPA does not 
extend protection to all genera and species. The Minister of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives can exempt the protection of certain genera or species on the basis of 
their importance to national security.241 This way, the PVPA differs from the 
UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions. Article 4 of the UPOV 1978 Convention 
provides for member states to extend protection to at least 24 genera or species 
within eight years of UPOV membership,242 while Article 3 of the UPOV 1991 
Convention obliges new UPOV members to protect all plant genera and species 
within 10 years of accession to the Convention.243  
 
As will be seen next, the other three varieties recognised under the PVPA are extant 
varieties; that is, varieties that already exist in Thailand. Local domestic plant 
varieties are varieties that exist only in a particular locality within Thailand, which 
have never been registered as a new plant variety.244 Section 3 of the PVPA further 
defines a locality as ‘a group of people residing and commonly inheriting and 
passing over culture continually and registered under this Act.’245 However, 
determining the origin of local plant varieties could raise conflicts, as many local 
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plant varieties are found in more than one community. 246 For example, even 
though Jasmine rice (the most well-known variety of this is Khao Dawk Mali 105) 
was said to have been found in Chonburi Province, southeast of Bangkok, about 
100 years ago, it spread to the Chachoengsao, the next province north for 
cultivation. The variety was spread further to the northeast, Issan region. It is now 
extensively cultivated nationwide. 
 
Wild plant varieties are those that currently exist or have previously existed in 
natural habitats within Thailand and which have not been commonly cultivated, 
while general domestic varieties are commonly exploited plant varieties that 
originate from or exist in Thailand.247 Section 3 of the PVPA clarifies that general 
domestic varieties include plant varieties that are not new plant varieties, local 
domestic plant varieties, or wild plant varieties.248 
 
Conditions for Protection 
 
Sections 11 and 12 of the PVPA provide conditions for the protection of new 
varieties. As highlighted above, the PVPA provides for UPOV-styled conditions 
of (commercial) novelty, DUS.249 Like its Indian counterpart, the PVPA tailors the 
‘distinctiveness’ condition to suit domestic agronomic and medicinal interests. A 
variety is considered distinct if the distinguishing quality is beneficial to the 
cultivation, consumption, pharmaceutical use, production, or transformation of the 
variety.250 These extra qualifications differ from the UPOV 1991 Convention, 
which simply provides that a ‘variety is deemed to be distinct if it is clearly 
distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common 
knowledge at the time of the filing of the application.’251 In addition, the PVPA 
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introduces novel conditions such as disclosure of origin which is absent in the 
conditions for registration in both the UPOV 1978 and 1991 Conventions.252 
Section 19(3) of the PVPA requires applicants to disclose details of the genetic 
materials used in breeding the new varieties.253   
 
Similar to new varieties, local domestic plant varieties are required to fulfil the 
DUS conditions, however, unlike new varieties, the local domestic varieties are not 
require to be (commercially) novel.254 Section 44 of the PVPA further provides 
that a member of a community involved in the conservation or development of a 
local domestic plant variety can register the local domestic plant variety on behalf 
of the community.255 Farmers’ groups or co-operatives are also entitled to apply 
for registration of local domestic varieties on behalf of communities.256 However, 
Section 46 of the PVPA provides that the application for registration of local 
domestic varieties shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures prescribed 
in the Ministerial Regulation. This Ministerial Regulation is yet to be passed, as 
such no local domestic variety has been registered in Thailand.257 Accordingly, in 
addition to issues about determining the exact origin of a local domestic variety, 
another hurdle to registering local domestic varieties is the absence of an enforcing 
regulation.  
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While general domestic plant varieties are also required to fulfil the DUS 
conditions similar to new plant varieties and local domestic varieties  above, wild 
plant varieties are only required to fulfil the ‘distinct’ and ‘stable’ conditions.258 In 
other words, wild plant varieties are exempted from fulfilling the ‘uniformity’ 
condition.259 Furthermore, would-be users of general domestic varieties and wild 
plant varieties are required to ‘obtain permission from the competent government 
official and to make a profit-sharing agreement’ as will be seen below.260 
 
Scope of Protection 
 
The PVPA provides varying durations for the protection of new plant varieties. 
Section 31 of the PVPA provides 12 years’ protection for plant varieties cultivated 
in two years or less, 17 years’ protection for plant varieties cultivated in over two 
years, and 27 years’ protection for trees.261 The 12 and 17-year duration is below 
the UPOV 1991 Convention threshold of at least 20 years’ protection, while the 
27-year provision for trees is higher than the 25-year duration under the UPOV 
1991 Convention.262 As Pawarit Lertdhamtewe points out, the reason for the lower 
duration of protection in the PVPA may be to limit the length of monopoly breeders 
have over plant varieties, which are a main source of food.263 Nonetheless, he also 
argues that the lower duration of breeder’s rights in the PVPA may discourage 
breeders from investing in breeding new plant varieties.264 This is because breeding 
a new plant variety is a time-consuming process, as it takes about 10 years to 
develop a marketable variety.265 Thus, plant breeders may consider the 12 or 17-
year period of protection as too short to recoup their research and development (R 
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& D) investments. Following from this, the higher duration of protection for new 
trees could incentivise R & D investments for new trees.  
 
Under Section 33 of the PVPA, the holder of a new plant variety has the exclusive 
right to produce, sell, distribute, import, or export the propagating material of the 
new plant variety.266 In other words, the PVPA grants exclusive monopolies over 
new varieties similar to the UPOV 1991 Convention.267 These exclusive rights are 
subject to exceptions such as use of new varieties for (i) education, study, 
experiments, or research, (ii) acts relating to a protected new plant variety 
committed in good faith; and (iii) non-commercial purposes.268 Furthermore, 
farmers are allowed to save and reuse seed from harvested protected plant 
varieties.269  However, the exceptions in the PVPA do not address issues such as 
essentially derived varieties.270 Where a protected variety is used as an initial 
source to develop a new variety which is subsequently commercialised, does the 
holder of the initial variety derive any benefits? In addition, noticeably absent 
under the exceptions to breeder’s rights is farmers’ ability or rights to exchange or 
sell farm-saved seeds of protected varieties. As previously discussed, the Indian 
PPVFRA provides for farmers to sell farm-saved seeds of protected varieties, 
provided they are unbranded.271 The right to sell farm-saved seeds is also one of 
the provisions Global South activists pushed for in the ITPGRFA.272 
 
For local domestic plant varieties, Section 47 of the PVPA provides that local 
communities have ‘exclusive rights to develop, study, conduct an experiment or 
research in, produce, sell, export or distribute by any means the propagating 
materials’ of these varieties, similar to breeders’ of new plant varieties as 
mentioned above.273 Section 48 of the PVPA further provides that access to local 
                                                 
266 PVPA, s 33.  
267 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 14.  
268 See generally Section 33 of the PVPA for the limitations to the exclusive rights to new varieties.  
269 Provided farmers do not cultivate more than three times of the initial quantity of protected 
varieties obtained. PVPA, s 33.4.  
270 The Indian PPVFRA above provides for essentially derived varieties. See also discussions on 
essentially derived varieties under UPOV in Chapter 3. 
271 See 5.2 above. 
272 See Chapter 3.  
273 PVPA, s 47. 
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domestic varieties is subject to a profit-sharing agreement, which must be 
concluded with a representative of the local community whose local domestic plant 
variety is collected, procured, or gathered for the purposes of variety development, 
education, experiment or research for commercial interests.274 These profits go 
directly to the local communities providing the varieties.275 Nonetheless, local 
communities’ exclusive IPRs over their local domestic varieties are subject to 
similar limitations like breeders’ of new varieties mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph,276 albeit with the exception of acts related to education and 
experiments.277  
 
Conversely, the scope of protection granted for wild plant varieties and general 
domestic plant varieties are akin to access and benefit sharing principles, not 
exclusive IPRs provided for new plant varieties and local domestic plant varieties 
as mentioned above. Section 52 of the PVPA provides that anyone who desires 
access to wild plant varieties or general domestic plant varieties for commercial 
purposes is required to obtain permission from the competent national official.278 
Access to wild plant varieties and general domestic varieties is also subject to a 
profit-sharing agreement which states inter alia, the purpose for collecting the plant 
variety and the amount of profit-sharing agreed.279 The amount agreed on for the 
use of the plant variety is then transferred to a plant varieties protection fund (PVP 
Fund).280 The money in the PVP Fund is used to assist communities with the 
conservation, research, and development of plant varieties.281 One advantage of 
protecting wild plant varieties and general domestic plant varieties using access 
                                                 
274 PVPA, s 48. 
275 20 per cent of the profits are allocated to the persons who conserve or develop the plant variety, 
60 per cent to the community as its common revenue, and 20 per cent to the local government 
organisation, the farmers’ group or the co-operative that makes the agreement. The profit-sharing 
is also required to be in accordance with any profit-sharing regulations established under the PVPA. 
See PVPA, s 49. 
276 PVPA s 47. 
277 Section 47 of the PVPA does not include the education and experimentation exceptions. In 
contrast, these limitations apply to breeders’ rights over new plant varieties as stated in Section 33 
of the PVPA.  
278 PVPA, s 52.  
279 See other conditions of the benefit sharing agreement in Section 52 of the PVPA.  
280 PVPA, s 52. 
281 PVPA, s 55. 
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and benefit sharing principles is that it avoids the conflicts that may arise in 
determining the owners of these varieties, which may occur in the case of local 
domestic varieties. Yet, a challenge with the access and benefit sharing approach 
is the fair and equitable distribution of funds to farmers and farming 
communities.282  
 
In sum, the PVPA is a creative sui generis system that protects both new and 
existing varieties in Thailand. As of September 2017, the Thai Plant Variety 
Protection Division had received 1,354 applications for new plant variety 
registration, and registered 453 plant varieties.283 Notably, despite special 
provisions in the PVPA such as the protection of local domestic varieties, wild 
plant varieties, and general domestic varieties which are non-UPOV compliant, 
Thailand is rethinking its UPOV membership. As will be seen below, Thailand’s 
contact and engagement with UPOV resumed in 1999, the same year the PVPA 
entered into force. 
 
5.2.3. Rethinking UPOV Membership and Trade Agreements 
 
A sampling of Thailand and UPOV’s interactions since the PVPA entered into 
force in 1999 demonstrates efforts from both parties to push Thailand the UPOV 
way. To start with, the Thai Plant Variety Protection office contacted the UPOV 
office in 1999 to ask about the procedure for becoming a UPOV member.284 
Although no progress was made after the initial contact, eight years later – on 28 
March 2007 – the Department of Intellectual Property (DOIP) visited UPOV to 
request for information about the principles and impact of the UPOV 
                                                 
282
 Robinson, ‘Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection Systems: Liability Rules and Non-UPOV 
Systems of Protection’ (n 234) 663.  
283 The Plant Variety Protection Office has granted the highest number of varieties to maize: which 
has 109 registered varieties. Thanks to Panipat Kritsamak: Agricultural Technical Officer, Plant 
Variety Protection Office MOAC, for the up-to-date information about the applications received 
and registered varieties in Thailand (September 2017). 
284 UPOV, ‘Annual Report of the Secretary-General for 1999, Council Thirty-Fourth Ordinary 
Session, Geneva, 26 October 2000’ (C/34/2, 16 March 2000) 19  
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c/34/c_34_2.pdf> accessed 22 August 2017.  
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Convention.285 The DOIP also explored the possibilities of a national workshop on 
a UPOV plant breeder’s rights system in Bangkok. Accordingly, on 22 June 2007, 
the UPOV office with support from the DOIP organised a briefing session at the 
DOIP to sensitise stakeholders, including Thai officials, academics, and CSOs, 
about the UPOV plant breeders’ rights system.286 Furthermore, on 4 and 5 July 
2007, the UPOV office met with officials of the MOAC and National Cultural 
Commission of Thailand to discuss the benefits of the UPOV plant breeders’ rights 
system.287 Notably, the UPOV office lists Thailand as one of the countries that has 
contacted it for assistance to develop a national plant variety protection law in line 
with the UPOV Convention.288 
 
Apart from the above direct UPOV office engagements with Thailand, another 
attempt to push Thailand the UPOV way has been through trade agreements. The 
US launched Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand in 2003, 
which included the requirement for Thailand to accede to the UPOV 1991 
Convention.289 Similarly, the EU launched FTA negotiations with Thailand in 
                                                 
285
 This meeting was held on 28 March 2007. UPOV, ‘Report on Activities During the First Nine 
Months of 2007, Council Forty-First Ordinary Session, Geneva, 25 October 2007’ (C/41/13, 4 
October 2007) 6 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c/41/c_41_03.pdf> accessed 22 
August 2017 (‘Report on Activities During the First Nine Months of 2007’). 
286
 The briefing session was held on 22 June 2007. Also, the 8th Asian Regional Technical Meeting 
for Plant Variety Protection took place from 25 to 29 June 2007 in Thailand. UPOV provided 49 of 
the 81 participants the opportunity to take the UPOV Distance Learning Course DL-205. UPOV, 
‘Report on Activities during the First Nine Months of 2007’ (n 285) 6. 
287 The meetings were held on 4 and 5 July 2007. UPOV, ‘Report on Activities during the First 
Nine Months of 2007’ (n 285) 8. 
288 UPOV, ‘Status in Relation to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants as of 20 March 2017’ <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/status.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2017.  
289 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘United States and Thailand Conclude Fourth 
Round of FTA Talks’ (Archive, 15 July 2005)  
<https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/July/United_States_Thail_Con
clude_Fourth_Round_of_FTA_Talks.html> accessed 23 August 2017; Raymond J Ahearn and 
Wayne M Morrison, ‘US – Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations’ (Congressional Research 
Service-CRS Report for Congress, Updated 26 July 2006) <http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32314.pdf> accessed 23 August 2017. See also Jakkrit Kuanpoth, 
Jiraporn Limpananont, Kingkorn Narintarakul, Benja Silarak, Supanee Taneewuth, Witoon 
Lianchamroon, Jacques-Chai Chomthongdi, Saree Aongsomwang, and Niramon Yuwanaboon, 
‘Free Trade Agreements: Impact in Thailand’ (FTA Watch, June 2005) 31  




2013 which also require Thailand to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention.290 
However, the FTA negotiations have stalled for a variety of reasons, including 
political instability in Thailand and CSO opposition.   
 
The vibrant CSOs in Thailand such as BIOTHAI have remained vigilant in 
countering attempts to push Thailand the UPOV way through UPOV office 
lobbying and FTA negotiations. As will be seen next, the CSOs have challenged 
the UPOV membership through public protests and policy briefs. Two examples 
of CSO-led public protests occurred in 2006 and 2013. In January 2006, during the 
6th round of the US-Thai FTA negotiation, about 15,000 to 20,000 people, 
including CSOs from both the agriculture and health sectors, protested the IPRs 
section of the FTA on the streets of Chang Mai, where the negotiations were held, 
disrupting the meeting.291 The 2013 protest held in Bangkok, though less attended, 
was equally as effective. In November 2013, about 30 CSOs representatives 
protested the Thai government’s moves to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention 
in a demonstration at the MOAC.292 The CSOs submitted a petition to Martin 
Ekvad, the Chairperson of the UPOV Administrative and Legal Committee, who 
had presented a lecture on the benefits of UPOV in Thailand to Thai officials at the 
MOAC.293 In the CSOs’ words: 
 
The main terms of the 1991 UPOV Convention will have an impact on the 
small-scale farmers and will abuse the rights of farmers, in contravention 
of sovereign rights of the country over the genetic resources. It would 
facilitate the monopolisation of the large seed corporations, and impose 
impacts for the biological diversity and food security of Thailand over the 
longer term. We hereby declare that the networks of small-scale farmers in 
                                                 
290 ‘European Commission Trade, Countries and Regions: Thailand’  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/thailand/index_en.htm> 
accessed 23 August 2017.  
291 BIOTHAI, ‘Fighting FTAs: The Experience in Thailand’ (October 2007)  
<http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/fightingFTA-en-Hi-2-b-experience-in-thailand.pdf> accessed 
23 August 2017.  
292 GRAIN, ‘Thai Farmers and Civic Groups Protest UPOV Lobby’ (19 November 2013)  
<https://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4833-thai-farmers-and-civic-groups-protest-upov-




Thailand, the civil society organisations and FTA Watch will mobilise to 
oppose UPOV 1991 to the utmost, and in particular to the pressure on 
Thailand to join this Convention as part of the negotiations towards an FTA 
between the European Union and Thailand.294 
 
In addition to the protests, the CSOs such as BIOTHAI have prepared policy briefs 
and publications to circulate knowledge about the Thai government’s UPOV 
activities or developments.295 It can be concluded that these CSOs interventions 




This chapter presents a TWAIL and regime complex analysis of India and 
Thailand’s creative sui generis plant variety protection systems. The chapter 
locates the Indian and Thai plant variety protection systems in the historical and 
politico-economic contexts in which they emerged. It further analyses the law-
making process through which the plant variety protection systems were 
introduced, as well as the substantive provisions set out in the systems. The law-
making and laws in both countries demonstrate the contestations between actors 
and the successful weaving together of the conflicting legal systems and principles 
relevant to plant varieties. For example, both pro-UPOV plant breeders’ rights and 
pro-farmers’ rights actors were actively involved in the law-making processes in 
India and Thailand. Furthermore, alongside protecting new varieties, India protects 
farmers’ varieties and extant varieties, while Thailand protects local domestic 
varieties, wild plant varieties, and general domestic varieties.  
                                                 
294 Letter to the Chairman of UPOV 1991, Signed by the BIOTHAI Foundation, Alternative 
Agriculture Network, Seed Freedom Thailand, The Foundation for Knowledge Management and 
Farmer School Network of Nakhon Sawam province, Food Security Network Satingphra, Network 
of Fish Folks, Phang-nga Bay, The Network for Change in the East, and the FTA Watch (18 
November 2013) (letter available on record with the author). 
295 See for example, BIOTHAI, ‘Impacts of the Thai-EU Free Trade Agreement on Plant Varieties, 
Biodiversity and Food Security’ (22 February 2015) <http://biothai.org/node/535> accessed 23 
August 2017; BIOTHAI, ‘Warming to Thai Government: Stop Meddling with the Plant Protection 
Laws’ (11 April 2016) <http://www.biothai.org/node/1421> accessed 23 August 2017;  BIOTHAI, 
Impacts for Farmers and Consumers of Amending the Plant Varieties Protection Act (11 April 
2016) <http://www.biothai.org/node/1422> accessed 23 August 2017. 
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The chapter has argued that the incorporation of these alternative provisions in 
India and Thailand were thanks to the vibrant CSOs in both countries. This is 
important to this thesis because it shows the significance of the active presence of 
domestic CSOs in influencing and shaping plant variety protection laws and law-
making. By strategically circulating ideas about farmers’ rights, the CSOs were 
able to translate the Global South common position at the TRIPS Council into 
national law. Although India and Thailand are ethnically diverse countries like 
Nigeria, deep-rooted influences, particularly the Gandhi Satyagraha in India 
alongside the Sufficiency Economy philosophy and New Agriculture theory in 
Thailand, unified the CSOs.  
 
Furthermore, the Indian and Thai CSOs’ vigilance have contributed to maintaining 
the creative sui generis plant variety protection systems in these countries despite 
growing pressures to join UPOV. In other words, while India and Thailand 
experienced similar pressures from trade agreements, seed companies, and UPOV 
office lobbies – which pushed African countries towards UPOV as seen in Chapter 
4 – one distinguishing feature of India and Thailand’s plant variety protection 
systems is their CSOs’ interventions. Overall, the insights from this chapter – 
combined with insights from Chapter 4 – help to answer the subsidiary research 
question about factors that influence the variations in plant variety protection 
systems in the Global South. More importantly, the findings from both chapters 
provide useful lessons for Nigeria because it is yet to introduce a plant variety 
protection system.  
 
The next chapter – which is the penultimate chapter of this thesis – revisits the 
Nigerian case study. It will analyse the Nigerian case study in the context of the 
findings from Chapter 4 (factors that influenced UPOV membership within Africa) 
and findings from this chapter (factors that influenced creative sui generis plant 
variety protection systems in India and Thailand). Furthermore, the chapter will 
unpack Nigeria’s Industrial Property Commission (IPC) Bill. Drawing from 
lessons of other Global South countries (in Chapters 4 and this chapter), along with 
empirical study conducted in Nigeria, the next chapter provides original insights 
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into the historical and politico-economic context that contribute to the plant variety 
status quo in Nigeria; it also explores how to design the sui generis system suited 
to it. This way, the next chapter attempts to answer the second central question of 
this thesis concerning the design and introduction of the sui generis plant variety 























Towards Plant Variety Protection in Nigeria 
 
This chapter builds on the background set out in Chapter 2 in order to provide a 
deeper analysis of the plant variety protection in Nigeria. To start with, the chapter 
explores the pre-TRIPS, during TRIPS, and post-TRIPS plant variety protection 
landscape in Nigeria. Second, it analyses the Nigerian plant variety protection 
landscape in the context of the key factors which influence variations in plant 
variety protection systems in the Global South as teased out in Chapters 4 and 5. 
These factors include trade agreements, regional associations, pressure from seed 
companies, UPOV office lobbies, alongside civil society activism. Third, it 
unpacks the plant variety protection provisions in Nigeria’s Industrial Property 
Commission (IPC) Bill.1 Analysing plant variety protection in this regard helps us 
understand the current plant variety protection status quo in order to consider how 
to design and introduce the system best suited to Nigeria. As such, this chapter 
addresses the second central research question posed in this thesis.  
 
The application of the TWAIL insights on the broad historical and politico-
economic context that shape law-making and laws in the Global South, combined 
with regime complex theory insights on actors’ strategies to relocate rulemaking, 
enrich the analysis presented in this chapter. This is because the TWAIL and 
regime complex analysis show that the focus on laws and policies alone are not 
enough to understand the implementation of the obligation to protect plant varieties 
under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS in Nigeria. The chapter finds that while India, 
Thailand, and the African Group were debating and developing sui generis plant 
variety protection systems in the early 1990s, Nigeria was under military regime, 
and fulfilling international obligations was not a priority. In addition, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) that contributed to the cognitive shaping of sui generis plant 
                                                 
1 ‘A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Intellectual Property Commission of 
Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap. T13, LFN 2004 And Patents And Designs Act, Cap. P2, 
LFN 2004 and Make Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of Trademarks, 
Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and Farmers Rights and For Other Related 
Matters’ (IPC Bill).  
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variety protection systems in India and Thailand were silent in Nigeria during that 
period. However, it is argued that the CSOs’ silence in the 1990s can also be linked 
to the absence of pro-UPOV plant breeder’s rights pressures in Nigeria. In other 
words, there were no actors pushing for or circulating ideas about plant breeder’s 
rights for the CSOs to counterbalance. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the 
CSOs in Nigeria’s agriculture sector have limited awareness about plant variety 
protection-related issues.  
 
The chapter further finds that while Nigeria does not have direct pressure from 
regional associations, seed companies, or the UPOV office to design a plant variety 
protection system, it is party to the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition (NAFSN), a trade agreement which requires it to reform its seed law. In 
fact, this is a symptom of the regime complex theory which reflects how powerful 
or industrialised Global North state actors such as the United States (US) or the 
European Union (EU) shift from multilateral agreements such as TRIPS to bilateral 
and regional trade and investment agreements –otherwise referred to as vertical 
regime shifting.2 According to Laurence Helfer,  Global North actors could 
leverage their economic and political clout in the intimate bilateral negotiating 
forums to demand that Global South countries accede to certain intellectual 
property (IP) standards that exceed those found in TRIPS, which are labelled 
‘TRIPS plus’ agreements.3 However, Nigeria did not specifically commit to 
introduce a plant variety protection system under the NAFSN. Rather, it generally 
committed to introduce seed laws that facilitate private sector-led agricultural 
                                                 
2 Peter K Yu, ‘International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property 
Schizophrenia’ (2007) 1 Michigan State Law Review 1, 15-16; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime 
Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 39, 
41 (‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’) 
3 Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (n 2) 41. See also 
Genetic Resources Action International Network (GRAIN), ‘TRIPS-Plus through the Back Door: 
How Bilateral Treaties Impose much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO’ (27 July 2001) 
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5-trips-plus-through-the-back-door> accessed 13 December 
2016; GRAIN, ‘Bilateral Agreements Imposing TRIPS-plus Intellectual Property Rights on 
Biodiversity in Developing Countries’ (08 April 2008)  
<https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/3645-bilateral-agreements-imposing-trips-plus-
intellectual-property-rights-on-biodiversity-in-developing-countries> accessed 28 August 2017. 
255 
 
growth. Nonetheless, the absence of direct pressures and debates does not mean 
there are no developments in plant variety protection law-making in Nigeria.  
 
The IPC Bill which contains a section on plant variety protection is currently being 
processed in Nigeria’s National Assembly.4 The plant variety protection part of the 
IPC Bill, as in the other intellectual property rights (IPRs) Bills previously 
proposed in Nigeria, is drawn from the African Model Law. However, the IPC Bill 
excludes certain key exceptions to breeder’s rights and farmers’ rights provisions, 
which is detrimental to both small-scale farmers and national interests in general 
as was discussed in Chapter 3. Yet, there are no public debates about the plant 
variety protection provisions in the IPC Bill in Nigeria. This is important because 
insights from Chapters 4 and 5 show the differences between plant variety 
protection systems in the Global South designed with and without public debates 
or discussions. Chapter 4 shows that the African Intellectual Property Organisation 
(OAPI) designed its UPOV 1991 Convention-compliant plant variety protection 
system without public debates or discussions,5 while Chapter 5 shows that India 
and Thailand’s creative sui generis plant variety protection systems were designed 
following public debates or discussions on the subject.6 In fact, Chapter 5 shows 
that CSOs’ circulation of ideas and knowledge about farmers’ rights contributed to 
the shaping of India and Thailand’s creative sui generis systems. As this thesis 
proposes a creative sui generis system as best suited to Nigeria (in answer to the 
first central research question), it is important to draw attention to the lack of public 
debates or discussions in this regard.   
 
The discussions in this chapter are divided into three parts. Part I explores pre-
TRIPS, during TRIPS, and post-TRIPS periods in Nigeria. This exploration 
unmasks how seemingly unconnected historical and politico-economic issues have 
                                                 
4 The Bill was presented by Honourable Chime Oji Agu at the House of Representatives of 
Nigeria’s National Assembly on 8 June 2016. The second reading of the Bill was on 18 January 
2017. The Bill has now been referred to the House Committee on Commerce. IPC Bill (n 1). 
5 Annex X: ‘Plant Variety Protection’ in the Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of 2 March 
1977 on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organisation (Bangui Central African 
Republic, 24 February 1999). 
6 The public debates and discussions were through workshops, seminars, rallies, and the media. 
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contributed to the absence of a plant variety protection system in Nigeria. Part II 
analyses the factors that influence variations in plant variety protection in the 
Global South within the Nigerian context. Part III examines the coverage of the 
law, conditions for protection, and scope of protection set out in the IPC Bill.  
 
6.1. Historical Evolution of Plant Variety Protection in Nigeria 
 
Chapter 2 already sets out the background on farming in Nigeria.7 To recap, over 
80 per cent of farmers in Nigeria are small-scale farmers who depend on the 
informal seed sector. The small-scale farmers source over 90 per cent of their seeds 
from the informal seed sector.8  Both public institutions and private seed companies 
are involved in plant breeding in Nigeria. Private sector participation surged 
especially from 2011 as a result of changes in Nigeria’s agricultural policies. 
Similar to India and Thailand, agriculture plays a significant role in Nigeria; it 
employs over 30 per cent of its labour force.9 Agriculture also contributed 21.1 per 
cent to Nigeria’s GDP in 2016.10 Major crops grown in Nigeria include maize, 
sorghum, wheat, cassava, and rice. In fact, Nigeria is the world’s largest producer 




Like India, Nigeria was colonised by Britain.12 Although the British colonial 
administration – from 1861 to 1960 – did not establish a plant variety protection 
                                                 
7 See generally Chapter 2.  
8 However, it is important to note that the percentage of famers’ seed sources and contribution to 
the seed sector varies depending on the crop. 
9 The World Bank, ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)’ (2010)  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=NG> accessed 28 August 
2017.  
10 The World Bank, ‘Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ (2016)  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=NG> accessed 28 August 
2017.  
11 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), ‘Nigeria at a Glance’  
<http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-glance/en/> accessed 28 August 2017; 
FAO, ‘FAOSTAT, Crops: Production Quantities of Cassava by Country’  
<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC/visualize> accessed 28 August 2017.  
12 See Chapter 5. 
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system in Nigeria, it introduced noteworthy changes which shaped Nigeria’s 
agriculture sector. The earliest British involvement in the agricultural sector was 
the establishment of the Department of Botanical Research (DBR) in 1893, in the 
former Western Nigeria.13 The DBR was part of a network of research institutes 
introduced in British colonies to conduct agricultural research. In 1905, the British 
Cotton Growers’ Association established a site known as Moor Plantation, also 
located in the former Western Nigeria, to grow cotton for the British Textile Mills. 
The Moor Plantation became the headquarters of the Department of Agriculture in 
Southern Nigeria in 1910.14 Two years later, in 1912, a similar Department of 
Agriculture was established in Northern Nigeria.15 After the amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, a unified Department of Agriculture was 
formed in Nigeria in 1921.16 The Department of Agriculture focused on increasing 
the production of export crops for the British market to promote Britain’s industrial 
growth.17  
 
The first comprehensive Agricultural Policy introduced by the British 
administrators in 1946 divided Nigeria into five agricultural areas (i) Northern 
provinces pastoral or livestock production area; (ii) Northern provinces export crop 
(groundnut and cotton) production area; (iii) Middle Belt food production area; (iv) 
Southern provinces export crop (palm oil and kernels) production area; and (v) 
                                                 
13 FAO, ‘Plant Breeding Programs in Nigeria’ <http://www.fao.org/in-action/plant-breeding/our-
partners/africa/nigeria/en/> accessed 30 August 2017.  
14 Montague Yudelman, ‘Imperialism and the Transfer of Agricultural Techniques’ in Peter 
Duignan and Lewis H Gann (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume Four, The Economics 
of Colonialism (Cambridge University Press 1975) 347 (‘Imperialism and the Transfer of 
Agricultural Techniques’). 
15 ibid.  
16 The Southern and Northern British protectorates were amalgamated to form one country – 
‘Nigeria’ – in 1914, under Lord Lugard’s administration. See generally, Benjamin Nwabueze, A 
Constitutional History of Nigeria (C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd 1982); Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, ‘History of Nigeria’ <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/index.php/2016-04-06-08-38-30/history-
of-nigeria> accessed 25 August 2017.  
17 See generally, Gerald Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in 
Nigeria (Richard Irwin Inc 1966) (Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in 
Nigeria); Eme Ekekwe, ‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’ in Claude Ake (ed), Political 
Economy of Nigeria (Longman 1985) 58-60 (‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’); 
Gbolagade Ayoola, Essays on the Agricultural Economy: A Book of Readings on Agricultural 
Development Policy and Administration in Nigeria, Volume 1 (TMA Publishers 2001) (Essays on 
the Agricultural Economy). 
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Southwest food export (cocoa and palm kernels) area.18 This division reflects the 
British colonial administration’s primary focus on export crops such as cocoa, 
cotton, groundnuts, rubber, and palm produce (palm oil and palm kernels). Eme 
Ekekwe remarks that the colonial administration was ‘interested in production for 
export. It encouraged or established co-operative groups and research institutions 
to promote cash crop production. It showed little interest in food production.’19 
Notably, these export cash crops were primarily grown by small-scale farmers, 
using simple farming tools such as hoes, cutlasses, axes, and knives.20  
 
Nigeria maintained the focus on small-scale production of export crops established 
by the British colonial administration even after it gained its independence in 
1960.21 In the 1960s, agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and 
the main source of foreign revenue.22 Agriculture accounted for about 70 per cent 
of Nigeria’s GDP and total export revenue.23 However, Nigeria’s discovery of oil 
in the late 1960s led to the neglect of agriculture. This further led to a food crisis 
manifested by increased levels of food imports by the 1970s, as there was a decline 
in both export cash crop and food crop production.24 Following the food crisis, 
successive Nigerian governments introduced a series of agricultural policies, plans, 
and programmes which focused on agricultural modernisation principles such as 
mono-cropping, mechanisation, and dependence on agro-chemicals (fertilisers and 
                                                 
18 Ayoola, Essays on the Agricultural Economy (n 17) 81.  
19 Ekekwe, ‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’ (n 17) 58-59. 
20 Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (n 17) 45. For 
detailed discussions on small-scale farmers and the main export crops during the colonial era, see 
generally, Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (n 17) 
76-134.  
21 Although Nigeria became independent on 1 October 1960, it was still an independent 
constitutional monarchy. The Nigerian government’s activities were still undertaken in the Queen’s 
name through the Governor General of Nigeria. However, Nigeria became a republic – ‘The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria’ – in 1963. Under the republican system, there is an elected president, and the 
elected representatives of the people are supreme. The Queen stopped being the Queen of Nigeria, 
and the Constitution of the Federation Act 1963 replaced the Nigeria Independence Act 1960.  
22 Eroarome Martin Aregheore, ‘Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles: Nigeria’ (FAO 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/nigeria/nigeria.htm> accessed 18 April 2016; 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment Policy Review: 
Nigeria (UNCTAD, United Nations 2009) 3-4.  
23 Ekekwe, ‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’ (n 17) 61; Jeremiah Dibua, Development 
and Diffusionism: Looking Beyond Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria, 1962-1985 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2013) 94 (Development and Diffusionism). 
24 Ekekwe, ‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’ (n 17) 61.  
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pesticides).25 Examples of the policies, plans, and programmes introduced include 
the National Accelerated Food Production Programme 1972, Agricultural 
Development Projects 1974, Operation Feed the Nation 1976, River Basin 
Development Authorities 1976, and Green Revolution Programme 1980.26  
 
Interestingly, the decline in the agriculture sector, which justified the introduction 
of agricultural modernisation principles, was attributed to the prevalence of small-
scale traditional farming in Nigeria.27 What this claim fails to acknowledge is that 
small-scale traditional farming practices were actually the key to agricultural 
growth from the colonial era to the 1960s. As stated in the preceding paragraph, 
agriculture accounted for about 70 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP and export revenues 
in the 1960s.28 Gerald Helleiner further points out that small-scale non-mechanised 
agriculture accounted for 95 per cent of Nigeria’s total food consumption prior to 
the 1960s.29 Notably, the promotion of agricultural mechanisation as a solution to 
the food crisis in Nigeria is traceable to European, US, FAO, and World Bank-
sponsored agricultural modernisation programmes or green revolution 
programmes during this period (from the 1970s).30 It was discussed in Chapter 5 
that the green revolution programmes focused on the use of high yielding varieties 
(HYVs), and agrochemicals were also introduced in India and Thailand from the 
late 1960s to the 1980s.31 
 
Nigeria’s Green Revolution Programme introduced by President Shehu Shagari in 
1980 sought to increase food production and achieve food self-sufficiency by 
                                                 
25 Dibua, Development and Diffusionism (n 23) 97. Examples of these principles are highlighted in 
the next paragraph.  
26 Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Westview Press 1993) 187-202; 
Juliana C Iwuchukwu and Edwin M Igbokwe, ‘Lessons from Agricultural Policies and Programmes 
in Nigeria’ (2012) 5 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 11, 12-15 (‘Lessons from 
Agricultural Policies and Programmes in Nigeria’).   
27 Dibua, Development and Diffusionism (n 23) 95.  
28 See above. 
29 Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (n 17) 45.  
30 Dibua, Development and Diffusionism (n 23) 96.  
31 See Chapter 5. 
260 
 
modernising the agricultural sector.32 To execute the programme, the Nigerian 
government supplied farmers with agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides, 
and improved seeds or seedlings. The government further provided incentives such 
as credit facilities, favourable pricing policy for agriculture products, income tax 
reliefs for pioneer enterprises, and duty-free imports on farm machinery for 
commercial firms investing in large scale farming. Following the introduction of 
the Green Revolution Programme in 1980, the first private seed company – 
Agricultural Seed Nigeria Ltd (AgSeed) – resumed operations in Nigeria in 1984.33  
 
However, the Green Revolution Programme failed to achieve its objectives. Two 
reasons for the failure of the Green Revolution Programme in Nigeria are as 
follows. First, requirements for planting improved varieties, including mono-
cropping and dependence on agrochemical inputs (such as fertilisers and 
pesticides), were alien to small-scale farming practices.34 Despite the government’s 
dissemination of agricultural inputs including the improved varieties, small-scale 
farmers still relied on their traditional varieties and farming practices. Second, 
there were administrative shortcomings such as delays in executing the project, 
lack of monitoring, and evaluating the projects.35 Jeremiah Dibua points out that 
the Green Revolution Programme, along with the other agricultural programmes 
focusing on modernised agricultural practices, were destined to fail because they 
‘completely discountenanced the historical, cultural, social, material and scientific 
foundations on which indigenous agriculture and agricultural practices are 
based.’36  
 
                                                 
32 Segun Famoriyo and M Rafique Raza, ‘The Green Revolution in Nigeria: Prospects for 
Agricultural Development’ (1982) 7(1) Food Policy 27, 36; Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, ‘Lessons 
from Agricultural Policies and Programmes in Nigeria’ (n 26) 14. 
33 Jeffery W Bentley, Olupomi Ajayi, and Kehinde Adelugba, ‘Nigeria: Clustered Seed Companies’ 
in Paul Van Mele, Jeffery Bentley, and Robert G Guei (eds), African Seed Enterprises: Sowing the 
Seeds of Food Security (FAO, the Africa Rice Centre, and CAB International 2011) 45 (‘Nigeria: 
Clustered Seed Companies’). 
34 Dibua, Development and Diffusionism (n 23) 97-98.  
35 Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, ‘Lessons from Agricultural Policies and Programmes in Nigeria’ (n 
26) 14.  
36 Dibua, Development and Diffusionism (n 23) 97-98.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the World Bank and the FAO seed sector programmes 
introduced in Nigeria from 1975 precipitated the introduction of the first seed law: 
the National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds Act (NCVLBA) in 1987.37 
Similar to India and Thailand, (i) Nigeria had also enacted a patent law during this 
period which prohibited patents for plant varieties, and (ii) there were also no 
discussions about plant variety protection in Nigeria prior to the commencement 
of the TRIPS negotiations.38   
 
During TRIPS Negotiations (1986-1994)  
 
In stark contrast to India and Thailand, there were also no discussions about plant 
variety protection in Nigeria during the TRIPS negotiations. In other words, neither 
the seed companies nor CSOs pushed for a plant variety protection system in 
Nigeria at that time. Although foreign seed companies such as Pioneer Hi Bred 
Seed also commenced operations in Nigeria from the 1980s, these companies 
started pulling out of Nigeria by the early to mid-1990s because of the low demand 
for improved seeds.39 Furthermore, unlike in India and Thailand, even the UPOV 
office did not organise seminars or programmes in Nigeria during this period.40  
 
Notably, Nigeria was under military regime throughout the TRIPS negotiations and 
fulfilling international obligations was not a priority.41 In addition, the military 
regime substantially curtailed CSO activities in Nigeria.42 This was to prevent 
CSOs from pushing for agendas unfavourable to the military regime. In fact, the 
military regime proscribed CSOs, particularly labour unions, professional 
                                                 
37 See Chapter 2.  
38 See Chapter 2 on the Patents and Designs Act 1970 (PDA). See also Chapter 5 on the Pre-TRIPS 
period in India and Thailand. 
39 See Chapter 2. See also Bentley, Ajayi, and Adelugba, ‘Nigeria: Clustered Seed Companies’ (n 
33) 50.  
40 See Chapter 5.  
41 WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of Legislation 
on 5-7 March 2002 (8 June 2004) IP/Q/NGA/1, IP/Q2/NGA/1, IP/Q3/NGA/1, IP/Q4/NGA/1, 2-3.  
42 For discussions on CSOs in Nigeria, see generally, Matthew Todd Bradley, ‘Civil Society and 
Democratic Progression in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations’ 
(2005) 1(1) Journal of Civil Society 61; Darren Kew and Modupe Oshikoya, ‘Escape from Tyranny: 
Civil Society and Democratic Struggles in Africa’ in Ebenezer Obadare (ed), The Handbook of 
Civil Society in Africa (Springer 2014) 14-16. 
262 
 
associations, and indeed, anyone that attempted to criticise its policies or undertake 
public demonstrations.43 For example, Oladele Giwa, a vocal investigative 
journalist and founding editor of Newswatch magazine, was killed after receiving 
a letter bomb which bore the seal of the Presidency, marked: ‘to be opened by the 
addressee only.’ Oladele Giwa spoke against the oppressive military regime, 
particularly criticising the government’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank assisted Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP, 
introduced in 1986, reformed Nigeria’s foreign exchange system, trade policies, 
and agricultural regulations.44 
 
The Nigerian government introduced the SAP because the oil boom, following the 
discovery of oil in the late 1960s, was short-lived. By the 1980s, there was a sharp 
fall in international oil prices, and Nigeria’s export revenues fell with it.45 
Meanwhile, with the discovery of oil, the Nigerian government neglected the 
agriculture sector to depend on oil revenue – a quintessential case of the Dutch 
disease.46 As discussed in the preceding section, the Nigerian governments had 
introduced capital-intensive agricultural policies, plans, and programmes from the 
1970s. With the fall in oil prices, Nigeria’s primary source of revenue declined, 
thus the SAP was introduced to address the challenges posed by the fall in oil 
revenues and to steer the economy on the path of steady growth.47 It aimed to 
reduce public sector dominance and intensify the growth potentials of the private 
                                                 
43 Remi Aiyede, ‘The Dynamics of Civil Society and the Democratization Process in Nigeria’ 
(2003) 37(1) Canadian Journal of African Studies 1, 7. 
44 For SAP in Nigeria, see generally, John Anyanwu, ‘President Babangida’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme and Inflation in Nigeria’ (1992) 7(1) Journal of Social Development in Africa 5; Paul 
Mosley, ‘Policy-Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment 
Policies in Nigeria 1985-1990’ (1992) 91(363) African Affairs 227; Adebayo Olukoshi (ed), The 
Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (James Curry Ltd 1993); The World  Bank,  ‘Nigeria -
Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and Impact’ (World Bank Report No 
13053-UNI, 13 May 1994)  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/pdf/multi0page.pdf> accessed 
29 August 2017 (‘Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program’).  
45 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program’ (n 44) vii.  
46 Dutch disease is a term in economics that refers to the negative consequences arising from large 
increases in the value of a country’s currency, primarily associated with natural resource discovery 
such as oil and decline in other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. The World Bank, 
‘Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program’ (n 44) vii. 
47 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program’ (n 44) vii.  
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sector.48 In particular, SAP reduced government funding in agriculture, leading to 
increased costs of agricultural inputs.  
 
Although SAP was unpopular because it reduced certain public sector subsidies, 
its deregulation and liberalisation principles re-oriented the Nigerian economy. For 
example, it created awareness about the importance of diversifying the economy – 
through agriculture and other sectors – which is still a key part of the Nigerian 
government’s national policy to date. Furthermore, SAP shifted the government’s 
agriculture policies from public sector driven projects, to private sector-led 
projects.  
 
Consequently, while Nigeria – along with India, Thailand, and other Global South 
countries – pushed for creative sui generis systems during the TRIPS negotiations, 
there was silence in this regard within Nigeria.49 However, from the above, it is 
apparent that Nigeria focused primarily on restructuring its economy during this 
period. Nigeria was also mired in political instability during this period; between 
1983 and 1994, it had three military coups, two attempted coups, and an interim 
government.50 Whereas India and Thailand had both drafted plant variety 
protection Bills by the end of the TRIPS negotiations in 1994, Nigeria had no 




The entry into force of TRIPS on 1 January 1995, including the obligation to 
protect plant varieties, did not change the plant variety protection status quo in 
Nigeria. One can imagine why implementing an international obligation to protect 
plant varieties was not a priority at this time - the country was basically unstable. 
                                                 
48 Shehu Yahaya, ‘State versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State’ in 
Adebayo Olukoshi (ed), The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (James Curry Ltd 1993) 
18-19.  
49 See Chapter 5.  
50 See generally Julius Ihonvbere, ‘Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of 
Democratisation in Nigeria’ (1996) 34(2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 193-225 (‘Are 
Things Falling Apart?’). 
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Indeed, the political tensions in the country heightened from 1995 to 1998. The 
military dictator at the time – General Sani Abacha – assumed authoritarian 
control.51 He sought to retain power and had zero tolerance for oppositions. Julius 
Ihonvbere notes that Abacha’s strategy to retain power included:  
 
…divide civil society by playing groups against each other; bribe, 
misinform, and co-opt; intimidate the leaders of protests and their 
organisations into silence; contain restless communities, especially 
minorities across the country; rehabilitate discredited politicians and retired 
military leaders; continue the system of graft, waste, and mismanagement; 
consolidate the power of the armed forces; and postpone the transition to 
civil rule for as long as possible.52 
 
In line with the above strategy, there was a series of civilian imprisonments and 
executions during this period. For example, Moshood Abiola, winner of the 
annulled 1993 Presidential election who was arrested and charged with treason, 
eventually died in custody in 1998, while his wife Kudirat Abiola who campaigned 
for his release was assassinated in 1996.53 CSOs and activists who criticised the 
military regime were not left out. Ken Saro-Wiwa, an environmental rights activist 
who campaigned against environmental damage in the oil-rich Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria, was executed by hanging in 1995.54 This execution led to Nigeria’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations for over three years.55 While 
                                                 
51 ibid 211-12. 
52 ibid 206. 
53 Chief Moshood Abiola was charged with treason for declaring himself Nigeria’s lawfully elected 
President.  
54 Ken Saro-Wiwa, who founded an environmental rights organisation in 1990 – the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People – was executed along with eight other activists, namely Barinem 
Kiobel, John Kpunien, Baribor Bera, Saturday Dobee, Felix Nwate, Nordu Eawo, Paul Levura, and 
Daniel Gbokoo. 
55 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) suspended Nigeria from the 
Commonwealth from 11 November 1995 to 29 May 1999, on grounds of serious violation of the 
principles set out in the Harare Declaration (including the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa). The 
suspension excluded Nigeria from receiving Commonwealth technical assistance and prevented 
government representatives from participating in intergovernmental Commonwealth meetings and 
events. The Commonwealth, ‘Nigeria suspended from the Commonwealth’  
<http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/nigeria-suspended-commonwealth> 
accessed 05 September 2017.  
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General Abacha died of a heart attack in 1998, another military dictator – General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar – took over power. It was only in 1999 that Nigeria 
returned to civilian administration.  
 
Remarkably, although Nigeria’s transition from a military regime to civilian 
administration in 1999 created a more conducive climate for CSOs activism, it did 
not yield any developments to plant variety protection. Johnson Ekpere explains 
that after TRIPS entered into force, he tried to get Nigerian CSOs involved in 
pushing for a sui generis plant variety protection system,56 but the CSOs were 
mostly uninterested.57 It is argued that the CSOs’ apathy for plant variety 
protection in Nigeria is also traceable to the absence of the circulation of ideas or 
lobbies to promote pro-UPOV plant breeder’s rights at the time. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Indian and Thai CSOs push for farmers’ and community rights was 
in response to the government’s moves towards a plant breeder’s rights system.58  
Indeed, Indian CSOs such as Gene Campaign and Navdanya were established to 
circulate ideas about farmers’ and community rights to counter the circulation of 
ideas on plant breeder’s rights during the TRIPS negotiations.59 Thus, since there 
were no pro-UPOV plant breeders’ rights pressures in Nigeria, the CSOs did not 
have any ideas to counterbalance. 
 
In sum, by the 1 January 2000 deadline for implementing TRIPS obligations 
(including the obligation to protect plant varieties), there was still silence in this 
regard in Nigeria. Put differently, both pro-UPOV plant breeders’ rights and pro-
farmers’ rights actors were mute. It was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 that during 
this period, Nigeria and other Global South countries elucidated their preference 
for a sui generis plant variety protection at the TRIPS Council in anticipation of 
                                                 
56 As stated in Chapter 4, Johnson Ekpere was actively involved in drafting and promoting the 
African Model Law. Incidentally, he is also Nigerian. The author’s personal communication with 
Johnson Ekpere (January 2017). 
57 The author’s personal communication with Johnson Ekpere (n 56). 
58 See Chapter 5.  
59 ibid. See also Navdanya, ‘Our History’ <http://www.navdanya.org/about-us/our-history> 
accessed 24 August 2017; Gene Campaign, ‘About Us’ <http://genecampaign.org/about-us/> 
accessed 24 August 2017.  
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the mandated Article 27.3(b) review.60 Although the anticipated review failed to 
take place, it was also discussed in Chapter 4 that Nigeria, along with the other 
African countries, designed the African Model Law.61 Nonetheless, Nigeria’s 
active regional and global sui generis plant variety protection activism was not 
translated into a national law. However, as will be seen in 6.2 and 6.3 below, the 
plant variety protection landscape in Nigeria post-TRIPS deadline is gradually 
changing.  
 
6.2. Plant Variety Protection Variations in the Global South: Nigeria? 
 
The discussion above shows that the plant variety protection landscape in Nigeria 
was silent even up to the 2000 TRIPS implementation deadline. This part further 
analyses plant variety protection in Nigeria, using key factors that influence 
variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South as teased out from 
Chapters 4 and 5. It is important to discuss these factors in the Nigerian context 
because the Global South have a common position at the TRIPS Council which 
promotes a creative sui generis system that incorporates alternative principles such 
as farmers’ rights alongside access and benefit sharing principles.62 Yet, as seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5, there is a difference between Global South WTO members’ 
‘rhetoric’ at the TRIPS Council and their actions at home. In other words, there is 
a difference between what Global South WTO members ‘say’ at the global level, 
and what they actually ‘do’ at the national level in response to the plant variety 
protection obligation under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. The factors that contribute 
to the variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South as teased 
out from Chapters 4 and 5 are trade agreements, regional associations, pressure 
from seed companies, UPOV office lobbies, and CSOs activism. The first four 
factors contribute to the Global South WTO members’ accession to the UPOV 
1991 Convention, while the last factor contributes to the design of sui generis plant 
                                                 
60 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
61 See Chapter 4.  
62 See Chapter 3. 
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variety protection systems in the Global South.63 These factors are discussed in 
turn. 
 
Trade Agreements: G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
 
The G8 NAFSN, launched in May 2012, seeks to create conditions to improve 
agricultural productivity and to develop the agri-food sector in Africa by attracting 
private investment in agriculture.64 African governments participating in the 
NAFSN, including Nigeria, are required to commit to developing or revising 
national polices.65 African governments are further required to implement certain 
commitments, termed the ‘New Alliance Commitments’ and to develop ‘Country 
Cooperation Frameworks’ (CCFs) which set out national policy commitments. 
CCFs include the creation of business-friendly environments, the removal of fiscal, 
regulatory, and administrative barriers to trade of agricultural commodities, and 
regulatory reform in the seed sector to strengthen IPRs of plant breeders.66 In 
particular, countries participating in the NAFSN are obliged to commit to 
introducing seed laws modelled on the UPOV 1991 Convention, which will 
facilitate the dissemination of ‘improved’ or ‘high yielding’ seeds to farmers.67  
 
Unlike Tanzania which expressly committed to joining the UPOV 1991 
Convention in its CCF, Nigeria’s CCF states that:  
 
                                                 
63 See Chapters 4 and 5.  
64 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) <https://new-alliance.org/> accessed 24 
August 2017.  
65 Nigeria is one of the 19 African governments that have joined the NAFSN. Others are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania. 
Nigeria joined NAFSN in 2013. See generally, NAFSN, ‘Nigeria’ <https://new-
alliance.org/country/nigeria> accessed 25 August 2017.  
66  NAFSN, ‘Cooperation Framework to Support the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
in Nigeria’ <https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/new-alliance-progress-report-
coop-framework-nigeria_compressed.pdf> accessed 24 August 2017 (‘Cooperation Framework to 
Support the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Nigeria’). 
67 Oliver De Schutter, New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department 
EP/EXPO/B/DEVE/2015/01, November 2015) 27. 
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It intends to pursue policy goals in order to build the confidence of domestic 
and international private sector to significantly increase agricultural 
investments.68  
 
In response, Nigeria’s first policy goal was: 
 
To increase private sector participation in the production and distribution 
of seed and fertilizer in Nigeria.69  
 
To achieve this goal, Nigeria committed to pass and implement seed laws to 
facilitate private sector participation in seed development, multiplication, and 
marketing.70 Although Nigeria did not pass a plant variety protection law in 
response to this commitment, it passed the Biosafety Management Act in 2015, 
which regulates the use of modern biotechnology, including genetically modified 
technologies in Nigeria.71 Apart from the NAFSN, Nigeria does not have further 





Similarly, Nigeria has no regional affiliations requiring it to accede to the UPOV 
1991 Convention. It is not a member of any of the regional organisations that has 
acceded – or is in the process of acceding to the UPOV 1991 Convention. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, these organisations are OAPI, African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organisation (ARIPO), and Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).72 As Nigeria is an anglophone country, ARIPO – which was formed to 
harmonise IPRs systems in anglophone Africa – appears to be the most likely 
regional IPRs organisation choice. However, Nigeria has simply maintained its 
                                                 
68 NAFSN, ‘Cooperation Framework to Support the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
in Nigeria’ (n 66) 2.  
69 ibid 4.  
70 ibid.  
71 National Biosafety Management Agency Act 2015.  
72 See Chapter 4.  
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observer status in ARIPO.73 As the two leading African economies of Nigeria and 
South Africa are not members of the two regional IPRs organisations ARIPO and 
OAPI, there are ongoing discussions at the African Union (AU) to establish a 
harmonised IP organisation for Africa called the Pan African Intellectual Property 
Organisation (PAIPO).74 Caroline Ncube notes that Nigeria and South Africa’s 
absence from ARIPO and OAPI have been cited as the justification for establishing 
PAIPO.75 Discussions about the establishment of PAIPO are still on-going, thus its 
status in relation to a regional plant variety protection system in Africa is yet to be 
clarified. 
 
While Nigeria does not have an IPRs policy which can be consulted to decipher its 
reason for not joining ARIPO, insights for its non-membership to a regional IPRs 
organisation can be gained from its general approach to IPRs. Apart from 
copyrights which is the most vibrant IPRs subject matter in Nigeria, there is limited 
activity regarding industrial property and sui generis rights such as patents, 
trademarks, and plant variety protection.76 As highlighted in Chapter 2, Nigeria’s 
first post-colonial Trade Marks and Patents Act, enacted in 1965 and 1970 
respectively, are still in force to date.77 Thus, it can be surmised that industrial 
property and sui generis rights are not national priorities. In sectors such as trade 
in goods and services where Nigeria is both active and has key influencers, it has 
joined relevant regional organisations to promote its interests. For example, 
Nigeria is a member of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), which was established to facilitate economic integration in West 
                                                 
73 African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO), ‘About Us’  
<http://www.aripo.org/about-aripo/membership-member-states> accessed 4 September 2017.  
74 African Union (AU), ‘Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 30-31 January 
2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ <https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/29514-
assembly_au_dec_588_-_604_xxvi_e.pdf> accessed 04 September 2017. See also Caroline B 
Ncube and Eliamani Laltaika, ‘A New Intellectual Property Organization for Africa?’ (2013) 8(2) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 114-17; Yeukai Mupangavanhu, ‘African Union 
Rising to the Need for Continental IP Protection? The Establishment of the Pan-African Intellectual 
Property Organization’ (2015) 59(1) Journal of African Law 1-24; Caroline Ncube, Intellectual 
Property Policy, Law and Administration in Africa: Exploring Continental and Sub-Regional Co-
operation (Routledge 2016) 126-39 (Intellectual Property Policy, Law and Administration in 
Africa). 
75 Ncube, Intellectual Property Policy, Law and Administration in Africa (n 74) 68-69.  




Africa.78 Indeed, Nigeria alone accounts for about 76 per cent of the total trade in 
the ECOWAS region.79 As Nigeria does not have pressures from regional 
associations, possible pressures from private seed companies and the UPOV office 
are discussed next.   
 
Private Seed Companies and UPOV Office Lobbies 
 
Unlike the Kenyan, Indian, and Thai examples in Chapters 4 and 5, seed companies 
or seed associations have not circulated pro-plant breeders’ rights ideas in 
Nigeria.80 Seed companies and associations have not organised national seminars 
or workshops on plant variety protection in Nigeria. In fact, the only workshop on 
plant variety protection in Nigeria was organised by public sector agriculture 
research institutes at the National Cereals Research Institute (NCRI), Badeggi, on 
14 December 2010.81 This workshop was organised to ‘create awareness on IP 
issues, rights and obligation and to discuss the prospects of establishing IPRs 
policies in the NCRI and other agriculture research institutes.’82 Over 80 officials 
from agricultural research institutes, universities, and relevant government 
ministries attended the workshop. Importantly, the convenor of the workshop, 
Catherine Abo, advocated for the enactment of a plant and animal variety 
protection system in Nigeria, as well as IPRs offices in the NCRI and other 
agriculture research institutes.83 This workshop was the first to discuss plant variety 
protection in Nigeria, however it did not result in any legal changes or national 
debates. 
                                                 
78 Nigeria is one of the 15 West African member states of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). It is a founding member of ECOWAS, which was established on 28 
May 1975 through the treaty of Lagos. The other 14 ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. ECOWAS <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-
information/> accessed 05 September 2017.  
79 ECOWAS, ‘Trade’ <http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/trade/> accessed 05 September 
2017.  
80 See Chapters 4 and 5.  
81 See generally, Catherine H Abo, John Abah and Nahemiah Danbaba (eds), Proceedings of the 
National Workshop on Intellectual Property: Issues, Rights and Obligations (National Cereals 
Research Institute (NCRI), Badeggi, Nigeria, 2010) (Proceedings of the National Workshop on 
Intellectual Property).  




Furthermore, although post-SAP policies in Nigeria have focused on promoting 
private sector participation in agriculture, as mentioned above, the low demand for 
improved seeds in Nigeria resulted in the closure of seed companies. However, 
Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture from 2010 to 2015, Dr. Akinwumi Adeshina, 
revitalised the agriculture sector by introducing projects to promote farmers’ access 
to seeds and input, such as the Growth Enhancement Support (GES) scheme.84  
Furthermore, Adeshina’s agriculture policy – the Agriculture Transformation 
Agenda (2011-2015), which the current Agricultural Promotion Policy (2016-
2020) builds on – promotes a private sector-led agricultural industry.85 These 
agriculture policies revived the interest of multinationals in Nigeria’s agriculture 
sector. Multinationals that contributed to pushing for plant variety protection 
systems such as Monsanto, Dupont-Pioneer, and Syngenta have resumed 
operations in Nigeria.86 Zidafamor Jimmy, the Deputy Director for Seed 
Production at the National Agricultural Seeds Council of Nigeria, explains that 
certain multinationals have questioned the absence of a plant variety protection 
system in Nigeria.87 Although there are no records of multinationals pushing for 
plant breeder’s rights in Nigeria, it can be surmised that Nigeria’s isolation from 
UPOV pressures may not last long given precedents in other Global South 
countries.  
 
For now, UPOV official records show that its activities in Nigeria are limited. In 
fact, a thorough search of the up-to-date UPOV website reveals that one of the few 
records of the UPOV office’s direct engagement in Nigeria was a sub-regional 
workshop on the ‘Use of IPRs System for the Promotion of Innovation and 
                                                 
84 Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), ‘Growth Enhancement 
Scheme’ <http://fmard.gov.ng/growth-enhancement-support-scheme-gess/> accessed 05 
September 2017. 
85 FMARD, ‘Agriculture Transformation Agenda: 2011-2015’; FMARD, ‘Agriculture Promotion 
Policy: 2016-2020’.  
86 See for example, Monsanto, ‘Monsanto in Africa’  
<http://www.monsantoafrica.com/who_we_are/monsanto_in_africa.asp> accessed 24 August 
2017; Dupont-Pioneer, ‘Nigeria’ <https://www.pioneer.com/home/site/about/business/contact-
us/middle-east-africa/nigeria/> accessed 24 August 2017; Syngenta, ‘Nigeria’ 
<https://www4.syngenta.com/contacts> accessed 24 August 2017.  
87 The author’s personal communication with Zidafamor Jimmy, Deputy Director for Seed 
Production at the National Agricultural Seeds Council of FMARD (March 2017).  
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Technology Transfer for Agriculture and Food Production in West Africa’ held in 
Abuja, Nigeria from 5 to 7 November 2003.88 UPOV officials participated in this 
meeting, which was organised by the Centre regional Africa de la technologie 
(CRAT) in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
and with financial support from the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD).89 Further search of the UPOV website reveals that the 
UPOV office has not organised any follow-up or further meetings in Nigeria. The 
next section discusses CSOs, which were identified in Chapter 5 as significant 
contributors to pushing for creative sui generis systems in the Global South.  
 
Civil Society Organisations  
 
CSOs in Nigeria’s agricultural sector were inactive with regard to plant variety 
protection during the TRIPS negotiations as seen in 6.1 above. This position has 
not changed to date. Indeed, of the CSO representatives interviewed during the 
fieldwork for this thesis, only one interviewee – Dr. Olaseinde Arigbede, National 
Coordinator of the Union of Small and Medium Scale Farmers of Nigeria 
(USMEFAN) – was aware of plant variety protection.90 USMEFAN is a Nigerian 
                                                 
88 UPOV, Plant Variety Protection (No 96, December 2003) 18  
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_438_96.pdf> accessed 20 June 2017 (Plant 
Variety Protection). However, participants from Nigeria attended - (i) a training session on UPOV 
at the 18th International Course on Plant Variety Protection organised by Naktuinbouw in 
Wageningen, Netherlands on 16 June 2015. (ii) the UPOV office’s presentation on the 
‘Implementation of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ at 
the WIPO-WTO Colloquium for Teachers of Intellectual Property on 23 June 2015. (iii)  the UPOV 
office’s presentation on ‘The Protection of Plant Varieties and the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)’ at the WIPO University of Geneva Summer School 
on Intellectual Property on 26 June 2015. See: International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, ‘Forty-Ninth Ordinary Session Geneva, 29 October, 2015- Report on Activities 
During the First Nine Months of 2015’ (C/49/3, 6 October 2015). 
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_49/c_49_3.pdf> accessed 20 June 2017. 
89 ibid.  
90 Six representatives from four CSOs were interviewed during the fieldwork: Femi Oke, Chairman 
of the Lagos chapter of All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) (Lagos, 2015); Ike Ubaka, 
National President of AFAN (Abuja, 2015); Akin Gbadamosi, Secretary General of the Federation 
of Agricultural Commodity Associations of Nigeria (FACAN) (Abuja, 2015); Prince Peter Bakare, 
Deputy Executive Secretary of FACAN (Abuja, 2015); Segun Adewumi, President of the Cassava 
Growers Association of Nigeria (CGAN) (Abuja, 2015); and Dr Arigbede, National Coordinator of 




CSO actively involved in promoting small-scale farmers’ interests at the local, 
national, and international levels.91 Arigbede points out that: 
 
Farmers’ rights, community rights and even breeder’s rights are not taken 
up by the Nigerian government. The public does not have knowledge or 
awareness about these issues… Any law-maker in the National Assembly 
can push for provisions inimical to our [farmers and farming communities] 
interests. Our struggle is both at home and abroad... I was in India for a 
while. They have progressed beyond us. They have dedicated institutions 
to protect and promote plant variety protection…92 
 
Although Arigbede is passionate about promoting Nigerian small-scale farmers’ 
interests, he notes that one of his main handicaps in pushing for farmers’ interests, 
including farmers’ rights in Nigeria, has been the lack of funding both to participate 
in the global debates and to lobby at the national and local levels.93 He asserts that: 
 
Our governments never funded us to attend meetings. I remember Obasanjo 
[Nigeria’s President from 1999-2007] openly said I will not give CSOs 
money, go and find your money, that is what we faced. There were 
meetings we attended and those who funded had the temerity to stand up 
and say Dr. Arigbede, if you take this position, you will never be asked to 
attend these meetings, and of course we stood up to say – ‘thank you very 
much’, but we are not anxious to come to meetings where we are short-
changed…. Unfortunately, once you do not fund yourself, you are 
handicapped. Even your organisation is threatened if you take too trenchant 
a position- a people rooted position. Even your brothers and sister Africans 
turn on you and say ‘listen, we are here to make progress please, can you 
drop your political issues at home?’ 94  
                                                 
91 Fieldwork interview with Dr Olaseinde Arigbede, National Coordinator of USMEFAN 
(Gbongan, 2015) (transcript on file with author).  
92 ibid. 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid.  
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Notwithstanding its funding limitations, thanks to Arigbede’s dedication and 
passion, USMEFAN is well-known as a small-scale centred organisation at both 
national and international forums.95 Arigbede notes that USMEFAN operates with 
little outside funding and few employees, but it has networks with farmers in 22 
states across Nigeria.96 It has collaborated or established relations with 
organisations such as IFAD, Oxfam-Novib, Network of Professional Agricultural 
Producers of West-Africa (ROPPA), and Agriterra.97  
 
The other CSOs interviewed, including the All Farmers Association of Nigeria 
(AFAN), the Federation of Agricultural Commodity Associations of Nigeria 
(FACAN), and the Cassava Growers Association of Nigeria (CGAN), were neither 
aware about nor involved in promoting farmers’ rights issues.98 These CSOs 
explained that they focus on topical issues affecting small-scale farmers such as 
access to quality inputs, access to credit, storage facilities, processing to prevent 
post-harvest losses, as well as access to domestic and international markets.99  
 
Apart from the CSOs’ focus on small-scale farmers’ day-to-day issues, it is 
important to point out the divergences and tensions amidst CSOs in Nigeria’s 
agriculture sector. Whereas Indian and Thai CSOs had uniting spirits such as 
Satyagraha, Sufficiency Economy philosophy, and New Agriculture theory, CSOs 
in Nigeria’s agriculture sector have no similar unifying bonds. In contrast, the 
CSOs are marked by ethnic rivalry and polarisation. The roots of Nigeria’s ethnic 
rivalry which is also reflected in the CSOs in the agriculture sector can be traced 
to the amalgamation of ethnically diverse Northern and Southern British 
protectorates for economic and administrative ease in 1914.100 It was 
                                                 
95 Agriterra, ‘Farmers Organizations in Nigeria: An Overview’ (Agriterra, June 2008) 1, 15 
<http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf_Mapping_Agricord_Nigeria_version_courte.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017 (‘Farmers’ Organizations in Nigeria’). 
96 Grain De Sel, ‘Farmers Organization Not Yet Unified in Nigeria’ (No 51, Grain De Sel, July-
September 2010) 29-30.  
97 Agriterra, ‘Farmers Organizations in Nigeria’ (n 95) 15.  
98 Conclusion derived from fieldwork interviews with Oke, Ubaka, Gbadamosi, Adewumi, and 
Bakare (n 90).  
99 ibid.  
100 See Pre-TRIPS above. See also Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann, ‘Law in Colonial Africa’ in 
Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann (eds), Law in Colonial Africa (Heinemann: James Curry 1991); 
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administratively convenient for the British colonial administration to amalgamate 
the North and South protectorates because the budget surplus derived from 
Southern Nigeria was used to offset the budget deficit in Northern Nigeria. 
Although the amalgamation united distinct regions, its peoples remained disunited.  
Apart from inter-ethnic rivalry – that is, rivalry between two or more ethnic groups, 
there were also intra-ethnic rivalries – that is, rivalries within the same ethnic 
group. For example, as will be seen below, there was rivalry between two CSO 
leaders in the agriculture sector who were both from the northern part of Nigeria, 
albeit, from different sub-ethnic groups.101 Obiora Okafor notes that while flags 
and personnel changed in Nigeria and the other African countries during their 
independence, these countries inherited flawed structural organisations.102 He adds 
that these post-colonial countries such as Nigeria failed to reconfigure themselves, 
losing the opportunity to shed their inherited illegitimacies.103 While ethnic 
diversity and colonial heritage is not unique to Nigeria, as mentioned above, 
Nigeria lacks the unifying bonds India and Thailand have. Indeed, there are limited 
points of convergence at which to articulate a national project in the country.104 
 
Prince Peter Bakare explains how the ethnic rivalries, power struggles, and 
government influence shaped CSOs in Nigeria’s agricultural sector in the 1990s.105 
                                                 
Sir Udo Udoma, History and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria (Malthouse Press Ltd 1994) 1; 
Okoi Arikpo, The Development of the Modern Nigeria (Penguin Books 1967) 26-29 and 35; T O 
Elias, Nigeria, The Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens & Sons 1967) 18. 
101 Nigeria currently has over 250 ethnic groups spread across its 36 states and Federal Capital 
Territory.  
102 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the 
Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa’ (2000) 41(2) Harvard International Law Journal 
503 and 507-511 (‘After Martyrdom’). Makau Mutua also makes similar arguments. See generally, 
Makau Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 1113.  
103 Okafor, ‘After Martyrdom’ (n 102) 507-11. It is important to note that the Ibo peoples in South-
eastern Nigeria attempted to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the late 1960s. This 
led to a civil war from 1967 to 1970, but this attempt was unsuccessful.  
104 Ihonvbere, ‘Are Things Falling Apart?’ (n 50) 201. 
105 There is a dearth of literature on this history. Two useful sources for this narrative are the 
following: (1) personal communication with Prince Peter Bakare, who gave a first-hand account of 
the historical development. He has been actively involved in the farmer organisations in Nigeria 
since the military regime. He is the former Director of Administration of AFAN and the current 
Deputy Executive Secretary of FACAN. (2) Sale Bayari, ‘Nigeria: Where is Obasanjo’s Apex 




Bakare recalls that during General Sani Abacha’s military regime (1993 to 1998), 
there was a farmers’ association called the Federation of Farmers Association of 
Nigeria (FOFAN), headed by Dr. Shettima Mustapha.106 FOFAN was a platform 
that brought together farmers to share common agrarian concerns and devise 
techniques to solve them. However, the growing membership of FOFAN was 
worrying for Abacha as he was concerned that a large unified farmers’ association 
could support his opponents and contribute to ousting his regime.107 Thus, Abacha 
directed Vice-Admiral Murtala Nyako to establish the Practising Farmers 
Association of Nigeria (PFAN), whose activities he (Abacha) could influence 
because of his close relations with Nyako.108 Farmers, attracted by the inclusion of 
‘practising’ in the new organisation, were lured to join PFAN.  
 
FOFAN and PFAN were constantly at loggerheads with regard to issues 
concerning farmers’ interests, polarising the farmers into these two groups. Ethnic 
differences between the leaders further contributed to the divisions. Although 
Mustapha of FOFAN and Nyako of PFAN are both from Northern Nigeria, 
Mustapha is ‘Hausa’ while Nyako is ‘Fulani.’ As such, Hausa farmers tended to 
align with Mustapha, while Fulani farmers supported Nyako. Rather than 
maintaining a united front to push for farmers’ interests similar to what was seen 
in India and Thailand, the Nigerian CSOs are divided by ethnic idiosyncrasies.  
 
The election of ‘President-Farmer’ Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 resulted in 
noteworthy CSO developments in the agricultural sector.109 Obasanjo, seeking to 
                                                 
106 Dr Shettima Mustapha was a former commissioner in Borno State. He was a Vice Presidential 
candidate of the Nigerian Peoples Party in 1983, and was Minister of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources from 1990 to 1992. 
107 The author’s personal communication with Prince Peter Bakare (2015). 
108 General Sani Abacha passed away on 8 June 1998, shortly after PFAN was formed. Vice-
Admiral Murtala Nyako was a Naval Officer who held many high-ranking positions, including 
Chief of Naval Operations, Flag Officer Commanding the Western Naval Command, Flag Officer 
Commanding the Naval Training Command, and Chief of Naval Staff. He has also had different 
government positions – he was the Governor of Niger State from February 1976 to December 1977. 
He was elected Governor of Adamawa State in April 2007.  
109 Olusegun Obasanjo owns one of the largest farms in Nigeria. After his two terms in office (1999-
2007), he returned to farming at Obasanjo Farms Ltd, Otta, Ogun State. Olusegun Obasanjo, ‘My 
Journey Back to the Future of African Farming’ (26 May 2016) The Africa Report 
<http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/my-journey-back-to-the-future-of-african-
farming-olusegun-obasanjo.html> accessed 30 August 2017.  
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resolve the tension between FOFAN and PFAN, suggested that they put aside their 
differences and work together in farmers’ interests.110 He further recommended 
that they merge to make it easier for the government to attend to one national CSO 
representing farmers’ interests.111  The two warring organisations, responding to 
President Obasanjo’s advice, merged to form AFAN.112 Nyako was elected 
president of AFAN, while Mustapha was elected as his first vice president. As 
such, AFAN was established as an umbrella for the different commodity-based 
associations in Nigeria.113 As one of the key farmers’ organisations that liaise with 
the Nigerian government on behalf of farmers, AFAN plays a significant role in 
the agriculture sector in Nigeria. However, as mentioned above, it is not involved 
in plant variety protection related activism. 
 
There are a variety of other CSOs in Nigeria’s agriculture sector which have 
different focuses.114 While there is no record of the exact number of CSOs in the 
agriculture sector, the CSOs can be broadly divided into five groups: 
 
(i) CSOs with a focus on advocacy 
(ii) CSOs that focus on providing financial services 
(iii) CSOs that operate only at the grass-root or local levels 
(iv) CSOs that specialise in one or more agricultural commodities 
(v) CSOs that provide special services for specific genders or age 
groups, i.e.  youth, elders, male or female-only organisations 
 
Notably, while the first group of CSOs – which includes USMEFAN – may engage 
in plant variety protection discourse as it emerges, no Nigerian CSO specialises in 
IPRs, plant variety protection, or biodiversity-related issues. Although it was 
argued in 6.1 above that the absence of pro-UPOV plant breeder’s rights pressures 
was one reason CSOs were not involved in pro-farmers’ rights movements in the 
                                                 
110 Bayari, ‘Nigeria: Where is Obasanjo’s Apex Farmers’ Body? (n 105). 
111 ibid. 
112 This was initially referred to as the All Farmers’ Apex Association of Nigeria (ALFAAN). 
113 Agriterra, ‘Farmers’ Organizations in Nigeria: An Overview’ (n 95) 15.  
114 ibid 13-32. 
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1990s, there are now plant variety protection law-making developments in Nigeria 
which CSOs ought to engage in. For example, the IPC Bill, which includes a plant 
variety protection section, was presented to the Nigerian National Assembly on 8 
June 2016.115 The plant variety protection section of the IPC Bill is analysed next. 
 
6.3 Unpacking the Industrial Property Commission Bill 
 
6.1 and 6.2 above discussed the historical context and factors that influence 
variations in plant variety protection systems in the Global South vis-à-vis Nigeria. 
While the preceding two parts provide rich insights into the plant variety protection 
status quo in Nigeria, this part illuminates a significant current development: the 
plant variety protection section in the IPC Bill. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, 
comprehensive IPRs legislations which combined distinct IPRs subject matters 
such as copyrights, trademarks, patents, and plant variety protection have been 
introduced in Nigeria.116 The Bills were not passed for reasons such as failure to 
prioritise IPRs matters on the legislative agenda, civil service officials’ aversion to 
combining copyrights with industrial property, and absence of committed actors to 
push the Bills.117 In essence, apart from contestations about substantive plant 
variety protection provisions discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, concerns about the 
configuration of IPRs legislations also arise in Nigeria. Harmonising the 
administration of distinct IPRs subject matters were the prominent concerns raised 
about the IPRs Bills introduced in Nigeria.118 The plant variety protection sections 
of these Bills were not specifically debated.  
 
The plant variety protection section of the IPC Bill is similar to the Intellectual 
Property Commission of Nigeria (IPCOM) 2008 and the other comprehensive IPRs 
                                                 
115 A Bill for an Act to Provide for the ‘Establishment of the Industrial Property Commission of 
Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap 436, LFN 1990 and Patents and Designs Act, Cap 344, 
LFN 190 and make Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of Trademarks, 
Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and Farmers’ Rights and for Related 
Matters’ (HB 16.06.640, C 3399) <http://placbillstrack.org/upload/HB640.pdf> accessed 03 
September 2017.  





Bills proposed in Nigeria.119 The plant variety protection section in these Bills are 
drawn from the African Model Law.120 Johnson Ekpere, one of the lead 
protagonists of the African Model Law, was also one of the key drafters of the 
plant variety protection section in Nigeria’s earlier IPRs Bills. Ekpere explains that 
he adopted key provisions from the African Model Law as the template for the 
plant variety protection section for Nigeria’s IPRs Bill.121 However, as will be seen 
below, the plant variety protection section of the IPC Bill differs from those in the 
previous IPRs Bills. Significantly, certain key provisions such as farmers’ rights, 
exceptions to breeders’ rights and government use are excluded from the IPC Bill. 
The exclusion of above provisions, alongside the lack of public debates about plant 
variety protection substantiates Arigbede’s remarks above about (i) the lack of 
awareness about plant variety protection issues in Nigeria, and (ii) the possibility 
of law-makers in Nigeria to push for plant variety protection Bills inimical to 
farmers’ interests.122  The substantive plant variety protection provisions of the IPC 
Bill, as well as the significant aforementioned exclusions from the Bill are 
examined in turn below.  
 
Coverage of the Law 
 
The IPC Bill provides for the protection of three types of varieties: (i) new 
varieties, (ii) extant varieties, and (iii) farmers’ varieties.123 Similar to the African 
Model Law as well as the Indian and Thai plant variety protection provisions, the 
IPC Bill fails to define new varieties. It simply provides that new varieties are 
required to meet the ‘distinct, uniform and stable’ conditions for protection 
(discussed below). Furthermore, Section 174 of the IPC Bill provides that only 
genera and species specified by the plant variety regulation established to 
implement the Bill are eligible for protection. In other words, the regulation can 
                                                 
119 IPC Bill (n 1). 
120 See Chapter 4 for the African Model Law.  
121 Fieldwork interview with Johnson Ekpere, Former Secretary-General of the Scientific, 
Technical, and Research Commission of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU/STRC) and lead 
protagonist of the African Model Law (Ibadan, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
122 Fieldwork interview with Dr Olaseinde Arigbede (n 91). 
123 IPC Bill, pt D, s 174.1(a)-(c). 
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restrict the protection of certain new plant varieties. Similarly, extant and farmers’ 
varieties are not defined in the IPC Bill. 
 
In rethinking the coverage of the Bill’s provisions, the definitions of new, extant 
varieties, and farmers’ varieties should be clarified and expressly set out. The 
Indian and Thai plant variety protection systems can provide guidelines for 
defining extant and farmers’ varieties.124 However, it is also important to tailor 
these definitions to the Nigerian context to circumvent the shortcomings of 
identifying farmers’ and extant varieties in the Indian and Thai systems as 
highlighted in Chapter 5.125  
 
Conditions for Protection 
 
Section 175 of the Bill provides conditions for the protection of the different 
categories of varieties.126 The conditions for protecting new varieties broadly 
follow the African Model Law’s distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) 
template.127 Notably, the distinctiveness condition simply provides that a variety is 
distinct if it is clearly distinguishable by at least one or more identifiable 
characteristics from other plant varieties. While similar to the African Model Law, 
this condition deviates from the UPOV 1991 Convention by introducing at least 
one or more identifiable characteristics. However, the IPC Bill fails to define 
identifiable characteristics. For example, should they be characteristics that 
contribute to the principal features, performance, or value of the plant variety under 
assessment? Specifying the identifiable characteristic provision could promote 
breeding and protecting improved varieties with special agronomic characteristics, 
not merely aesthetic or cosmetic features.128  
 
                                                 
124 See Chapter 5. 
125 ibid. 
126 IPC Bill, s 175. 
127 See Chapter 4. 
128 For example, the Indian plant variety protection system provides for agronomic distinctions.  
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Similar to the Indian plant variety protection system, the IPC Bill sets out further 
provisions for registering new varieties. Section 179.1 of the IPC Bill provides that 
applications for registering varieties are required to include provisions such as:  
 
(i) A complete passport data of the parental lines from which the 
variety was derived, along with the geographical location from 
where the genetic material was taken and all such information 
relating to the contribution, if any, of any farmer, village, 
community, institution, or organisation in breeding, evolving, or 
developing the variety. 
 
(ii) A declaration that the genetic materials or parental material 
acquired for the breeding, evolving, or developing the variety was 
lawfully acquired.129 
 
These two provisions are disclosure of origin and prior informed consent 
requirements, which prevent unauthorised use of genetic materials to develop new 
varieties. Ikechi Mgbeoji points out that these additional conditions of registration 
ensure that while Nigeria fulfils its TRIPS obligation, it also incorporates standards 
that limit exploitation of genetic materials.130 In particular, the disclosure of origin 
and prior informed consent application requirements facilitate the identification of 
farmers’ or farming communities’ plant materials used to develop new varieties. 
This identification can then lead to negotiation of appropriate benefit sharing 
agreements.  
 
Extant varieties are also required to meet the DUS conditions.131 However, the IPC 
Bill provides that the application of these conditions to extant varieties will be 
further clarified in the plant variety protection regulations. It is suggested that the 
plant variety protection regulations should relax the uniform and stable conditions 
                                                 
129 See IPC Bill, s 179 for other application requirements.  
130 Fieldwork interview with Ikechi Mgbeoji (Lagos, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
131 IPC Bill, s 175.2. 
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for registering extant varieties, as extant varieties which are already in the public 
domain are usually less uniform and stable than new varieties. India’s plant variety 
protection regulations can provide guidelines for this.132  
 
Furthermore, the IPC Bill states that farmers’ varieties ‘may not have to meet the 
distinct, uniform and stable conditions.’133 Section 173.2 of the IPC Bill simply 
provides for farmers and farming communities to identify varieties with specific 
attributes.134 Like the African Model Law, the condition for registering farmers’ 
varieties in the IPC Bill is vague.135 Notably, the IPC Bill fails to mention the types 
of specific attributes farmers’ varieties are required to have to qualify for 
registration. This should be clarified by defining the conditions for ‘identifiability.’ 
The tentative language included in the section – ‘may’ – should be deleted, as 
similar to extant varieties, farmers’ varieties are usually less uniform and stable 
than new varieties. Inclusion of the tentative language provides a loophole that 
could prevent the registration of farmers’ varieties.  
 
Scope of Protection 
 
Section 185.1 of the IPC Bill grants breeders of annual crops exclusive rights over 
a new variety for a duration of 10 years, while breeders of trees, vines, and other 
perennials are granted protection for a duration of 15 years.136 Breeders of these 
varieties or their successors, agents, or licensees have exclusive rights to produce, 
sell, market, distribute, import, or export the variety.137 Notably, these periods of 
protection are shorter than those stated in the African Model Law, which provides 
20 years for annual crops and 25 years for trees.138 Similarly, these periods are 
shorter than the duration of protection for new varieties in both the Indian and Thai 
plant variety protection systems. As previously discussed, India protects new 
                                                 
132 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority India, ‘Plant Variety Registry 
Related Information’ <http://plantauthority.gov.in/PVR.htm> accessed 03 September 2017.  
133 IPC Bill, s 173.2.  
134 IPC Bill, s 173.2.  
135 African Model Law, pt V and ch 4. 
136 IPC Bill, s 185.1.  
137 IPC Bill, s 186.  
138 African Model Law, art 34.  
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varieties of annual crops for an initial duration of six years, but allows renewal for 
up to 15 years, while Thailand provides protection for 12 years.139 As plant 
breeding is a time and resource consuming process, the short duration of protection 
may discourage investment in breeding new varieties in Nigeria.  
 
It is important to note that Section 185 simply provides for ‘duration of breeder’s 
rights.’140 Similarly, Section 186 of the IPC Bill provides that ‘a certificate of 
registration for a variety issued under this Act shall confer an exclusive right on 
the breeder or his successor, his agent or licensee, to produce, sell, market, 
distribute, import or export the variety or breed.’141 No provision in the IPC Bill 
defines who a breeder is or specifies which category of varieties this duration or 
scope of rights applies to. Thus, it can be concluded that the duration of breeders’ 
rights and scope of protection set out in Sections 185 to 187 of the IPC Bill applies 
to all categories of varieties: new, extant, and farmers’ varieties. The African 
Model Law does not provide guidelines in this regard, as it also does not set out 
the duration of protection for farmers’ and communities’ varieties.142  
 
Protection of farmers’ and extant varieties under the Indian and Thai plant variety 
protection systems also differ. While the Indian plant variety protection system 
provides for exclusive IPRs for farmers’ and extant varieties, the Thai plant variety 
protection system provides IPRs only for local domestic varieties. For wild plant 
varieties and general domestic varieties, the Thai plant variety protection system 
contains access and benefit sharing provisions – otherwise known as liability rule 
– instead. In other words, anyone who desires to use protected wild plant varieties 
and general domestic varieties for commercial purposes are required to request for 
permission from the competent national authority, which permission is granted 
subject to a benefit sharing agreement.143  
 
                                                 
139 See Chapter 5.  
140 IPC Bill, s 185.  
141 IPC Bill, s 186. 
142 See Chapter 4.  
143 See Chapter 5.  
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Ruth Okediji favours the adoption of liability rules for farmers’ varieties and extant 
varieties in Nigeria, rather than exclusive IPRs.144 Okediji explains that due to 
Nigeria’s large land mass – 923,768 square kilometres – and possible challenges 
in identifying the exact farmers, farming communities, or research institutions that 
developed farmers’ or extant varieties, it is better to adopt the liability rule 
approach. With the liability system, anyone who wants access to registered 
farmers’ or extant varieties would pay an agreed benefit sharing amount for such 
varieties.145 For his part, Ikechi Mgbeoji points out that famers and farming 
communities should engage in defensive registration of farmers’ varieties and 
extant varieties. He explains that ‘if as many local varieties as possible are 
registered, even if the rights are not exercised, at least it stops commercial breeders 
and seed companies from claiming and registering those varieties.’146 This thesis 
proposes a mixture of both suggestions above for Nigeria. That is, protection of 
farmers and extant varieties, as well as a comprehensive access and benefit sharing 
structure to compensate for use of farmers’ and extant varieties.147  
 
The scope of protection, along with the other plant variety protection provisions in 
the IPC Bill are similar to the previous IPCOM and other IPRs Bills. However, the 
IPC Bill is strikingly different as it excludes farmers’ rights and breeder’s rights 
exceptions, as will be seen next.            
 
Plant Variety Protection: Intellectual Property Commission Bill 2008 and 
Industrial Property Commission Bill 2016 
 
This section discusses three important exclusions from the IPC Bill, namely: 
farmers’ rights, exceptions to breeders’ rights, and government use in turn. 
 
First, the IPC Bill excludes farmers’ rights provisions that were in the IPCOM and 
previous IPRs Bills. For example, Section 203.1(d) of the IPCOM Bill provides for 
                                                 
144 Fieldwork interview with Ruth Okediji (via Skype, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
145 Fieldwork interview with Okediji (n 144). 
146 Fieldwork interview with Mgbeoji (n 130). 
147 Suggestions on access and benefit sharing is discussed further below. 
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farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed or propagating 
material of farmers’ varieties.148 This provision formally allows the sale of 
farmers’ varieties in Nigeria.149 It was discussed in Chapter 2 that the NCVLBA 
and the National Agricultural Seed Act (NASA) provisions both exclude the 
registration and commercialisation of farmers’ varieties.150 Thus, the express 
provisions for the sale of farmers’ varieties in the IPCOM Bill officially allows 
small-scale farmers to commercialise their traditional varieties. This provision thus 
preserves small-scale farmers’ control over their livelihood and gives force of law 
to the small-scale farmer-managed informal seed system.151 This provision could 
incentivise small-scale farmers to innovate. As seen in the Indian example in 
Chapter 5, the Indian plant variety protection system provides for farmers’ rights 
to save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share, or sell farmers’ varieties.152 The Indian 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority further grants awards 
to farmers and farming communities that have conserved and developed farmers’ 
varieties. 153 This incentive, in addition to the protection of farmers’ varieties, 
promotes small-scale farmers’ plant variety innovation in India.  
 
Similarly, Section 203.1(f) of the IPCOM Bill provides for farmers’ rights to ‘save, 
use, multiply and process farm saved seed of protected varieties.’154 Nonetheless, 
Section 203(2) of the IPCOM Bill prohibits farmers from selling farm-saved seed 
or propagating materials of breeders’ protected varieties on a commercial scale.155 
Thus, similar to commercial breeders’ access to farmers’ varieties, this provision 
                                                 
148 Emphasis added. The emphasis here is to distinguish these farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange, 
and sell farm-saved seed or propagating material of farmers’ varieties from the similar rights to 
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150 See Chapter 2.  
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153 India grants three types of awards to incentivise small-scale farmers: (i) Plant Genome Saviour 
Community Award; (ii) Plant Genome Saviour Farmer Reward; and (iii) Plant Genome Saviour 
Farmer Recognition. See Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority India 
<http://plantauthority.gov.in/index.htm> accessed 04 September 2017.  See also Chapter 5. 
154 Emphasis added. IPCOM Bill, s 203.1(f). The protected varieties here refer to the new plant 
varieties. See (n 148) above. 
155 IPCOM Bill, s 203(2). 
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also accords farmers the rights to save, use, multiply, and process seeds of 
protected varieties.  
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the prevalence of small-scale farming in Nigeria 
makes this farmers’ rights provision important for the country.156 With this 
provision, farmers are entitled to select and adapt farm-saved seeds of protected 
varieties to their local agro-climatic conditions. Section 203 further provides for 
farmers to obtain equitable share of benefits arising from the use of their plant 
genetic resources.157 These farmers’ rights which collectively seek to 
counterbalance plant breeder’s rights were deleted from the IPC Bill. 158 
 
Second, the IPC Bill excludes private use and research exceptions to breeder’s 
rights that were in the IPCOM and previous IPRs Bills. Section 189 of the IPCOM 
Bill allows use of protected varieties for (i) acts done privately and on a non-
commercial scale, and (ii) scientific research, experiments, and teaching.159 The 
private and non-commercial use allows farmers to use the protected varieties on 
their holdings, such as to produce food consumed by the farmer and the farmers’ 
dependents. The research exemption allows use of protected varieties for scientific 
research, including experiments to test or improve the variety as well for teaching 
purposes. This exception to breeders’ rights is important not only to protect small-
scale farming practices, but also to promote scientific research in Nigeria. 
Considering the plant breeding research activities undertaken in public research 
institutes and seed companies in Nigeria, this research exemption is invaluable to 
the country. In fact, even the UPOV 1991 Convention, which was established to 
strengthen plant breeder’s rights, provides that compulsory exemption to breeders’ 
rights includes acts done for private, non-commercial, and experimental 
purposes.160 
 
                                                 
156 See Chapter 3. 
157 IPCOM Bill, s 203.1(b).  
158 See IPCOM Bill, s 203 for the full list of farmers’ rights. 
159 IPCOM Bill, s 189.  
160 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 15.  
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Third, the IPC Bill excludes the provision regarding the Nigerian government’s 
power to use protected varieties and to grant compulsory licences when it is in the 
public’s interest that was in the IPCOM and previous IPRs Bills. Section 191 of 
the IPCOM Bill gives the Nigerian government the power to authorise anyone to 
purchase, import, or produce registered varieties when it is in the public’s interest 
to do so.161 Public interest includes concerns regarding food security, nutrition, 
health, biological diversity, and the development of any other vital sector of the 
economy.162 Similarly, Section 192 of the IPCOM Bill gives the Nigerian 
government the power to grant any qualified applicant compulsory licences to 
produce or sell the protected variety if the variety is not available to the public at a 
reasonable price.163 Similar to the preceding paragraph, the UPOV 1991 
Convention provides for compulsory licences to protect public interests, albeit 
subject to equitable remuneration of the breeders whose rights are limited.164 
Without doubt, these government interventions are important to protect Nigerians, 
as they prioritise public interests by ensuring access to plant varieties.  
 
One important provision absent in the IPC Bill and previous IPRs Bills is benefit 
sharing. While the IPCOM Bill provides for farmers’ rights to obtain equitable 
benefit sharing from the use of their genetic resources as mentioned above, the 
benefit sharing process and distribution mechanism was not clarified. Questions 
about benefit sharing as provided in the IPCOM Bill include the following: how 
are farmers and farming communities alerted about use of farmers’ varieties and 
extant varieties? How can farmers and farming committees make claims about 
breeders’ use of their plant genetic resources to develop new varieties? How are 
benefits derived from the use of these farmers’ and farming communities’ plant 
genetic resources disbursed? The ITPGRFA, the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, as 
well as India’s plant variety protection system can provide guides for these benefit 
sharing concerns. In particular, India’s plant variety protection system provides for 
                                                 
161 IPCOM Bill, s 191.  
162 IPCOM Bill, s 191.  
163 IPCOM Bill, s 192. Further details of the compulsory licence provisions are set out in Sections 
192 to 198 of the IPCOM Bill.  
164 UPOV 1991 Convention, art 17. Section 196 of the IPCOM Bill also provides for ‘reasonable 
compensation to the breeder.’ 
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a National Gene Fund, where benefit sharing received from the use of registered 
varieties and revenues obtained from fees and royalties, among others, are 
deposited.165 The Fund is then used to support farmers’ and farming communities’ 
activities, such as conservation of plant genetic resources.166  
 
The exclusion of the above provisions from the IPC Bill means it focuses solely on 
(commercial) plant breeder’s rights. While it was previously noted that the plant 
variety protection section of the IPC Bill (like the previous IPRs Bills introduced 
in Nigeria) was inspired by the African Model Law, the deletion of the above 
farmers’ rights provisions and exceptions to breeders’ rights deviates from the 
underlying rationale for the African Model Law, which – as discussed in Chapter 
4 – was to protect the interests of farmers, farming communities, and commercial 
breeders.167 Thus, while the IPC Bill provides a sui generis plant variety protection 
system, this was not the type of sui generis system envisioned by Nigeria along 
with the other Global South WTO members at the TRIPS Council.168 In fact, the 
IPC Bill provides a sui generis system skewed in favour of commercial breeders, 
which is even more restrictive for small-scale farmers than the UPOV 1991 
Convention. 
 
The only provisions favourable to small-scale farmers in the IPC Bill as it is 
currently worded are provisions for registering farmers’ and extant varieties set out 
in Sections 173 to 175. Even these provisions lack substantive details which may 
hinder their implementation. Therefore, it is argued that it would be a disservice to 
the small-scale farmers in Nigeria who substantially contribute to the seed sector 
if the IPC Bill is passed in its current form. In addition, the exclusion of government 
use and compulsory licences could pose risks in the event of monopolistic 
practices, national emergencies, or extreme urgencies. The question for law and 
policy makers in Nigeria is: what is the vision for enacting a plant variety 
protection system in Nigeria?   
                                                 
165 Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act 2001, s 45. 
166 ibid.  
167 See Chapter 4.  





This chapter has provided a further analysis on plant variety protection in Nigeria, 
building on the background set out in Chapter 2. To do this, the chapter employed 
insights from TWAIL (which draws attention to historical and politico-economic 
factors that shape plant variety protection law-making), as well as regime complex 
theory (which draws attention to the avenues through which overlapping legal 
regimes can shape plant variety protection laws at the national level). The TWAIL 
and regime complex theory insights, along with the discussions of the analytical 
frames devised from Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to the original analysis on plant 
variety protection in Nigeria presented in this chapter. 
 
Specifically, this chapter explored the historical and politico-economic context in 
Nigeria during the pre-TRIPS, during TRIPS, and post-TRIPS periods which 
influences the plant variety protection status quo in the country. Next, it analysed 
the factors that influenced variations in plant variety protection systems in the 
Global South, namely trade agreements, regional associations, pressure from seed 
companies, UPOV office lobbies, and CSOs activism. Finally, it unpacks Nigeria’s 
IPC Bill. These discussions are important to this thesis because they provide deeper 
insights into why Nigeria does not have a plant variety protection system, as well 
as how it can design and introduce the creative sui generis system suited to it. As 
such, it contributes to answering the second central research question posed in the 
thesis.  
 
This chapter has found that while other Global South WTO members such as India 
and Thailand responded to the obligation under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS by 
introducing Bills during the TRIPS negotiation period (1986 to 1994), Nigeria had 
other national realities that contributed to its inaction in implementing TRIPS. In 
particular, the country was under an authoritarian military administration which 
did not prioritise the implementation of international laws. As a corollary, the 
country was basically unstable; in fact, political instability reached its peak in the 
1980s to 1990s in Nigeria. It experienced bouts of military coup d’états, which 
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made the political terrain volatile. Furthermore, the fall in oil prices in the 1980s 
negatively affected the Nigerian economy, which heavily relied on the oil export 
revenue. Thus, the Nigerian government sought to introduce programmes such as 
the SAP to stabilise the economy. It was these national economic and political 
issues that were the primary preoccupation in the country at the time when India 
and Thailand were discussing plant variety protection. Notably, with the return to 
civilian administration and gradual stabilisation of the economy from 1999, the 
silent plant variety protection landscape in Nigeria did not change.  
 
Further analysis of the factors that have influenced variations in plant variety 
protection systems in the Global South within the Nigerian context shows that 
Nigeria does not expressly have trade agreements, regional associations, pressure 
from seed companies, and UPOV office lobbies, unlike the examples of African 
WTO members in Chapter 4. However, this situation may not remain the same for 
long for two reasons. First, Nigeria is part of the NAFSN under which it committed 
to reform its seed laws, albeit without specifying plant variety protection. Second, 
Nigeria’s agriculture policy promotes a private-led agriculture sector which has 
promoted the involvement of national and multinationals in the country’s 
agriculture sector, which may lead to the circulation of ideas on pro-UPOV plant 
breeders’ rights in the country.  
 
Yet, CSOs in Nigeria’s agriculture sector have limited awareness about farmers’ 
rights and plant variety protection in general. In addition, unlike India and Thailand 
where the CSOs have unifying spirits, the CSOs in Nigeria’s agriculture sector 
have none; rather, they have a history of rivalry. In fact, the plant variety protection 
provisions in the IPC Bill introduced in 2016 presents an opportunity for the CSOs 
to circulate ideas about the importance of farmers’ rights and exceptions to 
breeders’ rights. This is where the CSOs’ limited awareness about plant variety 
protection-related issues becomes glaring. The other two glaring issues arising 
from the IPC Bill is the general lack of public debates about the IPC Bill, as well 
as the non-existent IPRs policy in Nigeria. Implications of these loopholes are 
highlighted in the next chapter.  
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The next chapter concludes the thesis. It revisits the central and subsidiary research 
questions posed in this thesis, summarises the major findings, sets out 
recommendations for Nigeria and the Global South vis-à-vis plant variety 
protection, and proffers suggestions for future research. Overall, the next chapter 
will conclude that this thesis is timely and offers a useful way forward for Nigeria. 
This is because Nigeria still has the opportunity to introduce the creative sui 
generis plant variety protection system proposed which simultaneously protects 
interests of small-scale farmers and seed companies (commercial plant breeders), 










Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
 
This thesis analysed plant variety protection in the Global South, using Nigeria as 
a case study. Nigeria, along with other Global South WTO members, have an 
obligation to protect plant varieties under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, but Nigeria is 
yet to fulfil its obligations. Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS offers choice; it allows for 
WTO members to protect plant varieties through patents, an effective sui generis 
system, or a combination of systems. Global South WTO members express 
preference for the sui generis option at the TRIPS Council. However, there are 
variations in the translation of this Global South preference at the national level. 
While TRIPS does not refer to the UPOV 1991 Convention, Global South WTO 
members are increasingly acceding to it. The thesis explored the variations in plant 
variety protection in the Global South, to provide lessons for Nigeria. The thesis 
examined the African Group WTO members to understand how and why the 
UPOV 1991 Convention is proliferating within Africa. It also examined India and 
Thailand to understand how and why they were able to successfully introduce 
creatively designed sui generis systems as advocated for at the TRIPS Council. 
Therefore, this thesis is concerned with (i) plant variety protection laws – that is, 
what option under Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS is best suited to Nigeria; and (ii) plant 
variety protection law-making – that is, how can Nigeria introduce such system? 
 
The thesis employed TWAIL and regime complex theory as methodological lenses 
for its analysis.1 As discussed in the methodology section of Chapter 1, TWAIL is 
a critical legal approach that engages with international law from the perspective 
                                                 
1 See 1.3: ‘Methodology’ in Chapter 1. For TWAIL, see for example, Makau Mutua, ‘What is 
TWAIL?’ (2000) The American Society of International Law Proceedings of the 94th Annual 
Meeting, Washington DC 31 (‘What is TWAIL?’); James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History 
of its Origins, Its Decentralized Network and A Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3(1) Trade Law 
and Development 26 (‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins’). For regime complex theory, see 
for example, Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ 
(2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 39 (‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property 
System’); Kal Raustiala and David Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ 
(2004) 58(2) International Organization 277 (‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’).   
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of the Third World.2 TWAIL emphasises the importance of broad historical 
analysis as a way to understand the present and to rethink the future.3 Significantly, 
TWAIL adopts a narrative approach to legal writing. It seeks to produce narratives 
and counter-narratives that reflect the interests of the underrepresented or 
marginalised peoples in the Global South, which in this thesis focuses on small-
scale farmers. In essence, TWAIL seeks to produce alternative knowledge about 
international law by sharing Third World experiences and aspirations.  
 
TWAIL played two significant roles in this thesis. First, it provided the broad 
historical awareness to understand plant variety protection at the national, 
international and global levels. For example, the historical perspective helped to 
map out a rich analysis of plant variety protection in Nigeria as seen in Chapter 6. 
Second, TWAIL helped in understanding how ‘international law is made from 
below’; that is, how CSOs contribute to law-making at the national level, and how 
these national laws are gradually expanding the interpretation of international law 
as seen in Chapter 5. This attention to the reforms at the national level underscored 
the importance of learning from the plant variety protection law-making in India 
and Thailand. Without a doubt, exploring the plant variety protection law-making 
in other Global South countries provided useful insights for the analysis on plant 
variety protection in Nigeria in this thesis.  
 
While TWAIL narratives and counter-narratives illuminate the perspectives, 
interests, and aspirations of Third World peoples, it is argued that it is insufficient 
to fully unpack plant variety protection as envisaged in this thesis. This is because 
beyond the obligation to protect plant varieties set out in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, 
there are further conflicting legal systems and principles in an array of partially 
overlapping non-hierarchical institutions governing plant variety protection. While 
this thesis is grounded in TWAIL, it adopted the regime complex theory as a 
supplementary methodological lens to highlight particular nuances in its analysis 
                                                 
2 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 1) 31-32; Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins’ (n 1) 34- 
38.  
3 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 1) 31.  
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of the interactions between the inconsistent regimes governing plant variety 
protection. 
 
Regime complexes are marked by the existence of several conflicting legal systems 
and principles that are created and maintained in distinct fora with the participation 
of different sets of actors.4 While TRIPS is a starting point for the obligation to 
protect plant varieties in this thesis, other relevant legal systems and principles 
governing plant variety protection are set out in the UPOV Conventions, the CBD, 
the ITPGRFA, as well as in bilateral and regional trade or investment agreements.5 
As such, the regime complex theory provides insights into the ways in which actors 
interact with the overlapping legal regimes relevant to plant varieties.6  
 
The regime complex theory played two significant roles in this thesis. First, it 
provided insights to horizontal and vertical regime shifting.7 Horizontal regime 
shifting involves moving treaty negotiations, law-making initiatives, or standard-
setting from one venue to another.8 For example, Global South actors moved 
horizontally from the WTO to the FAO and the CBD to push for specific plant 
variety protection related principles such as farmers’ rights, as well as access and 
benefit sharing principles.9 On the other hand, vertical regime shifting involves 
moving from multilateral venues to bilateral venues covering the same subject 
matter (such as trade or IPRs). For example, Global North actors, including the 
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have moved vertically from the 
WTO to bilateral trade agreements in a bid to push for UPOV plant breeders’ 
rights, as noted in the preceding paragraph.10 
 
                                                 
4 Raustiala and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 1) 279. 
5 See Chapter 3 for discussions on the different legal systems and principles. 
6 Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (n 1) 40.  
7 See Chapter 1. Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Law Making’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 
13-18 (‘Regime Shifting’); Peter K Yu, ‘International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and 
Intellectual Property Schizophrenia’ (2007) 1 Michigan State Law Review 1, 15-16 (‘International 
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia’). 
8 Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting’ (n 7) 14. 
9 See Chapters 1 and 3. 
10 See Chapter 4. 
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Second, and as a corollary, the regime complex theory provides insights into the 
fragmentation of the institutions relevant to plant variety protection at the 
international and global levels, which is also reflected at the national level.11 This 
fragmentation of institutions results in conflicting broadly worded legal systems 
and principles, as ‘it is extremely difficult to work out the fine detail of all 
contingencies ex ante.’12 For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the TRIPS 
obligation to protect plant varieties is broadly worded.13 While it provides three 
options – patents, sui generis, or combination of systems – it does not clarify what 
constitutes a sui generis system.14 Similarly, as also seen in Chapters 3, the 
provisions on farmers’ rights are not defined in the ITPGRFA as the negotiators 
were unable to agree on a definition because farmers’ situations and interests 
differed.15 Therefore, these broadly worded legal systems and principles are either 
shaped or constrained through implementation at the national level.  
 
For some actors – particularly Global North countries – regime complexity 
provides the ‘cover’ to design preferred legislations.16 That is, with the existence 
of a variety of agreements relating to one subject matter, a country can choose to 
implement their preferred implementation of treaty obligations.17 While for other 
countries, particularly Global South countries, regime complexity enables the 
creation of ‘mandatory rules’ that eliminate or constrain the implementation of 
                                                 
11 See Chapters 1 and 3. From the background on Nigeria in Chapter 2, it was seen that at the 
national level, the different government ministries with mandates to implement the obligations 
under TRIPS, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA are the ministries of trade, agriculture, environment, and 
justice. Yet, there is a lack of synergy amongst these ministries and their departments, parastatals, 
and agencies. See also table 2.1.  
12 See Chapter 3 for the discussions about the legal systems and principles relevant to plant variety 
protection. See also Raustiala and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (n 
1) 302. 
13 See Chapter 3. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 For example, the United States (US) grants both patents and sui generis rights for plant varieties, 
while the European Union (EU) developed the UPOV Conventions which were tailored to suit their 
industrialised plant breeding systems. See Chapter 1 for the origins of plant variety protection at 
the national and international levels. See also Helfer, Regime Shifting in the International 
Intellectual Property System’ (n 1) 40-41. 
17 For example, the US grants both patents and sui generis rights for plant varieties, while the EU 
developed the UPOV Conventions which were tailored to suit their industrialised plant breeding 




preferred systems (or alternative systems or principles).18 As such, the salient 
characteristics of the regime complex for plant varieties are regime shifting, 
fragmentation, incoherence, and inconsistency.19  
 
In combining TWAIL with regime complex theory insights above, the thesis 
presents an original analysis on plant variety protection in Nigeria. The thesis 
breaks new ground by uncovering why Nigeria does not have a plant variety 
protection system, why it ought to have one, what type of system is best suited to 




















                                                 
18 This could be done through international organisations lobbies, pressure from industry, and 
bilateral or regional agreements as highlighted in the preceding paragraph. See Chapter 4. See also 
Helfer, Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (n 1) 40-41. 
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7.1. Main Findings 
 
To start with, the thesis posed these research questions: 
 
Central research questions:  
 
Considering the obligation for all WTO members to protect plant varieties 
set out in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, what type of plant variety protection 
system is best suited to Nigeria?  
 
Cognisant of the Global North-Global South narratives and counter-
narratives, alongside the interconnections between Article 27.3(b) of 
TRIPS, the UPOV Convention, the CBD, and the ITPGRFA, how can 
Nigeria design and introduce such plant variety protection system which is 
best suited to it? 
 
Subsidiary research question: 
Why are Global South WTO members increasingly adopting the UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system despite their advocacy at the TRIPS Council 
for sui generis systems that incorporate access and benefit sharing as well 
as farmers’ rights principles? 
 
These central and subsidiary research questions are important to understand the 
plant variety protection system best suited to Nigeria, as well as how it can design 
and introduce such a system. This is important because Nigeria still has pending 
obligations to protect plant varieties under TRIPS. Furthermore, Global South 
WTO members that collectively express preference for a creatively designed sui 
generis system at the TRIPS Council are increasingly joining UPOV. Thus, the 
thesis seeks to understand plant variety protection law-making and laws in the 




The TWAIL and regime complex methodological lenses provide original 
contribution to literature on plant variety protection. The narrative approach 
adopted using the TWAIL lens revealed insights that other mainstream Global 
North analytical approaches do not. As seen below, the thesis has revealed how 
historical, political, and economic dynamics contribute to the materialisation of 
plant variety protection systems in the Global South. In extension, these dynamics 
explain the absence of a plant variety protection system in Nigeria. The regime 
complex lens revealed insights to strategies that constrain the implementation of 
preferred plant variety protection systems in the Global South, such as vertical 
regime shifting. That is, bilateral trade agreements through which Global South 
countries are pressured to adopt specific ‘TRIPS plus’ agreements, such as the 
UPOV 1991 Convention.  In addition to the original methodological contribution, 
the thesis provides original empirical and analytical contribution to the literature 
on plant variety protection. The empirical findings from the semi-structured 
interviews in Nigeria alongside the novel analytical framework developed20 
contribute to the first comprehensive analysis of the plant variety protection 
landscape in Nigeria presented in this thesis. 
 
The combination of these original insights result in the main findings set out below. 
 
The thesis found that a sui generis plant variety protection system is best suited to 
Nigeria. This is because it provides the flexibility to protect the interests of 
different stakeholders, including small-scale farmers and commercial plant 
breeders, while incorporating provisions relevant to its national interests such as 
farmers’ rights alongside access and benefit sharing from the ITPGRFA and the 
CBD.21 In other words, the sui generis option provides the latitude for Nigeria to 
creatively design a TRIPS-compliant system contoured to suit Nigeria’s current 
realities.22 Importantly, with the sui generis option, Nigeria can take a positive 
                                                 
20 Factors that contribute to plant variety protection law-making in the Global South: trade 
agreements, regional associations, pressure from seed companies, UPOV office lobbies, and civil 
society activism.  
21 See Chapter 3 for the Plant Variety Protection Options under TRIPS. 
22 See Chapter 2 for a background on Nigeria which maps out the formal and informal seed sector 
in the country. Nigeria has about 80 per cent small-scale farmers and over 134 seed companies. 
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action to introduce its own home-grown plant variety protection system, without 
the restrictions set out under the UPOV 1991 Convention.23  
 
However, the thesis found that the translation of this proposed sui generis system 
into domestic legal architecture is not a straightforward process. Indeed, the 
proposed sui generis system aligns with Nigeria’s and other Global South WTO 
members’ advocacy for sui generis systems at the TRIPS Council, yet lessons from 
the select Global South countries studied revealed that the translation of their 
rhetoric into domestic legal architecture has varied.24 This allowed the thesis to 
make some speculations on plant variety protection law-making in the Global 
South. In addition to national historical and politico-economic dynamics, the thesis 
found that factors such as bilateral trade agreements, regional associations, 
pressure from private seed companies, UPOV office lobbies, and civil society 
activism have influenced the variations in plant variety protection systems in the 
Global South.25  
 
The first three factors have influenced African Group WTO members such as 
Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia, along with the 17 African 
Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) members, to accede to the UPOV 1991 
Convention.26 Although Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS does not mention the UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system as ‘the’ sui generis system, bilateral trade agreements 
with the US or the EU have specifically required countries such as Morocco and 
Tunisia to join UPOV.27 Thus, despite the existing African Model Law which sets 
out comprehensive guidelines for African countries seeking to design sui generis 
                                                 
23 This would be the case if Nigeria joins UPOV.  
24  See Chapters 4 and 5. The Global South countries studied were African countries that are 
members of the African Group, as well as India and Thailand. 
25 See Chapters 4 and 5. See also the analysis of these factors in the Nigerian context in Chapter 6. 
26 See Chapter 4.  See also UPOV, ‘Status in Relation to the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants as of 20 March 2017’  
<http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/status.pdf> accessed 06 September 2017 
(‘Status in Relation to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants as of 
20 March 2017’). 
27 See Chapter 4. 
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systems, African countries and regional organisations are increasingly joining 
UPOV.28  
 
In addition to the African UPOV members mentioned above, the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) – which has 19 members – has 
initiated the process of acceding to the UPOV 1991 Convention.29 In this regard, 
ARIPO adopted the Arusha Protocol in July 2015. Similarly, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) – which has 15 members – has sought the help 
of the UPOV office in drafting its plant variety protection protocol.30 ARIPO and 
SADC have a combined membership of 26 countries,31 while ARIPO, SADC, and 
OAPI have a combined membership of 43 countries. Thus, if ARIPO and SADC 
join UPOV, over 80 per cent of African countries would be UPOV members.32 
This reflects the extensive influence regional associations have on the proliferation 
of the UPOV 1991 Convention in Africa.33 
 
Meanwhile, CSOs have contributed to the design of sui generis plant variety 
protection systems in Global South WTO member states such as India and 
Thailand.34 What was unique about India and Thailand was that although they had 
pressures similar to the African Group members, the vibrant CSOs in these 
countries countered these pressures.35 For example, while the pro-plant breeders’ 
rights proponents in India such as the Seed Association of India and the UPOV 
office organised a seminar on plant variety protection which promoted the UPOV 
plant breeder’s rights system, pro-farmers’ rights CSOs also organised a counter 
                                                 
28 ibid. Organisation of African Unity’s Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources 2000 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/oau/oau001en.pdf > accessed 28 July 2017 (African 
Model Law). 
29 UPOV, ‘Status in Relation to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
as of 20 March 2017’ (n 26). 
30 ibid. 
31 Eight countries are members of both organisations: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
32 Africa has 54 countries.  
33 See Chapter 4.  




dialogue to promote a sui generis system.36 The CSOs also circulated ideas about 
farmers’ rights through rallies, protests, and media campaigns. Similarly, CSOs in 
Thailand protested against the Thai government’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
negotiations with the US and the EU respectively because these agreements 
included requirements for Thailand to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention.37  
 
Significantly, although India and Thailand are ethnically diverse, the CSOs in these 
countries have unifying spirits. As such, the CSOs significantly shaped the sui 
generis plant variety protection systems in these countries.38 Indian CSOs have 
Mahatma Gandhi’s Satyagraha, while Thai CSOs have King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej’s Sufficiency Economy philosophy and New Theory. In essence, India 
and Thailand had vibrant CSOs in the agriculture sector, as well as unifying forces 
which prompted them to collectively promote small-scale farmers’ interests. The 
CSOs demystified plant variety protection-related issues, creating awareness about 
it in a way the small-scale farmers understood. Furthermore, the CSOs collaborated 
with international CSOs to promote their national and local advocacy. This shows 
the role of CSOs in shaping the exemplary sui generis plant variety protection 
systems in India and Thailand. As such, it contributes to answering the subsidiary 
research question concerning the reasons for contradiction between Global South 
WTO members’ position at the TRIPS Council and their implementation of article 
27.3(b) of TRIPS at the national level.  
 
                                                 
36 ibid. See also Shaila Seshia, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights: Law-Making and 
Cultivation of Varietal Control’ (6-12 July 2002) Economic and Political Weekly 37(27) 2741, 
2744; M S Swaminathan and Vineeta Hoon, ‘Methodologies for Recognising the Role of Informal 
Innovation in the Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources: An Interdisciplinary 
Dialogue’ (M S Swaminathan Research Foundation for Research on Sustainable Agricultural and 
Rural Development, CRSARD Madras, Proceedings No 9, 1994)  
<http://eprints.icrisat.ac.in/13165/1/RP-9914.pdf> accessed 12 August 2017.  
37 See Chapter 5. Biodiversity Sustainable Agriculture Food Sovereignty Action Thailand 
(BIOTHAI), ‘Fighting FTAs: The Experience in Thailand’ (October 2007)  
<http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/fightingFTA-en-Hi-2-b-experience-in-thailand.pdf> accessed 
23 August 2017; Genetic Resources Action International Network (GRAIN), ‘Thai Farmers and 
Civic Groups Protest UPOV Lobby’ (19 November 2013)  
<https://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4833-thai-farmers-and-civic-groups-protest-upov-
lobby> accessed 23 August 2017.  
38 See Chapter 5. 
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The thesis found that while countries such as India and Thailand were debating and 
designing sui generis plant variety protection systems in the 1990s, Nigeria was 
basically unstable.39 Nigeria had its first main economic crisis in the early 1980s 
after the fall in oil prices.40 This led to the introduction of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) from 1986 to 1993.41 Furthermore, Nigeria was under a series 
of military dictatorships in the 1990s, which involved coups and attempted coups. 
Thus, unlike India and Thailand, fulfilling international obligations – such as the 
plant variety protection obligation under TRIPS – was not a priority for Nigeria in 
the 1990s.42  
 
Although Nigeria’s transition to civilian administration in 1999 returned stability 
to the country, there were no changes to the plant variety protection status quo. An 
analysis of the factors that influence variations in plant variety protection systems 
in the Global South reveals that Nigeria has not directly experienced any of the 
pressures that influence UPOV membership. In addition, Nigeria lacks vibrant 
CSOs that contribute to the design of sui generis systems. One key insight from 
this finding is that Nigeria is actually in a position to introduce a sui generis plant 
variety protection system suited to its national interests without having to resist 
pro-UPOV plant breeders’ rights pressures.43 Accordingly, in answer to the central 
research questions, this thesis makes a case for Nigeria to proactively introduce the 
sui generis plant variety protection system proposed.  
 
Notably, the plant variety protection situation in Nigeria may not remain the same 
for long. This is because Nigeria has certain agriculture-related agreements and 
                                                 
39 See Chapter 6. 
40 See generally, Ebenezer Ugorji, ‘Privatization/Commercialization of State-Owned Enterprises in 
Nigeria: Strategies for Improving the Performance of the Economy’ (1995) 27(4) Comparative 
Political Studies 537-60.    
41 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria -Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and 
Impact’ (World Bank Report No 13053-UNI, 13 May 1994) (‘Nigeria – Structural Adjustment 
Program’) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/pdf/multi0page.pdf> accessed 
29 August 2017. 
42 See Chapter 6. 
43 Unlike India and Thailand which had to counterbalance the pro-UPOV plant breeders’ rights 
activists. See Chapter 5.  
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policies such as the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) 
and the Agricultural Promotion Policy: 2016-2020 (APP) which promote private 
sector-led agriculture.44 From the precedents in other Global South countries such 
as Kenya, the active participation of private seed companies, especially 
multinationals, can lead to a push for a UPOV 1991 Convention-styled plant 
variety protection system in Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria has an IPRs Bill – the 
Industrial Property Commission (IPC) Bill 2016 – which includes plant variety 
protection provisions.45  
 
Unlike in India and Thailand, the plant variety protection part of this IPC Bill has 
not been subject of public discourse.46 In fact, there is no public awareness about 
the plant variety protection provisions in this Bill. A number of reasons contribute 
to this. First, there is limited awareness about plant variety protection in Nigeria.47 
The few CSOs and academics that understand plant variety protection debates have 
not created awareness about this subject in Nigeria. Second, plant variety 
protection provisions are set out in one part of the IPC Bill – Part D.48 As such, it 
is not as prominent as a distinct plant variety protection Bill. Third, with the 
similarly structured IPRs Bills introduced in the past, debates about IPRs reforms 
have focused on concerns about merging the different IPRs subject matters, that is, 
copyrights, trademarks, and patents, not on the plant variety protection provisions 
of the Bill.49 Although there have been unsuccessful attempts at IPRs reforms in 
                                                 
44 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition <https://new-alliance.org/> accessed 24 August 
2017 (NAFSN); Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), The 
Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016-2020): Building on the Successes of the ATA, Closing Key 
Gaps (Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2016) <http://fmard.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/2016-Nigeria-Agric-Sector-Policy-Roadmap_June-15-2016_Final.pdf> 
accessed 17 July 2017.  
45 ‘A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Industrial Property Commission of 
Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap 436, LFN 1990 and Patents and Designs Act, Cap 344, 
LFN 1990 and make Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of Trademarks, 
Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and Farmers’ Rights and for Related 
Matters’ (HB 16.06.640, C 3399) <http://placbillstrack.org/upload/HB640.pdf> accessed 03 
September 2017 (IPC Bill). This Bill was presented in Nigeria’s National Assembly on 8 June 2016.  
46 See Chapter 6. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 See Chapter 2.  
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Nigeria since the 1980s, the IPC Bill may be different as the pharmaceutical sector, 
interested in patents reforms in Nigeria, is actively involved in pushing for it.50  
 
In sum, the thesis makes a case for Nigeria to proactively introduce the sui generis 
system proposed.  This is because Nigeria does not currently have express pressure 
to accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention, unlike the other Global South WTO 
members examined. Therefore, a positive action should be taken to introduce the 
sui generis system which protects small-scale farmers and commercial breeders, as 
well as national interests.51 With this sui generis system, Nigeria will fulfil its 





As this thesis has shown, the sui generis option under TRIPS provides the 
flexibility to design a plant variety protection system suited to Nigeria’s realities. 
With the insights from the analysis in this thesis developed from using TWAIL and 
regime complex, the following recommendations are made. Although the 
recommendations are tailored to Nigeria, they can also provide useful insights for 
other Global South WTO members. On reflection, this thesis also sets out 
recommendations on how to rethink the regime complex for plant variety 






                                                 
50 The author’s personal communication with Hon Chime Oji Agu, who presented the Bill at 
Nigeria’s National Assembly. Other stakeholders that have been involved in pushing for industrial 
property law reform in Nigeria include the Intellectual Property Lawyers Association of Nigeria, 
Section on Business Law of the Nigerian Bar Association, and the Anti-Counterfeit Coalition of 
Nigeria.  





Civil Society Organisations  
 
CSOs are the main actors that contribute to the design of a creative sui generis 
plant variety protection system at the national level. However, there is limited 
awareness among Nigerian CSOs about plant variety protection. The thesis 
recommends that Union of Small and Medium Scale Farmers (USMEFAN), along 
with academics who understand the plant variety protection debates, should create 
awareness about plant variety protection related issues through seminars, 
workshops, policy briefs, media campaigns, and rallies in Nigeria. The CSOs and 
academics should also build alliances with regional and international CSOs such 
as the African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), the Genetic Resources Action 
International Network (GRAIN) and the Gaia Foundation to monitor and 
contribute to plant variety protection law-making process in Nigeria.52 In 
particular, it is important for the CSOs to set aside ethnic rivalries and any other 
forms of differences to work collectively to promote a plant variety protection 
system that protects small-scale farmers’ interests. Significantly, the CSOs and 
academics should ensure that the IPC Bill is not passed into law in its current form.  
 
Industrial Property Commission Bill 
 
This thesis recommends comprehensive amendments to the plant variety protection 
part of the IPC Bill.53 First, the thesis suggests a reincorporation of the breeders’ 
rights exemptions, farmers’ rights, government use, and compulsory licence 
provisions that were in Sections 188 to 208 of the Intellectual Property 
Commission (IPCOM) Bill 2008. The exclusion of these provisions means that this 
Bill provides unrestricted plant breeders’ rights. Second, the thesis suggests the 
incorporation of access and benefit sharing provisions which include the contents 
                                                 
52 African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) <https://acbio.org.za/> accessed 07 September 2017; 
GRAIN <https://www.grain.org/> accessed 07 September 2017; the GAIA Foundation 
<http://www.gaiafoundation.org/> accessed 07 September 2017.  
53 See discussions on the Bill in Chapter 6. 
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of a benefit sharing agreement and mechanisms for disbursing such benefits to 
farmers. In this regard, the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol can provide useful guides 
for Nigeria. Third, the thesis suggests the incorporation of a comprehensive section 
that defines the key terms used in the Bill. For these, the texts of the CBD, the 
ITPGRFA, the African Model Law, the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (PPVFRA), and the Thai Protection of Plant Varieties 
Act 1999 can provide useful guides for Nigeria.  
 
This thesis further recommends changes to the institutional structure proposed in 
the IPC Bill. Section 11 of the IPC Bill provides for the establishment of a plant 
variety protection registry as a department within the IPC.54 The IPC is to generally 
supervise the administration and enforcement of IPRs laws in Nigeria.55 It consists 
of four departments, namely (i) the Patents and Designs Registry, (ii) the 
Trademarks Registry, (iii) the Administration and Finance Department, and (iv) 
the Planning, Research, and Statistics Department.56 Instead of placing the plant 
variety protection registry in the IPC, the thesis recommends that a plant variety 
protection registry or office be established as an institution under the Agriculture 
and Rural Development. (FMARD). This is because the FMARD, which generally 
oversees agriculture and rural development, is better placed to oversee ‘plant 
variety’ - related issues than the IPC, which has a narrow focus on IPRs. 
 
This thesis suggests that the FMARD establish a Plant Variety Protection Office 
that exclusively oversees plant variety protection. This Plant Variety Protection 
Office would be responsible for processing plant variety protection applications. 
Since the conditions for registering plant varieties include the ‘distinct, uniform 
and stable’ tests, the Plant Variety Protection Office would liaise with the National 
Centre for Genetic Resources and Biotechnology (NACGRAB), an agency under 
the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology (FMST) and the National 
Agriculture Seed Council (NASC), an agency under the FMARD. NACGRAB and 
                                                 
54 IPC Bill, s 11(c).  
55 IPC Bill, s 4.  
56 IPC Bill, s 11(c).  
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NASC have experience with testing plant varieties for these conditions.57 
However, it is important to clarify the mandates of the Plant Variety Protection 
Office, particularly with regard to access and benefit sharing, which may cause 
tensions with other government ministries such as the Federal Ministry of 
Environment (FME) and FMST. Overall, the Plant Variety Protection Office 
should promote plant variety conservation and improvement in Nigeria in 
collaboration with relevant government institutions. A detailed IPRs policy which 
protects national interests could contribute to achieving the above, as 
recommended below. 
 
Intellectual Property Policy 
 
This thesis recommends that it is important for Nigeria to develop a national IPRs 
policy. Such a policy would clarify Nigeria’s vision in all IPRs sectors including 
plant variety protection. It is this policy that would determine the objectives 
Nigeria seeks to achieve with its IPRs laws. As such, Nigeria should develop its 
IPRs policy to suit its socio-economic circumstances, technological capabilities, 
policy goals in other key sectors of the economy, and overall national goals. 
However, this would require the following. First, quantitative and qualitative 
research on the IPRs needs in Nigeria. Second, coordination among national 
institutions such as the FMARD, the FMST, the Federal Ministry of Industry Trade 
and Investment (FMITI), the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMJ), the Federal 
Ministry of Health, as well as the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture. 
Third, multidisciplinary public consultations involving:   
 
(i) Academics with specialisations in IPRs and other related 
disciplines, such as agriculture, politics, economics, development, 
health, investments, and science and technology 
 
                                                 
57 The ‘distinct, uniform and stable’ conditions are prerequisites for registering and commercialising 
new varieties in Nigeria, as set out in the National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds 
(Registration, etc) Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004) ch N27, and National Agricultural 
Seeds Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004), ch N5. 
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(ii) CSOs, legal practitioners, and stakeholders that could be impacted 
by the IPRs policies, such as farmers, farming communities, seed 
companies, research institutions, scientists, pharmaceutical 
companies, publishers, authors, and musicians 
 
It is important to note here that there is no universal IPRs policy template for 
countries. Countries’ IPRs policies vary depending on their socio-economic 
circumstances. The IPRs policy can be subject to periodic revisions to reflect a 
country’s changing circumstances. Thus, IPRs policymaking should be nuanced 
and calibrated. While it has been recommended that Nigeria conducts extensive 
consultations at the national level to develop its IPRs policy, it can also seek 
technical assistance from organisations such as WIPO. However, it is important for 
Nigeria to specifically negotiate the terms of technical assistance to ensure that it 
aligns with its national interests. This also depends on identifying and articulating 
Nigeria’s IPRs policy as well as expressly setting out its technical assistance 
requirements. Ultimately, a carefully designed national IPRs policy would clarify 
Nigeria’s objectives for reforming or introducing IPRs systems, including a plant 
variety protection system.  
 
7.2.2. Regime Complex for Plant Variety Protection 
 
First, the thesis recommends that Global South WTO members maximise the 
flexibility provided in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS. In other words, Global South 
WTO members should implement the obligation to protect plant varieties under 
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS in ways that suit their national interests and realities. 
Particular attention should be paid to avoid bilateral trade and investment 
agreements or other forms of lobbies and pressures that specify certain plant variety 
protection systems which may be unsuited to their realities, such as patents and 
UPOV plant breeders’ rights systems. At the TRIPS Council, Global South WTO 
members should maintain their common position which promotes the design of 
creative sui generis plant variety protection systems at the national level that 
incorporate provisions from the CBD and the ITPGRFA.  
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Second, this thesis recommends that one way for state and non-state Global South 
actors to rethink their sui generis plant variety protection system advocacy is to 
actually design a guide international sui generis system. This recommendation is 
proffered because of the conflicting legal systems and principles relevant to plant 
varieties (regime complex), which some Global South WTO members lack the 
capacity to reconcile in ways that are suited to their national interests. This guide 
international sui generis system should incorporate the counter-hegemonic legal 
principles Global South actors push for, such as access and benefit sharing 
(including disclosure of origin and prior informed consent) alongside farmers’ 
rights. These legal principles are currently set out in different international 
agreements, namely the CBD, the ITPGRFA, and the proposed WIPO Genetic 
Resources Treaty.  
 
The proposed international sui generis system would pull together all the relevant 
provisions in a way that is generally suited to the Global South. The rationale for 
this international sui generis plant variety protection system, similar to that of the 
African Model Law, would be to provide practical guidelines for Global South 
countries seeking to design a sui generis system. However, the proposed 
international sui generis system should not be prescriptive. In other words, Global 
South countries should be able to tailor the guidelines to suit their national realities. 
This sui generis system is important because while Global North WTO members 
can easily point to the UPOV plant breeders’ rights system as their template or 
model for a sui generis system, Global South WTO members have no similar 
international template or model to refer to.58 
 
Third, this international sui generis plant variety protection system would require 
collaboration among state and non-state actors at the regional and international 
levels. The ability of these Global South actors to develop this sui generis system 
would depend on the coordination and circulation of ideas among the Global South 
                                                 
58 Nonetheless, as seen in this thesis, the African Model Law, the Indian Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (PPVFRA), and the Thai Protection of Plant Varieties Act 
can serve as useful references for Global South WTO members. 
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actors. Furthermore, the proposed international sui generis system should be 
introduced in the United Nations (UN), which currently favours Global South 
positions vis-à-vis plant variety protection.59 Although this increases the number 
of overlapping agreements in the regime complex for plant variety protection, it 
simultaneously harmonises provisions of some of the varied treaties to present one 
comprehensive international sui generis plant variety protection model from the 
Global South. The UN agency governing this international sui generis system 
would also provide technical support and assistance to Global South countries 
seeking to design or reform national plant variety protection systems. 
 
7.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Chapter 2, which sets out a background on Nigeria, revealed that there is limited 
documentation of small-scale farmers’ varieties and traditional farming practices. 
To understand farmers’ contributions to plant variety conservation and 
improvement, it is important that further extensive multidisciplinary research be 
conducted to document farmers’ varieties of different crops, along with their 
associated farming practice or knowledge. This would create a basis for informed 
decisions on how to conserve, improve, and protect farmers’ varieties. Further 
research could also explore the possibilities and provisions of the proposed 
international sui generis plant variety protection system that carefully pulls 
together the different legal principles advocated by the Global South.  
 
Without doubt, small-scale farmers make an important contribution to agricultural 
biodiversity in Nigeria. They dominate the agricultural landscape in the country 
and predominantly produce the food consumed. As such, it is important that their 
rights are effectively protected. Nigeria still has the opportunity to proactively 
introduce a sui generis plant variety protection system that protects the interests of 
its small-scale farmers, while simultaneously protecting commercial breeders and 
fulfilling its international obligations. This is because it has no express pressure 
                                                 
59 The CBD and the ITPGRFA are legally binding UN treaties.  
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otherwise. The type of plant variety protection system introduced in Nigeria will 
shape the future of its food system. It could have an influence on small-scale 
farmers’ access to seeds, small-scale farmers’ livelihoods, and corporate control of 





























Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
 Interviewee Organisation and Position• 
1. James Magaji Farmer 
2. Danjuma Magaji Farmer 
3. Thomas Haruna Farmer 
4. John Nyawosa Farmer 
5. Reuben Danladi Farmer 
6. Moses Abila Farmer 
7. Danlami Haruna Farmer 
8. Gbenga Shoga Farmer 
9. Jimoh Obadimeji Farmer 
10. M Balogun Farmer 
11. A Olaore Farmer 
12. Usman Hassan Farmer, Director, Arewa-Kebbi 
Investments Nigeria 
13. Femi Oke Farmer, Chairman, Lagos State Chapter, 
All Farmers Association of Nigeria 
14. Prince Ike Ubaka Farmer, National President, All Farmers 
Association of Nigeria 
15. Prince Peter Bakare Farmer, Deputy Executive Secretary, 
Federation of Agricultural Commodity 
Associations of Nigeria 
16. Akin Gbadamosi Farmer, Secretary General 
Federation of Agricultural Commodity 
Associations of Nigeria 
17. Segun Adewumi Farmer, President, Cassava Growers 
Association of Nigeria 
18. Dr Olaseinde Arigbede Farmer, National Coordinator, United 
Small and Medium Scale Farmers 
Association of Nigeria 
19 Oladeinde Ayeni Editor, Food-Farm News 
20. Mariam Mayet Founder and Director, African Centre for 
Biodiversity 
21. Prof Abraham Ogunbile Managing Director, Premier Seed Nigeria 
Ltd. 
22. Interviewee A Alheri Seeds Nigeria 
23. Oladeinde Ayeni Editor, Food - Farm News 
24. Dr Olutayo Adeniyan Senior Researcher, Institute of Agricultural 
Research and Training, Obafemi Awolowo 
University 
25. Dr Chiedozie Egesi Plant Breeder/Biotechnologist, Assistant 
Director, National Root Crops Research 
Institute, Umudike 
26. Dr Godwin Asumugha Agricultural Economist/Director, National 
Root Crops Research Institute, Umudike 
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27. Prof Ike Nwachukwu Department of Agricultural Extension and 
Rural Sociology 
Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, 
Umudike 
28. Dr A O Olojede System Agronomist/Assistant Director 
National Root Crops Research Institute, 
Umudike 
29. Dr Nwofia Emeka 
 
Agronomist, Department of Agronomy 
Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, 
Umudike 
20. Dr Sunday Aladele Director and Registrar, National Centre for 
Genetic Resources and Biotechnology, 
Federal Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
31. Prof Michael Abberton  Head of the Genetic Resources Centre, 
International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture  
32. Shafiu Adamu Yuari Trademarks, Patents and Designs Registry 
Commercial Law Department, Federal 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment 
33. Simeon Onyerikwu Senior Trade Officer, Trade Department, 
Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Investment 
34. Zidafamor Ebiarede 
Jimmy 
Deputy Director, Seed Production, 
National Agricultural Seeds Council, 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
35. Yarama D Ndirpaya Deputy Director/Program Manager, 
Natural Resource Management, 
Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria,  
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
36. Nwosa Lucky Director, Technical Acquisition and 
Research, National Office for Technology 
Acquisition and Promotion, Federal 
Ministry Science and Technology 
37. Oluwagbeminiyi Popoola Head Legal Unit, National Biotechnology 
Development Agency, Federal Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
38. Prof  Lucy Ogbadu  Director-General, National Biotechnology 
Development Agency, Federal Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
39. Rufus Ebegba Director-General National Biosafety 
Management Agency, Federal Ministry of 
Environment 
40. Benedicta Falana Access and Benefit Sharing Focal Point, 
Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Environment 
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41. Dr John Onyekuru Deputy Director, Forestry Conservation,  
Federal Ministry of Environment 
42. Simon Joshua Director, Environmental Quality Control, 
National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency, Federal 
Ministry of Environment 
43. Dr Fortune Ihua-
Maduenyi 
Committee Clerk, Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development, 
National Assembly Abuja 
44. Godwin Iheanubike Assistant Director, Legal Drafting 
Department, Federal Ministry of Justice 
45. John Asein  Nigerian Copyright Commission 
46. Uche Nwokocha Partner, Intellectual Property Rights, 
Aluko & Oyebode 
47. Prof Ikechi Mgbeoji Partner, Blackfriars LLP 
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School 
48. Prof Ruth Okediji Professor, University of Minnesota Law 
School 
49. Prof Oyelowo Oyewo Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 
Lagos  
50. Prof Adebambo 
Adewopo 
Partner, L & A Legal Consultants 
Professor, Nigerian Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies 
51. Prof Bankole Sodipo Senior Partner, G. O Sodipo & Co 
Professor, Faculty of Law, Babcock 
University 
52. Prof Johnson Ekpere Former Secretary-General of the 
Scientific, Technical and Research 
Commission of the Organisation of 
African Unity  






Appendix 2: Fieldwork Interview Questions 
Farmers/ Farming Communities 
1. Do you buy seeds from seed companies? Please give reasons for your 
choice 
a. If you buy from the seed companies, are you happy to buy every 
planting season? 
b. Do you save and replant the seed you buy from seed companies? 
2. Do you plant local traditional varieties? Please give reasons for your choice. 
3. Do you share/exchange seeds with other farmers? 
4. Do you sell the seeds from previous harvests? 
a. If yes, is selling seed an important source of income for you? 
5. If a company or research institute asks for some of your varieties/seeds, and 
uses it to develop improved varieties that is later protected, would you want 
to receive a share of the profit?  
6. Do you know about plant variety protection? Would you be interested in 
protecting your traditional varieties? 
Other Interviewees 
1. Considering Nigeria’s obligation to protect plant varieties under TRIPS, 
what type of plant variety protection system do you think is best suited to 
Nigeria and why?  
2. As Nigeria is also signatory to the CBD and ITPGFRA, what forms of 
systems should it have for access- benefit sharing, and farmers’ rights? What 
should be the main elements of these principles in Nigeria?   
3. Do you think farmers should be allowed to freely save, use, reuse, exchange 
and sell protected seed? 
4. Considering the proliferation of plant breeder’s rights systems in Africa, are 
there any good reasons for Nigeria to accede to the UPOV 1991 
Convention?   
5. The move to reform industrial property law in Nigeria commenced in the 
1980s, why do you think there have been no industrial property law reforms 
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to date, and what is your opinion about the breeders’ rights and farmers’ 
rights provisions in the IPCOM 2008 Bill?   
6. For CSOs – how is your organisation involved in plant variety protection 
related issues in Nigeria?  
7. For government officials – how is your institution involved with 
implementing TRIPS, CBD or ITPGRFA?
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Participant identification number where applicable              
 
CONSENT FORM 
Tentative Project Title:                                               Interrogating the Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property Rights for Plant Varieties through the lens 
of the Global South: The Case of Nigeria  
 
Name of Researcher: Titilayo Adebola 
I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to: 
a. Be interviewed    (  ) 
b. Have my interview audiotaped   (  ) 
c. Be identified and named in this research. (  ) 
d. Be further contacted via  e-mail or  telephone  (  ) 
 
I understand that my information will be held and processed for the 
following purposes: 
a. The researcher’s doctoral thesis to be submitted to the University of 
Warwick Law School 
b. Books, research papers, and reports that the researcher publishes   
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason without being penalised or 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 
 
_________________  _____________ ___________________ 
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
 
__________________ _____________ ____________________ 







American Fruit Growers v Brogdex Co and Funk Bros Seed Co v Kalo Inoculant 
Co (1948) 333 US 127 
Asgrow Seed Co v Denny Winterboer and Becky Winterboer (1995) 513 US 173 
Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (2000) WT/DS114/13  
Ex Parte Hibberd (1985) 227 USPQ 443 
Ex Parte Latimer (1889) 46 OG 1638, Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents 
123-127 
JEM AG Supply Inc, DBA Farm Advantage Inc et al v Pioneer Hi-bred 
International Inc (2001) 534 US 124 
Monsanto Company v Homan McFarling (2007) Fed Cir 05-1570-1598 
Novartis v Transgenic Plant (2000) G01/98 (EPOR) 303 
Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Limited v Monsanto Canada 
Incorporated and Monsanto Company (2004) 1 SCR 902, 2004 SCC 
34 
Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems (1995) T 0356/93 (EPO) 
Sidney A Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Ananda M 
Chakrabarty et al (1980) 447 US 303  
Vernon Hugh Bowman v Monsanto Company et al (2013) US 133 S Ct 1761 
 
 
Bilateral Agreements, Bills, Guidelines and Laws 
African Growth and Opportunity Act 2000 
African Union Practical Guidelines for the Coordinated Implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol in Africa 2015 
Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
South Africa, of the other part (4 December 1999) OJEC L311/3 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) Annex 
1C, 33 ILM 81  
Arusha Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation, July 2015) 
Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property 
Organisation, Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the 
Creation of an African and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property 
(Bangui, Central African Republic, 2 March 1977), revised on 24 
February 1999, entered into force on 28 February 2002 
Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization  
Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
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Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 143, 31 ILM 818  
Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94, latest amendment Council Regulation (EC) 
15/2008 of 20 December 2007 on Community Plant Variety Rights  
Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Conservation of Biological 
Diversity and Resources, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing) Regulations 2006  
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association Between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (18 March 2000) OJEC 
L70/2  
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Tunisia, of the other part (30 March 1998) OJEC L97/2 
FAO Conference, Farmers’ Rights Resolution 3/91, Annex to the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 
– –, Farmers’ Rights Resolution 4/89, Annex to the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources 
– –, Farmers’ Rights Resolution 5/89, Annex to the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources 
G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Nigeria (2013) 
G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Tanzania (2012) 
India - Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, New 
Policy on Seed Development 1988 (New Delhi, 16 September 1988)  
India - Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act (2001) 
India - The Patents Act (2005) 
India - The Seeds Bill (2004) 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961, as 
revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991, 815 UNTS 89 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (3 
November 2001) Res 3/2003 FAO Conference, 31st Session   
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (23 November 1983) FAO 
Resolution 8/83 
Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service Act (No 54 of 2012) 
Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service Order 1996 (Legal Notice No 305 of 
1996) 
Kenya Seeds and Plant Varieties Protection Act (rev edn 2012) 
Lusaka Agreement on the Creation of the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organisation (Adopted on 9 December 1976, entered into force on 15 
February 1978)  
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity  
321 
 
National Centre for Genetic Resources and Biotechnology, Guidelines for 
Registration and Release of New Crop Varieties in Nigeria 
(NACGRAB 2016) 
Nigeria - A Bill for an Act to Provide for the ‘Establishment of the Industrial 
Property Commission of Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap 436, 
LFN 1990 and Patents and Designs Act, Cap 344, LFN 190 and make 
Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of 
Trademarks, Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and 
Farmers’ Rights and for Related Matters’ (HB 16.06.640, C 3399)  
 Nigeria - A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Intellectual 
Property Commission of Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act Cap. T13, 
LFN 2004 And Patents And Designs Act, Cap. P2, LFN 2004 and Make 
Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection of 
Trademarks, Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and 
Farmers Rights and For Other Related Matters 
Nigeria - National Agricultural Seeds Act 1992, CAP N5, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (2004) 
Nigeria - National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds (Registration, etc.) Act 
1987, CAP N27, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004)  
Nigeria - Patents and Designs Act (1970) 
Organisation of African Unity’s Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of 
Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of 
Access to Biological Resources (2000)  
Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its 
Members States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 
(15 December 2000)  
Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Plant Breeders’ Rights) in 
the Southern African Development Community Region (Draft- 
Southern African Development Community 2012) 
Thailand - Patent Act B E 2522 (1999) 
Thailand - Plant Varieties Protection Act B E 2542 (1999) 
Trade and Development Act 2000 (Public Law 106-200, 106th Congress, 18 May 
2000) 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community  
US - Plant Patent Act (1930) 
US - Plant Variety Protection Act (1970) 








Abo C H, Abah J, and Danbaba N (eds), Proceedings of the National Workshop on 
Intellectual Property: Issues, Rights and Obligations (National Cereals 
Research Institute, Badeggi, Nigeria, 2010)  
Adewopo A, According to Intellectual Property: A Pro-Development Vision of the 
Law and the Nigerian Intellectual Property Law and Policy Reform in 
the Knowledge Era (Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
2012)  
Adewoye O, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria (London Longman 1977) 
Allard R W, Principles of Plant Breeding (2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons Inc 1999) 
Almekinders C J M and Louwaars N P, Farmers’ Seed Production: New 
Approaches and Practices (Intermediate Technology 1999) 
Anghie A,  Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 
Aoki K, Seed Wars: Controversies and Cases on Plant Genetic Resources and 
Intellectual Property (Carolina Academic Press 2008)  
Arikpo O, The Development of the Modern Nigeria (Penguin Books 1967)  
Ayoola G, Essays on the Agricultural Economy: A Book of Readings on 
Agricultural Development Policy and Administration in Nigeria, 
Volume 1 (TMA Publishers 2001)  
Bent S, Schwaab R, Colin D, and Jeffery D, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Biotechnology Worldwide (Stockton Press 1987)   
Biagoli M, Jaszi P, and Woodmansee M (eds), Making and Unmaking Intellectual 
Property: Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspectives (The 
University of Chicago Press 2011) 
Blakeney M, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise 
Guide to the TRIPS Agreement (Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 
Bogsch A, Brief History of the First 25 Years of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO 1992)  
Bolo M O, Learning and Innovation in Agri-Export Industries: Partnerships, 
Institutions and Capabilities in Kenya’s Flower Industry (Lap Lambert 
Academic Publishing 2012) 
Bowring J, The Kingdom and People of Siam: With a Narrative of the Mission to 
that Country in 1855: Volume 2 (First published in 1857, Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 
Braithwaite J and Drahos P, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 
Chiarolla C, Intellectual Property, Agriculture and Global Food Security: The 
Privatization of Crop Diversity (Edward Elgar 2011) 
Chiengkul P, The Political Economy of the Agri-Food System in Thailand: 




Correa C, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The 
TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options (Zed Books 2000)  
– – and Yusuf A (eds), Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS 
Agreement (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 
– –, Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries: A Tool for Designing a Sui 
Generis Plant Variety Protection System: An Alternative to UPOV 1991 
(APBREBES 2015)  
Correa C M, Sovereign and Property Rights over Plant Genetic Resources (Food 
and Agriculture Organization: Rome 1994) 
De Schutter O, Seed Policies and the Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity 
an Encouraging Innovation (United Nations General Assembly, 
A/64/170, 2009) 
Deere C, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global 
Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries 
(Oxford University Press 2009)  
Denscombe M, The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research 
Projects (5th edn, Open University Press 2014) 
Dibua J, Development and Diffusionism: Looking Beyond Neopatrimonialism in 
Nigeria, 1962-1985 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013)  
Drahos P, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth 1996) 
– – and Suthersanen U, Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar 2007)  
– –and Braithwaite J, Information Feudalism: Who owns the Knowledge Economy? 
(Earthscan 2002)  
Dutfield G, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Sciences Industries: A 
Twentieth Century History (Ashgate 2003)  
– –, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
(Earthscan 2004)  
Elias T O, Nigeria, The Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens & Sons 
1967)  
Falvey L, Thai Agriculture: Golden Cradle of Millennia (Kasetsart University 
Press 2000)  
Federal Ministry of Environment, Nigeria: National Policy on the Environment 
Revised 2016 (FME, 2016) 
Forrest T, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Westview Press 1993)  
Fowler C, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics and Plant Evolution (Gordon 
and Breach 1994)  
– – and Mooney P, Shattering: Food, Politics, and the Loss of Genetic Diversity 
(The University of Arizona Press 1990) 
Gandhi M K, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Dover Publications Inc. 2001)  
Gandhi M, Quit India (R K Prabhu and U R Rao eds) (Padma Publications 1942) 




Gibson J, Community Resources: Intellectual Property, International Trade and 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge (Ashgate 2005) 
Hansenclever A, Mayer P, and Rittberger V (eds), Theories of International 
Regimes (Cambridge University Press 1997) 
Helfer L, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties, International Legal 
Regimes and Policy Options for National Governments (FAO 
Legislative Study 85, 2004)  
Helleiner G, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria 
(Richard Irwin Inc 1966)  
Herbst J, States and Power in Africa (Princeton University Press 2000) 
Hills M F, Cream Country: The Story of the Kenya Co-operative Creameries 
Limited (KCC Nairobi 1956) 
Hutchins F G, India’s Revolution; Gandhi and the Quit India Movement (Harvard 
University Press 1973) 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD 
Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development: Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005)  
Janis M, Jervis H, and Peet R, Intellectual Property Law of Plants (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 
Keohane R, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press 1984) 
Kesan J, Agricultural Biotechnology and Intellectual Property: Seeds of Change 
(CABI Publishing Co 2007) 
Kingsbury N, Hybrid: The History and Science of Plant Breeding (The University 
of Chicago Press 2009) 
Kloppenburg J, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 
1492-2000 (2nd edn, University of Wisconsin Press 2004) 
Kochupillai M, Promoting Sustainable Innovations in Plant Varieties (Springer 
2016)  
Kongolo T, African Contributions in Shaping the Worldwide Intellectual Property 
System (Ashgate 2013)  
Lewis-Beck M, Bryman A E, and Liao T F, The Sage Encyclopedia of Social 
Science Research Methods (Sage Publications 2003) 
Matthews D, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPs Agreement 
(Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2002) 
– –, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and 
Social Movements (Edward Elgar 2011) 
May C, The World Intellectual Property Organisation: Resurgence and the 
Development Agenda (Routledge 2007) 




May T, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (4th edn, Open University 
Press 2011) 
Mgbeoji I, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants and Indigenous Knowledge (Cornell 
University Press 2006) 
Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: 
Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016)  
Minot N and Ngigi M, Are Horticultural Exports a Replicable Success Story? 
Evidence from Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire (International Food Policy 
Research Institute 2004) 
Mooney P R, Seeds of the Earth: A Private or Public Resource? (First published 
1979, reprinted with revisions 1980, Canadian Council for International 
Co-operation) 
– –, The Law of the Seed: Another and Plant Genetic Resources (A Journal of 
International Development Cooperation, Dag Hammarskjöld 
Foundation 1983) 
Mortimer R, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (2nd updated edn, 
Westview Press 1984) 
Ncube C B, Intellectual Property Policy, Law and Administration in Africa: 
Exploring Continental and Sub-regional Co-operation (Routledge 
2016)  
Netanel N W (ed), The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and 
Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 2009) 
Nnadozie K, Lettington R, Bruch C, Bass S, and King S (eds), African Perspectives 
on Genetic Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and Institutions 
(Environmental Law Institute 2003)  
Nwabueze B, A Constitutional History of Nigeria (C Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd 
1982) 
Okonjo-Iweala N, Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria (The MIT 
Press 2012) 
Olukoshi A (ed), The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (James Curry 
Ltd 1993) 
Packer M, The Science of Qualitative Research (Cambridge University Press 2011)  
Phongpaichit P and Baker C, Thailand Economy and Politics (Oxford University 
Press 1995) 
Picciotto S, Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 
Pistorius R and Wijk J V, The Exploitation of Plant Information: Political 
Strategies in Crop Development (CABI Publishing 1999) 
Raghavan C, Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay Round & the Third World (Zed 
Books & Third World Network 1990) 
Rajagopal B, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and 
Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press 2005)  
326 
 
Roberts R and Mann K, ‘Law in Colonial Africa’ in Richard Roberts and Kristin 
Mann (eds), Law in Colonial Africa (Heinemann: James Curry 1991) 
Robinson D F, Abdel-Latif A, and Roffe P (eds), Protecting Traditional 
Knowledge: The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(Routledge 2017) 
Robinson D, Exploring Components and Elements of Sui Generis Systems for Plant 
Variety Protection and Traditional Knowledge in Asia (International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD 2007)  
– –, Confronting Biopiracy: Challenges, Cases and International Debates 
(Earthscan 2010) 
Sanderson J, Plants, People and Practices: The Nature and History of the UPOV 
Convention (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
Santilli J, Agrobiodiversity and the Law: Regulating Genetic Resources, Food 
Security and Cultural Diversity (Routledge 2012) 
Santos B S, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and 
Emancipation (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
Seidman I, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in 
Education and the Social Sciences (Teachers College Press New York 
2006)  
Sell S K, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust (State University of New York Press 1998) 
– –, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Cambridge University Press 2003) 
Sherman S and Bentley L, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press 1999) 
Siamwalla A, A History of Rice Policies in Thailand (Stanford University Press 
1976)  
Singh G, Asokan S R, and Asopa V N, Seed Industry in India: A Management 
Perspective (Oxford and IBH Publishing Co 1990)  
Sodipo B, Piracy and Counterfeiting, GATT, TRIPS and Developing Countries 
(Kluwer 1994)  
Stabinsky D and Brush S B (eds), Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People 
and Intellectual Property Rights (Island Press 2007) 
Stenson A J and Gray T, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control (Palgrave 
Macmillan 1999) 
Stewart T (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986-1992 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993)  
Tansey and Rajotte (eds) The Future Control of Food: A Guide to International 
Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property Biodiversity and Food 
Security (Earthscan 2008) 
327 
 
The Crucible Group, People, Plants, and Patents: The Impact of Intellectual 
Property on Biodiversity, Conservation, Trade and Rural Society 
(International Development Research Centre 1994) 
The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, Policy Options for Genetic 
Resources: People Plants and Patents Revisited (International 
Development Research Centre 2000)  
– –, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2, Policy Options for Genetic Resources: People 
Plants and Patents Revisited (International Development Research 
Centre 2001)  
Udoma S U, History and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria (Malthouse Press 
Ltd 1994)  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Review: 
Nigeria (UNCTAD, United Nations, 2009) 
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Model 
Law for Developing Countries on Inventions (BIRPI Publication No 
801(E), 1965) 
Watal J, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries 
(Kluwer Law International: The Hague 2000) 
– –, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook 
(WIPO Publication No 489 (E), 2nd edn, WIPO 2004)  
Wright R, The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (World 
Publishing Company 1956) 
Yankey G S, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less Developed 
Countries: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria (Avebury 1987) 
 
 
Chapters in Books 
Agrawal P, ‘Seed Industry Regulations and Seed Industry Development in India’ 
in David Gisselquist and Jitendra Srivastava (eds), Easing Barriers to 
Movement of Plant Varieties for Agricultural Development (World 
Bank Discussion Paper No 367, World Bank 1997) 
Andersen R, ‘Farmers’ Rights: Evolution of the International Policy Debate and 
National Development’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop 
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and La0077 
(Earthscan 2016) 
– –, ‘Historical Context: Evolving International Cooperation on Crop Genetic 
Resources’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016) 
Bentley J W, Ajayi O, and Adelugba K, ‘Nigeria: Clustered Seed Companies’ in 
Paul Van Mele, Jeffery Bentley, and Robert G Guei (eds), African Seed 
328 
 
Enterprises: Sowing Seeds of the Future (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, AfricaRice Center, and CAB 
International 2011) 
Bragdon S, Garforth K, and Haapala J E Jr, ‘Safeguarding Biodiversity: The 
Convention on Biological Biodiversity (CBD)’ in Goeff Tansey and 
Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control of Food (Earthscan 2008)  
Chainuvati C and Athipanan W, ‘Crop Diversification in Thailand’ in Minas 
Papademetrou and Frank Dent (eds), Crop Diversification in the Asia-
Pacific Region (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations 2001)  
Cherfas J, ‘Technical Challenges in Identifying Farmers’ Varieties’ in Michael 
Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: 
Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Routledge 2016)  
Chomchalow N, ‘Agricultural Development in Thailand’ in Frits Penning de Vries, 
Paul Teng and Klaas Metselaar (eds), Systems Approaches for 
Agricultural Development: Proceedings of the International 
Symposium on Systems Approaches for Agricultural Development 2-6 
December 1991 Bangkok Thailand (Kluwer Academic Publishers 
1993) 
Correa C, ‘Sui Generis Protection for Farmers’ Varieties’ in Michael Halewood 
(ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in 
Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016)  
Dutfield G, ‘Turning Plant Varieties into Intellectual Property: The UPOV 
Convention’ in Geoff Tansey and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future 
Control of Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and Rules on 
Intellectual Property (Earthscan 2008)  
Egziabher T B G, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Interests of the South’ in Vandana Shiva (ed), 
Biodiversity Conservation: Whose Resources? Whose Knowledge? 
(Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage 1994) 
– –, Matos E, and Mwila G, ‘The African Group: Creating Fair Play between North 
and South’ in Christine Frison, Francisco Lopez and Jose T Esquinas-
Alcazar (eds), Plant Genetic Resources and Food Security: Stakeholder 
Perspectives on the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (Earthscan 2011)  
Ekekwe E, ‘State and Economic Development in Nigeria’ in Claude Ake (ed), 
Political Economy of Nigeria (Longman 1985)  
Ekpere J, ‘African Model Law on the Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access 
to Biological Resources’ in Kent Nnadozie, Robert Lettington, Carl 
Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah King (eds), African Perspectives on 
329 
 
Genetic Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and Institutions 
(Environmental Law Institute 2003) 
– –, ‘Sui Generis Legislation and Protection of Community Rights in Africa’ in 
Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (eds), Protecting and Promoting 
Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences and 
International Dimensions (UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2004)  
Fadda C, ‘The Farmers’ Role in Creating New Genetic Diversity’ in Michael 
Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: 
Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Routledge 2016)  
Gagne G and Ratanasatien C, ‘Commentary on Thailand’s Plant Varieties 
Protection Act’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties 
and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 
2016)  
Halewood M and Lapena I, ‘Farmers’ Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: Challenges 
at the Crossroads of Agriculture, Taxonomy and Law’ in Michael 
Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Farmers’ Rights: 
Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016)  
– – and Nnadozie K, ‘Giving Priority to the Commons: The International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ in Geoff Tansey 
and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control of Food: A Guide to 
International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property 
(Earthscan 2008)  
Ibigbami V M and Orji C, ‘A Review of the Nigerian System of Intellectual 
Property’ in Institutionalisation of Intellectual Property Management: 
Case Study from Four Agricultural Research Institutions in Developing 
Countries (CAS-IP Rome 2009) 
Igbokwe E M, ‘A Soil and Water Conservation System under Threat. A Visit to 
Maku, Nigeria’ in C Reij, I Scoones, and C Toulmin (eds), Sustaining 
the Soil: Indigenous Soil and Water Conservation in Africa (Earthscan 
Publication 1996)  
Jaffee S, ‘The Many Faces of Success: The Development of Kenyan Horticultural 
Exports’ in Steven Jaffee and John Morton (eds), Marketing Africa’s 
High-Value Foods: Comparative Experiences of an Emergent Private 
Sector (World Bank 1995) 
Kew D and Oshikoya M, ‘Escape from Tyranny: Civil Society and Democratic 
Struggles in Africa’ in Ebenezer Obadare (ed), The Handbook of Civil 
Society in Africa (Springer 2014)  
Krongkaew M, ‘Contributions of Agriculture to Industrialization’ in Medhi 
Krongkaew (ed), Thailand’s Industrialization and its Consequences (St 
Martin Press 1995)  
330 
 
Kuanpoth J, ‘Pushing against Globalization: The Response from Civil Society 
Groups in Thailand’ in John Gillespie and Randall Peerenboom (eds), 
Regulation in Asia: Pushing Back on Globalization (Routledge 2009)  
Louwaars N and Burgaud F, ‘The Evolution of Registration Systems with a Special 
Emphasis on Agrobioversity Conservation’ in Michael Halewood (ed), 
Farmers’ Crop Varieties and Famers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy 
and Law (Earthscan from Routledge 2016) 200 
Mooney P, ‘International Non-governmental Organizations: The Hundred Year (or 
so) Seed War – Seeds, Sovereignty and Civil Society – A Historical 
Perspective on the Evolution of ‘The Law of the Seed’ in Christine 
Frison, Francisco Lopez and Jose T. Esquinas-Alcazar (eds), Plant 
Genetic Resources and Food Security: Stakeholder Perspectives on the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (Earthscan 2011)  
Nnadozie K, ‘Access to Genetic Resources in Nigeria’ in Kent Nnadozie, Robert 
Lettington, Carl Bruch, Susan Bass, and Sarah King (eds), African 
Perspectives on Genetic Resources: A Handbook on Laws, Policies and 
Institutions (Environmental Law Institute 2003) 
– –, ‘Nigeria’ in Robert J Lewis-Lettington and Serah Mwanyiki (eds), Case 
Studies on Access and Benefit Sharing (International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute 2006) 
Oguamanam C, ‘Ramifications of the WIPO IGC for IP and Development’ in 
Daniel F Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif, and Pedro Roffe (eds), 
Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge 2017) 
Okediji R, ‘History Lessons from the WIPO Development Agenda’ in Neil 
Weinstock Netanel (ed), The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual 
Property and Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 2008)  
Pacon A, ‘What will TRIPS do for the Developing Countries’ in Friedrich-Karl 
Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPS – The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, 
and Competition Law 1996)  
Rajotte T, ‘The Negotiations Web: Complex Connections’ in Geoff Tansey and 
Tasmin Rajotte (eds), The Future Control of Food: A Guide to 
International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual Property, 
Biodiversity and Food Security (Earthscan 2008)  
Rangnekar D, ‘Commentary on the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act 2001’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop 




Robinson D F, Roffe P, and Abdel-Latif A, ‘Introduction: Mapping the Evolution, 
State-of-Play and Future of the WIPO IGC’ in Robinson, Abdel-Latif 
and Roffe (eds), Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge 2017) 
Roffe P, ‘Bringing Minimum Global Intellectual Property Standards into 
Agriculture: The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)’ in Geoff Tansey and Tasmin Rajotte (eds), 
The Future Control of Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and 
Rules on Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security 
(Earthscan 2008)  
Seay N, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Plants’ in Stephen Baenziger, Roger A 
Kleese, and Robert F Barnes (eds), Intellectual Property Rights: 
Protection of Plant Materials (Special Publication No 21, Crop Science 
Society of America 1993)  
Siamwalla A, Setboonsarng S, and Patamasisiwat D, ‘Agriculture’ in Peter G Warr 
(ed), The Thai Economy in Transition (Cambridge University Press 
1993) 
Srinivasan C S, ‘Institutional Capacity and Implementation Issues in Farmers’ 
Rights’ in Michael Halewood (ed), Farmers’ Crop Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights: Challenges in Taxonomy and Law (Earthscan 2016)  
Warr P G, ‘The Thai Economy’ in Peter G Warr (ed), The Thai Economy in 
Transition (Cambridge University Press 1993) 
Wenland W, ‘The Evolution of the IGC from 2001 to 2016: An Insider’s 
Perspective’ in Robinson, Abdel-Latif, and Roffe (eds), Protecting 
Traditional Knowledge  
Wittman H, Desmarais A, and Wiebe N, ‘The Origins and Potential of Food 
Sovereignty’ in Hannah Wittman, Annette Auriele Desmarais and 
Nettie Wiebe (eds), Food Sovereignty, Reconnecting Food, Nature and 
Community (2010)  
Yahaya S, ‘State versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian 
State’ in Adebayo Olukoshi (ed), The Politics of Structural Adjustment 
in Nigeria (James Curry Ltd 1993)  
Yudelman M, ‘Imperialism and the Transfer of Agricultural Techniques’ in Peter 
Duignan and Lewis H Gann (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: 
Volume Four, The Economics of Colonialism (Cambridge University 









Adikibi O T, ‘The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria’ 
(1988) 16(4) World Development 511 
Aiyede R, ‘The Dynamics of Civil Society and the Democratization Process in 
Nigeria’ (2003) 37(1) Canadian Journal of African Studies 1 
Ajai O, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Biotechnology Regulation in Nigeria’ 
(1997) 6(1) Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environmental Law 42 
Almekinders C J M and Louwaars N P, ‘The Importance of the Farmers’ Seed 
Systems in a Functional National Seed Sector (2002) 4(1-2) Journal of 
New Seeds 15 
Alter and Meunier S, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 
7(1) Perspectives on Politics 13 
Amokaye O, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity, Access to and Exploitation 
of Genetic Resources and the Land Tenure System in Nigeria’ (1999) 
11(1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 86 
Anghie A, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth 
Century International Law’ (1999) 40(1) Harvard International Law 
Journal 1 
– –, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ 
(2006) 27(5) Third World Quarterly 739 
– –, ‘TWAIL: Past and Future’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 
479 
– – and Chimni B S, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) Chinese Journal of 
International Law 77 
Anyanwu J, ‘President Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme and 
Inflation in Nigeria’ (1992) 7(1) Journal of Social Development in 
Africa 5 
Aoki K and Luvai K, ‘Reclaiming “Common Heritage” Treatment in the 
International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex’ (2007) 
Michigan State Law Review 35 
Arup C, ‘Competition over Competition Policy for International Trade and 
Intellectual Property’ (1998) 16(3) Prometheus 367 
Ayoola J B, Ayoola G B, and Chikwendu D O, ‘An Assessment of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Nigeria Agriculture’ (2014) 3(6) International 
Journal of Innovative Research and Development 337 
Bavikatte K and Robinson D, ‘Towards a People’s History of the Law: Biocultural 
Jurisprudence and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing’ 
(2011) 7(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal 35 
Bayari S, ‘Nigeria: Where is Obasanjo’s Apex Farmers’ Body?’ (12 September 
2002) Vanguard Newspaper 
333 
 
Benvenisti E and Downs G, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Fragmentation of International Law (2007) 60 Stanford Law 
Review 595 
Blair D, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and its Impact on the US Seed Industry’ 
(1999) 4 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 297 
Borowiak C, ‘Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle 
over Seeds’ (2004) 32(4) Politics and Society 511 
Bradley J, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Investments, and Trade in Services in the 
Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations’ (1987) 23 Stanford Journal 
of International Law 57 
Bradley M T, ‘Civil Society and Democratic Progression in Postcolonial Nigeria: 
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations’ (2005) 1(1) Journal of 
Civil Society 61 
Bugos G E and Kevles D J, ‘Plants as Intellectual Property: American Practice, 
Law and Policy in World Context’ (1992) 7 Osiris (2nd series) 74 
Carty A, ‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International 
Law’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law 66 
Chand R, Prasanna P A L, and Singh A, ‘Farm Size and Productivity: 
Understanding the Strengths of Smallholders and Improving their 
Livelihoods’ (25 June 2011) XVLI 26 and 27 Economic and Political 
Weekly 5 
Chimni B S, ‘Political Economy of the Uruguay Rounds of Negotiations: A 
Perspective’ (1992) 29 (2) International Studies 140 
– –, ‘The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A View from 
the South’ (2006) 40(1) Journal of World Trade 5 
– –, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 
International Community Law Review 3 
– –, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499 
– –, ‘Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century’ 
(2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law 17 
Chourou B, ‘The free-trade agreement between Tunisia and the European Union’ 
(2007) 3(1) The Journal of North African Studies 25 
Christie A, ‘Patents for Plant Innovation’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property 
Review 394 
Compeerapap J, ‘The Thai Debate on Biotechnology and Regulations’ (1997) 32 
Biotechnology and Development Monitor 1315 
Coomes O, McGuire S, Garine E, Cailon S, McKey D, Demeulenaere E, Jarvis D, 
Aistara G, Barnaud A, Clouvel P, Emperaire L, Louafi S, Martin P, 
Massol F, Pautasso M, Violon C, and Wencelius J, ‘Farmer Seed 
Networks make a Limited Contribution to Agriculture? Four Common 
Misconceptions’ (2015) 56 Food Policy 41 
334 
 
Cottier T, ‘The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT’ (1991) 28 Common 
Market Law Review 383 
Crocker A E, ‘Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on an 
International Level? A Look at the History of the US and International 
Patent Law Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely 
Changes After the US Supreme Court’s Decision in JEM AG Supply v 
Pioneer Hi-Bred’ (2003) 8 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 251 
Crombois J F, ‘The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement’ (2005) 10(2) 
Mediterranean Politics 219 
Cullet P, ‘Revision of the TRIPS Agreement Concerning the Protection of Plant 
Varieties: Lessons from India Concerning the Development of a Sui 
Generis System’ (1999) 2 Journal of World Intellectual Property 617 
– –, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Africa: Towards Compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement’ (2001) 45(1) Journal of African Law 97 
– –, ‘Property Rights over Biological Resources: India’s Proposed Legislative 
Framework’ (2001) 4 (2) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 
211 
– – and Koluru R, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights: Towards a 
Broader Understanding’ (2003) 24 Delhi Law Review 41 
De Jonge B, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Balancing 
Commercial and Smallholder Farmers’ Interests’ (2014) 7(3) Journal 
of Politics and Law 100 
Denicolo V and Franzoni L, ‘The Contract Theory of Patents’ (2004) 23 (4) 
International Review of Law and Economics 365 
Dezner D W, ‘The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 
7(1) Perspectives on Politics 65 
Dhar B and Chaturvedi S, ‘Introducing Plant Breeders’ Rights in India: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Proposed Legislation’ (1998) 1(2) Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 245 
– –, Pandey B, and Chaturvedi S, ‘Farmers’ Interests Recognized in Indian PBR 
Bill’ (23 June 1995) 23 Biotechnology and Development Monitor 18 
Drahos P,  ‘Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the 
GATT’ (1995) 13(1) Prometheus 6 
– –, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-
Setting’ (2005) 5(5) Journal of World Intellectual Property 772 
Dressel B, ‘Thailand’s Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution, 1997-2007’ 
(2009) 31(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia 296 
Eslava L, ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International 
Law’ (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 3 
– – and Pahuja S, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality 
of International Law’ (2011) 3(1) Trade, Law and Development 103 
335 
 
– – and Pahuja S, ‘Beyond the (Post) Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of 
International Law’ (2012) 45(2) Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America – Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (VRU) 1 
Evans G, ‘Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (1994) 18 
World Competition: Law and Economics Review 137 
Ezejiofor G, ‘The Law of Patents in Nigeria: A Review’ (1973) 9 African Legal 
Studies 39 
Famoriyo S and Raza M R, ‘The Green Revolution in Nigeria: Prospects for 
agricultural development’ (1982) 7(1) Food Policy 27 
Fidler D P, ‘Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing 
World and the Future Direction of International Law’ (2003) 2(1) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 29 
Fischer-Lescano A and Teubner G, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (Michelle Everson tr, 2004) 
25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999 
Fowler C, ‘The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation’ 
(2000) 82 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 621  
Francois J F, McQueen M, and Wignaraja G, ‘European Union-Developing 
Country FTAs: Overview and Analysis’ (2005) 33(10) World 
Development 1545 
Gaeo S W, ‘“Green Revolution” and Socio-Economic Implications for Rural 
Communities in Thailand’ (January 1978) 30 Akademika 7 
Gathii J T, ‘International Law and Eurocentricity’ (1998) 9 European Journal of 
International Law 184 
– –, ‘Rejoinder: Twailing International Law’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 
2066 
– –, ‘Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on 
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, Symposium Issue 
Forward’ (2000) 41(2) Harvard International Law Journal 263 
– –, ‘Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the 
International Law of Governmental Legitimacy’ (2000) 98 Michigan 
Law Review 1996 
– –, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and A 
Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3(1) Trade, Law and Development 26 
Gazaro W R, ‘Plant Variety Protection: Which System of Protection in Members 
States of OAPI?’ (2006) 28 World Patent Information 127 
Haugen H M, ‘Inappropriate Processes and Unbalanced Outcomes: Plant Variety 
Protection in Africa Goes Beyond UPOV 1991 Requirements’ (2015) 
18(5) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 196 
336 
 
Haverkort B and Millar D, ‘Constructing Diversity: The Active Role of Rural 
People in Maintaining and Enhancing Biodiversity’ (1994) 2 
Etnoloecologica 51 
Helfer L, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Law Making’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal 
of International Law 1 
– –, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (2009) 7(1) 
Perspectives on Politics 39 
Howard P, ‘Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry 1996-2008’ 
(2009) 1 Sustainability 1266 
Hoffman I, Gerling D, Kyiogwom U, and Mane-Bielfieldt A, ‘Farmers’ 
Management Strategies to Maintain Soil Fertility in a Remote Area in 
Northwest Nigeria’ (2001) 86 Agriculture, Ecosystems, and 
Environment 263 
Howard P H, ‘Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry’ (2015) 
55 Crop Science 1 
Hunt A, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 
Ibeawuchi I, ‘Intercropping – A Food Production Strategy for the Resources Poor 
Farmers’ (2007) 5(1) Nature and Science 46  
Ihonvbere J, ‘Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of 
Democratisation in Nigeria’ (1996) 34(2) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 193-225. 
Iwuchukwu J C and Igbokwe E M, ‘Lessons from Agricultural Policies and 
Programmes in Nigeria’ (2012) 5 Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization 11 
Jallab M S, Abdelmalki L, and Sandretto R, ‘The Free Trade Agreement between 
the United States and Morocco: The Importance of a Gradual and 
Asymmetric Agreement’ (2007) 22(4) Journal of Economic Integration 
852 
Janis M and Kesan J, ‘US Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury?’ (1994) 
Articles by Maurer Faculty Paper 
Jayaraman K S, ‘Indian Seed Bill Forges New Ground’ (October 2001) 19 Nature 
Biotechnology 895 
Junge B, Deji O, Abaidoo R, Chikoye D, and Stahr K, ‘Farmers’ Adoption of Soil 
Conservation Technologies: A Case Study from Osun State, Nigeria’ 
(2009) 15(3) The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 257 
Kanniah R, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand’ (2005) 8(3) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 283 
Keohane R, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ (1982) International 
Organization 325  
337 
 
Khosla M, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase’ (2007) 
International Commercial Law Review 291 
Koester V, ‘The Biodiversity Convention Negotiation Process and Some 
Comments on the Outcome’ (1997) 27 (3) Environmental Policy and 
Law 175 
Kosekenniemi M, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics’ (2007) 70 (1) The Modern Law Review 1 
Krasner D, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables’ (1982) 36(2) International Organization 185 
Kuanpoth J, ‘Protection of Traditional Knowledge in the Face of Globalisation: 
Balancing Mechanism between CBD and TRIPS’ (2009) 12(1) 
Thailand Journal of Law and Policy 
Kuhonta E M, ‘The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 “People’s Constitution”: Be 
Careful What You Wish For’ (May/June 2008) 48(3) Asian Survey 373 
Lertdhamtewe P, ‘Protection of Plant Varieties in Thailand’ (2014) 17(5-6) The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 142 
– –, ‘Plant Variety Protection in Thailand: The Need for a New Coherent 
Framework’ (2013) 8(1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice 33 
Leskien D, ‘The European Patent Directive on Biotechnology’ (1998) 36 
Biotechnology and Development Monitor 16 
Li T M, ‘Can there be Food Sovereignty Here?’ (2015) 41(2) The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 205 
Lianchamroon W, ‘Community Rights and Farmers’ Rights in Thailand’ (1998) 36 
Biotechnology and Development Monitor 9 
Mahop M T, Shikoli A M, and Tejan-Cole A, ‘Intellectual Property Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants in Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview of Existing 
Regimes (Part 1)’ (2015) 14(3) Bioscience Law Review 75 
Maredia M, Erbisch F, Naseem A, Hightower A, Oehmke J, Weatherspoon D, and 
Christopher W, ‘Public Agricultural Research and the Protection of 
Intellectual Property: Issues and Options’ (1999) 2 (3 &4) AgBioForum 
247 
Masood E, ‘Africa Splits over Ban to Patents on Plants’ (1999) 398(99) Nature 
May C, ‘The World Intellectual Property Organization and the Development 
Agenda’ (2007) 22(1) Global Society 97 
McElrow K P, ‘Elements in Patent Law’ (1929) 21(6) Industrial and Engineering 
Chemistry 608 
McGuire S and Sperling L, ‘Seed Systems Smallholder Farmers Use’ (2016) 8(1) 
Food Security 179 
Menescal A K, ‘Changing WIPO’s Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in 




Mickelson K, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal 
Discourse’ (1998) 16 Wisconsin International Law Journal 353 
– –, ‘Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories’ (2008) 10 International Community Law 
Review 355 
Mgbenka R N and Mbah E N, ‘A Review of Smallholder Farming in Nigeria: Need 
for Transformation’ (May 2016) 3(2) International Journal of 
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development Studies 43 
Mosley P, ‘Policy-Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural 
Adjustment Policies in Nigeria 1985-1990’ (1992) 91(363) African 
Affairs 227 
Mossof A, ‘Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550-
1800’ (2000-2001) 52 Hastings Law Journal 1255 
Munyi P, ‘Plant Variety Protection Regime in Relation to Relevant International 
Obligations: Implications for Smallholder Farmers in Kenya’ (2015) 
18(1-2) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 65 
Mupangavanhu Y, ‘African Union Rising to the Need for Continental IP 
Protection? The Establishment of the Pan-African Intellectual Property 
Organization’ (2015) 59(1) Journal of African Law 1 
Mutua M, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1113 
– –, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) The American Society of International Law 
Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting, Washington DC 31 
Nagarajan S, Yadav S P, and Singh A K, ‘Farmers’ Variety in the Context of 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001’ (25 March 
2008) 94(6) Current Science 709 
Ncube C B and Laltaika E, ‘A New Intellectual Property Organization for Africa?’ 
(2013) 8(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice  
Odumosu I T, ‘Challenges for the (Present/) Future of Third World Approaches to 
International Law’ (2008) 10 International Commercial Law Review 
467 
Oguamanam C, ‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Towards a Cross-
Cultural Dialogue on Intellectual Property Rights’ (2004) 15(1) 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 34 
– –, ‘Breeding Apples for Oranges: Africa’s Misplaced Priority over Plant Breeders 
Rights’ (2015) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 1 
Okafor O C, ‘After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the 
Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa’ (2000) 41(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal 503 
– –, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A 
TWAIL Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 171 
339 
 
Okediji (Gana) R L, ‘The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human 
Rights to Intellectual Property and Development’ (1996) 18 Law and 
Policy 315  
Okediji R, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of 
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property 
System’ (2003) 7 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 315 
Oyekale K O, ‘Growing an Effective Seed Management System: A Case Study of 
Nigeria’ (2014) 3(2) Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Sciences 345 
Pal S and Tripp R, ‘India’s Seed Industry Reforms: Prospects and Issues’ (2002) 
57(3) Industrial Journal of Agricultural Economics 443 
Patel R, ‘What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like’ (2009) 36(3) The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 663 
Peschard K, ‘Farmers’ Rights and Food Sovereignty: Critical Insights from India’ 
(2014) 41(6) The Journal of Peasant Studies 1085 
Plahe J K, ‘TRIPS Downhill: India’s Plant Variety Protection System and 
Implications for Small Farmers’ (2011) 41(1) Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 75 
Pottage A and Sherman B, ‘Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant 
Inventions’ (2007) 31(2) Melbourne University Law Review 539 
Pray C and Ramaswani B, ‘Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry: 
Competition, Research and Impact on Farmers’ (2001) 2(3/4) 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 407 
Purvis N, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ (1991) 32(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 81 
Rajagopal B, ‘Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography’ (1998-1999) Third 
World Legal Studies 1 
– –, ‘International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing 
Resistance’ (2002-2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
397  
Ramanna A and Smale M, ‘Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources under 
India’s New Law’ (2004) 22(4) Development Policy Review 423 
Rangnekar D, ‘Tripping in Front of UPOV: Plant Variety Protection in India’ 
(October-December 1998) 48(4) Social Action 432 
– –, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Agriculture: An Analysis of the Economic 
Impact of Plant Breeders’ Rights’ (Actionaid UK, March 2000) 
– –, ‘Geneva Rhetoric, National Reality: The Political Economy of Introducing 
Plant Breeders’ Rights in Kenya’ (2013) New Political Economy 1 
Ranjan P, ‘Recent Developments in India’s Plant Variety Protection, Seed 
Regulation and Linkages with UPOV’s Proposed Membership’ (2009) 
12(3) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 219 
340 
 
Rao N, ‘Indian Seed System and Plant Variety Protection’ (21-27 February 2004) 
39(8) Economic and Political Weekly 845 
Raustiala K, ‘Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law’ 
(2007) 40 University of California Davis Law Review 1021 
– –, and Victor D, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004) 
58(2) International Organization 277 
Reinbothe J and Howard A, ‘The State of Play in the Negotiations on TRIPS 
(GATT/Uruguay Round)’ (1991) 5 European Intellectual Property 
Review 157 
Robert T, ‘Patenting Plants around the World’ (1996) European Intellectual 
Property Review 531 
Robinson D, ‘Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection Systems: Liability Rules and 
Non-UPOC Systems’ (2008) 3(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
and Practice 659 
Roht-Arriaza N, ‘Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and 
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities’ (1996) 
17 Michigan Journal of International Law 917 
Sahai S, ‘India’s Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001’ (10 
February 2003) 84(3) Current Science 407 
Santos B S, ‘Globalizations’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture and Society 393 
Schiavoni C, ‘The Global Struggle for Food Sovereignty: from Nyeleni to New 
York’ (2009) 36(3) Journal of Peasant Studies 682 
Sell S, ‘TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and 
TPP’ (2011) 18(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 447 
– – and May C, ‘Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of 
Intellectual Property’ (2001) 8(3) Review of International Political 
Economy 467 
Seshia S, ‘Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights: Law-Making and 
Cultivation of Varietal Control’ (6-12 July 2002) 37(27) Economic and 
Political Weekly 2741 
Sfiligoj E, ‘Bayer-Monsanto Happens’ (2016) 179(10) Croplife 4 
Shand H, ‘There is a Conflict between Intellectual Property Rights and the Rights 
of Farmers in Developing Countries’ (1991) Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 131 
Steinberg R, ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO’ (2002) 56(2) International Organization 
339 
Stewart T, ‘The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History 1986-1992’ 
(1993) II Commentary 2245 
Strba S I, ‘Legal and Institutional Considerations for Plant Variety Protection and 
Food Security in African Development Agendas: Solutions from 
341 
 
WIPO?’ (2017) 12(3) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 
191 
Tarasofsky R, ‘The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity: Towards a Pragmatic Approach’ 
(1997) 6(2) Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environment Law 148 
Ugorji E, ‘Privatization/Commercialization of State-Owned Enterprises in Nigeria: 
Strategies for Improving the Performance of the Economy’ (1995) 
27(4) Comparative Political Studies 537 
Unger D, ‘Sufficiency Economy and Bourgeois Virtues’ (2009) 36(3) Asian 
Affairs 139 
Unger R M, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96(3) Harvard Law 
Review 561 
Ugwu D S, ‘Contributions of Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs) to 
Rural Livelihood and Food Security in Nigeria’ (2007) 2(4) 
Agricultural Journal 503 
Van Overwalle G, ‘Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and 
European Approaches’ (1999) 39 IDEA Journal of Law and 
Technology 143 
Verma S K, ‘TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries’, (1995) 
17(6) European Intellectual Property Review 281 
Walterscheid E C, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 1)’ (1994) 76 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office 
Society 697 
– –, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ 
(1994) 76 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 849 
Wuesthoff F, ‘Patenting of Plants’ (1956-1958) 1 Industrial Property Quarterly 12 
– –, ‘Cultivated Plant Nomenclature and Plant Variety Rights’ (1973) 22(4) Taxon 
455 
Yu, P K, ‘A Tale of Two Development Agendas’ (2009) 34 Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 465 
– –, ‘International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property 
Schizophrenia’ (2007) 1 Michigan State Law Review 1 
Zerbe N, ‘Biodiversity, Ownership, and Indigenous Knowledge: Exploring Legal 
Frameworks for Community, Farmers, and Intellectual Property Rights 
in Africa’ (2005) 53 Ecological Economics 493 
– –, ‘Contesting Privatization: NGOs and Farmers Rights in the African Model 







Papers, Reports, and Studies  
Adedipe N O, Okunneye P A, and Ayinde I A, ‘The Relevance of Local and 
Indigenous Knowledge for Nigerian Agriculture’ (presented at the 
International Conference on Bridging Scales and Epistemologies: 
Linking Local Knowledge with Global Science in Multi-Scale 
Assessments, Alexandria, Egypt, 16-19 March 2004)  
Adesina A, Agricultural Transformation Agenda: Repositioning Agriculture to 
drive Nigeria’s Economy (FMARD 2012)  
Ait El Mekki A and Tyner W E, ‘The Moroccan American FTA Effects on the 
Agricultural and Food Sectors in Morocco’ (Paper presented at the 7th 
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Trade, Poverty, 
and the Environment, 17-19 June 2004, Washington, DC) 
Ayyangar S J N R, ‘Report on the Revision of the Patent Laws’ (Government of 
India 1959) 
Bjornstad S B, ‘Breakthrough for “the South”? An Analysis of the Recognition of 
Farmers’ Rights in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report 
13/2004) 
Christinck A and Tvedt M, The UPOV Convention, Farmers’ Rights and Human 
Rights: An Integrated Assessment of Potentially Conflicting Legal 
Frameworks (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 2015) 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy (2002) 
Correa C, Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights 
(Background Study Paper No 8, Commission on Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture, April 1999)  
De Schutter O, New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies Policy 
Department EP/EXPO/B/DEVE/2015/01, November 2015) 
Dhar B, Sui Generis Systems for Plant Variety Protection: Options under TRIPS, 
A Discussion Paper (Quaker United Nations Office 2002) 
Dutfield G, Food, Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property: The Role of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) (Quaker United Nations Office, February 2011) Global 
Economic Issue Publications, Intellectual Property Issue Paper No 1 
Eboh E C, Baseline Study of Nigeria’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for 
Agricultural Research Technologies and Innovations Generated in 
National Agricultural Research Institutes and Universities, Revised 
National Synthesis Report (West Africa Agriculture Productivity 




Ekpere J A, The OAU’s Model Law: The Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access 
to Biological Resources, an Explanatory Booklet (OAU/STRC 2000) 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, Seed Security Assessment in North Eastern 
States of Nigeria (FAO 2016)  
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law (Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 
United Nations 2006) Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission 
Fuglie K, Ballenger N, Rubenstein K D, Klotz C, Ollinger M, Reilly J, Vasavada 
U, and Yee J, Agricultural Research and Development: Public and 
Private Investments under Alternative Markets and Institutions 
(Agricultural Economic Report No AER-735, May 1996)  
GAIA/GRAIN, Ten Reasons not to join UPOV, Global Trade and Biodiversity in 
Conflict (15 May 1998) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1-ten-
reasons-not-to-join-upov> accessed 04 July 2014 
Glokwa L, Burhenne-Guilmin F, and Synge H in collaboration with McNeely J A 
and Gundling L, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(IUCN Environmental Law Centre, Environmental Policy and Law 
Paper No 30, 1994)  
Genetic Resources Action International Network, ‘Of Patents and Pirates’ (GRAIN 
Report 2000) 
– –, ‘OAPI Undermines Farmers Rights in Francophone Africa’ (GRAIN 2002) 
Grain De Sel, ‘Farmers Organization Not Yet Unified in Nigeria’ (No 51, Grain 
De Sel, July-September 2010)  
Heitz A, ‘The History of Plant Variety Protection’, in The First Twenty-Five Years 
of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants 2 December 1961-2 December 1986 (UPOV Publication No. 
879 (E) 1987) 
– –, ‘The History of the UPOV Convention and the Rationale for Plant Breeders’ 
Rights’, Seminar on the Nature of and Rationale for the Protection of 
Plant Varieties under the UPOV Convention (UPOV Publication No 
679 (E) 1991) 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Kenya 
National Strategy on Genetic Resources within the Context of Climate 
Change 2016-2020 (Genetic Resources Research Institute 2015) 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, The First 
Twenty-Five Years of the International Convention for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants: December 2 1961 - December 2 1986 
(UPOV 1987)  
– –, ‘Overview of UPOV’ (Publication No 437, 20 March 2017) 
344 
 
– –, ‘Seminar on the Nature of and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties 
under the UPOV Convention, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 May 1993’ 
(UPOV 1994)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_737.pdf> accessed 
5 January 2017 
– –, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, 1991 
(UPOV Publication No 346 (E) 1992) 
– –, Seminar on the Nature of and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties 
under the UPOV Convention (UPOV Publication No 679 (E) 1991) 
– –, UPOV Report on the Impact of Plant Variety Protection (UPOV 2005) 
Keystone Centre, Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic 
Resources, Madras Plenary Session, Final Consensus Report of the 
Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources 
(Second Plenary Session, Madras, India, 29 January - 2 February 1990) 
– –, Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources, Oslo 
Plenary Session, Final Consensus Report: Global Initiative for the 
Security and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources (Third 
Plenary Session, Oslo, Norway, 31 May – 4 June 1991) (Final 
Consensus Report) 
Klein J, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for 
Participatory Democracy (The Asia Foundation Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper 8, March 1998) 
Kormawa P, Okorji E, and Okechukwu R, Assessment of seed sub-sector policy in 
Nigeria (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 2002) 
Koskenniemi M, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission, United Nations 
2006) 
Lertdhamtewe P, ‘Developing Country Sui Generis Options: Thailand’s Sui 
Generis System of Plant Variety Protection’ (Quaker United Nations 
Office 2014) 3 Briefing Paper: Food, Biological Diversity and 
Intellectual Property 1 
– –, ‘Thailand’s Sui Generis System of Plant Variety Protection’ (Paper Presented 
at South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment in 
Kathmandu, Nepal, 2 August 2017) 
Leskien D and Flitner M, Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic 
Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System (Issues in Genetic 
Resources No 6, International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, June 
1997)  
Munyi P, Mahop M T, du Plessis P, Ekpere J, and Bavikatte K, A Gap Analysis 
Report on the African Model Law on The Protection of the Rights of 
345 
 
Local Communities, Farmers, Breeders, and for the Regulation of 
Access to Biological Resources (Commissioned by the Department of 
Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union 
Commission, February 2012) 
Nigerian Law Reform Commission, Report on the Reform of Industrial Property 
Law (Nigerian Law Reform Commission 1991)  
Ramanna A, Farmers Rights in India: A Case Study (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 
May 2006) 
Rangnekar D, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and 
Agriculture (Study Paper 3a, United Kingdom Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights 2002) 
Rangnekar D, Assessing the Economic Implications of Different Models for 
Implementing the Requirements to Protect Plant Varieties: A Case 
Study of India (Impacts of the IPR Rules on Sustainable Development 
‘IPDEV’, November 2006) 
Report of the Patents Enquiry Committee I (1950) 
Rural Advancement Foundation International, ‘TRIPS Traps for Small Farmers: 
The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Sustainable Food 
Security and Farm Families Remains to be Felt’ (RAFI Genotype 1999) 
Sarnoff J and Correa C, Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin 
Requirements in Intellectual Property Applications  
 (UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2005/14, UN Publication 2006)  
Tansey G, Trade, Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: Key Issues and 
Options for the 1999 Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement 
– A Discussion Paper (Quaker Peace & Service London in association 
with Quaker United Nations Office 1999) 
The World Bank, Intellectual Property Rights: Designing Regimes to Support 
Plant Breeding in Developing Countries (Report No 35517-GLB, The 
World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Department, 2006) 
35-44 
Thitiprasert W, Ratanasatien C, Chitrakon S, Watanesk O, Chotecheun S, Forrer 
V, Sommut W, Somsri S, Samitaman P, and Changtragoon S, Country 
Report on the State of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture in Thailand, 1997-2004 (FAO, Department of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, February 2007)  
Tse A, ‘Welcome Remarks by the President of the Asia and Pacific Seed 
Association’ in Seed Policy and Programmes for Asia and the Pacific: 
Proceedings of the Regional Technical Meeting on Seed Policy and 
Programmes for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand, 2-6 May 
1999 (FAO Plant Production and Protection Paper 160, Seed and Plant 
Genetic Resources Service, FAO Plant Production and Protection 
Division 2000)  
346 
 
United Nations, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law (Adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its 58th Session in 2006) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Tracking the Trend 
towards Market Concentration: The Case of the Agricultural Input 
Industry (Study prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 20 April 2006) 
UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2005/16  
– –, The Role of Smallholder Farmers in Sustainable Commodities Production and 
Trade (UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/62/9, 30 July 2015)  
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Towards a Balanced “Sui Generis” 
Plant Variety Regime: Guidelines to Establish a National PVP Law 
and an Understanding of TRIPS-plus Aspects of Plant Rights’ (UNDP 
2008) 
United Nations Environment Programme – Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity, Biodiversity 
Country Studies, Note by the Executive Director (23 April 1992) 
UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-INC.5/3 2 
Watal J, Intellectual Property Rights in Indian Agriculture (Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations, Working Paper No 44, 
July 1998)  
– – and Taubman A (eds), The Making of the TRIPS Agreements: Personal Insights 
from the Uruguay Round Negotiations (World Trade Organisation 
2015) 
Wolfenson K D M, ‘Coping with the Food and Agriculture Challenge: 
Smallholders’ Agenda: Preparations and Outcomes of the 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development RIO+20’ (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation 2013) 
Wuesthoff F and Wuesthoff F, ‘Protection of New Varieties of Cultivated Plants’ 
(Report in the name of the German Group, Vienna Congress 1952 of 
the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property) 
reproduced in Bent et al, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology 
Worldwide (Stockton Press 1987) 
 
Web Sources 
Aregheore E, ‘Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles: Nigeria’  
 <http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/nigeria/nigeria.ht
m> accessed 02 April 2014 
Adcock M, ‘Farmers’ Rights’ (20 July 2002) The Hindu  
 <http://www.thehindu.com/2002/07/20/stories/2002072000151000.ht
m> accessed 19 August 2017 
347 
 
African Biodiversity Network, <http://africanbiodiversity.org/> accessed 1 August 
2017 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘About Us’  
 <http://www.aripo.org/about-aripo/membership-member-states> 
accessed 4 September 2017 
– –, ‘Consideration of the Revised ARIPO Legal Framework for Plant Variety 
Protection’ (Kampala, Uganda, 28-29 November 2013) 
– –, ‘ARIPO: Who we are & What we do’ (ARIPO Secretariat, Harare, Zimbabwe, 
February 2016) 
– –, ‘ARIPO Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Adopted’ 
<http://www.aripo.org/news-events-publications/news/item/69-aripo-
protocol-for-the-protection-of-new-varieties-of-plants-adopted> 
accessed 25 November 2016 
– –, ‘The ARIPO Protocols’ <http://www.aripo.org/about-aripo/legal-framework> 
accessed 25 November 2016 
African Union, ‘Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 30-31 
January 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’  
 <https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/29514-
assembly_au_dec_588_-_604_xxvi_e.pdf> accessed 04 September 
2017 
Agriterra, ‘Farmers’ Organisations in Nigeria: An Overview’ (June 2008)  
 <http://www.interreseaux.org/IMG/pdf_Mapping_Agricord_Nigeria_
version_courte.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017 
Ahearn R J, ‘Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement’ Congressional Research Service 
(RS21464, 26 May 2005)  
 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21464.pdf> accessed 13 December 
2006 
– – and Morrison W M, ‘US – Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations’ 
(Congressional Research Service-CRS Report for Congress, Updated  
26 July 2006) 
 <http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32314.pdf> accessed 23 August 2017 
Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, ‘AFSA appeals to ARIPO Members for 
the Postponement of Diplomatic Conference and National 
Consultations’ (3 November 2014)  
<http://www.apbrebes.org/files/seeds/AFSA%20POSTPONEMENT.p
df> accessed 4 December 2016  
– –, ‘AFSA Submission for Urgent Intervention in Respect to Draft ARIPO Plant 
Variety Protection Protocol (PVP) and Subsequent Regulations’ (July 
2014) <http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AFSA-
Susbmission-ARIPO-PVP-Protocol.pdf> accessed 4 December 2016 
348 
 
– –, ‘Appeal to ARIPO and African Union Member States and UNECA for an 
Effective ARIPO Protocol Supportive of Farmers; Rights and the Right 
to Food’ (Harare, Zimbabwe, 29 October 2014) <http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/AFSA-statement.pdf> 
accessed 4 December 2016 
– –, ‘AFSA’s Comments on ARIPO’s Responses to Civil Society: Draft Legal  
 Framework for Plant Variety Protection’ (2014)  
 <http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AFSA-letter-
ARIPO-March2014-.pdf> accessed 4 December 2016 
– –, ‘AFSA makes Small Gains for Famers’ Rights in Draft SADC PVP Protocol 
(A Briefing Paper) 
 <http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AFSA-
Briefing.pdf> accessed 23 November 2016 
– – and other CSOs, ‘ARIPO’s Draft Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (Draft Protocol) Undermines Farmers’ Rights, Lacks 





accessed 4 December 2016 
All Progressives Congress, ‘Roadmap to a New Nigeria’  
<http://www.thescoopng.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/210989962-Roadmap-to-a-New-
Nigeria.pdf> accessed 25 July 2017 
Ashton G, Is Africa About to Lose the Right to her Seed? (23 April 2013)  
 <https://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4700-is-africa-about-
to-lose-the-right-to-her-seed> accessed 01 August 2017 
Asia and Pacific Seed Association, ‘APSA Position on Intellectual Property Rights  
for the Seed Industry’  
<http://apsaseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FINAL-APSA-IPR-
Position-Paper.pdf> accessed 22 August 2017 
Biodiversity Sustainable Agriculture Food Sovereignty Action Thailand 
<http://www.biothai.org/> accessed 21 August 2017 
– –, ‘Fighting FTAs: The Experience in Thailand’ (October 2007)  
 <http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/fightingFTA-en-Hi-2-b-
experience-in-thailand.pdf> accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, ‘Impacts of the Thai-EU Free Trade Agreement on Plant Varieties,  
 Biodiversity and Food Security’ (22 February 2015)  
 <http://biothai.org/node/535> accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, ‘Warming to Thai Government: Stop Meddling with the Plant Protection  
349 
 
 Laws’ (11 April 2016) <http://www.biothai.org/node/1421> accessed 
23 August 2017 
– –, Impacts for Farmers and Consumers of Amending the Plant Varieties 
Protection Act (11 April 2016) <http://www.biothai.org/node/1422> 
accessed 23 August 2017 
– – and Genetic Resources Action International Network, ‘Signposts to Sui Generis 
Rights’ (Resource materials from the International Seminar on Sui 
Generis Rights Co-organised by BIOTHAI and GRAIN, Bangkok, 1-6  
December 1997, February 1998)  
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2-signposts-to-sui-generis-
rights> accessed 22 August 2017  
Brown L, Underwood W, Tongpan S, and Vattraphoudej U, ‘Private Sector 
Development in the Thai Seed Industry’ (US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Evaluation Special Study No 23 June 1985) 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAL047.pdf> accessed 25 August 
2017  
Charoen Pokphand Foods PCL  
<https://www.cpfworldwide.com/en/about/milestones> accessed 23 
August 2017 
Convention on Biological Diversity, History of the Convention  
 <http://www.cbd.int/history/default.shtml> accessed 05 July 2017 
– –: ABS, ‘Introduction to access and benefit-sharing’ (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Canada 2011)  
 <https://www.cbd.int/abs/infokit/revised/web/all-files-en.pdf> 
accessed 09 July 2017 
– –, List of Parties <https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml> accessed 10 
July 2017 
– –, Nigeria – Overview <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=ng> accessed 06 
June 2017 
– –, Pre-CBD Meetings < https://www.cbd.int/history/> accessed 06 June 2017 
– –, ‘Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation of Access and 
Benefit Sharing Arrangements’, Access and benefit-sharing as related 
to genetic resources. Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization, COP 6 Decision VI/24  
<https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7198> accessed 
15 July 2017 
Context Network and Sahel Capital, Nigeria Early Generation Seed Study: 
Country Report (United States Agency International Development and 
Africa Lead II, August 2016) 14 <http://www.africaleadftf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Nigeria-EGS-Study-Final-Report-August-
2016.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017 
350 
 
Centre for Food Safety, Monsanto vs US Farmers (2005) 
<http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport
11305.pdf> accessed 25 June 2017 
– –, ‘Tell President Trump: No Dangerous Monsanto-Bayer Mega Merger’ 
<http://salsa3.salsalabs.com/o/1881/p/dia/action3/common/public/?act
ion_KEY=19826> accessed 26 June 2017 
– – and Save our Seeds, Seed Giants vs US Farmers, (2013) 
<http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-
giants_final_04424.pdf > accessed 25 June 2017  
Declaration of Nyeleni, Selingue, Mali (27 February 2007)  
 <http://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290> accessed 09 July 2017 
Department of Agriculture, ‘Historical Background’  
 <http://www.doa.go.th/en/?page_id=123> accessed 23 August 2017 
Dupont, ‘Dow and DuPont Receive Antitrust Clearance from US Department of 




Merger-of-Equals/default.aspx> accessed 26 June 2017 
Dupont-Pioneer, ‘Nigeria’  
<https://www.pioneer.com/home/site/about/business/contact-
us/middle-east-africa/nigeria/> accessed 24 August 2017 
‘EAC at a Glance’, East African Community – One People, One Destiny 
<http://www.eac.int/> accessed 23 November 2016 
Economic Community of West African States <http://www.ecowas.int/about-
ecowas/basic-information/> accessed 05 September 2017 
– –, ‘Trade’ <http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/trade/> accessed 05 
September 2017 
Egziabher T B G, ‘The African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access 
to Biological Resources in Relation to International Law and 
Institutions’ (Paper from Ethio-Forum 2002 Conference, 14 February 
2002) <http://chora.virtualave.net/tewolde-rights.htm> accessed 28 
July 2017  
European Community, ‘Trade: Southern African Development Community  
 (SADC)’<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/regions/sadc/index_en.htm> accessed 2 December 2016 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ‘Countries and Regions’  
 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-
mediterranean-partnership/index_en.htm> accessed 13 August 2017 
Farmers Rights Resource Pages for Decision-Makers and Practitioners 
<http://www.farmersrights.org/> accessed 09 July 2017 
351 
 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, The Agriculture 
Promotion Policy (2016-2020): Building on the Successes of the ATA, 
Closing Key Gaps (Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2016)  
<http://fmard.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-Nigeria-
Agric-Sector-Policy-Roadmap_June-15-2016_Final.pdf> accessed 17 
July 2017 
– –, ‘Growth Enhancement Scheme’ <http://fmard.gov.ng/growth-enhancement-
support-scheme-gess/> accessed 05 September 2017 
Federal Ministry of Environment <http://environment.gov.ng/about.html> 
accessed 06 June 2017 
Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment, About Federal Ministry of 
Industry, Trade & Investment <http://www.fmiti.gov.ng/index.php/the-
ministry/about-fmiti> accessed 06 June 2017 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, ‘History of Nigeria’  
 <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/index.php/2016-04-06-08-38-30/history-
of-nigeria> accessed 25 August 2017 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: The Development 
of Farmers Rights in the Context of the International Undertaking and 
Article 9 (IT/GB-2/07/Inf.6, August 2007) 2-3  
 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-be152e.pdf> accessed 29 June 2017 
– –, ‘FAOSTAT, Crops: Production Quantities of Cassava by Country’ 
<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC/visualize> accessed 28 
August 2017 
– –, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture – 
Nigeria<http://www.fao.org/plant-
treaty/countries/membership/country-details/en/c/359344/?iso3=NGA 
> accessed 06 June 2017 
– –, ‘Nigeria at a Glance’ <http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-
glance/en/> accessed 28 August 2017 
– –, ‘Plant Breeding Programs in Nigeria’ <http://www.fao.org/in-action/plant-
breeding/our-partners/africa/nigeria/en/> accessed 30 August 2017 
– –, Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, ‘Milestones in 
the History of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture’<http://www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa/cgrfa-about/cgrfa-
history/en/> accessed 29 June 2017 
G8, ‘G8 Cooperation Framework to Support the “New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition” in Tanzania’  
 <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/TanzaniaC
ooperationFramework.pdf> accessed 16 December 2016 
352 
 
Gene Campaign, ‘About Us’ <http://genecampaign.org/about-us/> accessed 24 
August 2017 
– –, ‘Advocacy to Protect Farmers’ Rights’ <http://genecampaign.org/farmers-
rights/> accessed 25 August 2017  
Genetic Resources Action International Network  
 <http://www.grain.org/pages/organisation> accessed 22 August 2017 
– –, ‘Beyond UPOV: Examples of Developing Countries Preparing Non-UPOV 
Sui Generis Plant Variety Protection Schemes in Compliance with 
TRIPS’ (25 July 1999) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/14-
beyond-upov> accessed 01 August 2017 
– –, ‘For a Full Review of TRIPS 27.3(b)’ (GRAIN Reports 2000) 
  <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/39-for-a-full-review-of-trips-
27-3-b> accessed 26 July 2017 
– –, ‘International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources: The Final Stretch’ 
(GRAIN Reports 2001) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/90-
international-undertaking-on-plant-genetic-resources-the-final-
stretch> accessed 25 July 2017 
– –, ‘IPRs Agents Try to Derail OAU Process: UPOV and WIPO Attack Africa’s 
Model Law on Community Rights to Biodiversity’ (GRAIN June 2001) 
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/89-ipr-agents-try-to-derail-oau-
process> accessed 29 July 2017  
– –, ‘TRIPS-Plus through the Back Door: How Bilateral Treaties Impose much 
Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO’ (27 July 2001) 
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5-trips-plus-through-the-back-
door> accessed 13 December 2016 
– –, ‘India decides to Join UPOV’ (6 June 2002)  
 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1944-india-decides-to-join-
upov> accessed 19 August 2017 
– –, ‘Tunisia joins UPOV’ (21 August 2003)  
 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2080-tunisia-joins-upov> 
accessed 13 December 2016 
– –, ‘Africa’s Seed Laws: Red Carpet for the Corporations’ (Seedling, July 2005) 
28 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/540-africa-s-seeds-laws-red-
carpet-for-corporations> accessed 14 June 2017 
– –, with Devinder Sharma, ‘India’s New Seed Bill’ (July 2005)  
 <https://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/457-india-s-new-seed-bill> 
accessed 12 August 2017 
– –, ‘Bilateral Agreements Imposing TRIPS-plus Intellectual Property Rights on 
Biodiversity in Developing Countries’ (08 April 2008)  
 <https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/3645-bilateral-agreements-
imposing-trips-plus-intellectual-property-rights-on-biodiversity-in-
developing-countries> accessed 28 August 2017 
353 
 
– –, ‘Thai Farmers and Civic Groups Protest UPOV Lobby’ (19 November 2013) 
<https://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4833-thai-farmers-and-
civic-groups-protest-upov-lobby> accessed 23 August 2017 
Gomez K, ‘Rice, The Grain of Culture’ (Presented at the Siam Society Lecture 
Series, Thailand 20 September 2001)  
 <http://www.thairice.org/html/article/pdf_files/Rice_thegrain_of_Cult
ure.pdf> accessed 24 August 2017 
Government of India, Economy Survey 2016-17: Agriculture and Food 
Management (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Economic Affairs, Economic Division, August 2017)  
 <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2016-17/eprefaceVol2.pdf> accessed 25 
August 2017 
Government of India - The Gazette of India: Ministry of Agriculture, ‘The 
Provisions of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 
2001 Shall Come into Force from 11 November 2005’ (Regd No D L-
33004/99, Part II-Sec 3(ii), Notification New Delhi 11 November 2005) 
<http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2005/E_1183_2012_005.pdf> 
accessed 19 August 2017 
Government of Thailand, ‘Evaluation of the First Six Year Plan: 1961-1966’ 
(National Economic Development Board, Office of the Prime Minister, 
Bangkok, Thailand, June 1967)  
 <http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3776> 
accessed 19 August 2017 
Group of 77 at the United Nations, ‘Chairmanship of the Group of 77’  
 <http://www.g77.org/doc/presiding.html> accessed 4 August 2017 
Ignacio N G, Santos-Doctor J A, and Ferrer R, ‘Essentially Derived Varieties and 
the Perspective of Farmer-Breeders’ (Contribution to the UPOV 
Seminar on Essentially Derived Varieties, 22 October 2013)  
 <http://www.apbrebes.org/files/seeds/Essentially%20derived%20varie
ties%20and%20the%20perspective%20of%20farmer.pdf> accessed 24 
July 2017 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research <http://www.icar.org.in/en/aboutus.htm> 
accessed 19 August 2017 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement (FAO 2009)  
 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0520e.pdf> accessed 09 July 2017 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, ‘Council: 
Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session Geneva, 17 October 1995: Annual 
Report of the Secretary-General for 1994’ (C/29/2, 10 August 1995) 
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_29/c_29_2.pdf> 
accessed 21 August 2017 
354 
 
– –, ‘African Intellectual Property Organisation – Agreement Revising the Bangui 
Agreement of 2 March 1977 on the Creation of an African Intellectual 
Property Organisation’ (Bangui Central African Republic, 24 February 
1999) <http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/details.jsp?id=12622> 
accessed 4 August 2017 
– –, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Reply of UPOV to the 
Notification of June 26 2003 from the Executive Secretary of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)’ (adopted by the Council of 
UPOV at its 37th ordinary session on 23 October 2003)  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/news/en/2003/pdf/cbd_respon
se_oct232003.pdf> accessed 29 June 2017 
– –, ‘Accession by the Kingdom of Morocco’ (UPOV Notification No 99, 8 
September 2006) 
– –, ‘Accession by the Republic of Tunisia’ (UPOV Notification No 89, 31 July 
2003) 
– –, ‘Accession of Kenya to the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (UPOV Press Release 105, 
Geneva, 11 April 2016)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pressdocs/en/upov_pr_105.pdf> accessed 
5 December 2016 
– –, ‘African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) becomes Second 
Intergovernmental Organization to Join UPOV’ (UPOV Press Release 
97, Geneva, 10 June 2014)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pressdocs/en/upov_pr_097.pdf> accessed 
30 November 2016 
– –, ‘Annual Report of the Secretary-General for 1999, Council Thirty-Fourth 
Ordinary Session, Geneva, 26 October 2000’ (C/34/2, 16 March 2000) 
19 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c/34/c_34_2.pdf> 
accessed 22 August 2017 
– –, ‘Council: Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Geneva, 29 October 1997 (C/31/17, 
28 October 1998) Annex IV  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_31/c_31_17.pdf> 
accessed 5 December 2016 
– –, ‘Council: Thirty-Second Ordinary Session, Geneva, 28 October 1998 
(C/32/16, 18 July 2000) Annex III  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_32/c_32_16.pdf> 
accessed 5 December 2016 
– –, ‘Examination of the Conformity of the Draft ARIPO Protocol for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants with the 1991 Act of the UPOV 
Convention’ (31st Extraordinary Session, Geneva, 11 April 2014)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_extr_31/c_extr_31_2.p
df> accessed 25 November 2016 
355 
 
– –, ‘Gazette’ (No 96, December 2003) 
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_438_96.pdf> 
accessed 19 August 2017 
– –, ‘International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (Publication 
No 437, 8 November 2016)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_437.pdf> accessed 
23 November 2016 
– –, ‘Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants: International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants UPOV Convention (1961), as revised at Geneva (1972, 1978 
and 1991): Status on 15 April 2016’  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf
> accessed 28 June 2017 
– –, ‘Report on Activities During the First Nine Months of 2007, Council Forty-
First Ordinary Session, Geneva, 25 October 2007’ (C/41/13, 4 October 
2007) <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c/41/c_41_03.pdf> 
accessed 22 August 2017 
– –, ‘Seventeenth Extraordinary Session, Report adopted by the Council’ (UPOV, 
7 April 2000)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_extr_17/c_extr_17_6.p
df> accessed 30 November 2016 
– –, ‘Status in Relation to the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants as of 20 March 2017’  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/status.pdf> 
accessed 06 September 2017  
– –, ‘UPOV Council holds its Thirty-First Extraordinary Session’ (UPOV Press 
Release 96, Geneva, 11 April 2014)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pressdocs/en/upov_pr_096.pdf> accessed 
25 November 2016 
– –, General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and 
Stability and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV TG/1/3, 19 April 2002)  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/publications/en/tg_rom/pdf/tg
_1_3.pdf> accessed 25 June 2017 
– –, Guidance for the Protection of Laws based on the 1991 Act of the UPOV 
Convention’ (UPOV/INF/6) 
– –, Plant Variety Protection (No 96, December 2003) 
<http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_438_96.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2017 
– –, Seminar on Plant Variety Protection and Technology Transfer: The Benefits 




accessed 28 June 2017 
– –, Symposium on the Benefits for Plant Variety Protection for Farmers and 
Growers (Geneva, 2 November 2012)  
 <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_357_4.pdf> 
accessed 28 June 2017 
Indian Council for Agricultural Research, ‘ICAR Institutions, Deemed 
Universities, National Research Centres, National Bureaux and 
Directorate/Project Directorates’  
 <http://www.icar.org.in/en/node/325> accessed 19 August 2017 
Interview by Jerome Brooks, ‘Chinua Achebe, The Art of Fiction No. 139’ (Issue 
133, Winter 1994)  
 <https://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/1720/chinua-achebe-the-
art-of-fiction-no-139-chinua-achebe> accessed 23 July 2017 
Kenya Flower Council, Floriculture in Kenya  
 <http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/?page_id=92> accessed 12 December 
2016 
King Bhumibol and His Enlightened Approach to Teaching, ‘The New Theory and 
the Sufficiency Economy’  
 <http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook2/king/new_theory.html> accessed 21 
August 2017 
Kuanpoth J, Limpananont J, Narintarakul K, Silarak B, Taneewuth S, 
Lianchamroon W, Chomthongdi J, Aongsomwang S, and Yuwanaboon 
N, ‘Free Trade Agreements: Impact in Thailand’ (FTA Watch, June 
2005) 31  
 <http://www.thailaws.com/law/e_laws/freetrade/ImpactFTAinThailan
d.pdf> accessed 23 August 2017 
La Via Campesina/GRAIN, ‘Seed Laws that Criminalise Farmers: Resistance and 
Fightback’ (8 April 2015) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5142-
seed-laws-that-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback> 
accessed 04 July 2017 
Legal ISC Files, ‘Thailand-Irrigation Project: Loan 0036-Loan Agreement – 
Confirmed’ (World Bank 1950)  
 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/596861468101386382/p
df/Loan-0036-Thailand-Irrigation-Project-Loan-Agreement.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2017 
Leskien D, ‘Administrative Council of the European Patent Office Amends 
Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention: 
Biotechnological Inventions’ (August 1999) BIO-IPR  
 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/1919-epo-moves-to-use-eu-
directive-on-life-patenting?c=true> accessed 26 June 2017 
357 
 
Lightbourne M, ‘The Jasmati Trademark Affair’ (GRAIN 26 March 1999) 
<https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/2060-the-jasmati-trademark-
affair> accessed 22 August 2017 
Louwaars N P, Tripp R, Eaton D, Henson-Apollonio V, Hu R, Mendoza M, 
Muhhuku F, Pal S, and Wekundah J, ‘Impacts of Strengthened 
Intellectual Property Rights Regime on the Plant Breeding Industry in 
Developing Countries: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies’ (Report 
Commissioned by the World Bank, February 2005)  
 <https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05
.pdf> accessed 28 June 2017 
Manifesto of All Progressives Congress  
 <http://www.allprogressivescongress.org/manifesto/> accessed 25 July 
2017 
Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
UPOV Convention (1961), as revised at Geneva (1972, 1978, and 1991) 
Status on 5 April 2016  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf > 
accessed 28 June 2017 
Monsanto, ‘Monsanto in Africa’  
 <http://www.monsantoafrica.com/who_we_are/monsanto_in_africa.as
p> accessed 24 August 2017 
– –, ‘Patents’ <https://monsanto.com/products/product-stewardship/patents/>  
 accessed 25 June 2017 
 – –, ‘Saved Seed and Farmer Lawsuits’ (11 April 2017)  
<https://monsanto.com/company/media/statements/lawsuits-against-
farmers/> accessed 25 June 2017 
Moss D L, ‘Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition between a Rock and a Hard 
Place? (23 October 2009) The American Antitrust Institute  
 <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI_Platforms%
20and%20Transgenic%20Seed_102320091053.pdf> accessed 26 June 
2017 
Napasintuwong O, ‘Development and Concentration of Maize Seed Market in 
Thailand’ (Agricultural and Resource Economics Working Paper No 
2560/2, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Faculty 
of Economics, Kasetsart University, March 2017)  
 <ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/kau/wpaper/are201702.pdf> 
accessed 25 August 2017 
Narintarakul K, ‘Thailand’s Freedom Seeds Network: Can Jack Face the Giant?’ 
(BIOTHAI 2015) <http://www.biothai.org/node/490> accessed 23 
August 2017 




m> accessed 19 August 2017 
National Agricultural Seeds Council, Annual Reports: 2014  
 <http://seedcouncil.gov.ng/uploads/2017/02/2014_annual_report.pdf> 
accessed 14 June 2017 
National Bureau of Statistics - Commercial Agriculture Development Project, 
NBS/CADP Baseline Survey Report (The National Bureau of Statistics-
Commercial Agriculture Development Project, 2010) 
 <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/CADP%20Report%20F
inal.pdf> accessed 25 July 2017 
National Centre for Genetic Resources and Biotechnology, Varieties Released 
Catalogue 
<http://www.nacgrab.gov.ng/images/Varieties_Released_Catalogue.p
df> accessed 21 February 2017 
National Planning Commission ‘Nigeria Vision 20:2020, Economic 
Transformation Blueprint’ (2009)  
 <http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/NationalPlans/nige
ria-vision-20-20-20.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017 
National Seeds Corporation Limited: A Government of India Undertaking – ‘Mini 
Ratna’ Company <http://www.indiaseeds.com/> accessed 12 August 
2017 
Navdanya, ‘Our History’ <http://www.navdanya.org/about-us/our-history> 
accessed 24 August 2017 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition <https://new-alliance.org/> 
accessed 13 August 2017 
– –, ‘Cooperation Framework to Support the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition in Nigeria’  
<https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/new-alliance-
progress-report-coop-framework-nigeria_compressed.pdf> accessed 
24 August 2017  
– –, ‘Nigeria’ <https://new-alliance.org/country/nigeria> accessed 25 August 2017 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Agriculture in Africa: 
Transformation and Outlook (NEPAD, November 2013)    
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2013africanagricultures.p
df> accessed 28 July 2017 
Ngangoue N R and Oeudraogo B, ‘Small Farmers Seed Rights Up for Grabs?’ 
(March 1999) <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2009-oapi-caves-
in-to-upov> accessed 4 August 2017 
Nigerian Copyright Commission    
  <http://www.copyright.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/about-the-
commission> accessed 06 June 2017 
359 
 
Nigerian National Planning Commission, ‘Meeting Everyone’s NEEDS, National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy’ (Abuja 2004) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Nigeria_PR
SP (Dec2005).pdf> accessed 17 July 2017 
Nzeka, U M, ‘Nigeria’s Agricultural Biotechnology Update 2013’ (Nigeria 
Agricultural Biotechnology Annual, United States Department for 




accessed 14 April 2014 
Obasanjo O, ‘My Journey Back to the Future of African Farming’ (26 May 2016) 
The Africa Report <http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-
Africa/my-journey-back-to-the-future-of-african-farming-olusegun-
obasanjo.html> accessed 30 August 2017 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board  
 <http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/main.php?filename=develop_issue
> accessed 19 August 2017 
– –, ‘Sufficiency Economy: Implications and Applications’ (Sufficiency Economy 
Movement Sub-committee, Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, September 2007)  
 <https://web.archive.org/web/20110719090603/http://www.nesdb.go.t
h/Md/book/booksuffwork_eng.pdf> accessed 19 August 2017 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘United States and Thailand 
Conclude Fourth Round of FTA Talks’ (Archive, 15 July 2005) 
<https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/Jul
y/United_States_Thail_Conclude_Fourth_Round_of_FTA_Talks.html
> accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, Morocco Free Trade Agreement <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/morocco-fta> accessed 13 December 2016 
Organisation Africaine De La Propriete Intellectuelle <http://www.oapi.int/> 
accessed 30 November 2016 
Organisation of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
‘Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government’ 
<https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9543-
1998_ahg_dec_124-131_xxxiv_e.pdf > accessed 29 July 2017 
Plant Genome Saviour Farmer Recognition  
 <http://www.plantauthority.gov.in/PGSFRCG.htm> accessed 19 
August 2017 




nl-position-on-patent-and-plant-breeders-rights.pdf> accessed 26 June 
2017 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority India  
 <http://plantauthority.gov.in/index.htm> accessed 04 September 2017 
– –, Annual Report: 2009-2010 (Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights 
Authority, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of 
Government of India)  
 <http://plantauthority.gov.in/pdf/AnnualReport_09-10esum.pdf> 
accessed 15 August 2017 
– –, ‘Application Status up to 10 July 2017’ 
<http://plantauthority.gov.in/pdf/Application%20Status.pdf> accessed 
19 August 2017 
– –, ‘List of Certificate Issued up to 28 February 2017’ 
<http://plantauthority.gov.in/List_of_Certificates.htm> accessed 19 
August 2017 
– –, ‘Plant Variety Registry Related Information’ 
<http://plantauthority.gov.in/PVR.htm> accessed 03 September 2017 
Purdue University, ‘Farmers Relying on Herbicide Roundup Lose Some of its 
Benefit’ (16 April 2009) Science Daily  
 <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/04/090414153529.htm
> last accessed 25 June 2017 
Ravi B, ‘Seeds of Trouble’ (08 March 2005) The Hindu  
 <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/03/08/stories/2005030801761000.ht
m> accessed 19 August 2017 
Robinson D F, ‘Governance and Micropolitics of Traditional Knowledge, 
Biodiversity and Intellectual Property in Thailand’ (Research Report, 
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Bangkok, UNSW 
and University of Sydney, February 2006)  
 <https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Final%20HRC%20Micro
politics%20Report%20Mar%202005.pdf> accessed 23 August 2008 
Rural Advancement Foundation International, ‘Legal Terminator Threatens 
Francophone Africa’s Farmers: Right to Save Seed in Poor Countries 
May Be Eliminated as 15 African States are Pressured to Accept UPOV 
91’ (RAFI 17 February 1999)  
 <http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/3
82/01/news_upov91.pdf> accessed 4 August 2017  
Sahai S, ‘Legislate, then Contradict’ (1 April 2003) India Together  
 <http://indiatogether.org/farmright-agriculture> accessed 19 August 
2017 
– –, ‘Submission to Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture on Seeds Bill 2004 





004_19_June_2006.pdf> accessed 19 August 2017  
Seed Association of Thailand, <http://seed.or.th/english/eng_intro.htm> accessed 
22 August 2017 
Seednet India Portal, ‘Indian Seed Sector: Role of Public and Private Seed Sector’ 
<http://seednet.gov.in/Material/IndianSeedSector.htm> accessed 24 
August 2017 
Seed Trade Association of Kenya, <https://www.stak.or.ke/> accessed 15 January 
2017 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing: [8], Lanham: Congressional Documents and 
Publications (20 September 2016)  
 <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Addendum%20to
%20AAI%20White%20Paper_Transgenic%20Seed.4.5_04052010110
7.pdf > accessed 26 June 2017 
Shiva V, ‘Indian farmers rally against Dunkel Draft and MNCs’ (1993) North 
South Development Monitor  
 <http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/agricult/03051093.htm> 
accessed 12 August 2017 
– –, ‘The Indian Seed Act and Patent Act: Sowing the Seeds of Dictatorship’ (14 
February 2005) <https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/2166-india-
seed-act-patent-act-sowing-the-seeds-of-dictatorship> accessed 19 
August 2017 
Sikinyi E, ‘Seminar on the Enforcement of Plant Breeders’ Rights under the UPOV 
Convention: Experiences of PVP implementation and Enforcement in 
Africa’ (Hanoi, Vietnam, September 7-8 2016)  
 <http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/meetings/en/2016/enforcemen
t_seminar_viet_nam/7_sikinyi_in_africa.pdf> accessed 23 November 
2016  
Southern African Development Community, ‘History and Treaty’  
 <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/> 
accessed 06 December 2016 
– –, ‘COMESA-EAC-Tripartite Free Trade Area Launched’ (15 June 2015) 
<https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-
free-trade-area-launched/> accessed 2 December 2016 
Swaminathan M S, ‘Farmers Rights: From Law into Action’ (25 August 2001) The 
Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/2001/08/25/stories/05252523.htm> 
accessed 12 August 2017  
– – and Hoon V, ‘Methodologies for Recognising the Role of Informal Innovation 
in the Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources: An 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue’ (M S Swaminathan Research Foundation 
362 
 
for Research on Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development, 
CRSARD Madras, Proceedings No 9, 1994)  
 <http://eprints.icrisat.ac.in/13165/1/RP-9914.pdf> accessed 12 August 
2017 
Syngenta, ‘Nigeria’ <https://www4.syngenta.com/contacts> accessed 24 August 
2017 
The Asia and Pacific Seed Association, <http://apsaseed.org/> accessed 22 August 
2017 
The Chaipattana Foundation ‘The New Theory’  
 <http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=4121&Itemid=296> accessed 21 August 2017 
– –, ‘Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy’ 
<http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=4103&> accessed 19 August 2017 
The Commonwealth, ‘Nigeria suspended from the Commonwealth’ 
<http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/nigeria-
suspended-commonwealth> accessed 05 September 2017 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development, ‘Rural Poverty in Nigeria’ 
<https://operations.ifad.org/web/rural-poverty-
portal/country/home/tags/nigeria> accessed 25 July 2017  
The World Bank, ‘A Public Development Program for Thailand’ (John Hopkins 
Press 1959) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/338951468777615392/p
df/multi0page.pdf> accessed 21 August 2017 
– –, ‘Agricultural Development Projects in Nigeria’ (Independent Evaluation 
Group, The World Bank Group) 
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewFor
JavaSearch/FE7BA13642E3E0D7852567F5005D85CF> accessed 15 
June 2017 
– –, ‘Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=
ZG> accessed 28 July 2017 
– –, ‘Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ (2016) 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=I
N> accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, ‘Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ (2016) 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=
NG> accessed 28 August 2017 
– –, ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)’ (2010) 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=I
N> accessed 25 August 2017 
363 
 
– –, ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)’ (2010) 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=
NG> accessed 28 August 2017 
– –, ‘Employment in Agriculture’ (% of total employment) 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?end=2015&l
ocations=TH&start=1983> accessed 19 August 2017 
– –, ‘Growing Africa: Unlocking the Potential for Agribusiness’ (AFTP/AFTAI, 
The World Bank, January 2013) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/africa-
agribusiness-report-2013.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017 
– –, ‘Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review – National Seed and 
Quarantine Project’ (prepared by Wilfred V Candler, 2 March 1998)  
 <http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewFor
JavaSearch/8525679B0071774D8525659200528218?OpenDocument
> accessed 14 June 2017 
– –, ‘Implementation Completion Report, India: Third National Seeds Project’ 
(Credit 1952: IN, Report No 16546, 5 May 1997)  
 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235381468292312892/p
df/multi-page.pdf> accessed 12 August 2017 
– –, ‘Nigeria – Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and 
Impact’ (World Bank Report No 13053-UNI, 13 May 1994)  
 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/p
df/multi0page.pdf> accessed 29 August 2017 
– –, ‘Nigeria: Population, Total (2016)’ 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG> 
accessed 06 June 2017 
– –, ‘Population, Total’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IN> 
accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, ‘Project Completion Report, India: National Seeds I & II Projects (Loan 1273-
IN and Credit 816-IN)’ (Report No 6836, 15 June 1987)  
 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/654461468258301314/p
df/multi-page.pdf> accessed 12 August 2017 
– –, ‘Thailand – Agriculture, Value Added: % of GDP’ 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=
TH.-TH> accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, ‘Thailand – Population’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TH> 
accessed 23 August 2017 
– –, India: Issues and Priorities for Agriculture (17 May 2012) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05/17/india-
agriculture-issues-priorities> accessed 25 August 2017 
364 
 
– –, WAAPP/PPAAO and Agricultural Research Council, Innovating the 
Nigerian Agricultural Seeds Sector: A Proposed Action Plan for 
WAAPP - Nigeria (jointly developed by Nigerian Agricultural Seeds 
System Stakeholders through the WAAPP-Nigeria Task Force on 
Agricultural Seeds, May 2013) 
<http://waapp.gov.ng/images/InnovatingtheNigeriaAgriculturalSeedsS
ector.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017  
‘The Thammasat Resolution, Building and Strengthening our Sui Generis Rights’ 
<http://www.twn.my/title/tham-cn.htm> accessed 22 August 2017  
Third World Network, ‘Joint NGO Statement of Support for the Africa Group 
Proposals on Reviewing the WTO TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.3b’ 
(August 1999) 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Joint_NGO_Statement_of_Support_0899.
htm> accessed 4 August 2017 
Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry, Commercial Law Department, 
Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment 
<http://www.iponigeria.com/#/> accessed 06 June 2017 
United Nations Environment Programme, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Work of its Second Session in Preparation for a Legal 
Instrument on Biological Diversity of the Planet (2nd session, 19-23 
February 1990) UNEP/Bio.Div.2/3 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/iccbd/bdewg-02/official/bdewg-
02-03-en.pdf> accessed 06 June 2017 
United States Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agriculture Service, ‘Rice: 
World Markets and Trade’ (August 2017) 
<https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/grain-rice.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2017 
Unnys Navara Eco Farm, About Navara <http://navara.in/about_navara> 
accessed 19 August 2017 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, Intergovernmental Committee  
 <http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/> accessed 26 July 2017 
– –, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Twenty Seventh Session Geneva, 
‘Joint Recommendation on Genetic Resources and Associated 
Traditional Knowledge: Document Submitted by the Delegations of 
Canada, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea and the United States 
of America’ (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/27/6, 25 February 2014)  
 <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_27/wipo_grtk
f_ic_27_6.pdf> accessed 15 July 2017 
– –, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Twenty-Ninth Session Geneva, 





accessed 15 July 2017 
– –, The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Background Brief No 
2) <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_tk_2.pdf> 
accessed 15 July 2017 
– –, ‘WIPO – A Brief History’ <http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/history.html> 
accessed 3 July 2014 
World Trade Organisation, ‘Communications from the United States’ 
(Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 19 November 1998) 
WT/GC/W/115 
– –, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Minutes 
of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7-8 July 1999 
(IP/C/M/24, 17 August 1999) 
– –, ‘Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, Review of 
Provisions of Article 27.3(b)’ (8 November 1999) IP/C/W/163 
– –, ‘Communications from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group’ (Preparations 
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 6 August 1999) WT/GC/W/302 
– –, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Minutes 
of Meetings Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21-22 September 
2000 (IP/C/M/28, 23 November 2000) 
– –, Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 (Ministerial 
Conference, 4th session Doha on 9-14 November 2001, 20 November 
2001) WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1  
 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.
htm> accessed 26 July 2017 
– –, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Minutes 
of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 5-7 March 2002 
(IP/C/M/35, 22 March 2002)  
– –, ‘Communication from the European Communities and their Member States’ 
(A Concept Paper on the Review of Article 27.3b of TRIPS, 17 
October 2002) IP/C/W/383 
– –, ‘Communication from Kenya, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights - Elements of a Paragraph 6 Solution’ 
(IP/C/W/389, 2002) 
– –, ‘Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, Council for 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Proposal on 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health’ (2002) IP/C/W/351 
– –, Review of Legislation on 5-7 March 2002 (8 June 2004) IP/Q/NGA/1, 
IP/Q2/NGA/1, IP/Q3/NGA/1, IP/Q4/NGA/1 
366 
 
– –, ‘Communication from Brazil, India, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Tanzania, 
Doha Work Programme - The Outstanding Implementation Issue on the 
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’ (31 May 2006) WT/GC/W/564 & TN/C/W/41 
<http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/do/www/readDoc?docume
nt_id=79517&action=content> accessed 08 July 2014 
 – –, ‘Current Issues in Intellectual Property’  
 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_issues_e.htm> 
accessed 04 July 2017 
– –, ‘Review of TRIPS Article 27.3(b); Relationship between the TRIPS  
 Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity; Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’  
 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docssec4_e.htm> 
accessed 06 September 2017 
– –, ‘TRIPS Issues: Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity’  
 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm> 
accessed 04 July 2017  
– –, ‘TRIPS: Reviews, Article 27.3(b) and Related Issues: Background and the 
Current Situation’  
 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_
e.htm> accessed 26 July 2017 
– –, ‘Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed 
Country Members: Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 
2005’ (IP/C/40, 30 November 2005) 
– –, ‘Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed 
Country Members: Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 11 June 
2013’ (IP/C/64, 12 June 2013) 
– –, Joint Communication from the African Group, ‘Taking Forward the Review 
of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement’ (WTO Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) IP/C/W/404 
– –, TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS Agreement  
 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm> accessed 
18 June 2014 
Wynberg R, ‘Privatising the Means for Survival: The Commercialisation of 
Africa’s Biodiversity’ (Biowatch, South Africa, with contributions 
from GAIA/GRAIN, Issue No 5, April 2000)  
 <https://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/33-privatising-the-means-
for-survival-the-commercialisation-of-africa-s-
biodiversity?print=true> accessed 28 July 2017 
Zaidi A, ‘Seeds of Despair’ (30 July – 12 August 2005) 22(16) Frontline  
 <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2216/stories/200508120014088
00.htm> accessed 19 August 2017  
367 
 
Zulu E D, Makano R M, and Banda A, ‘National Experiences and Plans to 
Implement a Sui Generis System of Protection in Zambia’ (Paper 
presented at the UPOV-WIPO-WTO Joint Regional Workshop on ‘The 
Protection of Plant Varieties under Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement in Nairobi from 6-7 May 1999’)  
 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2121-zambia-s-approach-to-sui-




‘Biosafety Guideline and Regulation Review Workshop: A Workshop to review 
the Guidelines and Regulations of the National Biosafety Management 
Agency Law’ (Abuja, 18-20 August 2015) 
Beckett J, ‘Critical International Legal Theory’ (2012) Oxford Bibliographies 
Online Datasets  
‘Civil Society Concerned with ARIPO’s Draft Regional Policy and Legal 
Framework for Plant Variety Protection’ (Letter to the DG of ARIPO, 
6 November 2012)  
<https://acbio.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/CSOconcernsonARI
PO-PVPframework1.pdf> accessed 16 November 2016 
‘Civil Society Concerned with the Draft Protocol for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (Plant Breeders Rights) in the Southern African 
Development Community Region’ (2 April 2013)  
 <http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CSO-submission-
SADC.pdf> accessed 23 November 2016 
‘Comments on the revised draft regulations (draft 3) for implementing the Arusha 
Protocol for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (Prepared by the 
African Centre for Biodiversity, Third World Network, endorsed by the 
Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, 16 November 2016) 
<http://acbio.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/ARIPO_regs_comments.pdf> accessed 16 
November 2016 
Letter to the Chairman of UPOV 1991, Signed by the BIOTHAI Foundation, 
Alternative Agriculture Network, Seed Freedom Thailand, The 
Foundation for Knowledge Management and Farmer School Network 
of Nakhon Sawam province, Food Security Network Satingphra, 
Network of Fish Folks, Phang-nga Bay, The Network for Change in 
the East, and the FTA Watch (18 November 2013)  
Moss D L, ‘Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition between a Rock and a Hard 
Place? Addendum’ (The American Antitrust Institute, 5 April 2010) 
368 
 
The author’s personal communication with Prince Peter Bakare, Deputy Executive 
Secretary- Federation of Agricultural Commodity Associations of 
Nigeria (2017) 
The author’s personal communication with Prof Johnson Ekpere, Former Secretary 
General- Scientific, Technical and Research Commission of the 
Organisation of African Unity (2017) 
The author’s personal communication with Kent Nnadozie, Secretary Ad Interim- 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (2017)  
The author’s personal communication with Zidafamor Jimmy, Deputy Director 
Seed Production- National Agricultural Seeds Council of FMARD 
(March 2017) 
The author’s personal communication with Honourable Chime Oji Agu, IPC Bill 
presenter- National Assembly, Nigeria (September 2017) 
Thepgumpanat P and Tanakesempitat P, ‘Three Years after Coup, Junta is Deeply 
Embedded in Thai Life’ (Reuters World News, 21 May 2017) 
Ukpanah S J, ‘Statement at the Ministerial Level Meeting in Brussels’ (World 
Trade Organisation 1990) MTN.TNC/MIN (90)/ST/34 
Uwala A, ‘The Role of Informal Seed Sector in Agricultural Production in Nigeria’ 
(Written correspondence, March 2017) 
